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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND VENEZUELA'S HUGO CHAVEZ
by
Mariano J. Beillard
Florida International University, 2009
Miami, Florida
Professor Eduardo Gamarra, Major Professor
The Soviet Union's dissolution in December 1991 marks the end of the Cold War
and the elimination of the United States' main rival for global political-economic
leadership. For decades U.S. foreign policymakers had formulated policies aimed at
containing the spread of Soviet communism and Moscow's interventionist policies in the
Americas. They now assumed that Latin American leftist revolutionary upheavals could
also be committed to history.
This study explores how Congress takes an active role in U.S. foreign
policymaking when dealing with revolutionary changes in Latin America. This study
finds that despite Chavez's vitriolic statements and U.S. economic vulnerability due to its
dependence on foreign oil sources, Congress today sees Chavez as a nuisance and not a
threat to U.S. vital interests. Devoid of an extra-hemispheric, anti-American patron intent
on challenging the United States for regional leadership, Chavez is seen by Congress
largely as a threat to the stability of Venezuela's institutions and political-economic
stability. Today both the U.S. executive and the legislative branches largely see
Bolivarianism a distraction and not an existential threat.
vii
The research is based on an examination of Bolivarian Venezuela compared to
revolutionary upheaval and governance in Nicaragua over the course of the twentieth
century. This project is largely descriptive, qualitative in approach, but quantitative data
are used when appropriate. To analyze both the U.S. executive and legislative branches'
reaction to revolutionary change, Cole Blasier's theoretical propositions as developed in
the Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910-
1985 are utilized. The present study highlights the fact that Blasier's propositions remain
a relevant means for analyzing U.S. foreign policymaking.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
The bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is before them, glory
and danger alike, and yet notwithstanding, go out to meet it.
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War'
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND ITS REACTION TO REVOLUTIONARY CHALLENGES
Setting the Stage
My study explores the role the United States (U.S.) Congress takes in foreign
policymaking when dealing with revolutionary change in post-Cold War Latin America.
As a qualitative study of United States foreign policymaking, the central research
question ponders whether the U.S. Congress reacts differently to revolutionary change in
post-Cold War Latin America than it did during the Cold War. If so, how is it reacting
differently? If not, why not?
Throughout my study the argument is made that U.S. congressional foreign
policymaking has remained fairly consistent over time, especially since the 1970s. The
study also argues that the legislative branch's role in foreign policymaking is extensive
despite the executive branch's own assertions of primacy in leading the U.S. foreign
policymaking process.
The research undertaken in my study adopts the case study of Venezuela under
the government of Hugo Chivez (1998-present) to explore the key question of whether
the U.S. Congress is reacting differently today to revolutionary change in Venezuela than
it would have in the past. The present study of U.S. congressional reaction to post-Cold
1 Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. Rex Warner (translator). London, United Kingdom:
Penguin Classics, 1972.
1
War revolutionary change in Venezuela is critical, as it explores whether the legislative
branch might be prone to deferring to the executive branch in foreign policymaking
matters during times of heightened international instability. It is also important as it helps
to provide a continuum between U.S. foreign policymaking between the end of the Cold
War and the advent of the post-Cold War period, and it also enriches the literature by
incorporating past historical events that although antedate the Cold War, nonetheless
continue to impact policymakers' decision-making.
My study is relevant because it provides the researcher and policymaker alike
with an updated post-Cold War interpretation of Cole Blasier's framework originally
developed in The Hovering Giant in 1976 and subsequently revised in 1985.2 The present
study is especially timely in light of accusations by friend and foe alike that the United
States, as the sole remaining superpower, is acting as a hyper-power intent on forcing its
own vision of economic development and democratic stability norms on others while
disregarding their otherwise unique economic and socio-political domestic arrangements.
Key U.S. allies' concerns became especially pronounced during the George W. Bush
administration (R, 2001-09).3
The study provides a timeline of comparative analysis spanning a century. A 100-
year timeframe for analysis facilitates insight into the evolution of congressional foreign
policymaking towards revolutionary change in Latin America. As a result, the study
2 Blaiser, Cole. The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910-
1985. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 1985.
3 See comments by French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine where same defines the United States as a
hyperpower given America's dominant and or pre-dominant position in all categories. The International
Herald Tribune, "To Paris, U.S. Looks Like a Hyper-power," (February 5, 1999), accessed September 16,
2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/1999/02/05/france.t 0.php.
2
provides the researcher and the policymaker reassurance of the steadfastness of U.S.
foreign policy despite the cyclical alteration inpolitical party control over executive and
legislative branches of the government.
Given that the Latin American region and neighboring Caribbean states total
thirty-two countries the present study does not aspire to answer every aspect associated
with its central research question in relation to each individual Latin American and
Caribbean state. Rather what my study provides is a tightly focused post-Cold War
update of Blasier's theoretical propositions applied to a reduced number of states. By
narrowing the focus of the research to a reduced number of specific countries, the study
focuses on recent key revolutionary events while simultaneously serving as a point of
departure for other researchers wishing to further explore the role of Congress and its
impact in formulating Latin American foreign policy.
The Central Research Question
My study proposes that the U.S. Congress takes a reactive role in U.S. foreign
policymaking when dealing with Latin American revolutionary challenges. The central
research question asks: is the U.S. Congress reacting differently to revolutionary changes
in post-Cold War Latin America than it did during the Cold War? If so, how is it reacting
differently? If not, why not?
The study explores whether the U.S. Congress is reacting to revolutionary change
in Latin America in the post-Cold War period in a similar manner that it has throughout
much of the twentieth century. Additionally it explores whether Congress will concur
with a U.S. Presidential administration's characterization of a revolutionary movement or
3
revolutionary government as constituting a threat to U.S. vital interests if evidence exists
of an extra-hemispheric, anti-American power pursuing interventionist, non-constructive
foreign policy activities in the Latin American region.
To place the central research question within a tangible theoretical framework, the
present study adopts Cole Blasier's framework as it was originally developed in The
Hovering Giant in 1976 and subsequently revised in 1985. In The Hovering Giant Blasier
makes two main arguments. First, that U.S. foreign policymaking toward the Latin
American region has traditionally been premised on countering extra-hemispheric great
power threats (both perceived and actual) to U.S. security interests in the Latin American
region. Secondly it argues that U.S. foreign policy has sought to exert influence and
control over Latin American and Caribbean countries.4
The present study updates Blasier's work by looking at how the world's sole
superpower and its legislative branch are reacting to an unruly sub-regional power in the
post-Cold War era. It also compares the reaction of the U.S. Congress to disruptive
revolutionary actors, such as Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, with policies crafted to address
revolutionary changes during the pre- and Cold War periods. In the process the study puts
into current perspective the factors that will motivate the United States to adopt either a
suppressive or a conciliatory policy to a revolutionary government.
4 Fred Parkinson's review of Cole Blasier's Hovering Giant provides one of the clearest and most insightful
discussions available on Blasier's seminal foreign policy work. Parkinson adeptly illustrates how Blasier's
thought processes evolved between the 1976 and revised 1985 editions. Parkinson, in his review of the
Hovering Giant points out that Blasier's perspective evolves from focusing solely on the U.S.
government's attempts to maintain control of the Latin American region by excluding extra-hemispheric
powers to a more subtle approach which encompasses the notion that U.S.-Latin American foreign policy is
also geared toward influencing and controlling the region's states. See, Parkinson, Fred, untitled review of
Cole Blasier's The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Changes in Latin America, 1910-
1985 in "Journal of Latin American Studies, " Volume 19, Number 1 (May, 1987), pg., 227-229, accessed
September 7, 2008, http://www.jstor.org/stable/156935.
4
In the examination of the questions outlined above, the study focuses on
Venezuela as a case study during the ten year period commencing in 1998 with Chavez's
democratic election to the Venezuelan presidency and extending to the present (2009). To
further assist in evaluating the post-Cold War situation, the study compares the prevailing
situation in Chavez's Venezuela with notable pre- and Cold War era Latin American
revolutionary events that have impacted U.S foreign policymaking.
The Study's Resources
To compare present U.S. congressional involvement in the U.S.-Venezuelan
foreign policymaking process, the study reviews U.S. government primary source
documentation, namely the U.S. Congressional Record from 1983 to 2008 (first session)
in addition to open source and declassified national security/ foreign policy documents.
With regard to the review of the U.S. Congressional Record specifically, the study
undertakes a count of the instances in which countries relevant to the study's central
research discussion (e.g., Soviet Union/Russia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela) are
cited in the record. Conclusions are drawn by comparing the number of recorded citations
during the late Cold War (1983-91) to the number of recorded citations in the post-Cold
War period (1992-2008). Qualitative inferences made from the analysis of the U.S.
Congressional Record are compared to statistical trade data. The latter is used to
document the evolution of the U.S.-Venezuela strategic economic relationship and how
this impacts the crafting of U.S. foreign policy toward the Chavez government. On a
secondary level, trade data is utilized to assess the vulnerability of both the United States
and Venezuela to disruptions and volatility in international oil markets.
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Additionally, the study examines the role of the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED) to gauge the degree of congressional interest focused on Chavez and
his political stranglehold on Venezuela. The NED's budget is fixed through congressional
allocations, making it a particularly instructive tool for evaluating the impact of the U.S.
Congress's involvement in foreign policymaking in reaction to Latin American
revolutionary changes. The study looks at varying budgetary allocation amounts over
time to provide a rough indicator of congressional support or lack thereof, for containing
and or possibly seeking to undermine Chavez's revolutionary government. In other
words, this evaluation explores whether congressional funding of NED serves as an inter-
branch tool for regime change.
An indication of the relevance of NED funding as an assessment tool of
congressional interest in revolutionary Venezuela is highlighted by Chavez's accusations
that U.S. executive and legislative branches use NED democracy-enhancing activities in
Venezuela to implement regime change as an alternative to either outright military
intervention or support for pro-American coup plotters, as was the case during the Cold
War.
The study explores Chavez's accusations and whether NED activities can be
linked to a possible U.S. government attempt to overthrow the Chavez government. The
review of NED activities also highlights the continuity of both congressional and White
House interests in Venezuela, as well as both branches of the government's attempts to
influence the evolution of democratic governance in that country through promotion of
democracy instead of military intervention. Blasier's theory is used to explore whether
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the U.S.'s promotion of democracy activities are advancing the cause of democracy or
are a subterfuge for advancing U.S. economic and strategic goals.
Gaps in the Literature
The question of the reaction by the U.S. Congress to revolutionary change in
Latin America remains a poignant one today that merits greater attention than it has been
otherwise accorded by most senior-level U.S. foreign policymakers in the post-Cold War
era. Until now most U.S. policymakers have been prone to write off Latin America's
previous struggle with conflicting socio-economic and political ideologies in favor of less
sensitive foreign policy concerns such as regional economic integration.
Since the end of the Cold War as part of what the study terms the "mission
accomplished syndrome," U.S. foreign policymakers have largely ignored Latin
American demands for sustained and meaningful engagement. Latin America's calls for
action on what they consider matters of grave concern (e.g., assistance with immigration
and political and economic development) have been relegated to the lower echelons of
the U.S. foreign policymaking bureaucracy.
The study explores some of the reasons why U.S. foreign policymakers assume
that the end of the Cold War meant that the struggle for ideological supremacy and state
survival was a relic of a bygone era. Today some scholars adroitly affirm that with the
end of the Cold War a foreign policymaking disconnection with the past has occurred. A
study of Congress's post-Cold War increased interest in international trade concerns, in
contrast to the preceding era's more narrow focus on questions of assuring the socio-
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political survival of the United States and American society, provides more evidence of
this position.
The shift in policymaking focus is a marked departure from the Cold War era.
During that period U.S. congressional foreign policymaking concerns were narrowly
focused on the continued survival of American socio-political and economic
arrangements as defined in terms of liberal representative democracy and capitalism. The
bipolar rivalry of the era was defined by the United States' attempts to counter the Soviet
Union's interventionist activities in the Latin American region. The Soviet Union, in turn,
aspired to undermine traditional U.S. hegemonic control of the Latin American region.
Blasier's thoughts are captured in the present study and used as a point of comparison for
current congressional reactions to the Chavez government.
International relations literature indicates that there is a rift between the likes of
Noam Chomsky, who argue that in the post-Cold War period there is ongoing continuity
with the preceding Cold War era's foreign policymaking practices, and others such as
Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno who argue in Unipolar Politics: Realism and
State Strategies After the Cold War that a marked disconnection with past policies has
now arisen.5
Chomsky cites past U.S. foreign policymaking activities to support his position
that policymaking remains repressive and anti-democratic, especially whenever U.S.
interests are jeopardized. Researchers that subscribe to the Kapstein-Mastanduro thesis,
however, see that post-Cold War U.S. foreign polices are distinct from past policies. For
5 Stokes, Doug, "Why the end of the Cold War doesn't matter: the US war of terror in Colombia," in
Review of International Studies (2003), Volume 29, pg., 569-570, accessed September 7, 2008,
http://www.chomsky.info/onchomsky/200310--02.pdf.
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these scholars the United States in the post-Cold War period focuses mainly on
combating non-state actors such as narcotics traffickers and terrorists, as well as
strengthening democracy and human rights. 6 The research developed in my study builds
on the Kapstein-Mastanduro thesis by updating Blasier's theoretical premises to current
post-Cold War realities.
United States foreign policy is no longer crafted as it was during the Cold War.
Then the Soviet Union was the preeminent political-military and ideological rival to U.S.
global leadership and posed an existential threat to the survival of the United States.
Neither the Chinese, nor the Russians and much less the Iranians are capable of
marshalling the military or economic resources to challenge U.S. leadership. Today there
is no state or even group of ideologically hostile, anti-American states capable of
contesting U.S. global leadership. U.S. foreign policymaking has shifted course from the
previous Cold War norm. Policymaking has shifted from containment and countering
ideologically hostile states through the defense of the status quo, and whenever possible
strengthening stable, democratic governments, to emphasizing more ideologically-driven
policies of democracy promotion, human rights, and economic liberalism.7 In pursuit of
6 Ibid., pg., 570.
7 The U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization crafted its
Haiti Strategic Planning to ensure in the near term the establishment of a stable democratic government
committed to Haiti's recovery. Here stable democratic governance was defined as a system of governance
which assures credible, multi-party elections where the ensuing government respects political and civil
liberties, human rights, and demonstrates a commitment to broad-based economic recovery. United States
Department of State, Foreign Service Institute - Applying Theory to Practice - PD560, October 1, 2008.
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these post-Cold War objectives the executive and legislative branches have often
supported regime change.8
Extrapolating from the foregoing position, Latin America merits senior U.S.
foreign policymaking leadership's attention only when anti-American revolutionary
movements establish links to extra-hemispheric, interventionist powers.9 Lacking such a
linkage, the study argues that Latin America remains relegated to the proverbial
diplomatic backburner by foreign policymakers unless there is a significant and tangible
threat to continued access to a key strategic resource (i.e., petroleum).
The study provides support for this assertion by reviewing the drivers of U.S.
foreign policymakers' current interest in Latin America, and in Venezuela in particular.
U.S. foreign policymakers' interest in (revolutionary) Venezuela is driven primarily by
Chavez's Bolivarian revolutionary government's outreach to anti-American extra-
regional partners such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation, and the
People's Republic of China (PRC) at a time of heightened international tensions and
volatility in commodity markets. Interest is not driven by the necessity to combat an
ideologically hostile foe allied with a likeminded superpower, but rather premised on
more traditional/pre-Cold War policy objectives of preventing non-American powers
from gaining a foothold in the hemisphere, as well as maintaining access to key resources
8 The Barack H. Obama (D, 2009 to present) administration is signaling early in its tenure that it intends to
adopt a more pragmatic, realistic foreign policy position.The Obama administration seeks to move away
from the previous administration's idealistic position of linking regime change with (representative)
democracy promotion and safeguarding human rights.
9 Only as an outgrowth of the events of September 11, 2001, has the pendulum swung to focus on the type
of inter-civilization struggle as defined by Samuel Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations (1996) and
articulated within the parameters of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Latin America, beyond some very
specific foreign policy concerns, usually falls outside of such scrutiny.
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and markets. Note that recourse to unilateral U.S. military intervention is increasingly
frown upon and difficult to justify to the American public and the Latin American states.
Level of Analysis
Robert Jervis indicates in Perception and Misperception in International Politics,
that there is ongoing debate about the issue of the level of analysis.10 Jervis clarifies that
there are four levels of analysis or categories that can be utilized to classify international
relations as these pertain to the: 1) level of decision making; 2) bureaucracy; 3) nature of
the state coupled with domestic politics; and 4) the international environment." The four
levels of analysis raised by Jervis resonate well with Blasier's own framework, since the
former recognizes that it is difficult to assign pre-eminence to one level of analysis over
another. As a result, the level of analysis utilized may often vary by the type of situation
under scrutiny.
The enduring validity of Blasier's framework as reflected in my study's findings
is that the same recognizes the applicability of the different levels of analysis to explain
how the United States reacts to Latin American revolutionary challenges. The present
study relies primarily on the international environment level of analysis as the primary
means of explaining U.S. policy responses to revolutionary challenges.
10 Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976, pgs. 14 - 15.
" Ibid.
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In doing so, I recognize, much like Jervis, that personal bias impacts analysis.12
Thus as Jervis indicates, any social scientist that advocates a particular theory must
recognize that his theory of preference resembles the way he himself is prone to make
decisions. The relevance of decision-making bias, as Jervis indicates, is that statesmen
will similarly formulate choices, often armed with uncertain knowledge and ambiguous
information, but nonetheless in a manner not unrecognizable to that of the analyst.
Ultimately for Jervis, decision-making is the byproduct of a process of inferences that are
dependent on images, beliefs, and intentions subject to cognitive limitations that can
exacerbate misunderstandings. 15
Kenneth Waltz's findings in Man, the State, and War and Theory of International
Politics, contribute to reinforce Blasier's framework of analysis used in the present study.
Waltz for his part argues that international relations can be classified into three categories
or levels of analysis: 1) international politics impacted by the actions of individual
statesmen; 2) international politics impacted by the domestic regimes of states, and; 3)
international politics impacted by the international systems' anarchy, which is defined not
in terms of chaos or disorder but rather by the absence of a sovereign body governing the
interactions of the world's nation-states.1 6 Building on the foregoing findings, Waltz
1 2 Ibid, pg 4.
13 Ibid, pg. 5.
14 Ibid.
15 Cunningham, Edward. "Notes: Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics."
Pgs. 1-3, accessed, July 15, 2009,
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/-goodrich/IRnotes/Week03/Jervis BOOK summary.pdf.
16 Waltz, Kenneth. Man, the State, and War. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2001, pg. 12.
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clarifies in the Theory of International Politics that there are recurring types of behavior
that govern relations between states in an international system characterized by anarchy.
Waltz's systemic characterization of international politics supports Blasier's
framework, particularly if applied in explanatory and not predictive terms. By applying
the first level of analysis to Chavez's revolutionary reforms and his using the Bush
administration as a scapegoat for all of Latin America's ills, Chavez's actions fall within
the parameter of statesman-driven international politics. As a result, Blasier's
propositions can be utilized to explain how the U.S. government's executive and
legislative branches will react to statesmen-driven revolutionary policies, especially if
there is a verifiable link to a hostile, anti-American extra-hemispheric power acting as
Chavez's patron.
Similarly, Waltz's second level of analysis supports Blasier's propositions utilized
throughout the present study. Congress's reactions to Chavez's revolutionary reforms are
often driven by U.S. domestic constituent concerns. Yet unlike the situation prevailing
during the Cold War, Congress is not reacting to Chavez's revolutionary agenda based on
ideological concerns. Rather today's Congress, driven by its membership's interest in
being reelected, formulates policies that are responsive to constituent (individual citizen,
U.S. businesses, and lobbyists) economic and democracy promotion concerns for a better
international environment. Congress, while often following the President's lead regarding
Latin America, is not crafting policies in response to a competing socio-political ideology
that threatens the United States.
Waltz's third level of analysis also supports Blasier's framework since it defines
relations between states as being subject to an anarchic international system characterized
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by the absence of a supra-national sovereign entity capable of providing governing order.
This has not changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
What has indeed changed is the interpretation of whether bipolar systems or multipolar
systems are more stable. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, Waltz's position that
anarchy structures relations between states remains applicable in many circumstances.
Elaborating on the foregoing, Edward A. Kolodziej argues in Security and
International Relations that for Waltz security and survival of the state are the overriding
objectives of state action and not the Realist notion of the power capabilities versus that
of another state. 17 Thus in a system characterized by the absence of an authoritative
enforcer, both the United States and Venezuela will rationally strive to ensure their
survival by strengthening their security interests (e.g., augmenting their military
capabilities and political-diplomatic alliances).
Waltz places a heavy emphasis on the anarchic nature of the international system
and in the process relegates economic development, human rights, and welfare initiatives
to a secondary level of analysis. Yet it is his belief that policymakers should focus on
safeguarding the territorial integrity and security of the nation in an anarchic world that
reinforces Blasier's framework (that stresses the United States will suppress reformist
and revolutionary regimes if these collude with an extra-hemispheric power). As will be
further detailed in Chapters 3 and 4, throughout much of the Cold War Congress allowed
the President to set the tone for high-level U.S foreign policy precisely because of the
existential threat posed by the Soviet Union and international communism.
17 Kolodziej, Edward A. Security and International Relations. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
2005, pgs. 135 - 136.
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In the post-Cold War Congress is an active participant in foreign policymaking,
particularly in areas where there are threats to the vital security interests of the United
States. In the Latin American region Congress has however focused mainly on less vital
interests such as democracy promotion, human rights, and economic development
concerns because of the absence of an existential threat to the United States.
Based on a reading of Jervis, under less threatening conditions domestic
determinants premised on variations of social and economic structures are setting
congressional foreign policy objectives.1 8 Waltz, on the other hand, would consider
current congressional policies to be important but only of secondary importance when
compared to ensuring the state's survival. Waltz remains a proponent of the coercive
power of the state over its neighbors as the key ordering determinant in the international
environment. Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane would however disagree and argue that
the world today is now characterized by complex interdependence which negates the
need to always favor Waltz's high politics of security over the low politics of trade.1 9
The key factor stressed by the present study when debating the appropriate level
of analysis is the recognition that absent the Soviet threat, the U.S. reaction to Latin
American revolutionary challenges needs to be muted. As a result, any attempt by the
United States to suppress a post-Cold War Latin American revolutionary government
through military intervention underestimates the hostility that such action will cause in
both the affected state and the rest of the Latin American region. Keohane's and Nye's
18 Jervis, pg. 21.
19 Griffiths, Martin, and Terry O'Callaghan. International Relations: Key Concepts. New York, NY:
Routledge, 2002, pg. 158.
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position sustaining that recourse to military force is becoming less usable and important
as a policy option supports Blasier's framework that absent the threat from an extra-
hemispheric power U.S. policymakers today will be less likely to adopt suppressive
policies.20
The importance that Keohane and Nye place on complex interdependence differs
from the Cold War era power politics favored by the Realists, as well as by Waltz and the
Neo-realists with their emphasis on ensuring state security. Keohane's and Nye's position
about the international environment highlights the declining relevance (applicability) of
military force.
Interestingly, Keohane's and Nye's position resembles Blasier's points in Security
and the United States Latin American Relations in the 1980s. Here Blasier indicates that
not only is the United States increasingly unable to shape the outcome of leadership
struggles in Latin America, but that there are other options than military intervention
available to promote and ensure U.S. interests.2' Note that while Blasier defines ensuring
the political-military security of the United States in terms recognizable to Waltz- for
example defining security as the protection of the national territory and its population
from external threats by the armed forces of another nation- he is however actually
closer to Keohane and Nye in many aspects.
Blasier, much like Keohane and Nye, is a strong proponent that U.S. security can
be assured by non-military means such as friendship treaties, trade agreements, and
20 Ibid.
21 Blasier, Cole, "Security and the United States Latin American Relations in the 1980s: The Extra-
Continental Dimension," in Latin American Program Working Papers - The Wilson Center, (1984),
Number 149, pgs. 27-28.
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multilateral agreements.2 The present study consequently argues that such non-military
means for ensuring security are areas where Congress, with its constituency concerns,
plays a critical role in the U.S foreign policymaking process.
My study with its international environment level of analysis highlights the theory
that the post-Cold War relationship between the United States and Venezuela is premised
to a significant degree more on interdependence than on the preceding era's power
calculations. As Martin Griffiths and Terry O'Callaghan define in International
Relations: The Key Concepts, interdependence between states such as the United States
and Venezuela has two dimensions: sensitivity and vulnerability.23 Sensitivity, for
Griffiths and O'Callaghan, represents the degree to which one state is sensitive to
developments taking place in the other state. While vulnerability, for Griffiths and
O'Callaghan, refers to the distribution costs incurred as states react to changes in areas
where they share common interests (i.e., oil).24
Blasier's framework combined with these complex interdependence notions of
sensitivity and vulnerability remain particularly useful for understanding how the U.S.
government, and especially Congress, is reacting to Chavez's revolutionary challenges.
In the post-Cold War era both the United States and Venezuela have a keen interest in
keeping oil flowing to the U.S. energy market regardless of their preferred socio-political
and economic ideologies.
22 Ibid.
23 Griffiths and O'Callaghan, pg. 157.
24 Ibid.
17
In discussing notions of sensitivity and vulnerability Chapters 5 and 6 elaborate
on Chavez's revolutionary reforms and their exposure to any disruption in oil trade with
the United States. Extrapolating from Blasier's understanding of security, a Venezuelan
slowdown or a cut-off of oil shipments to the U.S. energy market devoid of an alternative
buyer or a combination of buyers that can absorb (and pay in cash) the volume of
shipments normally going to the United States would represent a critical domestic
economic and political threat to the Chivez government's survival. As Chapter 5
highlights, instability in Venezuela increases when oil prices drop.
The Study's Approach
The present study seeks to update Cole Blasier's seminal study on U.S. responses
to revolutionary changes as developed in The Hovering Giant in 1976 and subsequently
revised in 1985. Chapter 2 of the study provides a review of Blasier's framework. This
chapter also explains how Blasier's propositions help premise U.S. foreign policymakers'
actions when dealing with revolutionary change in Latin America.
There are a number of other notable methods and perspectives available to foreign
policy researchers and policymakers that support Blasier's theoretical propositions. A
noteworthy example of an alternative for analyzing U.S. reactions to Latin American
revolutionary change is the theoretical work undertaken by Charles Bergquist in Labor
and the Course of American Democracy: U.S. History in Latin American Perspective.
Bergquist argues that the United States will seek to oppress Latin American
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revolutionaries whenever they pose a threat to U.S. corporations' economic interests even
if such threats fall short of representing an actual threat to U.S. strategic interests.
While Blasier's framework is valid for understanding how U.S. foreign
policymakers react to revolutionary changes, the study finds that Berquist's position is
now increasingly less applicable for understanding how the United States will react to
revolutionary challenges. Blasier's framework, unlike Berquist's emphasizes strategic-
political factors as the main determinants for U.S. foreign policymakers' decision to
suppress or not to suppress revolutionary movements and governments. Berquist's thesis
on the other hand, is more reliant on the premise that U.S. business interests and U.S.
foreign policy interests are largely inseparable. The Barack H. Obama (D, 2009 to
present) administration's emphasis on a multilateral approach to international relations
that advocates cooperation and willingness to speak even with ardent anti-Americans
undermines Berquist's position by downplaying the relevance of U.S. business interests
as a driver of U.S. policy.
As a result my study argues that Chavez and his revolutionary policies both at
home and abroad today represent a manageable threat to U.S. interests, one that does not
necessitate military intervention and regime change. Chavez's leftist revolutionary
government is an irritant which only merits vigilance to revolutionary change in Latin
America, namely because of Venezuela's vast petroleum reserves.
The threat Chavez poses to the United States is only to U.S. economic interests.
Until Chavez or any other Latin American leftist governments invite an anti-American
25 UE International Solidarity, "Mexican Labor Bibliography: Review Essays Bayon, Bergquist, Cockcroft,
Hathaway, Hodges, " accessed September 16, 2008,
http://www.ueinternational.org/Mexico info/bibliography2.html.
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extra-hemispheric power to base military forces in the region, states such as Venezuela
will hardly constitute a threat to the vital interests of the United States. Until then,
Congress and other foreign policymakers in Washington will continue to focus on
heightened political-military instability in other more strategic hotspots such as the
Korean peninsula, the Persian Gulf, and or in the Caucasus. 26
My study argues that Blasier's framework remains relevant for determining U.S.
congressional foreign policymakers' actions. Blasier's theory can be adapted to analyze
U.S. foreign policymakers' decision making when dealing with lower level irritants in the
post-Cold War period. Blasier's Cold War era theory can be updated to meet present day
Latin American revolutionary challenges despite the fact that a key pre- and Cold War
variable which often influenced U.S. foreign policymakers' determination to either
suppress or seek accommodation with revolutionaries in Latin America is either not
present or its importance is now discounted because of the U.S.'s overarching supremacy.
The study recognizes that the possibility exists that Chavez, in a desire to perpetuate his
rule and consolidate his revolutionary changes may at some point in the future extend an
invitation to an extra-hemispheric rival of the United States to become more actively
26 Anthony Maingot in his 1994 commentary on Jorge Castaieda's "Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American
Left after the Cold War, " argues that Castaneda believes that the Latin American left has no choice but to
be nationalistic and anti-American during the post-Cold War given the fact that the United States remains
an arrogant power intent on interfering in the affairs of Latin American states (e.g., extra-territorial
kidnappings of drug traffickers, restricting other states' trade with Cuba). Interestingly enough, in terms of
Chdvez's Venezuela, Maingot cites Castaneda's position on the need for "cross-cutting" and "longitudinal"
nationalism that emphasizes "natural allies" while deemphasizing "permanent enmities and immutable
goals." Castaneda's position in calling for the Latin American left to lead the charge against the United
States and its free market policies and representative democracy, mirrors in many ways Chdvez's own
position on opposing the United States and his own promotion of participatory democracy as a means of
"giving back the nation to the people." Chavez in this regard has sought to take political control of
Venezuela away from a unrepentant dualistic elite that previously ruled over a socially segregated society.
See, Maingot, Anthony P, "Commentary on Utopia Unarmed: Jorge Castaneda Attempt to Make Sense of
the Latin American Left," in Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Volume. 36, Number 1
(Spring, 1994), pp. 179-180, accessed September 16, 2008, http://www.jstor.org/stable/165867.
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involved in the Latin American region. However the possibility is considered low
because of the consequences of its recklessness. Nevertheless Blasier's interpretations of
regime types and his reasoning of how the United States determines whether a
revolutionary regime will cooperate or not with U.S. objectives remain relevant.
Under current circumstances Chavez and other Latin American revolutionaries
will react as Jorge Castaieda suggests by implementing policies that are a combination of
pragmatic nationalism and anti-Americanism to distance themselves from the preceding
era's "mindless and self-defeating" anti-Americanism. For Castaneda, post-Cold War
Latin American revolutionaries must be less dogmatic and utopian and more prepared to
make tactical compromises even if that entails cooperating on occasion with the United
States and other western powers on certain issues.27 The study's analysis of the U.S.-
Venezuelan oil relationship supports Castafeda's position, since Chavez continues to
export oil to the United States despite repeated threats to cut off supplies and form a
military alliance with the Russian Federation. 28 Similarly, despite the nationalization of
several foreign companies (e.g.., Sidor, and Cargill's rice mills), and now Banco de
Venezuela (a unit of Spain's Banco Santander S.A.), Chavez's nationalizations although
changing how Venezuela interacts with international business, fall short of delinking the
economy from the global business community.
27 Ibid., pg., 181.
28 The continued survival of Chavez's revolutionary government is vulnerable to a drop in international oil
prices below the U.S. $80.00 per barrel mark. See, Stephens, Bret, "America Will Remain the
Superpower," in The Wall Street Journal, (October 14, 2008), accessed October 14, 2008,
http://online.wsi.com/article/SB122394103108030821.htm1.
29 See, Crowe, Dary, and Radl Gallegos, "Chavez Raises Stakes in Banks," in The Wall Street Journal,
(May 23, 2009), accessed May 23, 2009, http://online.wsi.com/article/SB124304353444249249.html.
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Blasier succinctly argues that U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America is the
product of U.S. perceptions of threats in the region. Blasier's framework is thus
compatible with the notions of tactical comprises outlined above. By applying Blasier's
framework and the notion of tactical compromise to current circumstances in Venezuela,
indications are that Congress will continue to resist suppressing Chivez's government
since there is no tangible link to a hostile, extra-hemispheric power. Despite Chavez's
threats to cut off oil exports and even to invite extra-hemispheric powers to take a more
active interest in the region, these threats are neither credible nor serious enough for U.S.
foreign policymakers to suppress the Chavez government. Chavez's rhetoric aside, the
status quo defined in terms of uninterrupted oil shipments to the United States has not
changed.
Richard Cottam's argument developed in Competitive Interference and Twentieth
Century Diplomacy (1967) supports Blasier's findings and is a poignant point of
departure for additional research when dealing with post-Cold War revolutionaries such
as Chavez and Bolivarian Venezuela. Cottam argues that, within the parameters of the
isolationist versus the internationalist debate, it is impractical for any state to adopt one
extreme or the other of this equation. Cottam maintains that extreme non-interference in
the affairs of Latin American states by the United States will invite interventionist
policies by other extra-hemispheric powers. Historical examples of this kind of situation
raised by Blasier include Germany in the lead up to the First and Second World Wars and
30 For Blasier, foreign policymakers in Washington perceive such associations as a security threat and
subsequently as a direct challenge to U.S. foreign policy goals.
31 See, Thompson, Kenneth W., in an untitled review of Richard W. Cottam's "Competitive Interference
and Twentieth Century Diplomacy," in Political Science Quarterly, Volume 84, Number 4 (December
1969), pg., 655, accessed September 16, 2008, http://www.istor.org/stable/2147137.
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the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Although no extra-hemispheric power has sought
to intervene in the Americas in support of Chavez's revolution in a manner similar to that
of the Soviet Union during the Cold War era, it does not mean that such a situation is
beyond the realm of possibility.
The enduring characteristic of regional and global leadership over time is the lack
of permanence as one state ascends and then declines in favor of another or a grouping of
other states. For both Cottam and Blasier there are factors that may eventually lead the
United States to attempt to suppress or be forced to seek conciliation with Latin
American revolutionary movements and governments. Cottam's framework, Image
Theory, defines the actions that motivate a state to undertake a particular foreign policy
in terms "of a compound of factors that predispose a government to and a people to move
in a decisional direction in foreign affairs." Cottom's framework provides support for
Blasier's own framework. 32 Cottam's position advocates the notion that states will move
to a balance between their competing issues based on their willingness to resolve disputes
peacefully while working through the current nation-state system in world affairs.
My study finds that Blasier's argument that executive and legislative branch
foreign policymakers have sought for over a century to exert exclusive U.S. hegemonic
control and influence over the Latin American region remains valid. Over time, foreign
policymakers, regardless of party affiliation, consistently view any Latin American
32 According to Robert C. North, what Cottam has attempted to do through his perpetual framework is
delineate the factors that will motivate the state to undertake certain policy objectives. Cottam in this sense
argues that states will seek to establish a balance of capabilities. Yet such a balance is vulnerable to the
personal perceptions of the ranking policymaker. See, North, Robert C., in an untitled review of Richard
Cottam's "Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and A Case Study," in The American Political
Science Review, Volume 72, Number 3 (September 1978), pg., 1156, accessed September 16, 2008,
http://www.istor.org/stable/1955244.
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revolutionary government's or movement's attempts to upset the prevailing status quo by
associating with an extra-hemispheric, anti-American power as an overt challenge to
continued American hegemony in the Western hemisphere.3 3
Explanations of political behavior, unlike mathematical equations, cannot always
be easily proven through quantitative means.34 As Blasier finds foreign policy, and the
process by which it is made, is often subject to conflicting and controversial
interpretations. 35 Blasier's assessment of foreign policymaking underscores the reality
that U.S. foreign policymaking is crafted through a process of not only intra- and inter-
agency consensus building within the executive branch, but also requires legislative
branch cooperation and consensus especially at higher policymaking levels.
The present study recognizes that the role of the U.S. Congress in foreign
policymaking is quite extensive. The pervasiveness of congressional impact is
highlighted by Congress's control over funding allocations, the requirement for enabling
legislation in the treaty ratification process, and the need for the executive branch to
consult with Congress when negotiating treaties and crafting foreign policies. The
importance of Congress's impact brings to the forefront the executive branch's need to
consult with Congress in order to avoid crossing congressional red lines that, if
disregarded, could result in the collapse of U.S. foreign policies and negotiations.
While chapter 2 provides the theoretical departure point for this study on how the
U.S Congress deals with revolutionary change in Latin America, Chapter 3 expands on
3 Note that the preferred term today for hegemony is "the preferred partner of choice."
34 Nevertheless, some quantitative analysis is provided in the latter chapters of the study.
3 Blaiser, 1985, pg., 211.
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the role of Congress in American foreign policymaking. Chapter 3 elaborates on how
Congress can either cooperate with, or for that matter block, executive branch foreign
policy initiatives. Chapter 3 reviews foreign policymaking powers accorded to Congress
by the U.S. Constitution (1787) and how Congress exercises these powers.
Consequently the study indicates that there is a need for inter-branch consensus
building. The need for consensus in U.S. foreign policymaking is apparent in the fact that
the U.S. Congress with its 535 members (435 in the House of Representatives and 100 in
the Senate) has, since the Viet Nam War (1959-75), been more willing to challenge U.S.
presidential foreign policymaking. Congressional willingness to assert itself has been
facilitated in the past three decades in no small measure, by what many see as White
House overreach in foreign policy. Chapter 3 elaborates on findings in the literature that
sustain that failed executive branch policies, at times compounded by congressional
accusations of the abuse of executive privilege, have led the U.S. Congress to assert a
more active role in American foreign policymaking.
A review of the literature indicates that congressional actions are interpreted as
acting as a brake on otherwise unbridled executive power. The U.S. foreign policymaking
process is muddled, not only by objectives and priorities of the U.S. Congress as a whole
often diverging from those of the White House, but also because each member of
Congress has the foreign policy agenda endorsed by the constituency. Agendas must be
explained, defended, and promoted if the members of Congress wish to be reelected.
In Chapter 3 the study argues that constitutional ambiguity as to which branch of
the U.S. government has the privilege of primary responsibility in the foreign
poicymaking process has resulted in substantial debate among both scholars and foreign
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policymakers. Chapter 3 clarifies that one prominent school of thought has consistently
argued that the Framers intended that Congress, as the first branch of the U.S.
government, is primarily responsible for leading the U.S. foreign policymaking process.
Proponents of congressional supremacy sustain that the executive branch merely
executes the will of Congress and structures their arguments around the interpretation of
the Framers' intent. The struggle between the branches for supremacy, as well as the lack
of definitive clarity as to which branch of the government has the primarily privilege for
foreign policymaking, is highlighted by an analysis of the number of treaties entered into
by the United States in the past two hundred years. Of the nearly 900 treaties to which the
United States is a party, only 21 treaties have been rejected by the full U.S. Senate. The
fact that the United States has subscribed to more than five thousand executive
agreements as a means of bypassing Congress is indicative of the inter-branch struggle. 36
Scholars such as Louis Fisher argue that the primary indication of the Framers'
intent is the degree to which U.S. congressional powers are enumerated in the
36 The U.S. Senate's Web site stresses that international law makes no distinction between ratified treaties
and executive agreements. Both of these international agreements are equally binding regardless of their
designation under domestic law. Illustrating this fact is that in 1952 the United States signed 14 treaties and
291 executive agreements. One year's worth of executive agreements surpassed the total number of treaties
entered into during the 1789 to 1889 period. Executive agreements to this day continue to grow at a rapid
pace. Explanations as to why the United States is increasingly recurring to executive agreements abound. It
is widely held that executive agreements are an effective means for coping with the ever growing volume
of business and contacts between the United States and other countries at a time when the Senate is
overloaded by a heavy workload. Others similarly sustain that executive agreements deal with more
mundane issues. The Senate could become quickly overburdened if all such agreements were submitted to
it for its advice and consent. Indicative of inter-branch cooperation in foreign policymaking in this regard
has been the passage of legislation authorizing the executive branch to conclude international agreements in
clearly delineated fields, such as foreign aid, agriculture, and trade. Further indicative of the lack of clarity
regarding the privilege of primacy in foreign policymaking is highlighted by a 1984 study by the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations which indicates that according to the U.S. Senate's Web page that "88.3
percent of international agreements reached between 1946 and 1972 were based at least partly on statutory
authority; 6.2 percent were treaties, and 5.5 percent were based solely on executive authority." See, United
States Senate, "Treaties: (Chapter 4) Executive Agreements, Treaty Termination, and Status as Law,"
accessed October 1, 2008, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm.
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Constitution when compared to those assigned to the executive branch. The present study
recognizes the importance of the position advocated by Fisher and like-minded
constitutional scholars who champion the view that the U.S. Congress is responsible for
deciding all matters of war and peace. 37 Fisher indicates in this regard that the President
in his role as Commander-and-Chief is mainly responsible for repelling attacks upon the
state. According to Fisher, the President does not possess any inherent or independent
power to make foreign policy as advocates of the sole organ doctrine otherwise sustain.38
For the likes of Fisher, the U.S. President undoubtedly leads the country but only
in the capacity of an executive that acts to execute the will of the people as embodied in
the directly elected U.S. Congress. Ultimately it is Congress that determines the course of
action that is to be followed by the nation and its elected leaders. It is Congress alone
which deliberates and votes on all matters of war and peace. 39 Proponents of this position
are adamant that the Framers' intent is clear. Article I of the U.S. Constitution confers on
Congress the right to declare war, while Article II specifies the requirement of
congressional concurrence for the ratification of treaties, conventions, and international
agreements negotiated by the President.
3 Data spanning the 1988 to 2008 period indicates that the Senate's involvement in foreign policymaking
as highlighted by treaties ratified has averaged 17.3 treaties per year with a high water mark of 53 treaties
in 1998 and a low point of only three treaties in 2001. In comparison, the Senate ratified 15 treaties in 1991
and 32 in 1992 at the end of the Cold War. See, United States Senate - Senate Daily Digest, Office of the
Secretary, "Legislative Statistics: 20-Year Comparison of Senate Legislative Activity," accessed October 1,
2008, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/g three sections with teasers/legislative home.htm
and http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/yearlycomparison.pdf.
38 Fisher, Louis. "History Refutes the President's Claims to Unlimited Power over Foreign Affairs" in
Round-up: Historians' Take. History News Network/ George Mason University: Seattle, WA. Accessed,
July 22, 2007. http://hnn.us/roundup/entries/32753.htm1.
39 McCormick, James M. American Foreign Policy and Process. F.E. Peacock Publishers: Itasca, IL.
3rdedition, 1998, pg., 278.
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The ability of the U.S. Congress to exert its influence over the course of foreign
policymaking is made possible by the fact, as Senator Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia,
1959-present) has often stated, Congress controls the most powerful instrument in the
American constitutional system. For Byrd and other adherents of congressional
supremacy in the U.S foreign policymaking process, Congress's power of the purse is the
ultimate means of control that prevents unbridled executive power.40
The U.S. Congress's foreign policymaking role is largely unique compared to
other legislative bodies. Mirroring a significant amount of the literature, the study argues
that this uniqueness is the byproduct of the Framers' fear of either a return to monarchical
rule in the form of an elected king or the rise of an American Caesar. Yet the Framers'
radical solution, the simple division of sovereign power between the branches of the
government, while preventing the return to monarchical and or even despotic rule has
often nonetheless resulted in situations of both conflict and cooperation arising between
the executive and legislative branches.
Chapter 3 stresses that the congressional attempt to reign in the executive branch
via amendments and acts is indicative of executive-legislative branch conflict in the
foreign policymaking process. In this sense the Bricker Amendment, the Case-Zablocki
Act, and the War Powers Resolutions are all fairly recent examples of Congress actively
seeking to curb the power of the President in the U.S. foreign policymaking process. In
Chapter 3, I review the constitutional overlap of executive and legislative foreign
policymaking powers and bring into the discussion an analysis of the role of the judicial
40 The Constitution assigns Congress not only the right and responsibility to declare war and make peace,
but also delegates the right to make and modify laws. Specifically, no money can be withdrawn from the
Treasury unless through appropriations made by law, Ibid, pg., 278.
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branch and key rulings that have aimed to clarify which branch of the government has the
privilege of primary responsibility for leading the U.S. foreign policymaking process.
The study also highlights the importance of the possibility of executive-legislative
branch cooperation in any discussion of U.S. foreign policymaking. Cooperation is
apparent whenever Congress defers to the President. Here the study argues that as a result
of Congress's deference to the President, the United States is able to speak with a unified
voice internationally.
Chapter 3 addresses the fact that the U.S. Congress has often deferred to the
President when dealing with Latin American revolutionary governments. A case in point
is how individual members of Congress often facilitated bi-partisan and intra- and inter-
branch cooperation during the Cold War. In this sense, Dante Fascell (D-Florida, 1955-
93) was adept at constructing and managing political coalitions based on foreign policy
consensus.
Yet even inter-party coalitions that facilitate congressional deference to the
executive branch when dealing with revolutionary movements in Latin America indicate
the ultimate power of Congress to either facilitate or block presidential foreign policies.
Congress's ability to stymie the President is evidenced by the activist foreign policy role
4 A critical example of the extent of the House Committee on Foreign Relations and the impact of its
chairman on U.S. foreign policymaking is the role undertaken by Congressman Fascell who in 1985 as the
committee's chairman coordinated congressional efforts with the Chairman of the House Budget
Committee to introduce H.R. 1460, also known as the "Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985," which was later
limited by the Executive Order of President Reagan. H.R. 1460 has come to be known as legislation that
was pivotal in ending the Apartheid government in South Africa and is linked to the Africa Subcommittee
H.R. 4868 which increases economic sanctions. Same was itself enacted over President Reagan's veto, with
a vote of 313 to 83 in the House and 78 to 21 in the Senate. Fascell was instrumental in coordinating inter-
party support/coalition building for legislation passed through the Committee on International Relations
which has impacted citizens of the United States and other countries. See, U.S. House of Representatives,
"Committee of International Relations: Origins and History," accessed October 1, 2008,
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/history.htm.
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assumed by Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-California, 2007-present) in the twilight years of
the Bush administration. The lack of constitutional specificity as to which branch of the
government has the primary privilege in leading the foreign policymaking process has
contributed to a significant degree of executive-legislative branch conflict.
Having reviewed Blasier's thesis in Chapter 2 and outlined the constitutional
foreign policymaking powers accorded to Congress, as well as how constitutional
ambiguity has often fueled the executive-legislative branch struggle for primacy in the
American foreign policymaking process in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 explores congressionally
driven foreign policymaking towards Latin America before and during the Cold War.
Chapter 4 highlights Blasier's thesis and its propositions and sets the stage for Chapter 5
which is the Venezuela-specific case study chapter, and for Chapter 6 and its conclusions
on Venezuela and Chavez's revolutionary agenda.
Chapter 5 argues that the United States- especially Congress as one of two key
constitutional foreign policymakers of the U.S. government- is dealing with Chavez's
Bolivarian revolution in a somewhat disimilar fashion as how it dealt with revolutionary
change in Latin America during the Cold War. To support this assertion, Chapter 5
compares previous U.S. policies toward revolutionary governments in Latin America
with current policies toward Chavez and his Bolivarian revolution.
Chapter 5 further builds on the preceding chapters by elaborating on how
Congress influenced U.S. foreign policymaking toward the Latin American state of
Nicaragua before and during the Cold War. While Chapter 4 looks at U.S.-Nicaraguan
interactions over the course of three revolutionary periods throughout the twentieth
century, Chapter 5 elaborates on those arguments by shifting its focus to Bolivarian
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Venezuela (1998-present) as the primary case study of post-Cold War U.S. reaction to
Latin American revolutionary change. Like the preceding chapter, Chapter 5 applies
Blasier's theoretical propositions to the review of U.S. foreign policymakers'
interpretation of revolutionary change. Chapter 5 provides a qualitative analysis of the
reasons why Blasier's theoretical propositions remain a viable means for interpreting the
impact of Congress on U.S. foreign policies dealing with Chavez and his brand of leftist-
inspired revolutionary change.
Chapter 5 looks at Nicaragua under the first Sandinista-led government (1979-90)
and Venezuela under Chavez and finds that both countries share a number of similarities
as well as key differences in light of how the United States has crafted its policies for
dealing with their types of revolutionary change. A focal point of discussion in Chapter 5
is the analysis of the major stumbling point in the government's relations with both of
these regimes especially the latter's intent to move away from representative democracy
toward participatory democracy.
Chapter 5 highlights the post-Cold War de-emphasis on ideology as a cause for
intervention. I explore U.S.-Venezuela foreign policy, and the level of attention focused
on Chavez and his Bolivarian revolution, by analyzing the impact of the oil trade on both
the United States and Venezuela in their mutual dealings in Chapter 5.
Chapter 5 also makes the point that Chavez's revolution is one that did not
necessarily catch U.S. foreign policymakers completely unawares, but nonetheless left
the government at loss for accurately identifying the sort and extent of revolutionary
challenges it represented. My study looks at U.S. foreign policymakers' inability to
adroitly locate Bolivarianism on the political ideological spectrum, which has motivated
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policymakers in both branches of the government to adopt a less reactionary "wait and
see" foreign policy posture toward Chavez and his government.
A U.S. policy position of restraint endures despite the Chavez government's
increasing identification of itself, as well as its domestic and international objectives,
along more socialist, anti-American lines. Chapters 5 and 6, by referring to the theoretical
model developed by Blasier, explore the factors that can lead policymakers to shift away
from the current largely status quo course of "wait and see" toward suppressing Chavez's
revolutionary government. The study indicates that the potential for intervention will
increase only if Chivez establish stronger political-military ties to extra-hemispheric,
anti-American powers intent on undertaking interventionist policies in Venezuela and the
surrounding region. The study looks at how Chavez's rhetoric and actions become bolder
as oil prices escalate. Only if Chavez's actions are identified as a threat to U.S. security
interests will policymakers in Washington be prone to move from merely labeling
Chavez as "increasingly authoritarian and anti-democratic" to actively seeking
justifications for suppressing the Chavez's government.
Blasier's thesis indicates that the suppression of the Chavez government is not
only dependent on Chivez significantly threatening U.S. private interests. As a result, my
study, mirroring Blasier's work, looks at nationalistic revolutionary changes that
potentially threaten continued U.S. political-military influence in the Latin American
region. Threats to U.S. political-military influence remain a key determinant for the
government's calculations to repress or subvert a revolutionary government. Although
the United States often responds with flexibility when dealing with revolutionary
movements, Blasier's model indicates that the U.S. government will not tolerate
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revolutionary governments that work against American hegemonic (or preferred
outcome) interests over the long run when these collude with extra-hemispheric powers.
To support my findings Chapter 5 incorporates comments and observations drawn
from interviews with U.S. foreign policymakers both within and outside the previous
George W. Bush administration. I compare in Chapter 5 today's congressional interests
with Chavez's revolutionary agenda in Venezuela with the Cold War case study of
Nicaragua's Sandinistas. Chapter 5 stresses that the low level of congressional concern
with Chavez's revolutionary agenda today, if compared to similar situations during the
Cold War, is the result of Congress's focus on troublesome hotspots where there is an
actual threat to U.S. vital security interests because of the extensive involvement of an
anti-American, interventionist power.
Chapter 6, as my study's conclusion, summarizes the study's central research
question, the study's approach, and findings. In particular, Chapter 6 clarifies why
Chavez is not a threat to U.S. vital security interests, reviews Chavez's own strategic
vulnerabilities, and assesses the overall state of present and near- to mid-term U.S.-
Venezuelan relations. As in preceding chapters, Chapter 6 returns to Blasier's thesis to
explain how the U.S. Congress is reacting to revolutionary change in Venezuela today
compared to how it reacted to revolutionary change in Latin America during the Cold
War. Summarizing the study's research and conclusions, Chapter 6 argues that since the
Cold War Congress has not significantly deviated from its methods for determining what
constitutes a threat to U.S. vital security interests. As a result of the enduring permanence
for equating the involvement of an extra-hemispheric, interventionist power in Latin
American affairs as a threat to U.S. vital security interests, the absence of such an entity
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makes mercurial Chivez more of a nuisance to the United States than a threat. This
conclusion explains why U.S. foreign policymakers continue to pursue a policy of
restraint when it comes to Chavez and his revolutionary agenda. It is a policy that is
geared toward waiting Chavez out.
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CHAPTER 2 - CONCEPTUAL INSTRUMENTS
"I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the
irresponsibility of its people."
Henry Kissinger
DEALING WITH REVOLUTIONARIES AND REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE
Setting the Stage
My study refers to Cole Blasier's thesis as developed in the Hovering Giant in
1976 and subsequently revised in 1985. The study is also influenced by Blasier's
subsequent work The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America from 1987 as it
pertains to the evaluation of the United States' (U.S) responses to the perceived links
between Soviet (communist) actions and revolutionary change in Latin America during
the Cold War (1947-91).
Blasier's framework of analysis for assessing how the U.S. government has
reacted to Latin American revolutionaries in the past and its subsequent dealings with
these movements once in power, serves as a point of departure for the study of how
foreign policymakers within the U.S. Congress today are dealing with Venezuela's Hugo
Chavez (1998-present). Blasier's framework is chosen because it has withstood the test of
time despite the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War threat
it had posed to the United States. While a number of other Cold War era theories which
Former Secretary of State Kissinger (1973-77) while as President Richard M. Nixon's National Security
Advisor (1969-75) voiced on June 27, 1970, support for U.S. efforts to block Salvador Allende's election in
Chile. Cited by Richard R. Fagen, in "The United States and Chile: Roots and Branches," Foreign Affairs,
January 1975.
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were often crafted as a reaction to short-term developments have come and gone,
Blasier's framework remains as relevant in the post-Cold War period as during the Cold
War era. Blasier's framework remains relevant because of the enduring, immutable
nature of U.S. foreign policy objectives - national security and economic interests.
Despite Latin America's two decade long transition away from authoritarianism
to democracy, followed by the more recent precipitous swing toward participatory
democracy in Venezuela with the Chavez government's desire to curtail representative
democratic practices and the workings of the free market, Blasier's premises continue to
identify the main parameters by which U.S. foreign policymakers will react to
revolutionary change. As James M. Malloy indicates in Authoritarians and Democrats:
Regime Transformation in Latin America, there is "no unilinear tendency toward
democracy or toward authoritarian rule." 2
Blasier's framework adroitly finds that the U.S. government's decision to seek
accommodation or repress a revolutionary government continues to be based on strategic
determinations and its perception of how serious a threat a revolutionary movement or
government poses to U.S. security and economic interests. 3 These concerns, and not the
George W. Bush administration's more recent emphasis on the promotion of democracy,
with the implied possibility of regime change to establish democratic governance, are the
constant primary factors traditionally influencing U.S. foreign policymaking.
2 Malloy, James M., in The Politics of Transition in Latin America in "Authoritarians and Democrats:
Regime Transition in Latin America." Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987, James M.
Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, editors, pg., 236.
3 Blasier, Cole, in The United States and Democracy in Latin America in "Authoritarians and Democrats:
Regime Transition in Latin America." Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987, James M.
Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, editors, pg., 230.
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There are two main alternative arguments to Blasier's theoretical propositions for
explaining U.S. foreign policymakers' reaction to Latin American revolutionary
movements during the Cold War period. On the one hand Dario Moreno finds in U.S.
Policy in Central America: The Endless Debate that U.S. foreign policymakers' reaction
to Latin American revolutionaries in the past can also be explained in terms of their
perceived threat to U.S. security emanating from ideological and military ties to Cuba
and the Soviet Union.4 In addition to the foregoing "Leninization" perspective, another
means for explaining U.S. foreign policymakers' reaction to Latin American
revolutionaries such as Sandinista Nicaragua according to Moreno is defined in terms of
Washington's frustration in having to deal with the American hegemonic decline during
the late Cold War period.s
Building on these perspectives for explaining U.S. foreign policymakers' past
reactions to Latin American revolutionary change, my study is timely since the Chavez's
Bolivarian government is the first post-Cold War (1991-present) reformist-revolutionary
government to gain power in Latin America. The study, much like Malloy's findings
from twenty years ago, shows that Latin American political regimes do not always
"conform neatly to our classic notions of either democracy or authoritarianism," a factor
that complicates U.S. foreign policymaking.6
4 According to Moreno this point of view is articulated by Jiri Valenat and Virginia Valenta in The FSLN in
Power, in Jiri Valenata and Esperanza Duran, eds., "Conflict in Nicaragua: A Multidimensional
Perspective," pgs., 3 to 41 and in Arturo J. Cruz, Sr., in "Leninism in Nicaragua, " ibid., pgs., 41 to 53. See,
Moreno, Dario, "U.S. Policy in Central America: The Endless Debate." Miami, FL: Florida International
University Press, 1990, pgs., 1 to 3 and 151.
5 Ibid, pgs., 3 and 151.
6 Malloy, pg. 256.
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Blasier's theoretical premises remain a worthwhile means of identifying
revolutionaries and indicating how U.S. foreign policymakers might react to these
movements and governments in an age of heightened international tensions. Blasier's
perspective, despite the U.S.'s hegemonic decline, in this sense remains a relevant means
of studying U.S. foreign policymakers' reaction to Latin American revolutionaries
because of, on the one hand, the unlikelihood of Leninism resurfacing as a viable means
of political-economic organization in the region. On the other hand, post-Cold War U.S.
foreign policymakers are aware of the difficulty associated with trying to assert the sort
of American hegemony that characterized the pre- and early Cold War eras. Hegemony
has evolved from being viewed in terms of political-military dominance to a more subtle
approach based on a political-economic partnership.
Hugo Chavez and the Revolutionary Government Challenging the Status Quo
The Chivez government, albeit democratically elected and certified as such by the
Organization of American States (OAS) and the Carter Center in 2004, was initially a
reformist government that is morphing increasingly into a socialist-inspired revolutionary
regime.7 United States foreign policymakers during the Bush administration view the
Chivez government as evolving into a revolutionary system of governance. The
government's inter-branch assessment also concluded that Chavez was democratically
The Carter Center found no statistical evidence of fraud so great as to change the exit-polled 60/40
opposition win to the official 40/60 government win. Consequently, former President Carter has publicly
commended the Venezuelan people and the outcome of the August 15, 2004, presidential recall
referendum. See, Carter, Jimmy, "Observing the Venezuela Presidential Recall Referendum:
Comprehensive Report." The Carter Center, February 2005, pgs. 3-4, and 134.
http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2020.pdf.
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elected and thus overturned Venezuela's previous status quo unwritten system of
governance and its power sharing rules known as the Pacto de Punto Fijo. Furthermore,
Chavez's threats to cut off Venezuelan petroleum shipments to the United States make
him an irritant and not a partner of Washington.8 Chavez's domestic and international
policy reorientations have been possible because of high international petroleum prices.
Blasier's Cold War theoretical premises in this regard assist in pigeonholing the
Chivez government as a revolutionary regime, and explain how U.S. foreign
policymakers might deal with Chavez's bothersome leftist government. According to
Blasier the United States has traditionally labeled any reformist regime in the Western
hemisphere that seeks to implement reforms that upset the traditional political-economic
status quo as revolutionary.9 Blasier argues that this definition of revolutionary has been
the dominant underlying driver in U.S. foreign policymaking behavior over most of the
twentieth century.
Blasier indicates that Washington will oppose any revolutionary change in the
political-economic status quo in Latin America. To prevent Latin American
revolutionaries from gaining political power, and contain or suppress their revolutionary
8 This governance pact, born out of the fear of a return to military rule, sought from 1958 until the
government immediately prior to Chavez's to moderate demands by requiring consultations among
Venezuela's main political parties - Acci6n Democratica, Comit6 de Organizaci6n Politica Electoral
Independiente (COPEI), and Uni6n Republicana Democratica (URD). These parties had participated in the
Patriotic Junta that ousted Marcos P6rez Jimenez's regime (1952-58). As such they were involved with the
creation of Venezuela's May 1958 electoral law, but unable to reach consensus on fielding a single
candidate for the December 1958 elections convoked by Venezuela's post-Perez Jimenez provisional junta.
This inability to reach a consensus led the AD, COPEI, and URD parties in October to draw up the Pact of
Punto Fijo whereby the parties' leadership agreed to resume cooperation after the December elections. The
parties agreed not only to adopt a common policy but more importantly from a stability perspective, to
divide cabinet posts and other governmental positions among themselves regardless of which candidate
won the December elections.
9 Blasier, pg. 230.
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governments if they do happen to gain power, the United States has in the past intervened
to prevent such changes. The United States has also, with varying degrees of success,
attempted to reestablish the status quo in the past. The U.S. aversion to change in the
status quo has led foreign policymakers to oppose both moderate reformers such as
Guatemala's Jacobo Arbenz (1951-54), as well as radical revolutionaries like Cuba's
Fidel Castro (1959-2008) and Nicaragua's Sandinistas (1979-90).10 Similarly Hans
Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson state in Transforming for Stabilization and
Reconstruction Operations that during the Cold War the United States intervened
militarily "to preserve the status quo, not to alter it, and to manage crises, not to resolve
underlying problems."1"
In a marked departure from Cold War norms, since the end of the Cold War U.S.
foreign policymakers have sought to alter the status quo as well as resolve underlying
problems. United States foreign policymakers continue to revert to Cold War language
(i.e., anti-democratic) to label the Caracas government as being increasingly
revolutionary as a result of Chavez's implementation of nationalist reforms that were
viewed by Washington as being (Cuban) socialist-inspired and redistributive in nature. A
1 Dates connote period of time when in power.
" Binnendijk, Hans and Stuart E. Johnson. "Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction
Operations." Dulles, VA: Center for Technology and National Security Policy - National Defense
University, 2004, pgs. 4 -5.
1 Key examples include, but are not limited to the U.S. organized military task force (Unified Task Force
or UNITAF) which entered Somalia in December 1992 (Operation Restore Hope) which was replaced in
May 1993 by United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) and the U.S. led North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) Balkan Air Campaign (Operation Allied Force) against Serbian led
Yugoslavia. In the case of the latter, after 78 days of bombings to stop Yugoslav/ Serbian military
operations in Kosovo, the air campaign ends with an agreement that recognized Yugoslav/Serb sovereignty
over Kosovo but places control of Kosovo under United Nations administration (United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo or UNMIK).
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number of these reforms have adversely impacted American private interests within
Venezuela. Examples of Chavez's nationalist reforms are the nationalization of
ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and Chevron's privately-run Orinoco oilfields on May 1,
2007. The nationalization of these oilfields had international political and economic
ramifications that transcended the U.S.-Venezuela bilateral relationship.
However, and despite Chavez's rhetoric, the Chivez government's reforms failed
the test of classical Leninism since there has been no violent revolutionary overthrow of
the capitalist bourgeois order supported by the Pacto de Punto Fijo parties with a
subsequent implementation of the dictatorship of the proletariat.' 3 Nor for that matter has
the Chivez government made any significant attempts to free the Venezuelan
(proletariat) people from what Lenin considered to be modes of false consciousness such
as religion and nationalism - the capitalist bourgeois order utilizes these to dominate the
population politically as well as exploit it economically. On the contrary, Chavez openly
refers to both.
From the U.S.-Venezuela bilateral relationship perspective, Blasier's theoretical
premises can be utilized to analyze the revolutionary, anti-United States nature of the
Chavez government. Chavez views himself as the leader of an anti-status quo power
13 Stalin defined Leninism as the "Marxism of the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution." In
Stalin's own words, "Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution in general, the theory
and tactics of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular." Stalin argues that Lenin "pursued his
activities in the period of developed imperialism, in the period of the unfolding proletarian revolution,
when the proletarian revolution had already triumphed in one country, had smashed bourgeois democracy
and had ushered in the era of proletarian democracy, the era of the Soviets." This is not the case in
Venezuela since there are has been no proletarian revolution, nor are there any Soviets in place. See, Stalin,
J.V. in "The Foundations of Leninism: Lectures delivered at the Sverdlov University" in J.V. Stalin,
"Problems of Leninism." Peking, China: Foreign Language Press, 1976, pgs. 2-3, accessed November 1,
2008, http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/FL24.html. Also see Lenin's pamphlet titled "What is to be
Done." Lenin, Valdimir Il'ich, "What Is to be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement," in "The Lenin
Anthology." New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Company, 1975, pgs. 12 to 114.
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within the Latin American region and, as such, is heir to Castro's revolutionary mantle.
In light of these factors, Blasier's theoretical premises can be utilized to determine how
U.S. policymakers will react to such an anti-status quo challenge. For example, key
means of dealing with Chavez have been to refuse to be baited into tit-for-tat "shouting
matches" in international forums by de-emphasizing the importance of Chavez's
denunciations, as well as by limiting contact (defined in terms of assistance and
engagement) while reducing U.S. dependence on Venezuelan petroleum supplies and
increasing support for pro-democracy groups in Venezuela.
On Chavez's part, his government is actively challenging the United States'
claims to hemispheric leadership by seeking to forge strategic alliances with hostile,
extra-hemispheric rivals such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation, and
the People's Republic of China. Chavez actions are somewhat analogous to the situation
analyzed by Blasier in the Hovering Giant which looks at the Soviet Union's
involvement with the Cuban and Sandinista revolutionary governments. In the post-Cold
War period, Chavez, much like Castro and the Sandinistas, is seeking to promote closer
ties with non-western rivals of the United States as a means of breaking Venezuela's, and
by extension Latin America's traditional economic and political-military dependence on
the United States.14
14 While the Latin American region remains heavily dependent on the United States and it markets, the
United States itself is also quite dependent on its Latin American neighbors. Luigi R. Einaudi indicates that
the United States is dependent on Latin America for more than half of its energy imports and nearly 40
percent of its iron and steel imports, and for a number of other resources and commodities. See, Einaudi,
Luigi R., in "Trans-American Security: What's Missing," in Strategic Forum, Institute for National
Strategic Studies - National Defense University, Number 228, (September 2007), pg. 1.
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However, today there is no extra-hemispheric power that can threaten the United
States' existence as was the case during the Cold War. The absence of a Soviet Union
like state negates the threat posed by any sort of Venezuelan alliance with an anti-U.S.
extra-hemispheric power.
The foregoing points will be addressed in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6 which
deal specifically with Chavez and Bolivarianism and the politics of oil. For now, the
relevance of the latter to the present discussion resides in the fact that it dovetails with
Blasier's theoretical propositions of how U.S. foreign policymakers are reacting to
Chavez and his government's unwillingness to cooperate with the post-Cold War's
emphasis on combating trans-national security problems (e.g., narcotics trafficking,
terrorism, humanitarian crises, weapons of mass destruction and proliferation, and
asymmetric threats to economies of the West).15
By openly refusing to cooperate on these issues, the Chivez government seeks to
challenge the United States' political-economic and leadership primacy (hegemonic
position) in Latin America. 16 Given the asymmetrical political-military power differential
existing between the United States and Venezuela, Chavez's challenge to continued U.S.
leadership in the region is only possible if the Latin American states agree to effectively
cooperate in the creation of an alternative, more Latin American-centric means of socio-
15 Einaudi in this regard believes that with the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of globalization
"ideas of closed regionalism are dead everywhere." Einaudi recognizes that for regionalism to prosper it
must be open to the world and not retreat from competition. Under this scenario, one where national
interests differ and where interdependence is uncomfortable, cooperation must be voluntary and not
imposed as was the case during the pre- and Cold War eras. See, Ibid. pg. 4.
16 U.S. hegemony in the Latin American region has declined significantly since the time of the Cuban
Revolution in 1959. In the post-Cold War aspect, hegemony and hegemonic are equated with the term that
is widely used with the United States government to describe the United States as the Latin American
region's "preeminent and or primary partner of preference."
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political and economic organization (e.g., Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas or
Alternativa Bolivarian de las Americas - ALBA).
The United States' Reaction to Latin American Revolutionaries
Blasier finds that whenever Latin American revolutionaries aim to disrupt the
political-economic status quo, U.S. foreign policymakers label both revolutionary
movements and governments as being not just anti-American but just as importantly,
anti-democratic.17 Simultaneously, U.S. foreign policymakers defend U.S. polices crafted
toward repressing reformist and revolutionary governments as being pro-democratic. 18
Blasier nonetheless stresses that U.S. foreign policymakers' labeling of
revolutionary regimes as being anti-American and anti-democratic are often a subterfuge
for more paramount objectives, namely defending U.S. strategic and economic interests. 19
An example of such strategic thinking is found in the work of Charles D. Lutes, M.
Elaine Bunn, and Stephen J. Flanagan, who indicate that the Chavez government engages
in practices that "trample (representative) democratic norms and threaten regional
stability.20
Unlike the case of poverty-stricken Nicaragua during the Cold War, the
Venezuelan state is currently buoyed by the influx of high oil revenues. Petroleum sales
17 Blasier, pgs. 223 and 230.
18 Ibid., pg. 230.
19 Ibid., pg. 230.
2 See, Lutes, Charles D., M. Elaine Bunn, and Stephen J. Flanagan in "The Emerging Global Security
Environment, " in "Strategic Challenges: America's Global Security Agenda." Dulles, VA: The Institute
for National Strategic Studies - National Defense University Press, Stephen J. Flanagan and James A.
Schear, editors, 2008, pg. 14.
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provide the Chivez government with the economic wherewithal to challenge the United
States. High oil prices also ensure that Caracas can engage in checkbook diplomacy
whereby it provides economic aid to its neighbors at a time when Washington "remains
vague about regional interests and fails to maintain steady engagement with these
governments as respected partners."2 1
As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye indicate, economic prosperity for Venezuela,
brought about by the dependent nature of its own petroleum-based trade relationship with
the United States, is leading to a situation in which Venezuela as a secondary state is
increasingly becoming capable of changing assumptions about the benefits of continued
American hegemony.22 The Chivez government is determined, regardless of the
economic benefits associated with continued U.S. hegemony and preservation of the
status quo, to reduce and eventually do away with Venezuela's own economic
dependence on the United States.
From an international political perspective the Chavez government is seeking to
break its dependence on the United States in order to increase its own governmental
autonomy and thus international space. It also aims to build up Chavez's revolutionary
credentials within the region. The question that needs to be answered in this context is
whether Chavez's neighbors (e.g., the member states of the Andean Community and the
Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement), lacking Venezuela's
petroleum resources, will risk losing their own preferential access to U.S. markets and
21 Ibid., pg. 14.
22 See, Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. "Power and Interdependence." New York, NY: Harper Collins
Publishers, 2"d edition, 1989, pgs. 45-47.
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financial resources by opting to subscribe to Chavez's revolutionary governance
proposals and Latin American trans-national agenda.2 3
Faced with this challenge, U.S. foreign policymakers during the Bush
administration have viewed Chavez's model of socio-political governance and economic
organization with growing distrust. Chavez's reforms are anathema to U.S. foreign
policymakers since they call for a strong presidency. Chavez is undermining
representative democracy by eliminating checks-and-balances and recurring to heavy
state intervention in the economy, which negates the benefits of neo-liberalism.
Luigi R. Einaudi, in Trans-American Security: What 's Missing, points out that
U.S. foreign policymakers in the post-Cold War subscribe to the notion that there is now
a "direct link between democracy and security."24 Acceptance of this principle requires
cooperation between the United States and its Latin American partners to meet standards
of democratic legitimacy. Einaudi's statement explains why the Chavez revolutionary
governance model's reliance on participatory democracy, instead of representative
democracy, has become so troublesome for U.S. foreign policymakers. The foregoing
highlights that what Chavez proposes is a different socio-political governance and
economic development model than the status quo representative democracy and neo-
liberal free market model advocated by the U.S. government.
3 Here reference is made to preferential market access provided to a number of Latin American countries
within trade agreements such as the Central American Free Trade Agreement - Dominican Republic
(CAFTA-DR) of 2005 and the Andean Trade Preference Act (1991).
24 Einaudi, pg. 4.
25 Chivez's Bolivarian Revolution, named after Sim6n Bolivar, Venezuela's independence hero, seeks to
establish what the former has vaguely defined as "Socialism of the Twenty-First Century." In this regard
Chavez advocates doing away with the sort of "savage capitalism" which he identifies with neo-liberalism
and replace this with his own radical vision of a more egalitarian socialist state. The January 2007 enabling
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As a result, Blasier's Cold War era thesis serves as a point of departure for
gauging how the United States, and in this case Congress, is dealing with revolutionary
change in Venezuela today. Blasier's propositions remain a meaningful means of
ascertaining if U.S. congressional foreign policymakers have indeed moved away from
Cold War-style policies which often previously supported the executive branch's
determination to intervene (overtly or covertly) to suppress revolutionary regimes and
install friendly pro-United States governments.
Blasier's thesis that the United States crafts its foreign policies not out of altruism,
but rather to ensure U.S. strategic and economic interests remains applicable in the post-
Cold War. The notion that U.S. foreign policymakers return to the language of promoting
democracy to cloak the pursuit of such interests also appears to remain largely
unchanged. While congressional willingness to influence and direct U.S. foreign
policymaking has become more assertive since the 1970s as a result of the need to reign
in imperial presidencies, this does not mean that policymaking tools have changed. For
that matter the willingness of policymakers in the White House and Congress to
safeguard U.S. strategic and economic interests has not diminished.
What has changed has been that during the Cold War the United States sought to
maintain the status quo. Today U.S. foreign policymakers seek to suppress and oust
revolutionary regimes in order to alter the status quo to favor U.S. country and regional
diplomatic and trade objectives. U.S. foreign policymakers are now focused on solving
law promulgated by Venezuela's National Assembly has granted Chavez almost free rein to accelerate
changes in broad areas of society by presidential decree. Chdvez's opponents argue that the 2007 enabling
law will propel Venezuela toward dictatorship. See Associated Press, "Chavez Gets Unprecedented
Powers" in the Wall Street Journal (January 31, 2007),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117029498706394489.html.
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the underlying problems that have led to the rise of reformist and revolutionary
governments whose policies diverge from U.S. strategic concerns and conflict with
American economic interests.
Blasier's propositions can consequently be utilized to ascertain how the executive
branch deals with Latin American reformists and revolutionaries like Chavez, and also
expanded to encompass congressional input in the foreign policymaking process.
Congress is assertive not just because it seeks to reign in the presidency and claim
constitutional primacy in the foreign policymaking process debate, as will be addressed
in the following chapters, but rather it is often motivated to take an active oversight role
as a result of constituent-driven concerns. Blasier's thesis and propositions can
consequently be used to explain both executive and legislative branches' foreign
policymaking reasoning.
The following sections of this chapter will address the forgoing points in greater
detail by reviewing the literature on the definition of what constitutes revolutionary
movements and governments for U.S. foreign policymakers, how Congress reacts to
revolutionary challenges to U.S. leadership, the types of indicators that can be utilized to
measure U.S. foreign policymakers' degree of hostility to Latin American revolutionaries
such as Chavez, and how these tie in with Blasier's own theoretical propositions.
THE TERM REVOLUTIONARY
The intent of the current section is not to provide an in depth analysis of the term
revolutionary. Rather, the purpose of this section is to facilitate an overview of how the
term revolutionary is used within this study, how it pertains to Blasier's theoretical
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framework, and how it is applicable to the way congressional foreign policymakers
interpret revolutions and revolutionaries.
Ofira Seliktar argues in Failing the Crystal Ball Test that revolutionary change
involves the interaction of factors that bifurcate in different directions, making
forecasting difficult to undertake. 26 Seliktar argues that the revolutionary process arises as
a result of a crisis of legitimacy that is itself the outcome of fundamental societal norms
being discarded in favor of new ones.27
For Seliktar, all political life is dependent on legitimacy. Therefore political
entities such as parties and or even governing structures can become de-legitimized and
thus lead to revolutionary change. Chavez is a revolutionary, not because he overthrew
the preceding political order by force of arms, but rather because Venezuela's status quo
with its unwritten system of governance and its power sharing rules had lost legitimacy in
post-Cold War Venezuela. Chavez successfully exploits popular discontent with the
status quo order and channels it to democratically overthrow the Pacto de Punto Fijo
system. Thus Chavez gains the presidency not by means of a traditional barrack revolt,
but rather by leading a ballot box rebellion of the underrepresented segments of the
Venezuelan electorate.
Chivez and his political supporters and allies in government have no qualms
about saying as much in their official pronouncements on the loss of legitimacy by the
26 Seliktar argues in this sense that forecasting involves relating stochastic variables such as crisis or
opportunity to evolving situations of highly correlated events. The occurrence, or outcome, of an event is
dependent on a number of other events occurring. See, Seliktar, Ofira. Failing the Crystal Ball Test: The
Carter Administration and the Fundamentalist Revolution in Iran. Westport, CN: Prager Publishing, 2000,
pg. 189.
27 Ibid, pg. XIX.
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Pacto de Punto Fijo parties and the governing system they operated. They claim that
such a loss of legitimacy validates their own claims to legitimacy, a fact that has been
reinforced by the multiple times the electorate has come to the support of the Chivez
government and its reform programs.
For example, Tarek William Saab, while president of the Venezuelan (Bolivarian)
National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Commission (Comisidn Permanente de Politica
Exterior), argued that changes implemented as a consequence of Venezuela's popularly
backed constitutional reform are meant to do away with forty years of misdeeds
(fechorias) carried out against Venezuelans' fundamental rights.28 Saab stresses that
Chavez's reform program is revolutionary by transforming the public's access to power.
Such radical change can only be made possible for Chavez and his supporters by
founding the Venezuelan republic anew. Venezuela's new order guarantees the concerns
of foreign investors (i.e., United States), but places these on a secondary level when
compared to its claims "to safeguard the interests of the humblest of Venezuelans." 29
According to Saab and other supporters of Chavez, the Chavez revolution's jettisoning of
the old Pacto de Punto Fijo status quo order and the ensuing, more equitable
redistribution of socio-political and economic power ultimately serves as justification for
a revolutionary reform program geared towards concentrating power in the Venezuelan
executive branch.
28 Saab, Tarek William "El Proceso Constituyente Venezolano y la Universalidad de los Derechos
Humanos: Un Espacio Conquistado para Vivir contra Morir. " Caracas, Venezuela: Republica Bolivariana
de Venezuela - Asamblea Nacional, Comisi6n Permanente de Politica Exterior. Undated paper circa 2000,
pgs. 12 to 15.
29 Ibid.
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Robert Pastor's comments in Condemned to Repetition builds on the foregoing
theories by making the point that such revolutionary processes in Latin America have
often and naturally led to a general state of distrust between revolutionaries and U.S.
foreign policymakers.3 0 Pastor points out that in order to prevent a repetition of the
Cuban and Sandinista revolutions the United States has to make an effort to better
understand the revolutionary process. Pastor consequently suggests to U.S. foreign
policymakers to place a greater reliance on promoting democratic transition in countries
with authoritarian regimes. While the Chivez government is not authoritarian, such
action could facilitate dialogue. Understanding the revolutionary process could, for the
likes of Russell Crandall, assist in staving off a repetition of the sort of Cold War policies
that characterized U.S. measures as coercive, unilateral, and distrustful. 3 1
Although Venezuela's system of governance prior to Chavez's election was not
completely representative of the needs of the entire populace, it was nonetheless
considered to be a functional representative democracy by most analysts and U.S. foreign
policymakers. As a result, popular discontent with the system of governance was often
written off as the normal tribulations of democracy or economically motivated by the
U.S. government. United States foreign policymakers, assured in the belief of the
enduring nature of the Pacto de Punto Fijo political-economic status quo and the
continued uninterrupted access to Venezuelan oil, were caught off guard by the
possibility of a socialist-inspired nationalist electoral revolt in post-Cold War Venezuela.
30 Moreno, Dario and Dario P6rez. The United States and the Central American Peacemaking Process in
"U.S.-Latin American Policymaking." Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, David W. Dent,
editor, 1995, pg. 492.
31 See, Crandall, Russell. "Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy Toward Colombia." Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner
Press, 2 "d edition, 2008, pg. 8.
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The U.S. government failed to anticipate that Chavez's leftist revolution would emanate
from up-until-then underrepresented segments of the national electorate and others
dissatisfied with the politically corrupt Pacto de Punto Fijo system of political
representation and its parties.
Joseph McMillan and Christopher Cavoli state that the concept of governing
legitimacy as it is presently understood was introduced into modern social science by
Max Weber.32 According to McMillan and Cavoli, Weber describes legitimacy as "the
attitude of, shared by people subject to a particular set of social relationships, that the
order within which those relationships exist has binding moral authority behind it."33
Departing from that notion, Chavez as a revolutionary can be analyzed based on
Juan B. Linz and Alfred Stepan's characterization found in The Breakdown of
Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Equilibrium. Chavez, like other Latin
American revolutionaries, is an individual that no longer pledges allegiance to a political
system that has been determined to be illegitimate. For Linz and Stepan, allegiance to a
political system exists only as long as the same "guarantees the persistence of, or the
opportunity to change, a certain social, normally socioeconomic, order." 34 The Linz and
Stepan interpretation of the term revolutionary shares similarities not only with McMillan
and Cavoli's Weberian interpretation of the term, but also coincides with Saab's position.
32 See, McMillan, Joseph and Christopher Cavoli, in "Countering Global Terrorism " in "Strategic
Challenges: America's Global Security Agenda." Dulles, VA: The Institute for National Strategic Studies -
National Defense University Press, Stephen J. Flanagan and James A. Schear, editors, 2008, pg. 37.
33Ibid., pg. 37.
3 Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. "The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and
Equilibrium." Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1987, pg. 11.
52
Chivez wrote off Venezuelan representative democracy, as instituted by the
Pacto de Punto Fijo system of political representation, as a failure years before being
elected. For Chavez representative democracy failed to provide him and others that
shared likeminded nationalist goals the opportunity to achieve their political objectives.
For Chavez, Venezuela's system of representative governance and its democratic
institutions controlled by the Pacto de Punto Fijo system parties were at odds with his
socio-political and economic beliefs. For Chavez these parties and the order they
represented lacked governing legitimacy and had to be eliminated. These factors are the
justification for Chavez's (failed) 1992 coup d'etat.
While Chavez's attempt to impose revolutionary change in an authoritarian
fashion via a coup failed, he has nonetheless succeeded in imposing revolutionary change
democratically by means of the slower, more effective and legitimate process of reform
via the ballot box.35 Ironically it has been under the conditions of democratic freedom
and compromise associated with the earlier Pacto de Punto Fijo system of governance
which ultimately allowed Chivez to dispute and win the 1998 presidential election.
Nonetheless for supporters of representative democracy and preservation of the status
quo, Chavez's election to the Venezuelan presidency has not ushered in an age of
democratic renewal but rather democratic decay, as evidenced by the concentration of
power in the presidency at the expense of institutional checks-and-balances.
Chavez, much like other Latin American revolutionaries, has sought to change the
prevailing socio-political status quo both domestically and in regards to relations with the
United States. It is worthwhile to highlight that Blasier uses Mexico's Francisco
3 Ibid., pg. 13.
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Madero's 1910-11 revolt, Fidel Castro's Cuba after 1961, and Nicaragua's Sandinista
government (1979-90) as examples of twentieth century Latin American revolutions that
have sought to restructure their societies and relations with regional hegemony.
Blasier's interpretation of revolution is similar to that of Theda Skocpol's
definition of social revolution. According to Skocpol, social revolutions are "rapid, basic
transformations of a society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in
part carried through by class-based revolts from below." 36 Skocpol's definition, much
like Linz and Stepan's, facilitates the notion that internal support for Chavez by
Venezuela's previously disadvantaged groups is a class-based, yet largely non-violent
revolt from below that, through the democratic process, has turned the old socio-political
agreement struck in 1958 through the Pacto de Punto Fijo on its head.
Both Skocpol and Blaiser refer to the socio-political and economic
transformations that societies undergo when reformists and revolutionaries alike seize
control of a national government. In Studies of Social Revolution: Origins in Mexico,
Bolivia, and Cuba, Blasier defines revolutionary situations not in terms of simplistic coup
d'6tats and other acts of violence that have often determined Latin American political
succession much like Chavez's abortive 1992 coup, but rather in terms of far reaching
social revolution like Chavez's 1998 election. Blasier clarifies that revolutionary
36 Skocpol's definition of revolution is a valid description of the political upheaval in Mexico (1910-11),
but also is a relevant definition of how pro-Chavez masses came to the aid of Hugo Chavez when he was
temporarily deposed in the coup d'etat attempt of April 11-13, 2002. See, Skocpol, Theda. "States and
Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China." New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1989, pgs. 4-5.
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situations entail the violent, "sudden and comprehensive change of social structures and
values." 37
Both Skocpol and Blasier stress that societies undergoing drastic changes have
often sought to break the chains of extreme dependency by adopting radical reforms. In
the case of Latin America, these reforms have often conflicted with U.S. government and
private American economic (business) interests. This explains Chdvez's reform program
and its calls for readdressing what he views as the exploitative nature of the traditional
U.S.-Venezuela bilateral relationship.
Chavez's democratic rise to power subscribes to Skocpol's notion that social
revolutions must be studied from a structural perspective, i.e., developments within the
country and those acting upon it from abroad influence the breakdown of past state
organizations, leaving in their wake new revolutionary state organizations. 38 Blasier
similarly finds that revolutions in Latin America need to be explained not just in terms of
being a reaction to deteriorating economic conditions or even international factors which
37 Blasier, Cole., in "Studies of Social Revolution: Origins in Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba, " in "Revolutions:
Critical Concepts in Political Science." New York, NY: Routledge Press, Rosemary H. T. O'Kane, editor,
Volume IV, 2000, pg. 3.
38 Skocpol argues that the success or failure of modern revolutions is dependent on the nature of the regime
in power. Successful revolutions are more likely in conditions where the central government has weak
control over national territory and tends to be exclusionary in its outlook. On the other hand as the state
becomes more effective in asserting its control over national territory, becomes more bureaucratized, and
inclusive, the prospects for successful revolution decrease. This helps to explain why Chdvez's coup
attempt failed in a well-centralized, bureaucratic state such as Venezuela in 1992, but succeeded at the
ballot box in 1998. See Goodwind, Jeff and Theda Skocpol, in "Explaining Revolutions in the
Contemporary Third World, " in "Revolutions: Critical Concepts in Political Science." New York, NY:
Routledge Press, Rosemary H. T. O'Kane, editor, Volume IV, 2000, pgs. 191 to 193.
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are larger context issues, but rather in terms of being the byproduct of socio-political
crisis.39
As a result, Blasier builds on Wilbert E. Moore's definition of revolutionary
change which argues that revolutions represent the significant alteration of social
structures, values, and cultural products and symbols. Moore's definition of social change
allows Blasier to elaborate that revolution is characterized by:
"An exceptionally rapid, comprehensive, and profound form of social change,
usually accompanied by violence and resulting in an abrupt and explosive change
with the past. This social process redefines man's relationship to land, machines,
and other men, thereby reordering the composition of social groups and their
relationship to one another." 40
Blasier's definition of revolutionary change brings to the forefront U.S. foreign
policymakers' concerns with Latin American reformist and revolutionary governments in
both the executive and legislative branches of the government. Such concerns were
heightened by the U.S. government's fears of reformist and revolutionary regimes'
potential links to extra-hemispheric, anti-American rivals of the United States in the
past.41 Most bilateral relations with the Latin American states during the Cold War were
39 Blasier here is writing about the belief among "most authorities" that socio-political issues are equally if
not more important than economic or fiscal issues as the explanation for revolution. To back this argument,
Blasier cites Silvia Herzog, who indicates that revolutions are not exclusively the result of economic,
international, or racial issues. Rather, revolutions are the result of socio-political crisis (e.g., loss of
legitimacy). See, Blasier (2000), pg. 8.
40 Blasier quotes Moore further as arguing that social change is defined as a "significant alteration in the
social structures (that is, of patterns of social action and interaction), including consequences and
manifestations of such structures embodied in norms (rules of conduct), values, and cultural products and
symbols. See Blaiser, Cole. The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin
America, 1910-1985. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985, pgs. 4 and 307.
41 Blasier finds that the cases of the Mexican (1911), Bolivian (1952), and Cuban (1959) revolutions were
the result of segments of the national population's moral indignation against what they saw as coercive,
despotic regimes. Blasier's three social revolutions represent what he calls "the revolt of the wide spectrum
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premised on assuring the preservation of the political status quo, economic growth, and
cooperation in combating communism.
American foreign policy strategy was the result of the need to counter Soviet
interventionism.4 United States foreign policymakers' pursuit of such objectives often
resulted in acrimonious relations developing with revolutionary Latin American regimes
and or heightened levels of suspicion and animosity with reformist governments. As a
consequence, during the better part of the twentieth century, especially during the height
of the Cold War years, congressional foreign policymakers were inclined to concur with
the executive branch's characterization of Latin American revolutionary governments as
a threat whenever the latter attempted to implement any sort of reforms that impinged
upon U.S. national security and private business interests.
While many reformist governments during the Cold War era were often more
inspired by nationalist attempts to readdress their one-sided relationship with the United
States as well as with local capital and foreign investors rather than being outright
communist sympathizers, their reform programs where nonetheless seen by the U.S.
government as being suspect if not backed by Soviet communism.
Thomas Bailey, for example, argues in A Diplomatic History of the American
People (1974) that when Salvador Allende (1970-73) won control of the Chilean
of the population, or of the groups that claimed to represent that spectrum." Chavez's revolution is similar
to these in that it involves a revolt against an elite that had lost by the 1990s if not the ability to govern the
country effectively, it had lost the prerequisite overarching societal legitimacy to govern. Chavez's, much
like the aforementioned Latin American revolutions, is an indigenous, nationalist revolution seeking a new
sense of national unity and purpose. See, Blasier (2000), pg. 25.
42 Interestingly enough direct Soviet involvement in the internal affairs of the Latin American countries
during the Cold War was minimal. The main exception being Soviet involvement in the Cuban revolution,
whose success made it possible for Cuba to become involved in Latin American guerilla insurgencies. See,
Chernick, Marc W., in Peacemaking and Violence in Latin America in "The International Dimensions of
Internal Conflicts," Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Michael E. Brown, editor, 1996, pg. 276.
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government, albeit through free and fair democratic elections in 1970, his seizure in 1971
of $800 million (equivalent to over $4 billion in 2007) in American holdings - namely
Anaconda and Kennecott copper mining interests - led to a backlash by Wall Street
bankers who saw the compensation being offered by the Chilean government as
inadequate. 43 The perceived lack of proper compensation for these nationalizations
combined with President Richard M. Nixon's (R, 1969-74) longstanding belief of
Allende's complicity with international communism was enough to seal the fate of the
Allende government.
Marc W. Chernick in Peacemaking and Violence in Latin America indicates that
the onset of the Cold War in the 1950s led the United States to reaffirm the basic
principles of the Monroe Doctrine, whereby external interference in the Western
hemisphere was prohibited and the Soviet Union replaced Europe as the source of hostile,
extra-hemispheric interference. 44 The success of the Cuban revolution drove U.S. foreign
policymakers to fear a repetition of these events. It was the fear of another Cuba, this
time established on the Latin American mainland, which led the Nixon administration to
work toward the overthrow of the Allende government given what it saw as Chile's
growing communist inclinations. 45
43 Bailey, Thomas. A Diplomatic History of the American People. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
1974. 9h edition, pg. 939. For computing the relative value of the U.S. dollar in 1971 to 2007 (last year of
full annual data for initial and target year) using the consumer price index, see
http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php# accessed, August 9, 2008.
as See, Chernick, pg. 270.
as The intelligence assessment National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 97 - "Regarding threats to
U.S. interests," predating Allende's election concluded that the United States had no vital national interests
in Chile despite tangible economic losses. It also determined that the world military balance would not be
significantly affected by an Allende victory. However, it did find that an Allende victory would create
political costs by undermining hemispheric cohesion at the Organization of American States, as well as
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Although the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did not carry out the coup d'6tat
that overthrew Allende, this agency was nevertheless authorized by the Nixon
administration to establish contacts and provide support for anti-Allende forces within the
Chilean polity.46 William I. Robinson indicates in Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization,
U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony that a major component of the CIA's function outside
of intelligence gathering and paramilitary campaigns were "political operations." The
Central Intelligence Agency's olitical operations involved "the creation, covert funding
and guidance of allied political groups and individuals in target countries - media,
political parties, trade unions, businesses, and associations." 47 Acquiring, cultivating, and
exploiting contacts were CIA hallmarks during the Cold War and remain a vital
component of U.S. foreign policy to this day.
What has changed in the post-Cold War era has been the realization among U.S.
foreign policymakers that with the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the cessation of
its non-constructive interventionist foreign policies, U.S. security no longer requires the
same regional dominance based on the previous era's conceptual and programmatic
pillars (e.g., counter-insurgency and development assistance). 48 Lars Schoultz writes that
represent a "psychological advance for the Marxist idea." See, Kornbluh, Peter. "The Pinochet File: A
Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability." New York, NY: The New Press - National Security
Archive, 2003, pg. 8.
46 According to Kornbluh, the CIA pursued a basic three-step plan that: 1) identified, contacted and
collected intelligence on likely coup plotters within the Chilean military; 2) communicated full support for
the coup short of sending in U.S. military forces (i.e. Marines), and; 3) fostered the creation of a climate
conducive to a coup by propaganda, disinformation, and terrorist activities in order to provide justification
for a military uprising. Ibid. pg. 14.
47 Robinson, Wililiam I. Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony. New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pg., 86.
48 Chernick, pg., 272.
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with the departure of the Soviet Union from the Latin American political landscape,
"U.S. security interests no longer required the same level of dominance."4 9
In National Security and U.S. Policy toward Latin America, Schoultz identifies a
causal linkage between Latin American instability and security threats to the United
States. Therefore, absent the main source of Latin American instability (i.e., the Soviet
Union), the threat emanating from the region toward the United States should decrease.
With the reduction of the threat driver comes the consequent reduction in the need to
dominate the region, require absolute hemispheric cohesion, and even the need to focus
scarce foreign policy resources on the region at times of heightened instability
elsewhere. 1
According to Crandall, this new reality should allow U.S. foreign policymakers
both in the executive and legislative branches to prioritize multilateralism and dialogue
instead of coercion and dominance. Crandall, however, indicates that contrary to such
notions, as Schoultz has argued, the United States has established as its hemispheric
policy the creation of a new set of threats in order to justify continued regional
domination. For Crandall, this situation is based on the hegemonic presumption belief
49Crandall, pg. 8.
5 See, Schoultz, Lars. National Security and U.S. Policy toward Latin America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1987, pg. 38.
51 Chernick indicates that during the Cold War era there were five forms of outside intervention in Latin
American internal conflicts: 1) Latin American support for insurgencies in other Latin American countries;
2) Soviet assistance to Cuba, and on a reduced scale to Sandinista Nicaragua; 3) the deployment of U.S.
military forces; 4) the creation of U.S.-sponsored proxy armies, and; 5) the extension of U.S. military
assistance to local governments and the training of local military and police forces. See, Chernick, pg. 276.
52 Crandall indicates that initially (prior to the events of September 11, 2001) these threats ranged from
drug trafficking to dictatorship to financial mismanagement and have served for many policymakers as a
justification for continued domination of the Latin American region. Crandall, pg. 8.
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among U.S. foreign policymakers that the United States has the right and the obligation
to continue to intervene in the internal affairs of the Latin American states in the name of
security and economic interests whenever deemed appropriate.5 3
However, the manner in which the United States is intervening today has evolved.
Robinson is of the opinion that U.S. foreign policymakers now intervene in the Latin
American region by focusing intensely on civil society itself, instead of the Cold War
norm of focusing on government structures.54 As a result, the purpose of the current U.S.
democracy promotion policies are not to suppress but to penetrate and conquer civil
society and integrate subordinate classes and national groups into a hegemonic
transnational social order.55
The U.S. Congress supports the three top priorities of U.S. foreign policy for post-
Cold War Latin America: 1) opening of markets; 2) strengthening of democracy; and 3)
combating the flow of illegal narcotics. For example, Congress has ratified the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1993), as well as free trade agreements with
Chile (2004), the Dominican Republic and Central America (DR-CAFTA, 2007), and
Peru (2007). Congress has also reiterated its concerns about the state of democracy in the
region and in particular Venezuela on numerous occasions. Additionally, Congress has
provided funding for combating the flow of illegal narcotics and recently provided an
additional $4 billion for Plan Colombia.
5 Ibid., pg. 8.
* Robinson, pg. 29.
ss Ibid., pg. 29.
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The U.S. Congress has supported and funded these measures throughout the post-
Cold War period in order to counterbalance growing Latin American disenchantment
with representative democracy and the neo-liberal economic policies the United States
wishes to see implemented by the Latin American states. Gabriel Gaspar in Political
Change in Latin America: Regional Geopolitical Implications, indicates that with the end
of the Cold War, most of the Latin American states underwent democratic transformation
and overcame authoritarian rule in addition to opening up to the global economy.56 By
doing so, it was thought such political changes could lead to a convergence of interests
between the United States and Latin America. 57
However, Latin American popular expectations and the quality of elected
democratic leaders continued to vary widely within the region. Socio-economic
difficulties have added to growing popular disenchantment with representative
democracy and neo-liberalism. Congress reacts to these concerns by providing funding to
U.S. programs that support human rights groups and democracy promotion
In the case of Venezuela, the U.S. Congress continues to react to Chavez's
revolutionary reform program by raising its concerns on the state of Venezuelan
democracy and human rights, energy issues, terrorism, and the overall status of the
56 Gaspar, Gabriel, Political Change in Latin America: Regional Geopolitical Implications, (April 20,
2006), Colleagues of the Americas Seminar Series - National Defense University, Institute for National
Strategic Studies, accessed November 1, 2008,
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/responsibility/inss proceedings/collegues for the Americas/colleagues 2006 03
Af.
57 Ibid.
62
bilateral U.S.-Venezuelan relationship.5 8 While U.S. funded democracy promotion
programs have operated in Venezuela since 1992, funding levels for the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED) and other democracy promoting activities in
Venezuela have expanded under the Chavez government.5 9 Funding support for NED
activities continues to be criticized by the Venezuelan government as overt intervention,
as opposed to covert CIA intervention/support as outlined in preceding passages by
Robinson, for the opposition and those groups involved in the failed April 2002 coup
attempt against the Chavez government. 60
Interestingly enough the factors just outlined coincides with Abraham
Lowenthal's position on how U.S. domestic issues in the post-Cold War are increasingly
the impetus and justification for continued overarching U.S. influence in the region.61
Lowenthal believes that U.S.-Latin American relations in the post-Cold War period will
be defined by the international spillover of U.S. domestic concerns involving both
domestic and international aspects and actors. 62 Congressional interest in developments
in Venezuela will be increasingly premised not just on internal Venezuelan issues, but
will also be viewed in terms of their impact on congressional constituents' concerns. In
this sense Congress will have to marry constituent-driven concerns such as high domestic
58 Sullivan, Mark P. Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy. Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service (CRS), (revised August 1, 2008), accessed November 1, 2008, pg. 59,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/l09526.pdf.
59Ibid., pg. 41.
606Ibid., pg. 41.
61 Crandall, pgs. 8 to 9.
62 Ibid., pgs. 8 to 9.
63
gasoline prices with Chavez's calls for production cuts. Lowenthal's "intermestic" issues
will force Congress to further assert itself in the foreign policymaking process and
question how U.S. policies dealing with revolutionary change are crafted.
BLASIER'S THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Blasier's theoretical framework is built around the three classical revolutionary
phases or stages: rebel movements (insurrections), reformist governments, and
revolutionary change. 63 Blasier's analysis is comparative and draws general propositions
about U.S. foreign policy and its relationship to revolutionary change in Latin America.
As such, Blasier's theoretical model is built around four revolutionary case studies:
Mexico (1910-14), Guatemala (1944-54), Bolivia (1943-63), and Cuba (1956-61). In the
Hovering Giant, Blasier utilizes the would-be Dominican Republic revolution of 1965,
post-1968 Peru, and Allende's Chile to further test his propositions.
The main premise of Blasier's theoretical framework is that the U.S. foreign
policymakers' actions, in this case the decisions made to accommodate, suppress or
repress a reformist or a revolutionary government, are a reaction to actions carried out by
reformists and revolutionary governments. If reforms and or revolutionary changes are
compatible with U.S. interests, then accommodation is the likely outcome. Otherwise,
there is a significant proclivity for U.S. foreign policymakers to suppress and repress
would-be reformists and revolutionaries alike. If the latter have links to rival extra-
hemispheric powers of the United States, then the U.S. Government will seek to change
the offending regime and sever that country's ties to that rival extra-hemispheric power.
63 See, Blasier, 1985, pg. 4-5.
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In recent years Blasier's theoretical framework has been grouped together with
that of other Latin American comparativist scholars. Like the work of a number of other
comparativists, Blasier's arguments have been criticized by Bates and Geddes as being
unsystematic, not cumulative, untestable, or maybe even a-theoretical.6 4 Yet, Blasier's
conclusions on the drivers of U.S. foreign policymaking in reaction to revolutionary
change in Latin America remain valid. U.S. foreign policymaking continues to emphasize
that its primary objective is the protection of the United States and its national security
interests (e.g., assuring the integrity of national borders and the continued survival of the
U.S. population, as well as continued American economic prosperity). Preoccupation
with security subsequently relegates both private business interests and general notions of
public good to secondary and tertiary tiers of importance for U.S. foreign policymakers.
United States foreign policymakers, especially at the senior level, have focused
almost exclusively and consistently over the decades on national security. From an
operational policymaking perspective, it is worth noting in this context that whenever a
foreign policy concern lacks a national security component, and if American business
interests are also not in serious jeopardy, then U.S. foreign policy is often relegated to the
bureaucratic mid-level.
Within the context of the present study, a recurrent theme based on Blasier's
theoretical framework is that Chavez's nationalization of the oil majors' privately run
oilfields within the Orinoco River Basin region is an example of what could potentially
64 See, Coppedge, Michael. How the Large N Could Complement the Small in Democratization Research.
Univeristy of Notre Dame: Notre Dame, IN. Accessed, September 23, 2007.
http://www.nd.edu/-mcoppedi/crd/cpmeth.htm. Also see, William, Mark Eric in Theory-Driven
Comparative Analysis: Dead on the Gurney or Lost in the Shuffle? (September 22, 2000). Accessed,
September 23, 2007, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary 0286-1903156 ITM.
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constitute a threat to both U.S. national security and private business interests. However,
the type of oil (largely sour, heavy crude) extracted from the Orinoco oil belt, declining
U.S. dependence on Venezuelan oil imports, and the Chavez government's willingness to
negotiate compensation for expropriated holdings placates many of the concerns that are
otherwise associated with an immediate threat to U.S. national (energy) security.65
Chavez's persecution of Venezuela's independent, pro-opposition media is
equally relevant to the present discussion. Although Chavez's action is distasteful to
many in the United States, it does not constitute a threat since even the expropriation of
American oil holdings in Venezuela are relegated to the non-vital interest level.
Blasier's Theoretical Propositions: Their Interpretation
To help explain the U.S. government's response to Latin American revolutionary
change, the study utilizes Blasier's list of twenty propositions. The propositions
pertaining to the three phases or stages of revolutionary change are detailed in Table 1.
65 The May 2007 nationalizations have without a doubt impacted American private business interests. Yet
what needs to be considered when reviewing this type of nationalization is how Chavez will compensate
the affected companies. In the past the nationalization of American private business interests, such as those
that occurred with Guatemala's attempt to implement a sweeping land reform detrimental to U.S.-based
United Fruit Company, led the U.S government to sanction overthrowing an offending regime in 1954.
Today's situation, characterized by the absence of an extra-hemispheric, interventionist power such as the
Soviet Union precludes a similar situation. For further discussion on the subject matter see Chapters Four
through Six.
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Table 1 - Blasier's Propositions for United States Government's (USG)
Action Grouped by Relevance to the Three Phases or Stages of
Revolutionary Change
Proposition Definition
Number 1 USG will respond flexibly to rebel movements (stage 1) whenever the United States
does not associate these rebel movements with a Great Power rival. USG will be hostile
toward rebel movements when these are perceived to be associated with rival Great
Powers.
Number 2 USG will be hostile toward most reformist governments (stage 2) primarily because of
the adverse impacts these have on U.S. private interests.
Number 3 USG responds to revolutionary governments (stage 3) in accordance to their links to the
U.S. strongest Great Power rival (Germany until 1945 and the Soviet Union 1947-91)
and its impact on U.S. national security interests. Strategic considerations shape whether
response is conciliatory or suppressive.
Number 4 USG leaders opt for a conciliatory response if they determine that the revolutionary
government will negotiate a settlement of issues in conflict and that an agreement
precludes further interference of a hostile Great Power. USG leaders opt for suppression
when they determine that the revolutionary government will not negotiate an agreement
and avoids an agreement when it is deemed the best means of preventing or countering
the interference of a hostile Great Power.
Source: Blasier, 1985, pg. 236.
Blasier's first four propositions pertain to the U.S. government's responses to
revolutionary change. For example, in Proposition 1, Blasier holds that during the
insurrection phase (stage 1) senior-level U.S. foreign policymakers (either the President
and or senior members of the Department of State) are actively engaged in policy
formulation. These actors in Blasier's country case studies react to rebel movements in
Mexico (1910-11), Guatemala (1944), and Cuba (1957-59) in a flexible manner once it
became evident that these revolutionary movements did not at that point have meaningful
links to a rival Great Power of the United States.
With regard to the case of Bolivia (1943-44) then Secretary of State Cordell Hull
(1933-44) adhering to the parameters that correspond to Blasier's Proposition 1 rejects
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and refuses to recognize the Gualberto Villarroel government out of fears that Villarroel's
Movimiento Nacional Revolutionario (MNR) and the MNR cabinet were sympathetic to
National Socialist (Nazi) Germany. The case of Bolivia represents an example of
reactionary policy made to repress a revolutionary regime once it is identified by U.S.
foreign policymakers to have been corrupted by an extra-hemispheric, anti-American
power. Corruption is not the result of revolutionaries overthrowing the previous socio-
political regime. Instead it is a designation applied to a regime linked to a hostile Great
Power rival of the United States.
Blasier's Proposition 2 holds that the U.S. government adopts a hostile position
toward rebel movements once these secure control of governing institutions and establish
reformist governments (stage 2). Blasier makes the argument that the decisive
consideration that leads to hostile/ suppressive U.S. government action against reformist
governments is the perception by U.S. foreign policymakers that the latter's reforms
adversely impact American private interests. U.S. government retaliatory action in this
case has often included the suspension of foreign aid, checking the offending regime's
proposals and participation in international forums, and active support for the regime's
opponents. 66
Unlike the prevailing situation in Proposition 1, in Proposition 2 the key foreign
policy decision-makers are non-cabinet members either located at the ambassadorial level
or are mid-level State Department bureaucrats. Examples of reformist governments that
66 For example the United States blocked Venezuela's election to the United Nations (UN) Security
Council in 2006 to prevent Chavez from interfering with United States' plans to pressure Iran over its
nuclear program. See, Regan, Tom, "US working to block Venezuela's Security Council bid," in The
Christian Science Monitor, (June 19, 2006), accessed August 9, 2008,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0619/dailyUpdate.html.
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met with U.S. government hostility in the past include Mexico (1913), Bolivia (1946),
and Guatemala (1950). However, in the case of Cuba (1959, January-May), State
Department bureaucrats initially opt to maintain open lines of communication with the
new Castro government during its initial reform stage. Their assessment of the possibility
of accommodation led them to forgo the recommendation of political-economic sanctions
that were feared could possibly push Castro into the Soviet camp.
Blasier's Proposition 3, in comparison to Proposition ] and 2, stresses that the
U.S. government responds to revolutionary governments in a manner commensurate to
these governments' perceived link to extra-hemispheric, anti-American powers. For
Blasier, the U.S. government's strategic considerations are the key determinant of
whether American foreign policymakers - in this case the President, the Secretary of
State, and or senior members of the Department of State - will seek accommodation with
the revolutionary government or alternatively seek to suppress it. Blasier highlights that
there are four possible outcomes in Proposition 3: reconciliation (i.e., Mexico, 1915-17),
acceptance (i.e., Bolivia, 1952), support (i.e., Bolivia, 1961), or suppression (i.e., Cuba,
1961).
In Proposition 3 Blasier determines that the decisive consideration for a sitting
U.S. president to seek reconciliation may be the need to secure the nation's border. The
need to secure the U.S.-Mexico border was the decisive consideration in President
Woodrow Wilson's (D, 1913-21) 1915 decision to provide Mexico's Carranza
government with defacto recognition (with de jure recognition occurring in 1917).
Wilson, having secured the U.S.-Mexico border by withdrawing American forces from
Mexico, could then enter the First World War in Europe without the distraction of a
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possible war in North America. Wilson's decision to withdraw American forces from
Mexico in 1917 reduced tensions with Mexico City and consequently prevented the
Carranza government from entering the First World War on the side of Germany.
Accommodation with a revolutionary government can also result from U.S.
foreign policymakers' willingness to accept the revolutionary government whenever it
assures the United States that it will not adversely affect American private interests with
the implementation of revolutionary measures. An example of this situation is the Harry
Truman administration's (D, 1945-53) acceptance and recognition of the MNR-led
Bolivian government in 1952. The Bolivian government assured the Truman
administration that American private properties and holdings in Bolivia would not be
nationalized without proper compensation. 67
Once the MNR government reached an agreement with the American owners of
expropriated Bolivian tin mines, the U.S. government benevolently extended emergency
economic assistance to Bolivia in an act of reconciliation in 1953. The United States'
action here demonstrates that expropriation with proper compensation leads to
reconciliation as a means to block the reformist government from entertaining the
possibility of accommodating Soviet (communist) influence in the country. Cold War
concerns over potential Soviet interventionism in Bolivia provides U.S. foreign
policymaking bureaucrats within the State Department with the justification for their
1961 recommendation for expanded economic assistance through the Plan Triangular
within the greater context of the Alliance for Progress.
67 Interestingly enough the issue of compensation, and what constitutes fair and timely compensation, will
play a significant role with regards to whether the United States will move either toward reconciliation
with Caracas in the future. Alternatively, American policymakers may seek to further suppress the Chavez
government.
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Alternatively, Proposition 3 according to Blasier can also be utilized to explain
why the U.S. government will seek to suppress a revolutionary government. Blasier's
Proposition 3 holds that the suppression of a revolutionary government is the preferred
policy once U.S. foreign policymakers determine that a reformist or revolutionary regime
has link to an extra-hemispheric, anti-American rival of the United States. Blasier
identifies the principles of Proposition 3 as being the determinants that led President
Dwight Eisenhower (R, 1953-61) to reverse the U.S. government's previous position of
acceptance of the Castro government (Proposition 2) in March 1960.
The enduring legacy of Eisenhower's policy reversal has been the U.S.
government's decades-long active suppression of the Castro government, which the
President initiated by authorizing the arming of Cuban emigres for a then possible
invasion of Cuba. Cuban exiles went on to launch their failed amphibious assault at the
Bay of Pigs from April 17-19, 1961, during the Kennedy administration (D, 1961-63).
Blasier's Proposition 4 holds that the U.S. government will opt to adopt a
conciliatory position toward a revolutionary government whenever the regime indicates
its willingness to reach an acceptable settlement of issues in conflict. A settlement
precludes any further link by the reformist or revolutionary regime to an extra-
hemispheric, anti-American power. Examples that typify such a settlement are Mexico in
1915-17, and again in 1938-41, as well as Bolivia in 1951 and 1961.
Blasier also finds that senior U.S. foreign policymakers, especially the President,
will be inclined to suppress a revolutionary government whenever it is determined that
the regime is unwilling to negotiate an acceptable agreement of outstanding issues.
Blasier's Proposition 4 also highlights the possibility that the President and other senior-
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level foreign policymakers may seek to subdue a settlement agreement whenever it is
deemed the best means of preventing or countering the interference of an extra-
hemispheric, anti-American power. A clear example of such a situation is the Eisenhower
administration's decision to implement measures to eliminate the Cuban sugar quota once
the U.S. government determined that the Castro regime was unwilling to negotiate in
good faith.
Blasier's framework makes a compelling argument of cause-and-effect as key
determinants of U.S. foreign policymakers reacting to revolutionary change in Latin
America. Blasier's Propositions 1- 4 highlight that reformist and revolutionary actions
will result in largely predictable American foreign policies. These propositions can
consequently be utilized to anticipate U.S. government reactions to reformist and
revolutionary governments.
Blasier's framework is not limited to just the three revolutionary stages or to four
propositions. Rather Blasier's framework also encompasses a set of economic and
bureaucratic explanations as determinants of U.S. reactions to revolutionary change as
indicated in Table 2.
72
Table 2 - Blasier's Propositions for United States Government's (USG)
Action Grouped by Relevance to Economic and Bureaucratic
Explanations
Proposition Definition
Number 5 Economic considerations and private business interests are important in the formulation
(economic) of USG policies and are compatible with policies decided on strategic grounds.
However, strategic factors take precedence over economic considerations.
Number 6 The President or the Secretary of State is engaged in Great Power rival strategic
(bureaucratic) decision-making.
Number 7 Departmental officials are the principal decision-makers in most responses perceived as
strategically insignificant. Scant participation by the President or the Secretary of State.
Number 8 USG responses determined by departmental officials are in line with those of U.S.
private interests or at least do not blatantly oppose these interests.
Number 9 USG responses involve intra-agency conflict. Bureaucratic considerations will condition
USG response.
Number 10 Strategic considerations and or private interests prevail over bureaucratic considerations
and are incorporated into the internal bargaining process.
Number 11 USG suppressive responses are the result of the need to retain U.S. hemispheric political
primacy.
Number 12 USG responses are shaped by: 1) the President acting with or through cabinet-level
officers; 2) leaders of large corporations working with the U.S. Congress and the
executive branch; and 3) middle level diplomats and civil servants. Responses are result
of security, economic, and bureaucratic considerations.
Note: Propositions 6 through 12 are labeled by Blasier as "bureaucratic explanations" of USG action.
Source: Blasier, 1985, pgs. 236-237.
Note that Blasier indicates in Proposition 5 that although economic considerations
and private business interests are important in the formulation of the U.S. government's
response to revolutionary change, strategic considerations will ultimately prevail.
Proposition 5, while recognizing the importance of economic factors, defers to security
considerations - national security trumps all other issues. Both Presidents Wilson and
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Franklin D. Roosevelt (D, 1933-45) were motivated to seek reconciliation with Mexico in
1915-17 and again in 1938-41 due to U.S. national security concerns (e.g., threats to U.S.
vital interests). They recognized that retaliatory actions, for example continued American
interference in Mexican internal affairs or sanctions levied against Mexico for its
nationalization of U.S. oil properties, could ultimately push Mexico into the German
camp.68
Blasier's Propositions 6, 7, and 8 are tied together by a common thread. In these
three propositions the ultimate determinant of whether the President and or cabinet-level
officials become involved (Proposition 6) in the U.S. government's response to
revolutionary change is strategic considerations with respect to the involvement of an
extra-hemispheric, anti-American power. For example, President Kennedy's decision to
authorize the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 is the result of concern over growing
Soviet involvement in Cuba. Should there not be an extra-hemispheric, anti-American
power link, mid-level departmental officials will retain primary responsibility for
determining the U.S. government's response (Proposition 7) and will likely formulate
policies in accordance with the demands of American private interests or at the least not
conflicting significantly with those interests (Proposition 8).
In Blasier's Propositions 9, 10, 11, and 12, the common theme linking the
propositions is the bureaucratic decision-making process. Here again the issue of strategic
considerations remains the ultimate determinant of not just the type of response, but also
how that response is determined internally within the U.S. government. Blasier indicates
68 Note that General John J. Pershing marched into Mexico in pursuit of the disgruntled Mexican
revolutionary general Francisco Villa for his March 9, 1916 raid on Columbus, New Mexico.
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that ultimately the U.S. government's actions will be determined by a combination of
security, economic, and bureaucratic considerations (Proposition 12).
The U.S. government's foreign policy is affected by the pyramid-like structure
(Graph 1) in which the President is located at the apex, with cabinet-level officers
immediately below, followed by members of Congress working with U.S. private
business interests. Forming the base of the pyramid, and consequently supporting the
actions of those above it, are mid-level diplomats and career civil servants, who may
often have a combination of vested (institutional) interests and cultural affinities for
recommending certain policies over others. However, congressional oversight and
funding functions often place Congress on an equal footing with the President in
impacting U.S. foreign policy as indicated by the curved arrow.
Graph 1 - Traditional U.S. Foreign Policymaking
Pyramid
President
Cabinet Officers
Members of Congress and U.S.
Private Business Interests
Mid-level Diplomats and Civil Servants
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Blasier also provides propositions that both evaluate the outcome of the U.S.
government's responses as well as highlight the impact of policies on revolutionary
governments. Table 3 below assists in summarizing this third set of propositions.
Table 3 - Blasier's Propositions for United States Government's (USG)
Action Grouped by Responses Evaluated and Impact
Proposition Definition
Responses Evaluated
Number 13 USG perceptions of German influence in Mexico and Soviet influence in Cuba are
correct. USG perceptions of German influence in Bolivia and Soviet influence in Bolivia
and Guatemala are exaggerated or incorrect.
Number 14 USG's strategic responses in Mexico and Bolivia are functional whereas in Guatemala
and Cuba are dysfunctional.
Number 15 Security considerations and not the need to protect U.S. private interests justify USG's
decision to sponsor armed action against a revolutionary government.
Number 16 The U.S. public's perception that the USG has the obligation to check the spread of
communism inculcates in U.S. leaders a fear of political repercussions if they fail to
contain communism.
Number 17 USG responses are crafted out of business and security concerns as described in
Propositions 2 and 3. Few USG responses are taken out of broad conceptions of U.S.
public interest.
U.S. Impact
Number 18 Conciliatory policies will have moderating and de-radicalizing influences that will tend
to check the momentum of revolutionary change. Suppressive policies will polarize
societies and radicalize opposition groups leading to the creation of revolutionary
situations.
Number 19 USG policies will generally not facilitate revolutionary governments' attempts to reduce
their dependence on the United States.
Number 20 The revolutionary process does not reduce dependence unless the revolutionary
government succeeds in establishing a firm one-party rule and effective subordination of
the armed forces.
Source: Blasier, 1985, pgs. 237-238.
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Blasier's final eight propositions ultimately evaluate the effectiveness of the U.S.
government's responses to revolutionary change. Blasier utilizes Propositions 13-17 to
examine the overall accuracy of the U.S. government's perception of a threat and
highlight what drives American foreign policies vis-a-vis the actions of Latin American
reformist and revolutionary governments.
Blasier's Proposition 13 questions whether the U.S. government's fears of
German influence in Mexico and Soviet interventionism in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Cuba
were justified. Blasier points out that in the case of German influence in Mexico and
Soviet influence in Cuba, U.S. foreign policymakers' conclusions were essentially
correct. However, U.S. foreign policymakers' fears of Soviet influence in Guatemala and
Bolivia were either incorrect or significantly exaggerated.69
The question that needs to be asked at this point is how does Proposition 13
explain the U.S. government's correct assessment of what constitutes a threat by an extra-
hemispheric, anti-American rival under one set of circumstances while in other cases it
fails to properly gauge the nature of the threat?
Arguably the Mexican (1915-17) situation, like that of Cuba in 1961 shares a
number of similarities that made both of these governments susceptible to being
influenced by extra-hemispheric, anti-American rivals of the United States. In this regard
the Carranza government, alarmed by continued U.S. interference in the internal affairs
69 The Bolivian revolution is a consequence of domestic upheaval that originates in the 1930s and extends
throughout the 1940s as the economic base of Bolivia's old social system collapses as a result of the tin
mining sector's decline. Up until then Bolivia's social system relied almost exclusively on the economic
benefits of tin mining. The immobility of mining assets and declining output contribute to the general
deterioration of the middle and working classes' living conditions. This factor combined with the loss of
ruling legitimacy of Bolivia's traditional leaders as a result of defeat in the Chaco War in 1935 results in
the rise of a new generation of reformist military leaders with populist proclivities.
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of Mexico and Pershing's occupation of northern Mexico, was increasingly drawn to
contemplate collaboration with the German Empire. Such collaboration, if left
unchecked, could have led to the possible formation of an alliance, threatening the U.S.
underbelly and keeping the United States from entering the conflict raging in Europe.70
The Wilson administration's foresight to unconditionally remove American forces from
Mexico and recognize the Carranza government placated Mexican pride, thus halting the
development of a Mexican-German alliance.71
With regards to Cuba in 1961, past American involvement in Cuban affairs irked
Cuban nationalist proclivities and contributed to the push of the nascent Castro regime
towards the Soviet Union. Prior to 1961, the Cuban communists were neither powerful
nor had substantial ties to Moscow. Today the consensus is that Castro sought to achieve
his political objectives in the early 1960s by narrowing the ideological and political-
diplomatic gap between Cuba and the Soviet Union as a means of changing the
traditional framework of U.S.-Cuban political-economic relations, and that U.S.
suppressive action actually facilitated Castro's agenda.
70 Interestingly the Mexican overture to Germany provided the latter with the possibility of establishing
submarine bases in Mexico to counter U.S. involvement in Mexican affairs.
71 Similarly In the years leading up to the Second World War, the United States' concerns with Mexico's
relations with the Axis powers are a result of Germany's high level of espionage, counter-espionage,
sabotage, and psychological warfare directed toward the United States during the First World War from
Mexican soil. What helped to prevent Mexican-German relations from progressing toward an anti-
American alliance during the pre-war period was the foresight of Roosevelt and other senior U.S foreign
policymakers to seek accommodation with Mexico in spite of its March 1938 seizure of foreign oil fields.
U.S. foreign policymakers' unwillingness to exert harsh economic sanctions in retaliation for the oil field
seizures, combined with the government of President Ldzaro Cdrdenas' distaste for the Axis powers given
on its reliance of support from Marxist-oriented labor, precluded Mexico from joining the Axis fascists.
The U.S. government's willingness to compromise on differences with Mexico, as well as offer economic
inducements and collaborate politically, worked to cool relations between Mexico City and Berlin.
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The Mexican (1915-17) case represents accommodation with the revolutionary
government on the part of the United States and on the part of Mexico represents
willingness to compromise by severing threatening links to a Great Power rival of the
United States. Once the Carranza government achieved its political objective of obtaining
a U.S. military pullout from its northern territories, it no longer saw it beneficial to pursue
the establishment of a wartime alliance with Germany, opting instead to remain neutral
throughout the First World War.
Castro on the other hand realized early on that in order to achieve his political-
economic objectives, namely doing away with Cuban dependence on the United States,
he had to reach out to the Soviet Union as an alternative, albeit far distant, patron.
Although Proposition 13 shows that an enlightened response by U.S. foreign
policymakers to a revolutionary regime will likely lead to a rapprochement between it
and the revolutionary regime, this has not been the case with Cuba. This proposition
stresses that in order for rapprochement to be feasible, the revolutionary regime must
sever its ties to extra-hemispheric, anti-American rivals of the United States. By 1961,
Castro confirmed the Eisenhower administration's suspicions about growing Soviet
influence in Havana through a combination of inflammatory statements heralding the
further radicalization of Cuban society and willingness to associate his regime with the
Soviets during the Cold War. The Eisenhower administration moved to repress the Castro
regime based on Blasier's Propositions 2 and 3.
Blasier's Propositions 13 and 14 are similarly linked. The former deals with the
validity of U.S. official perceptions, whereas the latter focuses on the efficacy of the U.S.
government's actions. Blasier argues that while the U.S. government's response to
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strategic fears in the Mexican (1915-17) and the Cuban (1961) cases are correct or
functional using Blasier's own terminology, the United States' response to the Bolivian
and Guatemalan (1954) situations is dysfunctional.
The U.S. government's response to revolutionary change in Bolivia and
Guatemala is dysfunctional. It is a knee jerk reaction to the (remote) possibility of
growing communism in these societies. Blasier's Proposition 14 finds that the U.S.
government's actions against these two countries was not driven by a significant or
growing communist presence, but rather was the product of America's own obsession
with anti-communism and the inability of American foreign policymakers to make the
distinction between populism and communism.
As a result of U.S. policymakers' inability to make the distinction between
populism and communism, the government's policies when dealing with reformist and
revolutionary governments during the early years of the Cold War succumbs to Senator
Joseph McCarthy's (R-Wisconsin, 1947-57) "Red Scare." While U.S. foreign
policymakers' inability to distinguish between the factors leading to the rise of populism
and communism may have been due to their past experiences with oligarchic politicians
and conservative military leaders, it is nonetheless McCarthy's pursuit of communist and
communist sympathizers within the U.S. Department of State that ultimately shaped
policy. In this regard, McCarthy's actions not only ruined careers, but equally
importantly disabled others within the department to make the crucial distinction that
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Latin America's rising populism was more likely to result in a military dictatorship than a
communist takeover. 72
Like the case with a number of Blasier's other propositions, Propositions 15, 16,
and 17 are also linked to each other. While the primary justification for military
intervention associated with these propositions arises from U.S. foreign policymakers'
security concerns, what is interesting to note is Blasier's comment that under these
scenarios American intervention was determined by the executive branch of the
government. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy authorized paramilitary action against
Guatemala (1954) and Cuba (1961), while Johnson (D, 1963-69) authorized the
deployment of U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic (1965) and Nixon ordered covert
CIA action against Allende as early as 1970.73
The pressure placed on the White House by the American electorate has
facilitated attempts led by the executive to check perceived Soviet interventionism in
7 Senator McCarthy's involvement in foreign policymaking can be deemed to be itself dysfunctional and
ultimately counterproductive.
73 Interestingly enough among the thousands of National Security Council (NSC) papers recently
declassified by the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at NARA, the White House's
(SECRET/SENSITIVE) Memorandum for the President, "Subject: NSC Meeting,_November 6-Chile,"
dated November 5, 1970, shows Kissinger's forceful attempts to influence Nixon's policy toward an
Allende government. Kissinger emphasized to Nixon that Allende's election "poses for us one of the most
serious challenges ever faced in this hemisphere." Kissinger goes on to list the threat Allende would pose to
U.S. private business interests in Chile and elsewhere. But most alarming for Kissinger was the precedent
set as an "example of a successful elected Marxist government" would have on other reformists and
revolutionaries. Heralding a number of aspects otherwise associated with Chivez's own election and
subsequent reelection, this memo notes that Allende will seek to be: "internationally respectable; move
cautiously and pragmatically; avoid immediate confrontations with us." Kissinger attributes this to
Allende's "gameplan" to "neutralize" his political opponents in Chile. Kissinger urged Nixon to overrule
the U.S. State Department position that the U.S. did "not have the capability of preventing Allende from
consolidating himself or forcing his failure" and that U.S. influence was best gained by "maintaining our
relationship and our presence in Chile." Kissinger goes on to recommend a hostile policy of pressure and
opposition, but implemented "quietly and covertly" for "maximum effectiveness." See, Kornbluh, Peter.
The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. National Security Archive
Electronic Briefing Book Number 110 (February 3, 2004), accessed, September 30, 2007.
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB110/index.htm#doc2 and
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 110/chile02.pdf.
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Latin America, interpreted as being carried out by revolutionaries and reformist alike.
Throughout the Cold War, the electorate tasked the U.S. President with primary
responsibility of curtailing the advance of communism. Blasier's Proposition 16 best
captures the notion of presidential action geared to suppressing (toppling) an offending
regime under such circumstances. 74 International communism (i.e., Soviet
interventionism) is identified not only as a threat to American private business interests in
the region, but is also seen as constituting a threat to the heart of American society as
represented by independent labor, universities, the free press, and organized religion.
Blasier finds that when the foregoing sectors were not threatened by Latin
American reformists or revolutionary governments' links to an extra-hemispheric, anti-
American rival of the United States, U.S. foreign policymakers crafted the government's
responses to non-security related challenges around private sector and other domestic
special interests. As a result of this, Proposition 17 indicates that significant, sustained
special interest pressure may be placed upon the executive branch to adopt policies that
go against its own policy preferences.75
74 Up through the Viet Nam era the American electorate's prevailing view on international communism was
that it represented a threat to all aspects of American life and that the President was responsible for
combating it.
75 A case in point indicative of the validity of Blasier's framework even outside of the Latin America
context, is the situation that arose with General George C. Marshall's failure to secure a coalition
government in China bringing together the nationalists and communists. This led the Truman
administration to conclude that the proper policy course would be to terminate all further military and
economic aid to the nationalist government of Chiang, Kai-shek. However the powerful China lobby within
the U.S. Congress managed to exert significant enough pressure on the Truman administration, namely by
threatening to withhold its support for the Marshall Plan and European recovery being threatened by Soviet
(communist) expansionism, that the White House was forced to reverse its position and continue aiding
Chiang. This sort of situation results in U.S. policy being shaped by global strategy and or special interests
instead of on the merits of the drivers of a particular bilateral relationship.
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Blasier's Theoretical Propositions: Evaluating the Impact of U.S. Foreign Policies
Blasier's Propositions 18, 19, and 20 evaluate the impact of the U.S.
government's policies crafted to address revolutionary change in Latin America. Blasier
recognizes that the extent of American influence on Latin American countries has been
so extensive and enduring over the past two centuries that a comprehensive evaluation is
difficult to achieve for all of these countries under the best of circumstances. However,
Blasier focuses largely on two major aspects to draw his conclusions: first, the effect of
the U.S. government's policies on the pace of revolutionary change; and second, on the
effects of the U.S. government's policies on reformist and revolutionary governments'
attempts to reduce their traditional dependency on the United States.
In Proposition 18 Blasier finds that whenever American foreign policymakers
have adopted conciliatory policies, such as is the case with Mexico and Bolivia, these
policies have had a moderating effect on the impacted governments. For Blasier these
policies have often succeeded in de-radicalizing reformists and revolutionaries alike.
Alternatively, whenever the U.S. government has implemented suppressive policies (i.e.,
Guatemala and Cuba), Blasier concludes that these policies have polarized societies and
radicalized opposition groups.
Blasier finds that excessive American pressure combined with the suspension of
economic and military aid force reformist and revolutionary governments to turn to a
hostile great power rival of the United States. For example, Blasier refers to the case of
the reformist government of Jacobo Arbenz (1951-54) in Guatemala and the
revolutionary regime of Fidel Castro (1959-present) in Cuba. Both of these governments
turned either out of necessity and or out of political affinity to the Soviet Bloc. In any
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case, Latin American reformist and revolutionary leaders have consistently become
embittered and rabidly anti-American, and thereby more prone to seek out an extra-
hemispheric, anti-American rival of the United States whenever U.S. foreign
policymakers have sought to repress their regimes.
As both reformist and revolutionary governments seek to reduce their traditional
dependence on the United States, American foreign policymakers become increasingly
unwilling to accept these governments and their proposed reforms since these adversely
impact American interests. The U.S. government's opposition to these reformist and
revolutionary governments' measures is similar to the situation indicated in Proposition
17, which argues that action at times is undertaken as a result of the White House having
to accede to special interest concerns.
Blasier's Proposition 19 concludes in a self-evident manner that the U.S.
government will not generally facilitate a reformist, and especially not a revolutionary
government's attempts to loosen the ties of dependence. Blasier's Proposition 19 also
highlights the fact that attempts by reformist and revolutionary governments to
implement reforms geared toward weakening their reliance on the United States have
largely been unsuccessful.
Blasier points to the example of Cuba's Che Guevara's diatribe that the
American sugar quota subjugated the Cuban people to a form of economic slavery, as a
means of highlighting the fact that even when Cuba switched its reliance on the United
States market for that of the Soviet Union its overall economic vulnerability actually
increased. Cuba's dangerous overreliance on the Soviet Union as its largest single export
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and import market was made apparent by the almost complete collapse of the Cuban
economy in the wake of the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1992.
Reliance on subsidized trade with the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc satellite
states left Cuba exposed to the consequences of the political upheavals in those countries.
In the process the evaporation of financial and material resources undermined the Castro
regime's legitimacy and stability. Nonetheless the Castro regime succeeded, where the
East Germans failed, by opening societal pressure values (e.g., turning a blind eye toward
Cubans seeking to leave the island) to lower socio-political pressure on the regime.76 It
has also been adept at finding alternative sources of financing either in liberal European
capitals or in an ideologically close ally such as Chavez.
Blasier's Proposition 19 can be applied to present day Cuba as well. The Castro
regime, notwithstanding its longevity and resilience, has failed to reduce its vulnerability
to political and economic dependence on a foreign patron. Today Cuba is increasingly
dependent on Chavez as it was on the United States in 1959 and the Soviet Union in
1992. Although Castro has managed in the past to mitigate some of the effects of external
influence on his regime by concentrating political-economic power in his own hands,
Venezuela's proximity, combined with Fidel and Raul Castro's advanced ages and the
need to ensure the continuation of the revolution, will increase Cuba's dependence on
Chavez and Venezuelan resources.
Blasier's Proposition 20 contrasts with Proposition 19 by concluding that the
revolutionary process does not reduce a country's dependence unless the revolutionary
76 The East Germans sought to prevent its citizens from escaping to the West by mining its borders and
installing automatic firing guns pointed inwards instead of outwards toward potential invaders.
85
government succeeds in establishing firm one-party rule and the effective subordination
of the country's armed forces to the revolutionary leadership. In Proposition 20 Blasier
argues that only by carrying out the preceding two measures will the revolutionary
government be able to isolate the country's internal affairs from foreign interference.
Both Castro's Cuba and Chavez's Venezuela are examples of Blasier's
Proposition 20. Although this argument will be further developed in the following
chapters, suffice it to say for now that in the Cuban case the Castro brothers firmly
control both the Cuban Communist Party and the Cuban military-intelligence apparatus
which has allowed the Castro regime to forswear a return to pre-1959 style economic
reliance on the United States even while staring down the near collapse of the national
economy in 1992.
Venezuela under Chavez is similarly moving in the Castro political-economic
model's direction. First, following the failed opposition-led coup attempt of 2002,
Chivez has sought not only to increasingly restrict political opposition with his
uncontested control over the country's National Legislative Assembly (Legislature), but
also has increased his control over Venezuela's armed forces. Secondly, Chavez has
managed to sideline the opposition by means of the ballot box and aided by internal
divisions within the opposition. Chivez is now politically powerful enough that he can
further consolidate his control over the country by forcing allied political parties to join
his own party or be made irrelevant as has largely occurred with the opposition.
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Blasier's Theoretical Propositions: Assessing the Impact of 1961 on Latin American
Revolutionary Change
Having reviewed Blasier's theoretical framework and its twenty propositions, the
next step is to briefly elaborate on what has been the U.S. Government's wait-and-see
approach to Latin American revolutionaries during the pre-1960s period and how this has
changed because of the success of the Cuban revolution in 1959 and its consolidation by
1961.
Prior to the 1960s American foreign policymakers often exhibited a certain degree
of tolerance toward Latin American revolutionaries. This was the case while the
revolutionaries had either not yet seized actual political power, or were otherwise
effectively consolidating their holds over the national governments.
Largely, the U.S. government's concern with communism in Latin America at the
dawn of the Cold War was not as great then as it would become by the 1960s. Lars
Schoultz finds that the U.S. Department of State's Policy Planning Staff concluded as
early as the Bogota Conference (1948) that although communism in Latin America
remained a potential danger, at that point it did not represent a serious danger when
compared to developments then underway on the European continent with a few possible
exceptions. A notable exception is the case of Guatemala under the government of Jacob
Arbenz (1951-54) which by the early 1950s was seen by the U.S. government as a
communist-inspired government (Blasier's Propositions 3 and 4)."
" Prior to Arbenz's overthrow (June 27, 1954) the Eisenhower administration (1953-61) isolated
Guatemala at the Organization of American States (OAS) by bullying the other member states into
adopting an anti-communist resolution that insinuated that the Arbenz government was a communist
beachhead. This resolution facilitated international support for the mutinous Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas
and his peasant army. Armas' ultimate success depended in no small measure on the logistical support
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United States foreign policymakers' inability to properly discern the true
ideological nature of Latin American reformist and revolutionary governments has been a
persistent problem. As a result U.S. foreign policymakers have often equated nationalist
reformist governments (e.g., Guatemala's Arbenz government) that have sought to
readdress what they perceive to be economic and political exploitation by the United
States, as being leftist at best, and communist in the worst cases (Blasier's Propositions
13 and 14).
However, the Cuban revolution (1959) is the catalyst that galvanized American
foreign policymakers' perceptions of a link existing between Latin American
revolutionary change and Soviet interventionism. Prior to the Cuban revolution U.S.
foreign policymakers had often favored a wait-and-see approach (excluding Guatemala's
Arbenz government). The American approach served as a means of ascertaining how the
revolutionary change would play itself out, permitting U.S. foreign policymakers to focus
resources on ascertaining the implications of the revolutionary agenda on American
interests.
What has changed since 1961 and has contributed to undermining this wait-and-
see approach is that Latin American revolutionaries began to view the United States as an
enemy from the onset of their campaigns to overthrow their countries' established
(traditional-conservative) political order. Before the 1960s, both reformists and
revolutionaries alike were hesitant of taking actions that could potentially antagonize the
provided by a covert Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operation code-named PBSUCCESS, which
included the strafing of Guatemala City by unmarked planes and the jamming of the country's airwaves
with reports of the government's imminent collapse. See, Streeter, Stephen, "Interpreting the 1954 U.S.
Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Post-Revisionist Perspectives," in The History
Teacher, Vol. 34, No. 1 (November 2000), pgs. 61-62.
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United States, therefore curtailing their ability to raise funds and support for their
endeavors amongst the American electorate.
Even Castro, whose socialist proclivities were honed while imprisoned (1952-55)
on the Isle of Pines (Cuba), freely traveled to the United States in 1955 prior to his
overthrow of the pro-U.S. regime of Fulgencio Batista (1952-59) to explain his cause and
raise funds for the revolutionary action.78 The Castro example compares satisfactorily
with somewhat similar activities carried out by Mexico's Francisco I. Madero during his
1910-11 rebellion in which he went as far as organizing armed units on U.S. territory for
his insurrection against the established Mexican government. 79
As the preceding statements indicate, U.S. foreign policymakers in the pre-1960s
period were often sympathetic to revolutionaries. Even when U.S. foreign policymakers
were not sympathetic to revolutionaries, they were at least not antagonistic as is normally
the case in the late Cold War period. The U.S. Government's tepid response to Latin
American revolutionaries in the past is a consequence of Latin American reformists and
78 Although Castro had sought to initiate political reform in Cuba through the country's political system by
seeking a parliamentary seat during the 1952 election, Batista's coup against the government of president
Carlos Prio Socarrds (1948-52) and the subsequent cancellation of elections motivated Castro to launch an
unsuccessful armed attack against the Moncada Military Barracks in Oriente province. Upon his release
from prison in 1955, Castro traveled to the United States (Bridgeport, Union City, New York, Miami,
Tampa, and Key West) and Mexico to raise funds for a new strike against the Batista regime. Castro even
met with staunch anti-communists like then Vice President Richard M. Nixon. One of the largest donations
made to Castro while in the United States was made by Socarrds who turned over approximately $40,000 to
$50,000 to Castro in McAllen, Texas in September 1956 (equivalent to $297,000 to $370,000 in 2006).
See, Blaiser, Cole. The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910-
1985. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 1985, pg. 20. For computing the relative value of the U.S.
dollar in 1956 compared to 2006 (last year of full annual data for initial and target year) using the consumer
price index, see http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php# accessed, August 30,
2007.
79 It is worthwhile to note that under a different set of circumstances a half a century later, such actions
would by then be considered to be an outright violation of United States neutrality laws. This fact is
evidenced by the United States indictment of 190 Cubans and the subsequent conviction of 170 of them for
violating U.S. neutrality laws.
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revolutionaries going to extensive lengths to reassure U.S. foreign policymakers that they
would act responsibly and honor the international commitments signed by previous
governments. 80
With the triumph of Fidel Castro's revolution in 1959, and the subsequent
deterioration of relations between Washington and Havana by 1961, the wait-and-see
approach fell by the wayside. A significant departure from past revolutionary perceptions
of legitimacy is that with the triumph of the Cuban revolution, Latin American
revolutionaries no longer sought to assure either the U.S. Department of State or the
American public that their objectives were not anti-American. Rather, Latin American
revolutionaries have for almost fifty years consistently identified the U.S. government,
and the American interests it represents, as an enemy of their revolutionary agendas.
Labeling the United States as being a hostile anti-reformist and anti-revolutionary state is
however an outgrowth of U.S. policymakers' support, actual or perceived, for those
regimes that Latin American reformers and revolutionaries alike have sought pressure to
change or overthrow since the 1960s.
Jorge I. Dominguez argues that during the Cold War era the U.S. government
became prone to deploying military forces against, or covertly sought to overthrow, Latin
American governments when these represented an ideological threat to the United
States.81 In his view, while in the early Cold War period the United States sought to
80 An example of this sort of situation is Francisco I. Madero's commitment to respect Mexico's pre
(November 30) 1910 treaties and obligations. In addition, Madero bound himself to guaranteeing his
government's responsibility for any damages to American property and interests or injuries to American
citizens. See, Blasier, pgs. 19-20.
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suppress Latin American (reformist/ revolutionary) governments only if these were
interpreted as moving significantly toward becoming communist, were quasi-communist,
or had already become communist states. By the second half of that era any anti-
American government was seen as an ideological threat. 82
81 Dominguez, Jorge I., "U.S.-Latin American Relations during the Cold War and its Aftermath," in
Working Paper Series 99-01 (January 1999) Weatherhead Center for International Affairs - Harvard
University: Cambridge, accessed August 28, 2007, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/dii01/.
82 9Ibid.
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CHAPTER 3 - GOING BEYOND THE WATER'S EDGE
"The Framers . .. gave to Congress the responsibility for deciding matters of war and
peace. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, was left with the power to "repel sudden
attacks" ... Whenever the President acts unilaterally in using military force against
another nation, the constitutional rights of Congress and the people are undermined."
Louis Fisher, constitutional scholar
THE PRIVILEGE OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EXECUTIVE-
LEGISLATIVE DISPUTE OVER FOREIGN POLICYMAKING LEADERSHIP
Setting the Stage
The United States (U.S.) President and the Congress share significant foreign
policymaking powers under the U.S. Constitution of 1787. However, the Framers
deliberately, or through oversight, chose not to specify which of these two branches of
the federal government is ultimately responsible for U.S. foreign policymaking. Such
constitutional ambiguity necessitates inter-branch cooperation as it places constraints on
the possibility of one branch, either the executive or legislative branch, from otherwise
monopolizing the U.S. foreign policymaking process.
The Objective of Chapter 3 is not to pass judgment on the Framers' decision to
diffuse primary responsibility in the U.S. foreign policymaking process. Such a review is
outside the scope of the present study. Similarly, the present discussion does not seek to
categorically answer the question of which of the three federal branches of government
1 Cited by McCormick, James M. in American Foreign Policy and Process. Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock
Publishers, Inc., 1998, Third edition, pg. 321.
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has the privilege of primary responsibility in the U.S. foreign policymaking process. That
is a task best suited to constitutional scholars.
Rather, Chapter 3 provides a general overview of how congressional foreign
policy is made and the inter-branch institutional constraints under which foreign policy is
crafted. The overview of the executive-legislative dispute and the accompanying
institutional discussion is necessary for setting the stage for the country-specific case
studies analyzed in the study's latter chapters. The present overview provides context of
how the inter-branch dispute for the privilege of primary responsibility in foreign
policymaking impacts the congressional determination of whether post-Cold War Latin
American reformists and revolutionaries alike constitute a threat to U.S. vital interests.
U.S. Constitutional Ambiguity
Constitutional ambiguity precludes a quick resolution of the debate as to which
branch of the U.S. government has the privilege of primary responsibility for directing
foreign policymaking. At first glance, it seems that constitutional ambiguity exists to
force the branches of the federal government to cooperate in foreign policy formulation.
One could expect that in the face of ambiguity, the branches of government would be
forced to work together in crafting U.S. foreign policies promoting the national interests
over local, state, or other special interests.
As Gordon Silverstein holds in Imbalance of Powers: Constitutional
Interpretation and American Foreign Policymaking, wherein he cities James Madison's
position in Federalist 37 (1788), one of the most difficult tasks confronting the Framers
was the need to balance stability in government with "the inviolable attention due to
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liberty and the republican form." 2 From the Framers'delicate constitutional balancing act
the present constitutional system of separation-of-powers has arisen. The U.S.
constitutional system of checks-and-balances added to ambiguity surrounding which
branch of government ultimately leads the foreign policymaking process, should in
practice inhibit the dominance of the foreign policymaking process by one branch or
alternatively limit the proclivity for partisan foreign policies by diffusing responsibility. 3
Nonetheless partisan-driven foreign policies do often prevail. Highly partisan
policymaking prevails especially whenever one of the two major parties gains control of
the White House (executive branch) and Congress (House of Representatives and the
Senate). Partisanship characterizes George W. Bush's first term as president (R, 2001-05)
as well as the first half of Bush's second term in office through the 2006 mid-term
elections when the Republican Party controlled both the White House and Congress.
Following the 2006 mid-term elections, control of Congress again flipped back to
the Democratic Party. The Democrats have subsequently expanded their hold on
Congress as a result of the 2008 general elections, capitalizing on voter dissatisfaction
with the Bush administration's domestic economic and international foreign policies. As
2 Silverstein, Gordon. Imbalance of Powers: Constitutional Interpretation and American Foreign
Policymaking. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997, pg. 213. See also, Madison, James,
Federalist 37, in Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist. Middleton,
Connecticut: Wesleyan University, Jacob E. Cooke, editor, 1961, accessed December 12, 2008,
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v 1 ch9s9.html.
3 Under the Articles of Confederation (1777-87), the states retained such a degree of independence vis-a-vis
the central government that Congress found itself often not only lacking sufficient funding but more
importantly even the necessary quorum to deliberate and approve treaties such as the Treaty of Paris (1783)
which for weeks Congress was unable to act upon. During the Articles of Confederation period members of
Congress paid greater attention to home state politics and their personal affairs rather than focusing upon
the nation's legislative body. See, Library of Congress, "Documents from the Continental Congress and the
Constitutional Convention, 1774: Identifying Defects in the Confederation." Accessed, December 16, 2007,
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/continental/defects.html.
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a result of the Democratic Party's reinvigorated control of Congress, combined with the
incoming Democrat presidential administration of Barak H. Obama (elected November
2008, assuming office January 2009), the tone and pace of U.S. foreign policymaking
will in all likelihood be characterized by a high degree of partisanship up through the
2010 mid-term elections. 4
In past years whenever one of the two major parties has lost majority party status,
it has managed to remain politically relevant despite the loss of control of one or both
Houses of Congress, as well as the White House. In the position of minority opposition
party a measure of influence is nonetheless retained as a result of the recognition by both
major parties of the inevitability of eventual electoral alternation in subsequent elections.
In other words, today's minority party is tomorrow's majority party and vice versa.
Centrists' (moderates) in the minority party under such circumstances often
succeed in negotiating policy compromises with the majority party's own moderates and
thereby retain political influence in the policymaking process between elections.5 As a
consequence, under circumstances of divided control of the federal government,
especially when one party controls the legislative branch and the other the executive
4 The Republican Revolution of 1994, which resulted in the net gain of 54 seats in the House and an
additional eight seats in the Senate for the Republicans, continues to influence foreign policymaking both
as a consequence of dominance as well as Democratic backlash following the 2006 mid-term election that
has seen political tables turned on the Republican Party. In the November 4, 2008 Senate elections, popular
disapproval of the Bush administration led to a gain of seven seats for the Democrats, with one of the State
of Minnesota's seats (Norm Coleman, R) in the Senate at the time of writing subject to a recount. The 2008
House election also expanded the Democrats' 2006 majority in the House of Representatives.
5 Although prior to the 1994 election the Republicans had not controlled the House of Representatives since
the 8 3rd Congress (1953-55), they nonetheless had retained control of the Senate. This control of the Senate
lapsed after the 8 3 'd Congress until the 97h Congress (1981-83) and has oscillated ever since. The incentive
for the majority party to negotiate with the minority party is based on the majority party's recognition that
its own control of Congress is subject to periodic electoral contest, the outcome of which cannot be
guaranteed to ensure the return of all members of the governing party to power.
95
branch, the position of moderate members of Congress on both sides of the aisle tends to
strengthen, facilitating compromise that leads to bi-partisan foreign policies.
Bipartisan policymaking mitigates partisan proclivities. However even with
bipartisan cooperation there is always the possibility for gridlock (disagreement).
Gridlock occurs whenever the White House and Congress fail to overcome significant
differences over policies. 6 As a result, U.S. foreign policymaking can be encumbered not
just by partisanship within Congress, but also by the executive-legislative inter-branch
struggle for policymaking leadership.7
The foregoing does not imply that Congress is powerless to avoid or overcome
situations of gridlock. Glenn P. Hastedt finds that Congress has the capability to limit or
amend presidential foreign policy legislation by exercising its legislative powers. An
example of congressional intervention diverging from the Bush White House's objectives
occurred at the onset of the administration when both Houses of Congress forbade
Mexican commercial trucks from operating more than twenty miles within the United
States.9
6 Snow and Brown clarify that the possibility of policy gridlock increases whenever "partisan divisions
intensify the institutional rivalry inherent in a separation-of-powers structure." See Donald M. Snow and
Eugene Brown. United States Foreign Policy: Politics Beyond the Water's Edge. Boston, MA: Bedford/ St.
Martin's, 2 "d edition, 2000, pgs. 161-162.
Time will tell if the Democrats' control of both the White House (Barak H. Obama) and the 111h
Congress (2009-11) will facilitate executive-legislative branch foreign policymaking cooperation or will,
contrary to popular expectations, lead to gridlock.
8See, Hastedt, Glenn, P. American Foreign Policy: Past Present, Future. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice
Hall, 2003, 5th edition, pgs. 202-203.
9 Congress, succumbing to domestic pressure from a coalition of labor and consumer groups, voted to
restrict Mexican commercial trucking's free access to the United States citing safety concerns in violation
of stipulations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Ibid., pgs. 202-203.
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The Mexican trucking case is an example of legislative foreign policy reactionism
and represents a case where domestic protectionist concerns within Congress drove the
majority of its membership to intervene in the U.S. foreign policymaking process in
opposition to the White House's position. However congressional foreign policymaking
has institutional limitations that allow the executive branch to take on a leadership role.
Congressional domination of the foreign policymaking process is hindered by
Congress's institutional outlook which is neither truly national, nor international. Such a
limitation, combined with Congress's lack of a professional civil service and other
extensive resources that the executive branch controls, curtail its ability to either hijack
the U.S. foreign policymaking process outright or constitutionally assert itself more in the
lead foreign policymaking role.
In addition, the 535-member Congress (435-member House of Representatives
and 100-member Senate) is driven by the need to formulate policies that will get its
members reelected.10 With 535-would be Secretaries of State, Congress is often seen by
the general public and scholars alike as an unwieldy and parochial institution more
concerned with immediate constituent-specific issues than the overarching national
foreign policy priorities routinely raised by the executive branch. 1
1 In the case of House members, their two-year terms force them to be continuously campaigning for office
among their constituents and political backers.
" For example, while the executive branch's departments and specialized agencies may in the case of a
trade dispute hammer away at a trade partner for non-compliance on an agreement on technical and
political fronts, Congress may offer to provide its assistance to the administration either through individual
members of Congress writing to the senior leadership of the trade partner expressing their personal
discontent with the situation and or through more public congressional practices and procedures that are
aimed to shame the offending party on the public record.
97
James M. Lindsay nonetheless makes a valid argument in Testing the
Parochialism Hypothesis: Congress and the Strategic Defense Initiative that although
conventional wisdom holds that parochialism influences the way members of Congress
vote on matters of defense and foreign policy, he finds there is a lack of "systematic
supporting evidence" for the parochial hypothesis.12 Lindsay argues that most studies find
that ideology and not constituent economic interests will determine how members of
congress will vote on such issues. However, Lindsay does recognize that presidential
popularity, or lack thereof, may also impact the way Congress votes.' 3
Alternatively, R. Douglas Arnold, commenting on the work of David Mayhew,
believes that the latter has found that members of Congress are "single-minded seekers of
reelection."1 For Mayhew, congress members' need to be reelected impacts the way they
allocate congressional hearing timing, seek to publicize their position in the media, and
even how they organize congressional practices and procedures.1 5 Members of Congress
recognize that in order to be reelected they need to address constituents' concerns, while
remaining faithful to core ideological beliefs and party constraints. Arnold further
elaborates on this point by analyzing the work of Richard Fenno, who points out that
12 Lindsay, James M., "Testing the Parochialism Hypothesis: Congress and the Strategic Defense
Initiative " in the Journal of Politics,(August 1991), Volume Number 53, pgs. 860-61, accessed December
12, 2008, http://www.istor.org/stable/2131583.
" Ibid., pg. 861.
14 See, Arnold, R. Douglas, in David Mayhew's Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven,
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2 "d edition, 2004, pgs. viii-ix.
15 Ibid., pgs. viii-ix.
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congressmen pursue three main goals: 1) reelection; 2) influence within their respective
House, and; 3) good public policy.16
Mayhew's own writings on the subject support these affirmations. For example,
Mayhew states that members of Congress will often seek to address constituents'
demands since this will facilitate their own reelection to political office. For Mayhew this
assertion is valid for four reasons. First, it fits political reality. Secondly, it emphasizes
the importance of the individual politician within the political party apparatus and in
dealings with special interest groups. Thirdly, it confirms that members of Congress,
much like other human beings, seek to acquire and maintain relationships of power.
Finally, he asserts that "the reelection quest establishes a tangible degree of
accountability with the electorate" which is the centerpiece if not the hallmark of
democracy. 17 One observation which illustrates the complicated nature of congressional
foreign policymaking when dealing with Latin American reformists and revolutionaries
alike is that the member of Congress often has to balance his constituent (parochial)/
special interest concerns with a broader national policy agenda which also requires
negotiated intra- and inter-party consensus.
The requirement to address local concerns within the larger context of national
and international policies is ultimately one of the major stumbling blocks for resolving
the debate of which branch of the national government has primary responsibility in
foreign policymaking. The lack of constitutional clarity regarding which branch of the
16 Ibid., pg. ix.
17 Mayhew, David. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press,
2 "a edition, 2004, pgs. 6-7.
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government has primary responsibility in the foreign policymaking process, coupled with
the need to address constituent demands in order to be reelected and a congressman's
own ideological position on issues, promotes intra- and inter-party partisan conflict.1 8
U.S. Congressional Shortcomings
Although the U.S. Congress is often referred to in the singular, the Framers
established the legislative branch as a bicameral body consisting of both a House of
Representatives and a Senate House. Congress is not a monolithic entity. Besides being
institutionally divided into two houses, Congress is further divided along party and even
often along (unofficial) regional lines. Both Houses of Congress are also known at times
to be fractured along issue-specific lines which may see members of opposing parties
voting together. These sorts of divisions undermine intra-party cohesion when voting on
controversial foreign policies, including occasions when a controversial policy vote may
impact the individual congressman's own reelection possibilities.
18 When dealing with authoritarian regimes, no Congressman likes to be accused of being "soft" either by
members of the opposing party or especially not by members of his own party. If a party's leadership
determines that a Congressman is deviating from the party norm, it is likely that in the party primaries the
same will back a challenger more in tune with the party's political agenda than the incumbent. An example
of this is the case of the Democratic Party's lukewarm support for incumbent U.S. Senator Joseph I.
Lieberman (D-Connecticut, 1988-2006, Independent Democrat-Connecticut, 2006-present) for his support
of the Bush administration's Iraq and anti-terror policies. Although Lieberman was officially endorsed by
the Connecticut Democrat Convention in May 2006, 33 percent of delegates went on to vote for the anti-
war challenger Ned Lamont and thereby forcing an August 2006 primary run off which Lieberman
subsequently lost. Lieberman was then determined to run as an independent and was called upon by
Democratic Party heavyweights Senator Hillary Rodman-Clinton (D-New York, 2001-09) and Howard
Dean to reconsider his candidacy. See, Fouhy, Beth, "Clinton Reiterates Pledge to Support Lamont," in The
Washington Post, Thursday, August 10, 2006, accessed December 12, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/10/AR2006081001659.html and
Nagourney, Adam, "Democrats Rally Behind Lamont Isolating Lieberman," in The New York Times,
Wednesday, August 9, 2006, accessed December 12, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/washington/09cnd-
senate.html? r=2&hp&ex=1155182400&en=386129aOdcd5fl47&ei=5094&partner=homepage&oref=logi
n.
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The lack of congressional unity frustrates the American electorate, explaining in
part the Congress's low marks in Gallup public opinion polls.1 9 Even when one of the
two parties gains control of both houses, which occurred with the Democratic-controlled
110th Congress elected in the wake of frustration with the Bush administration's Iraqi
War policies, major changes in policy or even limited bipartisanship has been difficult to
produce.
In summary, major shifts in foreign policymaking stemming from congressional
legislation are difficult to force because of the possibility of presidential vetoes, intra-
party disagreements, and in the case of the 1 1 0 th Congress the inability of Democrats to
attract moderate Republicans' support for policy proposals.20 Low congressional approval
ratings combined with the need for the individual members of Congress to remain
reelection-worthy does not facilitate unity. Congressional disunity, as it relates to U.S.
foreign policymaking, has been compounded by the mid-1970s' democratization of
power within Congress and the subsequent decentralization of authority on Capitol Hill.
Since the 1970s Congress has traversed phases of decentralization and
recentralization of authority. The fragmentation of authority brought about by the 1970s'
institutional changes allows the rank-and-file membership greater leeway to impact
foreign policy by reducing the power of the committee and subcommittee chairs." At the
19 Jones, Jeffrey M. "Congress Approval rating Matches Historical Low" in Gallup News Service (August
21, 2007) accessed February 2, 2008, http://www.gallup.com/poll/28456/Congress-Approval-Rating-
Matches-Historical-Low.aspx.
20 Ibid.
21 Zelizar, Julian E. On Capitol Hill: The Struggle to Reform Congress and its Consequences, 1948/ 2000.
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pg. 233.
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same time, and especially after 1984 according to Julian E. Zelizar in On Capitol Hill:
The Struggle to Reform Congress and its Consequences, 1948/2000 partisanship has
increased as evidenced by the number of roll-call votes taking place along party lines.22
Since the mid-1980s, congressional polarization has been driven by a spike in the
concentration of personal power among influential members of Congress such as Trent
Lott (R-Mississippi, 1973-89), Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia, 1979-99), and Tom DeLay
(R-Texas, 1985-2006).23 Zelizar finds that the concentration of power among
congressional notables is the result of their ability to construct majority caucuses and
enforce party unity and discipline on key political issues. 24
While congressional power prior to the 1970s was concentrated in a handful of
powerful committee chairs chosen by seniority, committee chair authority has now
become rarefied. Even though the dispersion of power today allows greater opportunities
for individual legislators to impact the U.S. foreign policymaking process, it has in
certain cases adversely affected the ability to forge majorities necessary to pass
legislation.25 Forging majorities is difficult when proposed modifications to congressional
practices and procedures or legislation are not backed by key members of Congress.
Inter-party negotiated compromise has suffered as a result of what Zelizar regards
as the decline of the American center and the loss of congressional moderates. The
decline of the American center is the result of the 1980s economic recession and
22 Ibid., pgs. 233-234.
23 Ibid., pg. 233
2 Ibid., pg. 233.
25 Snow and Brown (2000), pg. 163.
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subsequent redistricting measures.26 Economic recession claimed moderate Republican
seats, with incumbents replaced outright by Democrats or more partisan Republican
challengers. Redistricting (verging on gerrymandering) has been carried out following the
Supreme Court's ruling in Vieth v. Jubelier (2004) to entrench elected officials' rights to
choose constituents, a ruling that ensures that district lines are redrawn along party lines
guarantying incumbents'reelection chances.
U.S. Congressional Foreign Policymaking Tools
Congress's foreign policymaking tools are: (1) simple resolutions, which are
statements made by one of the Houses of Congress; (2) concurrent resolutions, which are
statements passed by both Houses of Congress; (3) joint resolutions, which are statements
made by both Houses of Congress and signed by the President, and; (4) legislative bills.
While the first three types of congressional statements or resolutions do not carry
the force of the law and are just statements of opinion by Congress, a legislative bill is
law. For a legislative bill to be enacted, it must be passed by both Houses of Congress
and signed by the President and or be able to override a presidential veto.28 Even though
the first three types of resolutions lack legislative impact, their promulgation and or even
the possibility of Congress passing them carries international ramifications that may
diverge with the policies of the President.
26 Zelizar, pg. 235.
27 The Rehnquist court in a plurality decision found that political gerrymandering is not unconstitutional.
See, Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
28 Hastedt, pg. 202.
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The institutional debate on the question of U.S. foreign policymaking primacy is
complicated by the Framers' assignment of the role of chief executive to the President
(Article II) while assigning the U.S. Congress as the first branch of government (Article
I) the responsibility for deciding what laws are to be enforced and or funded. This
situation raised by Articles I and II impacts not only how U.S. military force is exerted
overseas (e.g., in Iraq or Afghanistan) or the designation of terrorists and other persons of
interests (i.e., Manuel Noriega, military dictator of Panama 1983-89) to the United States
government, but also how funding is allocated as result of negotiations, or imposed or
withheld as a consequence of party discipline. 29
As a result, one of the principal means by which Congress, and especially the
Senate, influences the U.S. foreign policymaking process is through the role played by
the Senate Appropriations Committee and in particular the subcommittee for State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. The Senate for its part appropriates the
funding for foreign policy operations and organizations (i.e., the National Endowment for
Democracy) that the White House will utilize to achieve U.S. objectives overseas.30 The
means by which the Senate exerts jurisdiction over matters of funding is detailed below:
29 One of the major foreign policymaking debates raging in Washington toward the end of 2007 was the
funding of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). This Executive branch foreign policy agency
was announced by the Bush administration in 2002 and created in 2004 with bi-partisan support during a
period in time when the Republican Party controlled both the White House and the U.S. Congress. Today
the MCC's continued funding at full levels as requested is being questioned and challenged by the
Democratic-controlled Congress. The 110* Democratic Party controlled Congress seeks to exert a more
activist role in foreign policymaking by demanding greater accountability and verifiable indicators of
success of how funds authorized by Congress are used by executive branch agencies.
30 The International Republican Institute obtains the vast majority of its funding from the National
Endowment for Democracy. Created by Congress in 1983, the endowment channels congressional funds to
the International Republican Institute and three other institutes: the National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs, the American Center for International Labor Solidarity, and the Center for
International Private Enterprise. These organizations provide technical assistance to political bodies
worldwide and are widely perceived as American foreign policymaking tools.
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"(1) Appropriation of the revenue for the support of the Government, except as
provided in Senate Rule XXV (e). (2) Rescission of appropriations contained in
appropriations contained in appropriation acts (see 1 U.S.C. 105). (3) The amount
of new spending authority described in sec. 401(c)(2)(A) and (B) of the
Congressional budget Act of 1974 which is to be effective for a fiscal year. (4)
New spending authority described in sec. 401 (c)(2)(C) of the 1974 Congressional
Budget Act provided in Bills and resolutions referred to the committee under sec.
401(b)(2) of that act (but subject to the provisions of sec. 401(b)(3))."
While the President is constitutionally given command over the armed forces of
the United States (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1) and sets the overall course of American
foreign policy, Congress is the sole institution entitled to declare war (Article I, Section
8, Clause 11 - War Powers Clause). Further indicative of the convoluted nature of U.S.
foreign policymaking is that although the President has the responsibility for negotiating
treaties (Article II, Section 2, Clause 2), Congress (in particular two-thirds of the Senate)
is required to provide its advice and consent on all treaties negotiated by the executive
branch. As a result, Articles I and II lead to a situation of executive-legislative overlap of
responsibilities in foreign policymaking (Table 4).
31 See, Claflin, Ericka, editor, Congressional Yellow Book: A Leadership Directory. New York, NY:
Leadership Directories, Inc., (Summer), Volume 33, Number 2, 2007.
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Table 4 - Constitutional Overlap of Executive and Legislative Foreign
Policymaking Powers
Powers The President The U.S. Congress
War making "Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the "To provide for the Common
powers Navy of the United States" Defense;" the power "to declare
(Article II, Section 2, Clause 1) war;" "to raise and support armies"
(Article I, Section 8, Clause 1)
(Article I, Section 8, Clause 11),
and (Article I, Section 8, Clause 12
Commitment "He shall have Power ... to make Treaties" "provided two-thirds of the
making powers (Article II, Section 2, Clause 2.1) Senators present concur"
(Article II, Section 2, Clause 2.1)
Appointments "He shall nominate .. . and shall appoint "by and with the advice and
Ambassadors" Consent of the Senate"
(Article II, Section 2, Clause 2.2) (Article II, Section 2, Clause 2.2)
Source: Compiled from McCormick, 1998, pg. 279.
Foreign Policymaking Overlap
In Congress's New Role: Undermining U.S. Foreign Policy, Victor David Hanson
suggests that while in the past the American electorate, and thus by extension its
congressional representatives, has usually been content with allowing the President and
the Secretary of State to speak for the United States, more recently "hundreds in
Congress have decided that they are better suited to handle international affairs than the
State Department."3 Hanson in referencing House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's (D-California,
1987-present) 2007 Damascus meeting with Syrian President Bashar Assad makes the
32 Hanson, Victor David in "Congress's New Role: Undermining U.S. Foreign Policy" in Real Clear
Politics, (October 18, 2007), accessed December 12, 2008,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/10/congresss new role undermining.html.
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point that such congressional travel undermines U.S. foreign policy and endangers
American interests and U.S. allies (i.e., Israel). 33
Hanson argues that members of Congress undertake international travel mainly to
gain either media exposure for their own attempts at building up foreign affairs
credentials for potential bids for the presidency and or in order to attract campaign funds
to ensure their re-elections. 34 Hanson is a strong defender of the position that the
executive branch is primarily responsible for determining and carrying out foreign
policies with Congress being relegated to having the responsibility for merely overseeing
the President's policies and acquiescing by granting or withholding funds.
Others, such as James M. Scott and Ralph G. Carter in Choosing the Road Less
Traveled: A Theory of Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurship, argue a different
position more in tune with the lack of clarity about which branch of government has the
primary responsibility in the U.S. foreign policymaking process. Scott and Carter
recognize that there is foreign policymaking overlap in their comments pertaining to how
and why the congressional role in U.S. foreign policymaking has increased in recent
years. Scott and Carter make the case that the congressional role in U.S. foreign
policymaking has increased as a result "of a number of changes in the political system
outside of Congress involving party organization, voter attitudes and the role of the
media."3 5 Scott and Carter believe that these changes undermine the position of scholars
3 Here Hanson is referring to the possibility of granting the Assad regime expanded legitimacy through
political engagement that downgrades its status as a state sponsor of terrorism and therefore endangers the
U.S. regional ally, the State of Israel. Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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that hold that the congressional role has a limited, almost compartmentalized impact, and
is responsible for motivating, albeit a small number, members of Congress to freelance in
international affairs on the behalf of Congress and the United States. 36
Hanson finds such "entrepreneurial action" in the best of cases to represent only a
foil with which U.S. diplomats can badger recalcitrant negotiating partners and or
diplomatic foes into compliance with U.S. objectives - negotiate with us now under
known terms and conditions or risk a volatile Congress getting involved - and in the
worst of cases represents folly that endangers U.S. interests and allies.37 Scott and Carter
on the other hand find that "congressional entrepreneurship" in foreign policymaking not
only leads to the repudiation of existing (domestically unpopular/ failed) policies, but to
the innovation of new policies that result in fundamental foreign policy changes that go
against what has been done or not done in the past (e.g., military withdrawal from the
Viet Nam conflict or end of support for the Nicaraguan Contra-Revolutionary Forces). 38
Hanson points out that U.S. foreign policymaking responsibility overlap is
susceptible to congressional representatives' need to remain accountable to constituent
interests and thus remain viable for reelection. Constituent interests in this regard, local in
outlook, as well as special interests advocated by lobbyists, may conflict with the broader
foreign policy course of the executive branch as indicated previously in the case of the
3 Scott, James M., and Ralph G. Carter. Choosing the Road Less Traveled: A Theory of Congressional
Foreign Policy Entrepreneurship. Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the
International Studies Association, San Diego, California, March 21-25, 2006. Accessed, December 12,
2008, pgs. 2-3, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p 9 9 4 3 7 index.html.
36 Ibid., pg. 3.
37 Hanson, 2007.
38 Scott and Carter, pgs. 3 and 5.
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NAFTA Mexican trucking issue or the more recent uproar over the House of
Representative's Armenian Genocide Resolution (2007) and its impact on U.S.-Turkish
relations. 39 Table 4 helps illustrate the overlap of the executive and legislative branches'
foreign policymaking powers.
With regards to the Senate and treaties, James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver
claim that while the Senate has seldom rejected or refused to act on treaties negotiated by
the executive branch, or even sought to modify or amend these treaties (i.e., the Panama
Canal Treaty), its failure at times to bind the United States' participation in certain
treaties (i.e., the League of Nations -1919) has fueled presidential disdain of senatorial
participation in treaty negotiation.4 0
The executive branch's push back on the Senate's involvement in international
agreements has led to the increased employment of executive agreements to circumvent
the Senate. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in The Imperial President cites executive agreements
39 Both the Bush administration and the Turkish government's representative, Ambassador Nabi Sensoy,
were critical of the House of Representative's bipartisan 27 to 21 vote. Sensoy stated: "It is an irresponsible
act for a committee of the House of Representatives to pass, in this manner and at an extremely critical
time, a draft that will not only endanger the relations with a friendly and allied nation but also jeopardize
a strategic partnership that has been cultivated for generations," the Turkish statement said. "We still hope
that common sense will prevail and that the House of Representatives will not move this
resolution any further." Prior to the vote the Bush administration argued that the resolution's passage would
have serious deleterious consequences on U.S. foreign policy, stating that "its passage would do great harm
to our relations with a key ally in NATO and the global war on terror." However, Speaker Pelosi's
spokesman Nadeam Elshami commented that the committee vote "demonstrated bi-partisan support for a
resolution which is consistent with long-held concerns of the people of the United States about the
suffering of the Armenian people." See, Neuman, Johanna, "House panel passes Armenian genocide bill,"
in The Los Angeles Times, (October 11, 2007), pg. A-1, accessed December 2008,
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/ll /nation/na-genocide 11.
40 The U.S. Senate neither ratified the charter of the League of Nations, nor acquiesced to the United States
joining the League despite President Woodrow Wilson's efforts. See, Nathan, James A., and James K.
Oliver. Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and
Company. 2nd edition, 1987, pgs. 128-129.
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as practical means for making international agreements.41 Not surprisingly, Nathan and
Oliver found that more than 95 percent of all formal agreements negotiated between the
United States and foreign governments during the 1945 to 1970 Cold War period, were
concluded via executive agreements. 42 The recourse of using executive agreements is
indicative of the perceived need identified by U.S. foreign policymakers, especially
within the executive branch, of having the United States speak with a single voice on the
world stage in times of great uncertainty and likelihood of conflict.
Foreign policymaking overlap has become an area that Supreme Court
(Associate) Justice Robert Jackson (1941-54) described as being a "zone of twilight in
which the President and the Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain." 43 Overlap of responsibilities and constitutional ambiguity
drives the executive and legislative branches of the federal government to claim the right
of primacy in the foreign policymaking process.
Kirk A. Randazzo in Judicial Decision Making in U.S. Foreign Policy Litigation
clarifies that the Supreme Court, as the third branch of the national government, has
sought to shed some clarity on the matter.44 Randazzo argues that while the "political
branches of the government directly determine foreign policy outcomes," the courts'
contribution to the U.S. foreign policymaking process, although often overlooked, is
significant since most foreign policy questions entail the courts' constitutional
41 Ibid., pg. 129.
42 Ibid., pg. 130.
43 McCromick, 1998, pgs. 278-279.
44 See, Kirk A. Randazzo, "Judicial Decision Making in U.S. Foreign Policy Litigation," Paper prepared for
presentation at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, January 8-11, 2004, New
Orleans, LA, pg. 3, accessed December 12, 2008, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p67780_index.html.
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interpretation of the extent of the role assigned to executive and legislative branches.4 5
For Randazzo the importance of the courts as arbitrators in the executive-legislative
dispute for the privilege of primacy in the foreign policymaking process resides in the
courts' authority of constitutional interpretation, a function which defines the parameters
and boundaries within which the other two branches of the government must operate. 46
Lisa Miller's findings in Too Little Too Late: The Supreme Court as a Check on
Executive Power denote the importance of the courts' determinations of the parameters
and boundaries within which the other two branches of the government operate. Miller
finds that the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the executive branch's power is at it
lowest ebb whenever it seeks to exert power contrary to the congressional intent in
situations where it lacks constitutional authorization. 47 However, Miller also clarifies that
since the end of World War II Congress has been often been a willing accomplice in
granting the executive branch extended powers to ensure national security in times of
uncertainty.48
The Supreme Court's reasoning is clearest in its decision in United States v.
Curtiss- Wright Corporation (1936) where it ruled the President's authority is broader in
matters of foreign policy than in domestic ones.4 9 Alternatively, Raoul Berger, as a
proponent of diminishing executive privileges and prerogatives, argues that not only does
41 Ibid., pg. 3.
46 Ibid. pg. 3.
47 Miller, Lisa. "Too Little Too Late: The Supreme Court as a Check on Executive Power" in Foreign
Policy Focus (February 17, 2006), accessed December 9, 2007, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3117.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
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the U.S. Constitution (1787) make no reference to executive agreements as being an
inherent power of the executive branch, but also that the court's own reasoning in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation remains "extremely specious." 0
Since the Viet Nam War era there has been substantial debate generated among
both scholars and U.S. foreign policymakers concerning which branch of the government
has the primary responsibility for American foreign policymaking. The debate is a result
of constitutional ambiguity as highlighted in Table 4, as well as congressional attempts to
reign in the presidency whenever it is seen by Congress and the American electorate as
having overstepped its constitutionally mandated authority.
The foregoing coincides with the opinion of congressional staffers, such as Tim
Reif with Representative Charles Rangel's (D-New York, 1971-present) office in the
House Ways and Means Committee (during the 10 9th Congress, 2005-06), who concurs
with the notion that there is a significant role for the legislative branch to play in the
American foreign policymaking process.51 Specifically Reif argues that it is up to
Congress to provide guidance to the executive branch in foreign policymaking.
Congressional advice to the President can be in areas as diverse as tariff reductions and
trade negotiations where Congress can advise what tariffs can be cut and what limits may
be imposed on a trading partner.5 Reif's reasoning is based on the U.S. Congress's
50 Nathan and Oliver, 1987, pg. 130.
51 Reif, Tim. "The Congressional Agenda, United States Trade Policy, and Interaction between the
Executive and Legislative Branches." Briefing given at the Foreign Service Institute - U.S. Department of
State on June 30, 2006.
52 Ibid.
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constitutional powers arising from the right to raise revenues (Commerce Clause) and its
own foreign relations powers (Commitment Making Powers).
Congress asserting itself when presidential leadership is questioned is illustrated
by the executive-legislative dispute that has arisen as a result of the White House's
overreach during the Viet Nam War (1960-73), providing an example of how U.S.
foreign policymaking can become convoluted. Note that the term "war" in this case is
actually a misnomer as American military involvement was never the result of an actual
declaration of war as per Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, and is in actuality a case of
presidential discretion facilitated by congressional supportive resolutions.53 American
involvement in South East Asia relates to Miller's earlier point about Congress delegating
authority to the executive branch in light of national security concerns.
The Viet Nam conflict, often categorized as a "police action," is the result of U.S.
foreign policymakers,' in particular President Kennedy's (D, 1961-63), determination to
prevent a communist victory in Viet Nam. The Kennedy administration was convinced
that such a victory would fatally damage U.S. credibility with America's allies and the
result of a communist victory in Southeast Asia would only further embolden communist
(Soviet) adversaries. In this case, Kennedy's determination to "draw a line in the sand"
and prevent a Cold War communist victory in Viet Nam commits his administration and
the succeeding Lyndon B. Johnson (D, 1963-69) and Richard M. Nixon (R, 1969-74)
53 Note that the study anchors the Viet Nam War between the years 1960 and 1973 based on President
Kennedy's "Americanization" of the conflict and the cessation of direct, large-scale American military in
1973 with the Paris Peace Accords. Alternatively, this conflict can be dated commencing in January 1959,
when the North Viet Nam Communist Party's Central Committee issued a secret resolution authorizing an
armed struggle against the South Vietnamese regime of Ngo Dinh Diem (1955-63) and ending on April 30,
1975, with the North Vietnamese military victory over the Republic of Viet Nam (South) and the final
withdrawal of all U.S. military personnel.
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administrations to a foreign policy of making American (political-military) power
credible.
Blasier's theoretical premises, applied to the foregoing situation, highlight that
during the Kennedy administration the U.S. government sought to repress the North
Vietnamese government. The administration structured its policies along the lines of
Propositions 3, 5, 6, 11, 12, 15, and 16 once the Hanoi regime was determined to have
ties to an anti-American, "Great Power" rival (Soviet Union) of the United States.
The perceived need to make American power credible both domestically and
internationally among friend and foe alike (Proposition 16) becomes associated with an
excessive and dangerous growth in the foreign policymaking powers of the President in
later years. As a result of the White House's heavy involvement (Proposition 6 and 12) in
the conduct of the Viet Nam War, Congress, itself driven by the need to remain
accountable to its constituent base, has grown to distrust and often question the executive
branch's foreign commitment-making decisions. Since the Viet Nam War era, Congress's
distrust of the White House spikes whenever the two major parties share control of the
government, a factor that, combined with constitutional ambiguity on U.S. foreign
policymaking primacy, results in heightened inter-branch tensions.
CONGRESS IN ACTION: U.S. CONGRESSIONAL FOREIGN POLICYMAKING
Placing Limits on the Executive Branch
The literature widely finds that the U.S. Constitution significantly empowers
Congress to wield its authority in the foreign policymaking process. However, as many
have noted, U.S. congressional activism has nonetheless historically oscillated.
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According to Donald Snow and Eugene Brown, Congress has repeatedly deferred to the
executive branch in foreign policymaking matters throughout much of the period between
1930 and 1970.14
The foregoing period encompasses not only the Great Depression (1929-39) and
its economic effect on countries such as Germany, that influenced the political fortunes of
German National Socialism (1920-45) and the outbreak of World War II (1939-45), but
also the subsequent Cold War (1947-90) waged between the United States and the Soviet
Union over expansionist and interventionist communism. Congress and its leadership was
convinced to defer to the President on matters of foreign policymaking by events such as
these, which were identified as posing a significant threat to the continued existence of
the United States. Congress accepted the notion that such action, especially in times of
great necessity, allowed the United States to speak with a single, unified voice.
As a result of congressional deference in U.S. foreign policymaking, both
Franklin D. Roosevelt (D, 1933-45) and Harry S. Truman (D, 1945-53) were not only left
largely unhindered to conduct the United State's foreign policy during the Second World
War, but were also allowed to construct the post-war institutions meant to impede a
recurrence of the factors that had led to the 1939-45 worldwide conflict. The international
relations literature widely cites the case of the United Nations (UN) as being one of the
most poignant examples of how the U.S. Congress left the executive branch largely to its
own devices to craft major pieces of modern American foreign policy.
4 Snow, Donald M., and Eugene Brown. Beyond the Water's Edge. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press,
1997, pg., 162.
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Congress, notwithstanding its Cold War era deference to the White House on
foreign policymaking matters, has since the Watergate scandal (1972-74) and President
Nixon's ensuing resignation (August 9, 1974) strongly asserted its own foreign
policymaking capabilities. Congressional capability to guide American foreign
policymaking, as well as the means by which it can constrain the President whenever it so
chooses, can be enumerated as follows: (1) its commitment-making reporting
requirements; (2) its attempts to limit presidential war making power; (3) its ability to
restrict foreign policy funding; and (4) its desire to exert congressional oversight.
With regard to commitment-making reporting requirements, through the mid-
1960s Congress was largely content to follow the foreign policy lead of the executive
branch. Snow and Brown argue that congressional deference to the presidency during the
Cold War was the result of the belief that the United States could ill afford to appear to a
menacing Soviet Union as being either divided or irresolute.55 Confronted by this sort of
overarching existential threat, congressional leaders such as Senator J. William Fulbright
(D-Arkansas, 1945-74) agonized in 1961 whether the time had come for Congress to
formally surrender the power necessary to conduct world affairs to the President and
largely unimpeded by Congress and its often parochial outlook.
Notwithstanding Fulbright's earlier deliberation on whether to allow the President
greater leeway in U.S. foreign policymaking, he and others in Congress changed tack by
the late 1960s. Fulbright, by this point, identified growing presidential foreign
policymaking power within the sphere of commitment-making as a threat to the
* Ibid, pg. 162.
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Legislative branch's own privileges.56 Reacting to growing presidential foreign
commitment-making, Congress seeing itself as a co-equal branch of government by the
late 1960s required the President to report to Congress on all foreign policy commitments
made by the executive branch. Fulbright's National Commitments Resolution, passed by
a "Sense of the Senate" on June 26, 1969, is the first successful congressional attempt to
curb presidential foreign policymaking power.57
Graph 2 highlights Congress's, specifically the House of Representatives's, intent
to exert an active role in U.S. foreign policymaking. The House's impact on foreign
policymaking is evidenced by the number of committee and subcommittee hearings held
by the House International Relations Committee throughout the 1947 to 2008 period.
56
5 While Senator William Fulbright (D-Arkansas, 1945-74) is credited with successfully having the Senate
pass the National Commitments Resolution by a margin of 70 to 16 votes in June of 1969, this was not the
first congressional attempt to curb presidential foreign policymaking power. Rather it was Senator John
Bricker (R-Ohio, 1947-59) who proposed in the early 1950s that any treaty or executive agreement that
infringed upon American's constitutional rights should be considered as being unconstitutional. As such,
Congress has the obligation to enact legislation to put into effect any treaty or executive agreement
proposed by the President.
Bricker was concerned that international treaties or agreements negotiated by the President, such as the
United Nations Treaty, could commit the United States to domestic actions that could undermine either
congressional oversight and or constitutionally assured state prerogatives. The Bricker Amendment came
closest to passing in 1954, when it fell short by one vote of the required two-thirds majority necessary to
pass a constitutional amendment in the Senate.
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Graph 2 - Committee and Subcommittee Hearings of the House
International Relations Committee, 80th- 110th Congresses (1947-
2008)
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Note: Data for the 1 10" Congress encompasses hearings through both Congressional Sessions. For a list of
all congressional sessions by year see Appendix 1.
Source: Compiled from McCormick, 1993, pg. 353, Committee on International Relations, "Hearing Index
Page," (accessed November 10, 2007), http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/index.htm, GPO
Access, "House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Hearings - 106' Congress Page," (accessed January 6,
2008), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/intrelations/106ch.html, Compilation of the 10 5th (First
Session) Congress Survey of Activities (accessed January 6, 2008)
http://www.foreignaffairs.house.,Qov/archives/106/survev/surveya.htm, Compilation of the 10 5 h (Second
Session) Congress Survey of Activities (accessed, January 6, 2008),
http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/106/survey/2survey.htm, and the U.S. House of
Representatives House Committee on Foreign Affairs - Testimony and Transcripts 110th Congress
(accessed, December 12, 2008), http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/testimony.asp?pQ=1.
Building upon the National Commitments Resolution (1969), the Case-Zablocki
Act of 1972 passed during the 9 2 nd Congress (1971-72) marks a significant milestone in
executive-legislative relations in the foreign policymaking arena. The significance of this
law is that for the first time legislation is enacted that obligates the President to report all
international agreements to Congress within sixty days.
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Not content with the reach of the Case-Zablocki Act, the 9 5t" Congress (1977-78)
proceeded to further strengthen the act in 1977. The 1977 revision of the Case-Zablocki
Act requires all executive branch agencies to report all agency-specific negotiated
agreements to the U.S. Department of State within a period of twenty days. In turn, the
Department of State is obligated to transmit these agreements to Congress.
Graph 2 illustrates the impact of the foregoing legislation by highlighting the
spike in committee and subcommittee hearings of the House Committee on International
Relations that commences with the 94 th Congress (1975-76) and substantially taking off
with the 9 5 th Congress. Consequently, the Case-Zablocki Act serves as a tangible
example of how Congress has sought to affirm an activist (some would even argue at
times an obstructionist) role in U.S. foreign policymaking. Similarly, congressional
enforcement of the requirements of the Case-Zablocki Act also serves as an indicator of
increased congressional proclivities for entrusting foreign policymaking to the executive
branch whenever the White House and the Congress are controlled by the same party.
Although the Case-Zablocki Act has been strengthened through the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act of 1979, Congress has nonetheless remained focused with
executive branch reporting throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Congress has been especially
concerned with both late reporting by the executive branch and the often incomplete
nature of the reporting being transmitted. Reporting deficiencies have led Congress to
accuse the White House of undermining information sharing. Not surprisingly, whenever
information is not transmitted in a timely manner, and the minority party raises its
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objections, the administration will accuse it of playing partisan politics and of
obstructionism.5 8
An alternative means by which the U.S. Congress has sought to assert its own
foreign policymaking capabilities has been by attempting to limit presidential war-
making power. Throughout the 1970s and into the present era Congress has grown weary
of the President's recourse to the position of Commander-in-Chief and the executive
clauses found within the U.S. Constitution as the constitutional instruments that authorize
presidential foreign intervention.
The 1970 repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution (1964) was an early measure
adopted by Congress to curtail non-sanctioned presidential military adventurism abroad.
What is relevant about the congressional repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution is that
the same had until then allowed the President, according to McCormick a "virtual free
hand for conducting the Viet Nam War" (Proposition 6).s9
Yet interestingly enough, much as has been the case whenever matters of national
security gain preponderance in U.S. politics, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was itself
adopted by a margin of 416 to 0 in the House and by 89 to 2 in the Senate.60 Most
proponents of presidential supremacy in foreign policymaking point to such wide
58 Reif in this sense makes an interesting argument by indicating that the Bush administration has been
prone to accusing Democrats in Congress as being protectionists whenever these raise concerns about the
administration's lack of strong adherence to requiring Free Trade Agreement (FTA) partners to respect
basic international labor standards. The Bush administration in this sense has been willing to forgo
pressuring trade partners and holding its allies accountable for weak adherence to such issues as no child
labor, collective bargaining, no forced labor, and freedom of association if these should conflict with the
administration's interpretation of national security concerns. See, Reif, 2006.
59 McCormick, 1993, pg. 326.
60 A similar situation has occurred with post-September 11 cases of the USA Patriot Act (October 26, 2001)
and the IraqWar Resolution or the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002.
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margins as definitive proof of congressional willingness to put aside possible
constitutional prerogatives once it recognizes that it cannot deal with international
situations requiring speed of decision making, discretion, and the marshaling of
significant resources and expertise.
Thus during the Cold War, fears of the Soviet Union and expansionist
communism in the 1960s overwhelmingly accorded the Johnson administration the
ability to deploy military forces abroad without the need to obtain a formal declaration of
war from Congress. However, by 1973 Congress had grown troubled by the White
House's reliance on the executive's war-making power as justification for the conduct of
the Viet Nam conflict. Congress as a result passed the War Powers Act which has since
then required the President to obtain Congress's consent for any long-term commitment
of U.S. military forces abroad.6 1
Today the Democratic-controlled 110th Congress's desire to exert increased
congressional oversight is evidenced in Figure 3. The figure also shows that the
administration of George W. Bush benefited from friendly Republican dominance of the
House. House committee and subcommittee meetings dominated by the Republicans
have blocked their Democrat members' own attempts to hold hearings on issues that
could otherwise conflict with White House objectives.62 Majority tyranny has been
highlighted by the Democrats who argued that as a consequence of a Republican-
61 The resolution forces the President to notify Congress with 48 hours of commtting U.S. forces abroad
and forbids U.S. forces from remaining over 90 days without a congressional authorization of the use of
military force or a declaration of war by Congress. Also see, Wiarda, 2006, pgs. 54 and 85.
62 It will be interesting to see if this committee will hold more hearings as a consequence of the 2006 mid-
term elections which saw the Democrats gain control of both the House and the Senate and ended twelve
year of Republican control of the House (1994-2006).
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controlled House and Senate after the November 2002 elections, the Bush administration
through the 2006 mid-term election has counted on powerful allies in the U.S. Congress
that have been willing to abdicate constitutional oversight responsibility. A House
Minority investigation has concluded that:
"On issue after issue, the Congress has failed to conduct meaningful
investigations of significant allegations of wrongdoing by the Bush
Administration. As documented in a companion report, this approach stands in
stark contrast to the breadth and intrusiveness of congressional investigations of
the Clinton Administration." 63
The National Endowment for Democracy: A Case of Executive-Legislative
Cooperation
The preceding sections have reviewed the executive-legislative dispute over
which branch of the federal government ultimately has the primary responsibility for U.S.
foreign policymaking. In the same vein, these sections have also highlighted the principal
congressional tools for guiding U.S. foreign policymaking. The present section builds
upon the preceding discussion by looking specifically at the impact of congressional
appropriation responsibility on U.S. foreign policymaking.
Congress's role in appropriating funding impacts foreign policy institutions as
diverse as the Departments of State, Agriculture, and Commerce among others. The
foregoing executive branch institutions are indispensable components of the President's
ability to conduct American foreign policy and the debate over the level of funding is a
perennial issue of concern in Washington.
63 See, United States House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform - Minority Staff Special
Investigation Division. "Congressional oversight of the Bush Administration." Washington, D.C. (January
17, 2006), Special Report for Representative Henry A. Waxman. Accessed November 12, 2007.
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20060117103554-62297.pdf.
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Within the U.S. foreign policymaking arena, the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED) is a lesser known but still important instrument of American policy.
NED's relevance to the present discussion resides in the fact that while it enjoys non-
governmental status, its democracy-promoting activities often coincide with those of the
U.S. government.
As a quasi-governmental institution, NED is a leading private U.S. organization
that promotes democracy and economic freedom throughout the world. Its democracy-
promoting activities mirror the cornerstone of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy.64
Although NED is not an agency or an official establishment of the United States
government, it is accountable to a wide variety of overseers in both the executive and
legislative branches of the federal government. Senator Charles H. Percy (R-Illinois,
1967-85) clarified the independent nature of NED when he introduced the original
legislation in the Senate and stated:
"The Endowment will come under continuous and extensive scrutiny in the
appropriate committees of both Houses of Congress. The additional provisions for
GAO (U.S. Government Accountability Office) oversight, as well as the terms of
the USIA (U.S. Information Agency) grant agreement under which it will
function, assure a convergence of oversight procedures virtually unique among
grantees of federal funds."6 5
64 In a series of reports on the U.S. Department and Related Agencies fiscal year allocation, the
Congressional Research Service reports that the "National Endowment for Democracy is a private,
nonprofit organization established during the Reagan Administration that supports programs to strengthen
democratic institutions in more than 90 countries around the world. NED proponents assert that many of its
accomplishments are possible because it is not a U.S. government agency. NED's critics claim that it
duplicates government democracy promotion programs and could be eliminated, or could be operated
entirely through private sector funding." Congressional Research Service, accessed January 27, 2008,
http-//digital library unt edu/govdocs/crs/search/?q=National+Endowment+for+Democracy+funding&t=full
text&o=&nhi=2005&nlow=1 983&system=CRS&start=60&pageSize=10&sort=default&view=.
65 See, Congressional Record, September 22, 1983, pg. 12,714.
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Although NED is often maligned by the American left as a relic of the Cold War
era, it nonetheless remains a relevant actor in American foreign policymaking as its
activities in countries such as Haiti, Venezuela, and Iraq today attest. Congressional
support for NED has not diminished in the post-Cold War period, but rather has grown
steadily. Today NED enjoys widespread bi-partisan endorsement on Capitol Hill.
Congressional support is best exemplified by the identical Senate and House of
Representatives resolutions (Senate Concurrent Resolution 66; House Concurrent
Resolution 274) passed in October 2003, which commended the National Endowment for
Democracy "for its major contributions to the strengthening of democracy around the
world on the occasion of the 20th anniversary" of its establishment, and endeavoring "to
continue to support [its] vital work." 66
The National Endowment for Democracy's activities transcend a quarter of a
century to a period of time when Congress itself has sought to assert its own foreign
policymaking role in the wake of the Watergate scandal. Yet in spite of the contentious
relationship between the executive and legislative branches in matters pertaining to U.S.
foreign policymaking, the establishment of NED is a result of the cooperation between
the White House and Congress. 67 Both branches of the federal government realized in the
66 The Senate resolution was passed by unanimous voice vote; the House resolution passed on a roll call
vote of 391-1. Both resolutions had strong, bi-partisan co-sponsorship. These strong margins help to
illustrate NED's legitimacy and widespread bi-partisan support of its activities. Bi-partisan co-sponsors in
the Senate included: Frist, Daschle, Lugar, Biden, Graham, Bayh, Kyl, Hatch, Leahy, Hagel, Levin,
McCain, McConnell, and Sarbanes; while in the House: Hyde, Lantos, Cox, Payne, Berman, Bereuter,
Cardin, Chabot, Crowley, Diaz-Balart, Dreier, Engel, Gallegly, (Mark) Green, Houghton, (Patrick)
Kennedy, Kingston, Kirk, Lowey, Meeks, Menendez, Napolitano, Pitts, Rohrabacher, Ros-Lehtinen,
Royce, (Christopher) Smith, and Ackerman. See, Lowe, David. "Idea to Reality: A Brief History of the
National Endowment for Democracy." Accessed, January 26, 2008,
http://www.ned.org/about/nedhistory.html.
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early 1980s that the time was ripe to decouple American soft side operations (i.e.,
democracy promotion) from widespread perceptions that these were Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) fronts.
The American Political Foundation, established in Washington in 1980, is the
catalyst for NED. President Ronald W. Reagan (R, 1981-89) stated in one of his major
foreign policy speeches - delivered to a packed House of Commons in Britain's
Westminster Palace - in 1982 that the American Political Foundation would undertake a
study to determine how the United States as a nation could best contribute to a global
democracy campaign.68 The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
subsequently went on to fund the American Political Foundation's study with a $300,000
grant (equivalent to $644,000 in 2007 dollars) which came to be known as the
"Democracy Program." 69 Soon afterward the Democracy Program, overseen by an
executive board composed of a cross-section of American politicians and influential
foreign policymakers outside of the government recommend the creation of the
67 The American Political Foundation is premised on the 1978 measure proposed by Congressmen Dante
Fascell (D-Florida, 1955-93) and Donald Fraser (D, Minnesota, 1963-79) known as "QUANGO" (quasi-
autonomous non-governmental organization). QUANGO's raison d' tre was the advancement of human
rights. The Fascell-Frazer bill, borrowing from Germany's democracy assistance based on the democracy
transition foundation model (known as "Stiftungen") sought the creation of an Institute for Human Rights
and Freedom. This institute would provide technical and financial assistance to non-governmental
organizations dedicated to the promotion of human rights overseas. SourceWatch, "American Political
Foundation." Accessed, January 26, 2008,
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=American Political Foundation.
68 See the address delivered by President Reagan before the British Parliament, London, on June 8, 1982,
during his trip to France, the Vatican, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany
(June 2-11, 1982). Ronald W. Reagan. "Promoting Democracy and Peace," (June 8, 1982), United States
Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., accessed February 1, 2008,
http://www.ned.org/about/reagan-06088 2 .html.
69 See http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php# accessed, February 1, 2008.
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bipartisan, private, non-profit corporation known as the National Endowment for
Democracy.70
To date NED affirms that it "is guided by the belief that freedom is a universal
human aspiration that can be realized through the development of democratic institutions,
procedures, and values."7 1 The National Endowment for Democracy is governed by an
independent, non-partisan board of directors composed of party activists, representatives
of the U.S. labor, business, and education communities, foreign policy specialists, and
two members of Congress. Yet unlike most other Washington non-profits, NED is funded
by the U.S. national budget. NED utilizes congressionally appropriated funds to make
hundreds of grants each year in support of pro-democracy groups around the world.
Although NED is a non-governmental organization, the fact that it is funded by Congress
requires congressional oversight. 72
The National Endowment for Democracy, acting as a grant-making foundation, in
turn distributes congressionally appropriated funds to private organizations. Nearly half
of all funding is allocated to the American Center for International Labor Solidarity
(ACILS), the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs (NDI), and the International Republican Institute
70 Lowe.
71 National Endowment for Democracy. Accessed, January 21, 2008, http://www.ned.org/.
72 To avoid accusations that NED is an agency or an establishment of the United States government, its
authorizing legislation specifically spells out the Endowment's non-governmental status. Furthermore,
NED board members are not selected by the President and those that do happen to be appointed to serve in
the executive branch are required to relinquish their board membership.
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(IRI).7 3 The remainder of NED grant monies is awarded annually to hundreds of overseas
non-governmental organizations (NGO) that apply for support.74
While the Endowment's authorizing legislation specifically states that NED
enjoys non-governmental status, its detractors argue that this lack of official status allow
it to operate with little accountability. Barbara Conry of the CATO Institute believes that
NED is a "foreign policy loose cannon." 75 For Conry, NED not only lacks accountability
but also it no longer serves American interests since the end of the Cold War. The
National Endowment for Democracy is often perceived, if not criticized, as serving
special interests groups (e.g., the Republican and Democratic Parties, organized labor,
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) given that these control most of its funds. 76 Conry
goes on to argue that the end of the threat and ideological challenge posed by the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991 has allowed democracy to spread largely unencumbered. As
a result, democracy has readily spread on its own in the post-Cold War period, making
the NED superfluous, according to Conry.
Others, such as Congressman and 2008 Presidential Candidate Ron Paul (R-
Texas, 1997-present) view NED as a facilitator of special interest-driven American
foreign policy objectives. Congressman Paul argues that NED's "meddling" in the
73 Note that these NED core institutes are private organizations created by the two main U.S. political
parties and the business community and are joined by regional international institutes of the labor
movement.
74 See the National Endowment for Democracy - Grants Program, accessed February 1, 2008,
http://www.ned.org/grants/grants.html.
75 Conry, Barbara. "Loose Cannon: The National Endowment for Democracy." CATO Policy Briefing
Number 27 (November 8, 1993) Accessed, January 21, 2008, http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-
027.html.
76 Ibid.
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internal affairs of foreign countries does more harm to the United States than good since
it engenders ill-will toward America by millions overseas. 77 Paul states that:
".. . In the final analysis, the endowment embodies the most negative aspects of
both private aid and official foreign aid-the pitfalls of decentralized 'loose
cannon' foreign policy efforts combined with the impression that the United States
is trying to 'run the show' around the world."78
For NED detractors, the Endowment's activities include the harassment of foreign
governments, even those democratically elected, if the latter's policies conflict with those
of the United States and its special interest groups. The National Endowment for
Democracy not only accused of financial mismanagement, but more poignantly of
interfering in foreign elections and facilitating the corruption of democratic movements. 79
Funding of the National Endowment for Democracy
Originally the House Foreign Affairs Committee included a two-year
authorization for the Endowment at an annual level of $31.3 million (equivalent to $60.3
million in 2007 dollars) as part of the Fiscal Year (FY) 1984 and 1985 U.S. State
Department Authorization Act (H.R. 2915).80
77 Paul, Ron. "National Endowment for Democracy: Paying to Make Enemies of America." (October 11,
2003) accessed January 26, 2008, http://www.iefd.org/articles/paying to make enemies.php.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 For computing the relative value of the U.S. dollar in 1985 to 2007 (last year of full annual data for initial
and target year) using the consumer price index, see
http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php# accessed, August 9, 2008. See also
Lowe.
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The Reagan administration proposed a $65 million (equivalent to $125.2 million
in 2007 dollars) democracy promotion initiative to be coordinated directly by the United
States Information Agency (USIA). Ultimately the Reagan administration opted to
support the outright establishment of the Endowment when the Foreign Affairs
Committee reported out H.R. 2915.81 In this resolution the committee staked out its
preference for the non-governmental Endowment concept.
Although authorized levels were originally set at $31.3 million, actual
appropriations only reach $18 million (equivalent to $34.6 million in 2007 dollars). 82 It
took 10 years for NED appropriations to actually reach the original authorized level.
Thus the issue of congressional funding of NED serves as a viable indicator of the degree
to which Congress significantly impacts the reach of U.S. foreign policy. The impact of
Congress's control over the scope of foreign policy activities is evidenced not only by the
levels of the second NED authorization for FY 1986 and 1987 (set at $18.4 million,
equivalent to $34.8 million in 2007 dollars), but also by the requirement for the
81 Note that the Senate version (Senate 1342) ran into trouble the moment it was reported out (May 23,
1983). The Senate version ran afoul of conservative members of Congress such as Senator Jesse Helms (R-
North Carolina, 1973-2003) who through a hostile amendment sought to allocate NED funds to the Voice
of America for transmitters. Helms co-sponsored an amendment (defeated by a 48 to 42 vote) that would
have struck NED entirely from the U.S. Department of State appropriation bill. Representative Jim Leach
(R-Iowa, 1977-2007) declared that "the entire project was a scandal in the making." While Senator Orrin
Hatch (R-Utah, 1997-present) wanted to see funds for the political party institutes dropped entirely and
given to the labor institute. Conservative columnist James L. Kilpatrick accused the NED bill of being an
attempt to create "a plump little slush fund for the big cats of labor, business, and the two major parties."
Eventually the Senate-House conference committee worked out a compromise on funding and on
November 18, 1983 (the last day of the congressional session) and a modified National Endowment for
Democracy was established as part of the State Department Authorization Act. Goldman, Ralph M. "The
Future Catches Up." New York, NY: IUniverse Publishers, Volume 1: Transnational Actors and Parties,
2002, pgs 138-139.
82 Lowe, writing on the history of National Endowment for Demeocracy's 20t anniversary, highlights the
role of Congress the endowment's operations. See, Lowe.
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incorporation of expanded language to the NED Act. According to David Lowe of the
National Endowment for Democracy, congressional requirements included the following:
1) That the NED Board of Directors codified prohibitions on the use of funds for
partisan political purposes, including the funding of national party operations.
2) Mandated the requirement that NED grantees consult with the U.S.
Department of State, although the same would have no veto over grants, prior
to the commencement of program activities.
3) Establishment of February 1 as the required date of reporting to Congress on
all grants (originally it was December 31).
4) The requirement that despite NED's non-governmental status, it be subject to
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requirements.
5) That all NED financial transactions for each fiscal year be subject to a
possible USIA audit. (This section has subsequently been amended by new
authorizations to require such audits.) 83
The existence of the foregoing requirements is not meant to imply that Congress
has not provided NED with special appropriations as deemed appropriate in countries of
special interest to the United States. For example, in the past Congress has authorized
additional funds for NED to undertake specific democratic initiatives in countries at
different stages of democratization as diverse as Poland (where it supported the Polish
trade union Solidarity), Chile, Nicaragua, South Africa, China, Burma, and Eastern
Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Lowe indicates that while the Foreign Relations Act of 1992 declares that it is the
sense of the Congress that NED supplement congressional appropriation with funding
from the private sector, Congress has rejected any requirement that NED raise matching
83 Note that a provision in the Foreign Relations Act of 1995 recommended the equal funding of the four
institutes and a capping of the total amount reserved for them at 55 percent of the appropriated amount.
Ibid.
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funds. 84 NED consequently remains primarily funded on an annual appropriations basis
from the U.S. national budget.
Graph 3 - National Endowment for Democracy
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Note: The Congressional Research Service (CRS) does not provide direct public access to its reports,
requiring citizens to request them from their member of Congress. Some members, as well as several non-
profit groups, have posted the reports on the Web. Funds data has been compiled from a number of CRS
reports made available from Web sites since 1990. Data for FY 2007 is estimated and FY 2008 is
requested. For an actual breakdown of dollar amounts by year in 2007 dollars (last calendar year available
at time of writing for full initial and target year consumer price index data) see Appendix 2. For computing
the relative value of the U.S. dollar in 1995 to 2007 (last year of full annual data for initial and target year)
using the consumer price index, see http://www.measurincworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php#.
Source: The FY 1995-2005 data is compiled from CRS State Department and Related Agencies FY
Appropriations reports (various years), see http://digital.library.unt.edu/ovdocs/crs/searchform.tkl. FY
2006-2008 data compiled from U.S. Department of State, "FY 2008 Budget in Brief," (February 5, 2007),
accessed January 27, 2008, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/bib/2008/html/79742.htm.
84 In this regard Lowe argues that in FY1993, NED began compiling an annual report of cash and in-kind
contributions raised by all of its grantees to supplement their NED funding. The FY1999 report indicates
that for every program dollar spent from NED's congressional appropriation, its grantees raised an
additional $.65. Ibid.
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Appropriations for the Endowment are included in the U.S. Department of State -
U.S. Agency for international Development (USAID) budget. Graph 4 clarifies the issue
of appropriation amounts by highlighting the 1995 to 2008 levels of NED funding (see
Appendix 2 for a comparison of annual appropriations based on 2007 dollar values).
NED also receives a small amount of funding from various foundations.
Graph 3 also highlights that with the Cold War's end, which purportedly heralded
an era of lessened political military confrontation and the advent of a "peace dividend,"
NED funding levels have remained relatively constant. 85 For that matter, funding levels
have actually increased in FY 2003 in the wake of the events of September 11, the War
on Terror, and the Iraqi War.86 Justification for increased NED funding levels is
attributable to a combination of factors. These factors include that the Endowment has
become better organized, more transparent (e.g., regularly publishes its annual reports
and independent audits of its activities), and has benefited from the Bush administration's
intent to make democracy promotion a cornerstone of American foreign policy.
CHAPTER SUMMARY AND PRELUDE TO CHAPTER 4
The purpose of Chapter 3 has been to shed light on the nature of the executive-
legislative struggle for the privilege of primary responsibility in the U.S. foreign
policymaking process. The overview of the dispute for primacy has not only touched
85 The "peace dividend" is a political slogan originally popularized as a political slogan in the early 1990s
by President George H.W. Bush (R, 1989-93) and by the United Kingdom's Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher (Conservative Party, 1979-90). This slogan was frequently utilized immediately after the end of
the Cold War in discussions describing the economic benefit of decreased defense budgets.
86 In the financial year ending in September 2004, NED had an income of $80.1 million, $79.25 million of
which came from U.S Government agencies, $0.6 million came from other contributors, plus a small
amount of other revenue. Ibid.
132
upon the issues associated with the struggle for U.S. foreign policymaking primacy, but
also reviewed the means at Congress's disposal, namely control over the funding process,
to guide policymaking.
The review has been necessary to grasp the nuances associated with the
executive-legislative foreign policymaking debate. The discussion of executive-
legislative relations in foreign policymaking is also required for a better comprehension
of the following chapter's case studies. Chapter 4 will apply the arguments presented in
Chapter 3 to the discussion of how Congress has dealt with Latin American revolutionary
change during the Cold War. Chapter 5 will also compare how Congress today, in the
post-Cold War period, is dealing with revolutionary change in Latin America.
The next two chapters will bring together the general points made in Chapter 3
about the executive-legislative dispute for primacy in U.S. foreign policymaking with
specific examples of how this dispute impacts international relations. Blasier's theoretical
propositions, already discussed in both Chapters 2 and 3, will be further utilized to
identify similarities and differences between how Congress has reacted to revolutionary
change in Latin America during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.
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CHAPTER 4 - CONFRONTING REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN
LATIN AMERICA
"Beyond the issue of U.S. security interests in the Central American-Caribbean region,
our credibility world wide is engaged. The triumph of hostile forces in what the Soviets
call the 'strategic rear' of the United States would be read as a sign of U.S. impotence."
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, 19841
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICYMAKING: APPLYING BLASIER'S FRAMEWORK
Setting the Stage
Chapter 3 set the stage for the application of the framework by elaborating on the
nature of the executive-legislative debate over which branch of the United States (U.S.)
government has the primary responsibility for leading foreign policymaking. Chapter 4
builds on that debate by applying Cole Blasier's theoretical propositions to three case
studies where the U.S. Congress influenced foreign policymaking toward Latin America
before and during the Cold War. The discussion in Chapter 4 is the basis for analysis U.S.
interactions with post-Cold War Venezuela.
Chapter 4 analyzes U.S. reaction to revolutionary change by focusing on the
Central American/ Caribbean Basin sub-region. The chapter compares and contrasts
congressional involvement in dealing with reformists and revolutionaries such as
'U.S. National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (Kissinger Commission), "Report of the
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America," [Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State,
January 1984], pg 93. See Schoultz, Lars. National Security and United States Policy toward Latin
America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987, pg., 276.
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Nicaragua's Jose Santos Zelaya's reformist government (1893-1909), the Sandinista as
revolutionaries (1961-79), and the Sandinista revolutionary government (1979-90).
Chapter 4 undertakes a review of key aspects of U.S. involvement in Central
America and establishes a baseline of analysis of current day drivers influencing U.S.-
Central American/ Caribbean Basin relations. Chapters 5 and 6 subsequently build on the
analysis presented herein and deliberate on the extent that the U.S. executive and
legislative branches perceive Venezuela, governed by Hugo Chavez, to be a threat to
American interests. The review carried out in this chapter assists in answering the
question of whether Chivez is a threat or rather merely a nuisance much as was the case
of the congressional assessment of the (first) Sandinista government toward the end of
the Cold War.
Chapter 4 further defines what constitutes U.S. interests in Latin America, and in
the Central America/ Caribbean Basin sub-region in particular, and how such interests
may be threatened by non-hemispheric powers. Chapter 4 also reviews a series of pre-
and Cold War era case studies. These case studies illustrate the evolution of U.S. foreign
policymakers' thinking pertaining to the interpretation of potential threats arising from
Latin American reformists and revolutionaries as they transition from positions outside of
government to becoming the ruling party.
In Chapter 4 Blasier's theoretical propositions illuminate the U.S. executive and
legislatives branches' justification for involvement in the region. Classic examples
include the Roosevelt Corollary (1904) to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, and the Rayner
Resolution (1909). Chapter 4 delves into the circumstances that motivate U.S. foreign
policymakers to support as well as withdraw support from a regime. I also describe the
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conditions under which U.S. foreign policymakers will likely accommodate or suppress
reformist and revolutionary regimes.
In a similar vein, Chapter 4 addresses the globalist-regionalist perspectives debate
that influenced the Carter and Reagan administrations' interpretation of, and dealings
with the Sandinistas. Blasier's propositions are used to interpret the perception or
misperception of the extent of Soviet interventionism in Latin America. The analysis of
such events explores the reasons why the congressional assessment of the Sandinista
threat ultimately diverged from that reached by the Reagan administration.
A Note on the Case Studies and other Means of Analysis
The case studies in Chapter 4 share similarities interpretable by means of
Blasier's theoretical propositions. While the case studies deal with descriptive historical
events, they also serve the purpose of shedding light on U.S. foreign policymakers'
reactions to actual and perceived threats posed by revolutionaries. Blasier's framework
adroitly anticipates how U.S. government's policymakers may react to Latin American
revolutionary challenges even today. Blasier's framework captures the dynamics that
determine U.S. foreign policy, which has remained fundamentally unchanged since the
dawn of the Republic. Excluding hostile extra-hemispheric powers (including non-state
actors) from Latin America remains a key component of U.S. policy.2
2 In 1811 Congress reacted to growing security concerns over the presence of extra-hemispheric powers by
adopting the "No Transfer Resolution." This resolution passed on the verge of war with Great Britain,
when the latter threatened to seize Spanish Florida and use it as a base to attack the United States, asserted
that the United States "cannot without serious inquietude see any part of the said territory (Spanish Florida)
pass into the hands of any foreign power (Great Britain); and that a due regard to their own safety compels
them to provide . . . for the temporary occupation of the said territory." This resolution is the catalyst for
the subsequent Monroe Declaration of 1823 that has become the cognitive bedrock for U.S. foreign policy
toward Latin America whereby "prudent people keep potential adversaries as far away as possible." See
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The U.S. Government's commitment to this objective remains steadfast despite
the post-September 11, 2001 realities created by the rise of the potential for non-state
actors to threaten the United States. 3 A modern reinterpretation of the policy for example,
is the Bush Doctrine (2001-02) that is worded broadly enough as to justify intervention in
any part of the world, including Latin America, in order to pre-empt hostile (terrorist)
forces from using a third country as a springboard for attacks against the American
homeland. What has changed from the Cold War era is that today, neither the Russian
Federation as the Soviet Union's heir, nor the People's Republic of China as an emerging
global power, possess the combination of political, military, and economic capability to
challenge U.S. hegemony in the Americas. During the Cold War the United States was
threatened by a political, militarily powerful, ideologically hostile extra-hemispheric
power (Soviet Union) seeking to challenge U.S. hegemony worldwide in its bid for
global leadership. Latin American revolutionary change, interpreted through that prism,
was seen as possessing the potential to threaten U.S. vital security interests. 4
The foregoing statements are placed in context by providing examples of how the
U.S. executive and legislative branches reacted to revolutionary change in Central
Hartlyn, Jonathan, Lars Schoultz, and Augusto Varas, The United States and Latin America in the 1990s:
Beyond the Cold War. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992, pgs. 3-4.
3 The post-World War II international system will be unrecognizable by 2025. Terrorist entities may
decline if youth employment and avenues for political expression are provided in the Islamic world. Latin
America's major countries, excluding Venezuela and Bolivia that experimented with populist governance,
will be middle income powers. However, the region will fall behind Asia and other areas in terms of
economic competitiveness. National Intelligence Council - Directorate of National Intelligence. Global
Trends 2025: A Transformed World. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008, pgs. vii-ix.
4 Vital interests are defined in the context of the present study as being conditions and situations so
important to a state that it will not voluntarily forfeit these interests to another state. A state in this regard
may be compelled by a more powerful state to surrender these interests. More succinctly put, vital interests
are those issues, concerns, or resources over which a state will go to war to assure. See, Snow, Donald M.,
and Eugene Brown. United States Foreign Policy: Politics Beyond the Water's Edge. Boston, MA:
Bedford/ St. Martin's Press, 2 "d edition, 2000, pgs. 6-7.
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America during the 1970-90 period. Past U.S. policy responses to revolutionary
challenges confirm the applicability of Blasier's propositions to the Nicaragua case
studies and mesh with the sidebar commentary of other countries, such as El Salvador,
which also experienced revolutionary upheaval during that time.
Defining Interests and Threats
Blasier's theoretical propositions remain a relevant means for analyzing
congressional reaction to Latin American revolutionary change dating from before the
Cold War era through it and into the present post-Cold War period. Blasier's framework
highlights how the United States defines interests and threats while stressing foreign
policymakers' consistency in dealing with such revolutionary challenges.
Interest is defined as "a situation or a condition important to the State." 5 Based on
the importance that the State assigns to such interests, the amount of finite (political-
military and economic) resources it is willing and able to expend will vary.
CASE STUDY NUMBER 1: THE UNITED STATES AND ZELAYA (NICARAGUA)
United States Involvement in Nicaragua: The Early Years
The Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberacidn
Nacional - FSLN) in 1979 ousted the government of longtime U.S. ally Anastasio
Somoza Debayle. 6 The Sandinistas toppled the Somoza (autocratic) dynasty in place
5 Ibid. pg. 277.
6 Note in order to distinguish between father and sons in the case of the Somozas, the study recurs to using
their compound last names - Somoza Garcia in the case of the elder Somoza (1937-47 and 1950-56), and
Somoza Debayle in the case of the younger Somozas, Luis (1956-63) and Anastasio (1967-72 and 1974-
1979).
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since the elder Somoza consolidated power in 1936 under the aegis of the United States.
In doing so, the Sandinistas created a revolutionary offshoot of the Cuban Revolution.
Despite the Sandinistas' links to Soviet-backed Fidel Castro's Cuba, their regime cannot
be defined in terms of being a communist bloc state since it remained committed to a
mixed economy, did not do away with political pluralism, and pursued membership in the
non-aligned movement of states thus eschewing "great power and bloc politics." 7
Notwithstanding internal dissent and open rebellion by the Contras (U.S.-funded
contra-revolutionary forces), the Sandinistas controlled Nicaragua from 1979 until 1990
when they were democratically ousted from power.8 The Sandinistas' decade-long
stranglehold on power is the result of their control over the multi-party Junta of National
Reconstruction (Junta Nacional de Reconstruccidn) and the presidency.
The U.S. involvement in Nicaragua predates the Sandinistas. As early as 1909 the
United States intervened in support of Conservative party forces rebelling against the
(Liberal party) government of Jos6 Santos Zelaya (1893-1909). The 1909 intervention,
and the decades-long presence in Nicaragua, was motivated by a combination of factors.
By the early 1900s U.S. foreign policymakers wrote off a partnership with Zelaya for
7 See Cruz, Arturo in an untitled review of Anthony Lakes' "Somoza Falling" in Journal of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 3, Special Issue: The International Dynamics of the
Commonwealth Caribbean (Autumn, 1989), pp. 208, accessed February 18, 2008,
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.fiu.edu/view/00221937/ap010120/01a00100/0?currentResult=00221937%2ba
p010120%2b01 a00100%2b0%2c07&searchUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fsearch%2FBasicRes
ults%3Fhp%3D25%26si%3D 1 %26gw%3Ditx%26jtxsi%3D 1 %26icpsi%3D 1 %26artsi%3D 1 %26Query%3
DSomoza%2BFalling%26wc%3Don. Also see, Castro, Fidel, "Speech to the United Nations as Chairman
of the Non-Align Movement," October 12, 1979, accessed January 31, 2009,
http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/castro/ 19 7 9 / 19 7 9 10 12 .
8 Although the Sandinistas lose multi-party elections in 1990, they remain to this day a politically powerful
party, and to the chagrin of U.S. foreign policymakers, former president Daniel Ortega (FSLN - 1985-90)
has been democratically reelected to the Nicaraguan presidency in 2006.
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having restricted American investors' access to natural resources (e.g., the building of a
trans-isthmus canal through Nicaragua, as well as limited access to mining and logging
concessions).
Three key factors motivated U.S. intervention: 1) Zelaya's political-military threat
to the U.S.-backed Central American republics, 2) his overture to extra-hemispheric
imperial rivals (Germany and Japan), and; 3) attempts to reign in Nicaragua's pro-United
States Conservative party. United States intervention was justified by the obligation to
protect American lives and property and to assure internal political stability in Nicaragua.
Such justifications are still used to validate contemporary U.S. foreign policies.
Interpreting the Zelaya Government Threat: Blasier's Propositions 2, 3, and 4
The assessment of the threat Zelaya posed to his Central American neighbors and
to American interests is the key determinant of U.S. action. Blasier's Proposition 2 and 3
apply to how U.S. foreign policymakers viewed Zelaya. United States hostility toward
Zelaya is a result of the government's conclusion that the Zelaya government's
revolutionary reform policies were a threat to U.S. political and economic interests. The
Zelaya (reformist) government is itself a product of a Liberal party revolt against the
preceding Conservative party government. U.S. hostility toward Zelaya further evolved
as a result of his revolutionary, anti-conservative origin, and autocratic governance style.9
Blasier's Proposition 2 maintains that the United States is hostile toward
reformist (stage 2) governments, not because of their autocratic natures, but rather due to
the adverse impact of their reforms on U.S. private interests. Unease over Zelaya's
9 American interests were concentrated in pro-Conservative party areas (e.g. Bluefields).
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reform agenda was compounded by overtures to Germany and Japan, both then hostile,
extra-hemispheric rivals. Zelaya's policies clashed with U.S. interests in Nicaragua and
were labeled a threat to vital strategic considerations (Proposition 3): exclusive control
over a single trans-isthmus canal and mining interests.
Map 1 - Central America and the Caribbean
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Obs: Author modified map of "Central America and the Caribbean," with actual (solid line) and
proposed (dashed line) trans-isthmus canals. Canal route lines are approximated.
Source: University of Texas - Perry Castan'eda Library Collection, accessed February 16, 2008, see
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/central america refO2.ipe.
One is hard pressed to accept that Zelaya's progressive, liberal policies (e.g.,
public education, a national road building program, and the establishment of a national
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steamship line) threatened U.S. (hegemonic) interests. Yet, if these reforms are viewed in
terms of the Conservative-Liberal political struggle, another picture emerges. Zelaya's
progressive reforms sought to modernize Nicaragua and centralize authority. To
consolidate such reforms, Zelaya created a national army loyal to him with the
accompanying requirement that all civilian-held weapons be surrendered to his
government. Zelaya's measures represented an autocratic bid to centralize authority and
perpetuate personal rule by crushing dissent. 0
As Chapters 5 and 6 will illustrate Zelaya's Nicaragua and Hugo Chavez's
Venezuela share similarities regarding the rise of anti-U.S. politicians seeking to
rebalance their country's prevailing socio-political and economic order and relations with
the United States. Both Zelaya and Chavez seek to centralize authority and crush political
opponents identified as agents (stooges) of the United States and local U.S. interests.
Although liberalism in Central America (Map 1) is normally associated with the
region's coffee-growing elites, Zelaya is not an instrument of the coffee-growing elites
nor were all coffee growers supporters of the Liberal party. The ease with which Zelaya
imposed autocracy is instead the result of Nicaragua's widespread and incessant intra-
and -inter-party factionalism. Political factionalism freed Zelaya from being constrained
by Conservatives or beholden to his Liberal party.1 Having seized power, Zelaya
contrived to dictate political stability in Central America, mirroring some of the same
concerns as those evidenced by the United States.
See, Mahoney, James. The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central
America. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2001, pg. 181.
" Ibid. pgs. 181-182.
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While both Zelaya and the U.S. government concurred with the need for regional
political stability. However Zelaya's interpretation of stability and means for achieving it
diverged from U.S. notions. Zelaya interpreted stability as emanating from the
resurrection of the old Federal Republic of Central America (Republica Federal de
Centroamerica, 1823-1840), with himself as its president, and Nicaragua as the dominant
state in the amalgamated country. 2 Zelaya's objectives were seen by the United States as
expansionist, constituting a threat his neighbors and a challenge to U.S. hegemony.
Heralding many of today's concerns with Chavez's aspirations, Nicaragua's
neighbors and the United States interpreted Zelaya's machinations as a threat. Despite
Central Americans' desires for political-economic union, Zelaya is blamed for the 1906-
07 regional wars fought to impose stability via forced reunification. In a pattern that
characterizes most inter-state relations in Central America, hostilities only ceased as a
result of the United States' involvement.1 3 Mirroring current accusations raised by
12 The republic encompassed Guatemala, which then included today's Mexican state of Chiapas, El
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. The republic was torn apart by differences between
Liberals who wanted to establish a modern, democratic state based on the precepts of the French revolution
and free trade, and wealthy land-owning Conservatives backed by the Roman Catholic Church that favored
the maintenance of the status quo. The 1838-40 Liberal-Conservative Civil War split the federation.
13 In June 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt (1901-09) acted as a mediator between Guatemala on the
one side and Honduras and El Salvador on the other to end the brief war that had broken out between these
Central American republics. The peace treaty signed onboard the U.S. gunboat U.S.S. Marblehead required
these states to henceforth submit their differences to arbitration. The treaty invoked the moral guidance of
the mediators for the fulfillment of its obligations. According to Philip Marshall Brown, this direct
reference to the United States' obligation to mediate and intervene in the affairs of the Central American
republics was assented to by all of the region's states with the exception of Zelaya's Nicaragua. Zelaya
subsequently attacked Honduras in February of 1907, but American (naval) intervention prevents the
conflict from extending to El Salvador and Guatemala. American diplomatic intervention in August of the
same year inhibits war from breaking out between Nicaragua and El Salvador. The need to ensure peace
and stability in the region leads Roosevelt to convene the Washington Peace Conference (November 13 to
December 20, 1907) which obliged the Central American to take their disputes to the Central American
Court of Justice and abide by its ruling. See, Brown, Philip Marshall. American Intervention in Central
America, in Latin America. New York, NY: G. E. Stechert and company, 1914, George H. Blakeslee,
editor, pgs. 245 to 246, accessed March 9, 2008,
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Chavez, U.S. involvement is denigrated by Zelaya as interference in Central American
affairs. 14
During this period, access to Nicaraguan resources and concession rights for
digging a trans-isthmus canal through Nicaragua is at stake for the United States. A key
incentive for American investors for locating a canal through Nicaragua is that it would
shave roughly 500 miles off a similar canal route through Panama (Map 1). Yet
Nicaragua's political instability and hostility toward the United States made a Nicaraguan
inter-oceanic canal difficult to negotiate.
For decades American investors had sought to dig a canal through Nicaragua.
Despite the fact that Nicaragua had long been the favorite option given American
investors' agricultural and commercial interests, lobbyists for the Panamanian route
convinced the U.S. Senate to vote against Nicaragua in favor of Panama. Not to be
outdone by a perceived American affront to extort concessions from Managua, Zelaya
invited Germany and Japan to build a competing canal through Nicaragua. U.S. foreign
policymakers interpreted Zelaya's action as a political, military, and economic threat
since the United States and Germany were competing for access to Caribbean ports.15
http://books.google.com/books?id=R9WV9aG6wlkC&pg=PA245&lpg=PA245&dq=1906+central+americ
an+war&source=web&ots=Y2RfCezOMg&sig=TmLyL8YDXlNjIlZBOToYfqGJF4&h=en#PPR3,M1.
14 See, Mahoney, pg. 187.
15 In part, the United States, already involved in a Cold War of sorts with Germany, feared that Nicaragua
would be unable to service its foreign debt and thereby result in a repetition of Germany's aggressive
intervention during the Venezuela incident of 1902-03. In the case of the latter, Berlin had communicated
that the British were wiling to "temporarily occupy Venezuelan harbors much as it had done in China."
Note that in 1898 Kaiser Wilhelm II had "temporarily" acquired Kiaochow in China on a ninety-nine year
lease. President Theodore Roosevelt concurred with Rear Admiral Henry Clay Taylor, chief of the Bureau
of Navigation that Venezuela. ". . . could offer nothing but territory, or she could mortgage her revenue in
such a way as to place herself in complete political dependence on Germany. The United States could not
allow either of these, and yet Germany's right to indemnity would be incontestable." See, Morris, Edmund,
"A matter of extreme urgency: Theodore Roosevelt, Wilhelm II, and the Venezuela Crisis of 1902 - United
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The Nicaraguan case study again shares similarities with Venezuela. Chavez,
much like Zelaya, in control of a coveted resource (i.e., petroleum), extorts major
economic concessions from U.S. business interests, while offering political quid pro quos
to U.S. policymakers. Chavez promises the provision of an uninterrupted oil flow to the
United States in exchange for a U.S. withdrawal from Latin America.
The need to safeguard American agricultural and commercial interests was a key
determinant of U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. In the 1909 intervention, the main concern
was to safeguard U.S. interests associated with assuring Panama's independence albeit
under U.S. suzerainty. 16 On the basis of protecting American interests, U.S. foreign
policymakers interpreted Zelaya's German/ Japanese gambit as a security threat.17
Had the U.S. government not blocked Zelaya's dealings with extra-hemispheric rivals of
the United States, U.S. foreign policymakers feared that Managua would revoke the concession
rights of the (American) Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. 18 Ensuing exclusive German-
States-Germany conflict over alleged German expansionistic efforts in Latin America, " in Naval War
College Review (Spring 2002), pg. 2, accessed May 30, 2008,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi mOJIW/is 2 55/ai 88174230/pg 2.
16 By the American Civil War (1861-65), the United States and its citizens had growing strategic and commercial
interests in Nicaragua (i.e. banking, transportation, and coffee and banana plantations). Furthermore the likes of
Cornelius Vanderbilt, Cornelius K. Garrison, and Charles Morgan all had significant business interests in the
lucrative New York-to-San Francisco trade route traversing through Nicaragua. Vessels sailing from New York
would enter Nicaragua via the San Juan River on the Atlantic Ocean side and sail across Lake Nicaragua to the city
of Rivas where passengers and goods would then be transported by stagecoach a short distance over land before
reaching the Pacific and continuing their onward passage to San Francisco. So lucrative were these interests that
there was discussion of acquiring Nicaragua as a U.S. territorial possession. Case in point is the U.S. government's
fear of the establishment of a British-controlled trans-isthmus canal which led to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850)
whereby both states agreed not to occupy any part of Central America. Belize and the Bay Islands were excluded
since they were already controlled by Great Britain.
17 In part the United States feared Nicaragua becoming unable to service its foreign debt and thereby a
repletion of Germany's aggressive intervention during the Venezuela incident of 1902-03.
18 U.S. official involvement and private-sector interest in a proposed trans-isthmus canal through Nicaraguan
territory is evidenced by the U.S. Senate bill of December 15, 1881 (sponsored by Senator Miller of California)
incorporating the Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. The bill assigned to the President of the United States of
145
Japanese control of a Nicaraguan canal would both compete with the U.S. canal being dug in
Panama and prejudice American investors' interests in a Nicaraguan canal.
The threat to U.S. vital strategic interests posed by the construction of a
competing canal resides in Zelaya's exclusion of U.S. participation in its construction,
operation, and defense.' 9 Zelaya's overture to hostile rivals of the United States in the
"American backyard" poisoned relations with Washington (Proposition 3).20 As will be
further discussed in the following chapters, Chivez has, unlike Zelaya, succeeded in
extracting significant concessions pertaining to oil field control and operations from
major international oil companies under the threat of expropriation. Chavez, much like
Zelaya, has reached out to extra-hemispheric powers - in this case China and Iran - to
assist with his vision of Venezuela's economic-nationalist development and the
commercialization of its resources.
A key distinction between Zelaya's Nicaragua and Chavez's Venezuela resides in
the lack of a catalyst of significant magnitude to spark calls for Chavez's removal from
power at the U.S. grassroots and congressional levels. Lars Schoultz in "Beneath the
United States" elaborates on the Zelaya threat to American economic (mining) interests
America the right to name one of the eleven board of director members. One of the investors and a board member,
was former President Ulysses S. Grant (18). See, The New York Times, (December 16, 1881), accessed February 16,
2008, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf? r=1&res=9B01E2D81438E033A25755C1A9649D94609FD7CF&oref=slogin.
19 Mahoney, pg. 187.
20 Recall that the U.S. government, according to Blasier, will respond to revolutionary governments (stage
3) in accordance to the latter's perceived links to the United States' strongest Great Power rival. In the
years leading up to the First World War, Germany was identified by U.S. government officials as the
United States' greatest rival. Both countries had conflicting interests in the Pacific and Germany was
increasingly active in Mexico and the Caribbean, areas falling within the U.S. sphere of influence. Any
German political-military and or economic involvement in the region is consequently identified as a threat
to U.S. vital strategic interests.
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in Nicaragua, while pointing out that there is scant evidence linking Secretary of State
Philander Chase Knox's (1909-13) actions to entrepreneurs from the United States and
the Nicaragua Mining Company (a mining concession), as a determinant of policy. Here,
Schoultz cites the Zelaya government's execution of Lee Roy Cannon and Leonard
Groce, American employees of the Pittsburgh-based mining concession, as a key factor
leading to the U.S. overthrow of Zelaya. 21 Cannon's and Groce's execution for their
involvement in the Conservative-led rebellion restricts Zelaya's room for maneuvering.
The execution of two Americans fueled the ire of William H. Taft (R, 1909-13) who,
from the onset, sought to oust Zelaya.22 Chavez has avoided such a situation.
Legitimizing U.S. Intervention: Blasier's Propositions 2, 3, and 4 as applied to the
Roosevelt Corollary and the Rayner Resolution
In a pattern that later characterized the U.S.-Soviet Cold War period, the Senate
weighed in on the U.S.-Nicaragua dispute, not as rival to executive branch foreign
policymaking, but rather as a facilitator, curtailing the possibility of inter-branch conflict
(Blasier's Proposition 9). The Senate, through an act of Congress, conceded the foreign
policymaking initiative to the Taft administration. Congress abdicated its responsibilities
21 Schoultz, Lars. Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, pgs. 212-213.
2 Leo B. Lott, commenting on Dana G. Munro's "Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean,
1920-1921" argues that the foreign policies of the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt, William H. Taft,
and Woodrow Wilson were motivated mainly by political and not economic considerations. In this sense
both Munro and Lott find common ground with the notion that American foreign policy during the period
sought "to put to an end conditions that threatened the independence of some Caribbean states and
consequently were a threat to the security of the United States." See, Lott, Leo B., untitled review of Dana
G. Munro's "Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921" in Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 356, The Non-Western World in Higher Education (Nov.,
1964), p. 209.
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to assert its constitutional foreign policymaking prerogatives, and acted as a counter
balance to special interest pressures influencing White House policies.
The extent to which the Senate abdicated the foreign policymaking initiative is
best exemplified by Senator Isidor Rayner's (D-Maryland, 1905-12) resolution
introduced 10 days following the Taft administration's December 1, 1909 severance of
diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. In Rayner's resolution, the Senate authorized the
Taft administration "to take all necessary steps for the apprehension of Zelaya, the
alleged perpetrator of the crime (the executions of Cannon and Groce)."23
Blasier's Proposition 4 is applicable to both the Taft administration's position and
to the Rayner resolution. The resolution, calling for the apprehension of the recognized
head-of-state and -government, precludes the negotiation of any agreement with
Managua short of capitulation. Blasier's Proposition 4 in this case ascertains that the U.S.
government will opt to suppress any revolutionary government whenever it is determined
that the latter will not negotiate an agreement acceptable to Washington (in this case both
the White House and Congress). It is important to note that the Rayner resolution
authorizes the Taft administration to use "whatever methods and processes may be
necessary to accomplish this purpose."24 The Rayner resolution establishes congressional
precedence of delegating authority to the President by legitimizing the implementation of
the earlier Roosevelt Corollary.2 As a consequence, the Rayner resolution and the
23 Ibid. pg. 213.
24 Ibid. pg. 213.
25 President Theodore Roosevelt's 1904 amendment to the Monroe Doctrine (1823) asserted that the United
States had the right to intervene in Central America and Caribbean states in order to stabilize their
economic affairs. Washington feared that the alternative to U.S. intervention would be intervention by the
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Roosevelt Corollary set the stage for intervention in Central America and the Caribbean
Basin sub-region through 1934.26 Justification for intervention is phrased in terms of the
burden that the United States must bear on behalf of its southern neighbors.
The notion of the burden that America bears on behalf of its southern neighbors
first arises in President Theodore Roosevelt's (R, 1901-09) 1904 annual message to
Congress. Roosevelt's speech specifies the reasoning for intervention and states:
"It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger ... as regards the other
nations of the Western Hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this
country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and
prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon
our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable
efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays
its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic
wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of
civilized society [however], may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require
intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the
adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United
States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to
the exercise of an international police power ... While [our Southern neighbors]
obey the primary laws of civilized society they may rest assured that they will be
treated by us in a spirit of cordial and helpful sympathy ... It is a mere truism to
European powers seeking to recover monies owed by these countries' bondholders. Kris James Mitchener
and Marc Wiedenmier indicate that the Roosevelt Corollary brought not only a measure of financial
stability to the region, but also reduced intra- and inter-state political conflict. Both of the foregoing factors
benefited the United States directly in the sense that financial stability reduced the proclivity for European
intervention and assured American hegemony in the region. See, Mitchner, Kris James, and Marc
Wiedenmier in "Empire, Public Goods, and the Roosevelt Corollary," (January 2004), accessed March 9,
2008, http://lsb.scu.edu/faculty/research/working papers/pdf/mitchener wp02-b.pdf.
26 U.S. Presidents have cited the Roosevelt Corollary as justification for U.S. intervention in Cuba (1906-
1910), Nicaragua (1909-1911, 1912-1925 and 1926-1933), Haiti (1915-1934), and the Dominican Republic
(1916-1924). The United States began to shift its position on intervention in 1928 during the Calvin
Coolidge administration (1923-29) with the Clark Memorandum (December 17, 1928) which states that the
United States only has the right to intervene in Central America and the Caribbean when these states are
threatened by European powers. By 1934 Franklin D. Roosevelt renounced interventionism and established
his "Good Neighbor policy." Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy is responsible for tolerating the emergence
of dictators such as Anastasio Somoza Garcia (1937-47 and 1950-56) in Nicaragua, Fulgencio Batista
(1940-44 and 1952-59) in Cuba, and Rafael Le6nidas Trujillo (1930-38 and 1942-52, unofficially holding
power until assassinated in 1961) in the Dominican Republic.
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say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to
maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of
such independence can not be separated from the responsibility of making good
use of it."2 7
Rayner's resolution provides the Legislative branch's congressional acquiescence
to the White House invoking the Roosevelt Corollary. The latter is utilized to legitimize
the landing of 100 Marines from the US. S. Paducah to protect American lives and
property in Bluefields. However, U.S. intervention is directly responsible for preventing
the capitulation of the Conservative-controlled port of Bluefields to Zelaya loyalist Jose
Madriz, a factor that turns the course of the Nicaraguan civil war.28
Rayner's resolution represents congressional carte blanche authorizing the U.S.
executive branch to impose order and stability on the tumultuous Central American
republics. Although Rayner's resolution is not tantamount to an unconditional surrender
of Congress, and thus in collusion with the executive branch in matters of foreign
policymaking, it exemplifies significant congressional deference.
Table 5 summarizes Blasier's Propositions 2, 3, and 4 and illustrates how
Blasier's propositions explain the reasoning of why the United States adopted a hostile
position toward Zelaya.
27 Roosevelt, Theodore, President of the United States of America in "1904 Annual Message to Congress."
(December 6, 1904), accessed March 9, 2008, http://www.pinzler.com/ushistory/corollarysupp.html.
28 Extrapolating from Rayner's resolution in accordance with Proposition 4, it can be assumed that even if
Zelaya had surrendered to the United States but left Madriz in charge of the government, the United States
would have still pursued regime change. It was feared that Madriz, by being politically associated with
Zelaya, would likely have continued Zelaya's overture to extra-hemispheric powers. Therefore the United
States could not accept a successor (Liberal party) Madriz regime given that it would entail a continuation
of the hostile, anti-American policies of the Zelaya government.
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Similarly, the Chavez government, because of its populist reforms, is raising U.S.
concerns because of the impact of the former on U.S. business interests in Venezuela
(Proposition 2). If the Chivez government pursues more radical revolutionary reforms,
either as a means of ensuring popular political support at home to perpetuate its rule, or
seeks to more closely align itself with extra-hemispheric powers hostile to the United
States, foreign policymakers in Washington may opt to suppress the Chavez government.
(Proposition 3). However, should the Chavez government, or a successor regime,
negotiate an acceptable settlement of issues in conflict (e.g., continue to provide quick
and adequate compensation for expropriated U.S. property) then Washington's foreign
policymakers will likely react by extending to Venezuela conciliatory policies
(Proposition 4).
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Table 5 - Applying Blasier's Propositions to the United States
Government's (USG) Action in dealing with the Zelaya Government
(Grouped by Phases or Stages of Revolutionary Change)
Proposition Action Grouped by Relevance to the Three Phases or Stages of
Revolutionary Change
Number 2 USG will be hostile toward most reformist governments (stage 2) primarily because of
the adverse impacts these have on U.S. private interests. Zelaya's progressive reforms
and limitations on access to Nicaraguan natural resources impacts American private
interests.
Number 3 USG will respond to revolutionary governments (stage 3) in accordance to the latter's
perceived links to the United States' strongest Great Power rival. Germany's
involvement in the region is identified as a threat to American national security interests.
Strategic considerations shape a suppressive USG response to the Zelaya government
which is itself a product of political revolt.
Number 4 USG leaders will opt for conciliatory responses when it is determined that a
revolutionary government will negotiate an acceptable settlement of issues in conflict
and that such an agreement precludes the interference of a hostile Great Power in the
country concerned. USG leaders will opt for suppression whenever they determine that
the revolutionary government will not negotiate such an agreement and subdue such an
agreement whenever it is deemed the best means of preventing or countering the
interference of a hostile Great Power. In the Nicaraguan case, Zelaya would neither
voluntarily surrender to the United States nor forgo ties with extra-hemispheric powers
consequently making a mutually acceptable negotiated agreement impossible.
Source: Blasier, 1985, pg. 236.
Interpreting the Zelaya Government Threat: Blasier's Propositions 5, 6, 11, and 12
The Washington-Managua dispute is also explained in terms of Blasier's
Propositions 5 and 6, which encompass U.S. economic and strategic considerations.
Blasier's Propositions 11 and 12 nevertheless are better indicators of a typical U.S.
response. U.S. objectives in dealing with Zelaya are shaped by the President acting
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through a cabinet-level officer (i.e., Secretary of State Knox), and are a response to
pressure exerted by an American corporation on the executive branch.29
Security considerations, the need to retain U.S. hemispheric political-military
primacy (Proposition 11), and economic considerations (Proposition 12) remain two
major determinants of American foreign policy. The latter case is best highlighted by the
U.S. State Department's (Knox's) opposition to Zelaya negotiating loans with British
banking syndicates meant to finance the construction of a new railway. By bypassing
American involvement the U.S. government would lack control over the proposed project
and thus undermine U.S. suzerainty in the region.3 0
In the time leading up to the First World War, the U.S. government sought to
establish preeminent influence in Central America vis-&-vis the other imperial powers.
For example, the 1901 Hay-Paunceforte treaty between the United States and Great
Britain highlights U.S. objectives for securing interests.31 Britain, recognizing its
29 Knox's links to Pittsburgh mining interests are extensive. Prior to serving as Attorney General of the
United States in the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations, Knox as general counsel of the Carnegie
Steel Company, help organize the United States Steel Company in 1901. Knox has been said to have had a
close association with the United States and Nicaragua Mining Company, and in testimony before the
United States Senate Sub-committee on Foreign Affairs the U.S. Consul to Bluefields (Moffat) indicated
that it was his belief that Zelaya's actions against the Pittsburgh-based mining concession was what
motivated Knox to seek Zelaya's removal. Zelaya had been planning to cancel the United States and
Nicaragua Mining Company's concession since at least 1907. See, Gismondi, Mike and Jeremy Mouat,
"Merchants, Mining, and Concessions on Nicaragua's Mosquito Coast: Reassessing the American
Presence, 1893-1912," (Penultimate versions before editing) in Journal of Latin American Studies
(London: Cambridge University Press) 34, 4 2002, pgs. 845-879, accessed March 16, 2008,
http://www.athabascau.ca/html/staff/academic/gismondi/Final JLAS Merchants.htm.
30 Mahoney, pg. 187.
31 Note that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty (1850) is more of a treaty made between equals than is the case of
the Hay-Pauceforte treaty (1901). The former bound both signatories not to obtain or maintain exclusive
control over a trans-isthmus canal. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty also bound both signatories to respect
Nicaraguan and other Central American republics' sovereignty by having them renounce any right to
occupy, fortify, or colonize any of these countries. The Hay-Paunceforte treaty itself nullifies the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty of 1850 and gives the United States the sole right to establish and control a trans-isthmus
canal through Central America.
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diminishing influence compared to the United States, signed the treaty to counter German
encroachments on its political and commercial interests in the Caribbean Basin.32
Schoultz clarifies that the U.S. government remained cordial to Zelaya only as
long as he cooperated with American objectives for the region (e.g., Blasier's
Propositions 2 and 3).33 An understanding with Britain assured by treaty, coupled with
Panama's independence from Colombia (1903), ensured that any incentive that the U.S.
government had in accommodating the Zelaya government evaporated. Britain's
acquiescence to U.S. control of the trans-isthmus canal starting construction through
Panama (and completed by 1914) negated Washington's need for further indulging
Zelaya's regional aspirations.34
Today, the United States is cultivating the leaders of countries that will serve as
alternative sources of petroleum (i.e., Angola and Equatorial Guinea). Diversification of
suppliers is meant to reduce U.S. dependence on hostile states such as Venezuela. Such
contingency planning is tantamount to the realistic assessment that Chavez's regime will
endure and aims to mitigate the consequences of a possible future suspension of
32 For Great Britain, friendship with the United States represents an expedient, low-cost means for
checking threatening German aspirations and involvement in the region while at the same time further
drawing the United States into a potential confrontation with Germany over regional port access.
3 Schoultz, pg. 210.
3 A U.S. controlled canal through newly independent Panamanian territory assured unhindered U.S. access
to the Pacific Ocean and the U.S. territories on the American west coast. Note that while Zelaya is willing
to assign concessions to foreign interests in order to develop Nicaragua, he is unwilling to concede on the
issue of sovereignty. Territorial integrity required for Zelaya Nicaraguan sovereignty over a trans-isthmus
canal. While the United States had offered the Zelaya government $11 million in 1900 (or $280.1 million in
2007) for ceding the right-of-way, Zelaya refused the offer giving sovereignty concerns. Zelaya's refusal
to acquiesce to the U.S. offer motivates Washington to look to Panama in 1903 as an alternative route. See,
Gismondi, Mike and Jeremy Mouat, pgs. 845-879. For computing the relative value of the U.S. dollar in
1900 to 2007 (last year of full annual data for initial and target year) using the consumer price index,
accessed, August 9, 2008, see http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php#.
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Venezuelan crude oil shipments. Zelaya's and Chdvez's actions are indicators of the
extent to which an anti-status quo power may seek to disrupt regional recognition of U.S.
hegemony.
Interpreting the Zelaya Government Threat: Conclusions and Consequences
While the foregoing highlights the regional security threat posed by Zelaya, his policies
were not crafted in a political vacuum. Zelaya's policies are as reactionary to external
threats to Nicaragua as they are attempts by Managua to impose centralized authority
over its domestic rivals, factors captured by Table 6 below.
Table 6 - Applying Blasier's Propositions to the United States
Government's (USG) Action in dealing with the Zelaya Government
(Grouped by Economic and Bureaucratic Explanations)
Proposition Action Grouped by Relevance to Economic and Bureaucratic Explanations
Number 5 Economic considerations and private business interests are important in the formulation
(economic) of USG policies and are compatible with policies decided on strategic grounds.
However, strategic factors take precedence over economic considerations. A concern for
U.S. policymakers was the possibility that Zelaya would allow the German and Japanese
governments to construct a trans-isthmus canal through Nicaraguan territory, threatening
American concessions and security.
Number 6 President Taft and Secretary of State Knox are engaged in Great Power rival strategic
(bureaucratic) decision-making.
Number 11 USG suppressive responses are the result of the need to retain U.S. hemispheric political
primacy.
Number 12 USG responses are shaped by: 1) the President acting with or through cabinet-level
officers; 2) leaders of large corporations working with the U.S. Congress and the
executive; and 3) middle level diplomats and civil servants. Responses are result of
security, economic, and bureaucratic considerations.
Source: Blasier, 1985, pg. 236-237.
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From a Nicaragua-centric perspective, Zelaya's political objectives result from the
need to check the expansionist proclivities of Guatemala's Manuel Estrada Cabrera.35
Schoultz takes the position that while U.S. foreign policymakers identified Zelaya's
attempts to check Estrada Cabrera as destabilizing, Washington was oblivious to foreign
concessionaries' (i.e., Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and France and the United States)
and Estrada Cabrera's shared responsibility for regional instability.36
Beyond the factors enumerated in Table 6, the United States had ulterior motives
for preventing what would have been a regionally destabilizing Nicaraguan invasion of El
Salvador (Propositions 6, 11, and 12). While the United States saw the Zelaya
government as a threat to its vital security interests, it also had to weigh its actions in
light of U.S.-Mexican relations. Thus U.S-Nicaragua policy is influenced by the strategic
need to curtail Mexico's Porfirio Diaz's own Central American designs (Proposition 3) at
a time of growing German influence in Mexican affairs. Chavez's saber rattling along the
Venezuela-Colombia border is not comparable to this situation.
If the pro-Mexico Zelaya government had been permitted by the United States to
destabilize its neighbors, Diaz's own influence in Central America would have increased
and benefited German ambitions. 37 An expansion of Mexican influence in Central
3 Gismondi and Mouat, pgs. 845-879.
36 Ibid.
3 The Diaz government is seen as holding imperialist territorial aspirations of its own in Central America
and in particular in Guatemala where more than 40,000 Mexicans resided. See, The New York Times, "Our
Government Is Waiting; Zelaya asks inquiry by our Commission," (December 5, 1909), accessed February
23, 2008, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf~res=9503E0D7113EE033A25756C0A9649D946897D6CF. At the same time editorials in the New
York Times similarly stoked the ire of American public opinion by calling for the Zelaya government to pay
reparations for the execution of Cannon and Groce, going as far as advocating the seizure of Nicaraguan
government controlled ports in the case of non-compliance. See, The New York Times. The underlying
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America would have encircled pro-United States Guatemala, stoking already tense Great
Power rivalries in the ramp up to World War I (1914-18).
Zelaya's fate is ultimately sealed when Mexico indicates that it would not
challenge the United States for regional hegemonic control in Central America. Mexico
clarified to the United States that its strategic interests for the region extend only to the
contested Guatemalan territory of Chiapas.38 Zelaya, facing a Conservative insurrection,
a U.S. Marine landing at Bluefields, and realizing that Diaz would not intervene on his
behalf, determined that exile in Mexico City was the only viable option. He was acutely
aware of what happened to American filibuster William Walker (e.g., his failed bid to
retain control of Nicaragua ended before a firing squad) half a century earlier.
The United States response to the challenges posed by the Zelaya government
also falls within Blasier's Propositions 14 and 17. The U.S. response to the Zelaya threat
is functional given that German involvement in the region in the years leading up to First
World War was on the rise. Berlin sought to establish greater depth of political influence
than mere commercial concerns would otherwise justify (Proposition 14). The Zelaya
situation does not hold true with regards to Chavez's Venezuela given that there is no
extra-hemispheric power that can challenge U.S. regional influence at present.
In the pre-Cold War period, the importance of U.S. concerns over the possibility
of extra-hemispheric powers establishing a foothold in the region is clarified by James
argument in both cases is the call for an American protectorate in Central America given that because of
the regional government's constant political strife they were incapable of assuring either peace nor stability
and consequently the local population would welcome American interventions. See, The New York Times,
"Taft up dase against Nicaragua," (November 22, 1909), accessed February 23, 2008,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9DOOE0DA 1630E733A25751 C2A9679D946897D6CF.
38 Mexico's decision not to challenge the United States by acceding to Washington's Central American
interests in this case serves as an example of Blasier's Proposition 4 in the U.S.-Mexico bilateral
relationship.
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Mahoney in "The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in
Central America. " Mahoney indicates that American investors had contemplated
Nicaragua as the possible site for a trans-isthmus canal for decades. 39 Mahoney makes the
case that the need to safeguard American lives, property, and commercial interests in
Nicaragua was only of secondary importance 40 in the decision of U.S. foreign
policymakers to intervene in the Liberal-Conservative party dispute.41 Instead, U.S.
military intervention in the Nicaraguan civil war is the calculated outcome of the need to
safeguard overarching U.S. vital security interests (Proposition 17) by denying a hostile
extra-hemispheric power a foothold in the region. However, American interests serve as a
convenient catalyst for intervention. Yet Zelaya's departure neither ends instability nor
results in the expeditious withdrawal of U.S. military forces or heralds the end of U.S.
involvement. Rather it is the U.S. occupation (1912 to 1933), not the Conservative party
government (1910-26), that sets the tone of U.S.-Nicaragua relations until the 1979
Sandinista triumph.
For forty years U.S.-Nicaraguan relations are characterized by Nicaragua's
dependence on the United States. Throughout the period Nicaragua is unwilling to sever
its ties of dependence (Proposition 19) as a result of the succeeding pro-United States
government's reliance for their political survival on maintaining friendly ties with
39 To facilitate and safeguard these investments, Senator John Franklin Miller (R-California, 1881-86)
introduced the Nicaragua Canal Bill on December 15, 1881, which proposed the incorporation of the
Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua. This bill provided for extensive participation by the United States
government with roles reserved for both the executive and legislative branches (see Appendix 3). Interest in
and support for the Nicaraguan Canal remains high in the United States for decades nevertheless. See,
Mahoney, pgs. 187-188.
40 Ibid. pg. 189.
41 Ibid. pgs. 188-189.
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Washington.4 2 Table 7 illustrates how the U.S. government's dealings with Zelaya and
the successor governments are grouped.
Table 7 - Blasier's Propositions for United States Government's (USG)
Action
(Grouped by Responses Evaluated and Impact)
Proposition
Responses Evaluated
Number 14 USG strategic responses in Central America deal with the threat posed by Zelaya are
functional given the possibility of German involvement if Mexico's President Diaz had
not limited his country's Central American aspirations of recovering territory in Chiapas
from Guatemala.
Number 17 USG responses are crafted out of business and security concerns as described in
Propositions 2 and 3. Few USG responses are taken out of broad conceptions of U.S.
public interest. The handful of shareholders of the Maritime Canal Company of
Nicaragua and the United States and Nicaragua Mining Company do not represent the
public interests of the United States.
U.S. Impact
Number 19 USG policies will generally not facilitate revolutionary governments' attempts to reduce
their dependence on the United States. The Liberal-Conservative coalition and
Conservative party governments of the 1910-26 period and the ensuing Somoza family
presidencies (1936-79) all remained highly dependent on the United States.
Source: Blasier, 1985, pgs. 237-238.
The U.S. occupation of Nicaragua provides a measure of stability otherwise
lacking in the Nicaraguan polity - which continued deeply fissured along Liberal-
Conservative partisan lines.43 The precarious stability provided by the U.S. Marines is
42 Interestingly enough given the nature of the U.S. military intervention in 1909 which was motivated in
part by the Zelaya government's overture to Germany and Japan to construct a trans-isthmus canal through
Nicaraguan territory, by 1914 the United States and Nicaragua sign the Bryan-Chamorro treaty. This treaty
allowed the United States to construct a second Central American canal across its territory.
4 The Marine occupation of Nicaragua is brought about by the 1911 treaty signed between the United
States and Nicaragua that authorized American intervention in exchange for the reorganization of
Nicaragua's finances. Note that the 2,700 man Marine force dispatched to Nicaragua by Taft in 1912 is
officially invited by the Managua government to intervene in the country's affairs in order to safeguard
U.S. lives and property. See, United States House of Representatives, "Report of the Congressional
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made evident by the fact that their 1925 evacuation resulted in the outbreak of the
"Constitutionalist War" between Liberal and Conservative partisans, with order only
being restored with the return of U.S. Marine forces in 1926.44 The presence of U.S.
military forces ushers in the age of an informal American protectorate over Nicaragua
and facilitates the establishment of Liberal-Conservative coalition governance.
The Liberal-Conservative coalition government is, however, quickly challenged
by Augusto C6sar Sandino. Sandino wages a nationalist guerilla war against the
Conservative-led regime and its U.S. protectors. Sandino's revolt succeeds in-as-much as
it forces the United States to compromise with Nicaragua's warring political parties and
withdraw it forces by 1933. Yet prior to evacuating its forces, the United States
establishes the Nicaraguan National Guard (Guardia Nacional) to safeguard American
interests. This act empowers the Somoza family as defacto pro-consuls of Washington.45
Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair with Supplementary, Minority, and Additional Views."
Washington, DC: 10 0 th Congress, 1St Session, (November 17, 1987), accessed April 2, 2008,
http://books.google.com/books?id=ew K3auTwEgC&pg=PA27&lpg=PA27&dq=congressional+oppositio
n+to+the+sandinistas&source=web&ots=IwFuTqMiBF&sig=KnzRidRwwhXC rVhz-eS-
oo3UOI&hl=en#PPR1,M1, pg., 25.
44 As Schoultz indicates, the pull out in 1925 of the U.S. Marine forces stationed in Nicaragua is due to the
fact U.S. foreign policymakers had determined that by 1924 U.S. objectives in Nicaragua had been
accomplished. Namely there was constitutionally valid transfer of power acceptable to Washington,
Nicaragua's debt claims had been paid, the country's finances put into order, and its foreign relations
stabilized. See, Schoultz, pg. 262.
45 Note that while Sacasa had won the 1932 election, Washington's decision to replace the U.S. Marine
commander of the National Guard (Guardia Nacional) with Anastasio Somoza Garcia seals the fate of the
Sacasa administration. Somoza Garcia assumes full control over the National Guard on January 1, 1933,
the same day that Sacasa is inaugurated. Somoza Garcia's control of the National Guard leads to an uneasy
struggle for power that culminates with the resignation of Sacasa in 1936. Somoza Garcia goes on to
assume the presidency after winning rigged elections. It is the U.S. equipped and trained National Guard,
led by the pro-United States Anastasio Somoza Garcia that assassinates Sandino in 1934. Note that
Sandino and Somoza Garcia had by 1934 become the real rulers of Nicaragua, relegating President Juan
Bautista Sacasa (1933-36) to mostly a figurehead role. With the elimination of Sandino, and counting on
the unequivocal support provided by the National Guardsmen, Somoza Garcia consolidated the sort of
power in 1936 that allowed him and his family to control Nicaragua's political destiny through 1979. See,
Schoultz, pg., 270-71.
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CASE STUDY NUMBER 2: U.S. CONGRESSIONAL FOREIGN POLICYMAKING, THE
PRESIDENT, AND THE SANDINISTAS AS REVOLUTIONARIES
Setting the Stage: The Sandinistas' Evolution from Revolutionaries to Ruling Party
Despite the differences between Zelaya and the Sandinistas, they form part of a
revolutionary continuum seeking to break Nicaragua's ties of political-economic
dependence on the United States.46 Yet, while Zelaya sought liberal reforms to
consolidate Nicaragua as a modern capitalist state, the Sandinistas aspired to impose
revolutionary reforms that would reconfigure Nicaraguan class identity and the State.
The Sandinista revolutionary agenda, like Chavez's, called for the establishment
of egalitarian and participatory democratic governance. The Sandinistas aimed to
empower Nicaragua's citizens and popular organizations by involving them in the
political decision-making process. In "The Sandinista Revolution: National Liberation
and Social Transformation in Central America, " Carlos M. Vilas concludes that:
"What characterizes representation is the function developed in relation to a given
class: consequently the representation of a class, alliance, or project can be in the
hands of an organization or state apparatuses whose management corresponds to
class or factions distinct from those whose interests are pushed in a given
proj ect." 47
46 Zelaya sought to bury the ghost of American filibusters like William Walker (1824-1860). Zelaya, as the
scourge of Central America became the sixth president of Nicaragua (1856-57) and sought to expand the
Southern (U.S.) institution of Slavery in the sub-region. The Sandinistas for their part sought to erase the
legacy of forty years of Somoza family dictatorship.
47 See, Vilas, Carlos M. "The Sandinista Revolution: National Liberation and Social Transformation in
Central America." Berkley, CA: The Monthly Review Press - Center for the Studies of the Americas,
1986, pg. 39.
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Vilas' interpretation shares a number of similarities with Venezuela's Bolivarian
Circles.4 8 Additionally, Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., purports in "Central America, a
Nation Divided, " that the Sandinistas, in the wake of the Somoza dynasty's collapse,
viewed themselves as the vanguard in the struggle to provide a better life to Nicaragua's
masses, while prioritizing the interests of the masses above those of the traditional elite.49
This revolutionary style of democratic governance differs radically from the
representative democratic governance model long advocated by U.S. policymakers. 0
Sandinismo as a government is a radical departure from the past quasi-totalitarian
democratic, if not oligarchic and kleptocratic practices of the Somocista governments.
Mark Major in "The Sandinista Revolution and the Fifth Freedom, " elaborates that the
United States became alarmed by the Sandinista philosophy of "governing by the logic of
the majority."5 1 The Sandinista proposal to make Nicaragua's poor majority the primary
48 The Bolivarian Circles are grassroots organizations in Venezuela with more than 2.2 million adherents.
The Circles are the most basic form of political participation in Venezuela's democratic process and bypass
the country's traditional party-system organizations by involving Venezuelans directly in domestic and
international matters. See, Chdvez, Rodrigo, and Tom Burke in "The Bolivarian Circles," published in
ZNet, (July 30, 2003), accessed April 6, 2008,
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=3971.
49 Woodward, Ralph Lee, Jr. Central America, a Nation Divided. New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2 "d edition, 1985, pg. 263.
50 The U.S. Department of State defines representative democracy as a system of governance in which a
country's citizens "elect officials to make political decisions, formulate laws, and administer programs for
the public good." Representative democracy differs from direct, participatory democracy. While in the
latter citizens make public decisions without the intermediary of elected or appointed officials, in a
representative democracy elected officials deliberate in a thoughtful and systemic manner on complex
issues on behalf of the electorate. See, U.S. Department of State, "Defining Democracy," accessed, April 5,
2008, http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/whatsdem/whatdm2.htm.
* Majors, Mark, "The Sandinista Revolution and the Fifth Freedom," in the Monthly Review (August 15,
2005), accessed April 11, 2008, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/maiorl50805.html. I define totalitarian
democracy in the Nicaraguan case along the lines of a polity in which the state, as embodied by the Somoza
dynasty abrogates to itself the topmost power over everything to itself and everyone. Under this sort of
arrangement the Nicaraguan state sought to crush any independent and unruly entity (e.g. the Liberal party
and the Sandinistas). See, Polyarchy.org, "totalitarian Democracy" in "Polyarchy: Paradigm from
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beneficiaries of national public programs such as health, education, agrarian reform,
welfare, and housing and social reform are similar to those now proposed by Chivez.
The Overthrow of Somoza Debayle: Overview
The Sandinistas that overthrew Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979 are the
product of the 1961 student agitation movement at the National Autonomous University
of Nicaragua.52 The student movement arose as a result of the Somoza Debayle regime's
repressive nature coupled with economic injustices.53
Peter H. Smith points out in the Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S. - Latin
American Relations, that the Somoza dynasty contained the seeds of its own destruction.
Yet, to the end the Somoza family remained unflinching Cold War lieutenants of the
United States. They neither questioned the U.S. overthrow of Guatemala's Jacobo Arbenz
in 1954, nor did they oppose it, but rather cheered on the anti-Fidelistas that departed
from Puerto Cabezas (1961) in their quest to win back Cuba for the United States. In
spite of American political, military, and economic assistance, Anastasio Somoza
Debayle's ability to rule unchallenged rapidly eroded in the early 1970s.
totalitarian democracy to libertarian polyarchy," (2002), accessed April 13, 2008,
http://www.polyarchy.org/paradigm/english/democracy.html#totalitarian.
52 Founded by Jose Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga, and Tomis Borge Martinez, the Frente
Sandinista de Liberaci6n Nacional (FSLN) began in the late 1950s as a group of student activists at the
National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Nicaragua--UNAN) in
Managua. A number of early members such as Borge spent several years in jail while others like Fonseca
were exiled to Mexico, Cuba, and Costa Rica. Although numerically small throughout the 1960s, by the
early 1970s the FSLN had gained enough support from peasants and students groups to launch limited
military initiatives. See, Library of Congress, "Country Studies: Nicaragua," (December 1993), accessed
February 23, 2008, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:a)field(DOCID+ni0022).
5 Although first organized as the National Liberation Front (Frente de Liberacidn Nacional - FLN), this
movement evolves into the FSLN by 1963 when its activists adopt the moniker "Sandinista" in order to
establish continuity with the earlier (nationalist) Sandino movement as a means of establishing ideological
legitimacy and strategic capabilities.
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Somoza Debayle's weakness was the result of strong domestic discontent with
official corruption and his iron-fisted autocratic rule. Samuel P. Huntington refers to this
sort of situation as characteristic of an undemocratic system.5 4 While oppressive dictators
are bad enough, Somoza Debayle combined oppression with ineptitude. Lack of foresight
crippled his government's ability to evolve in the face of domestic discontent and
mounting U.S. congressional opposition to heavy-handed governance.55
As Walter LaFeber purports in Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in
Central America, Somoza Debayle's error resides in the lack of political foresight
resulting from the exclusion of Nicaragua's elite from highly profitable entrepreneurial
activities controlled by the presidency.56 The Conservative party landed elite, along with
the National Guard and the United States, were the guarantors of Somoza's rule. By
excluding the landed elite from a share of the economic wealth controlled by the Somaza
kleptocracy, and compounding this action by not permitting the emergence of effective,
legal, more representative mechanisms as an outlet for reformist Liberal party inspired
" Huntington in this sense holds that a key characteristic of an undemocratic system (i.e. Somocista
Nicaragua) is the fact that the opposition will be curbed and or harassed and the free press reigned in/
repressed. In elections, the votes are routinely manipulated/ miscounted to produce an outcome favorable to
the incumbent government. Interestingly enough, if the Somoza Debayle government is labeled as being
authoritarian it does in fact evidence a number of characteristics such as a high degree of repression, denial
of its own weakness, and the pursuit of fabricated legitimacy via ballot box manipulation. Huntington,
Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1993, pgs. 7-8.
* At the end of the day the Somoza Debayle government failed to retain its claim to governing legitimacy
since it failed to promote itself to the Nicaraguan citizenry as being capable of providing viable long-term
solutions to the country's political, economic, and social problems.
56 Of the $32 million sent to Nicaragua by the United States in 1972 earmarked for the reconstruction of
Managua, the Nicaraguan treasury could only account for $16 million. Half of the funds disappeared
outright while the Guardia Nacional either sold the medical relief supplies sent and or engaged in the
looting. LaFeber indicates that when reconstruction finally began, Somoza Debayle and his close friends
drove out other businessmen to control construction funds. The Nicaraguan business class never forgave
Somoza Debayle for the fortune that the dictator made with his friends in land speculation and building.
See, LaFeber, Walter. Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America. New York, NY:
W.W. Lorton and Company, 1984, pg. 228.
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demands, Somoza Debayle foments armed resistance to his rule.57 Somoza Debayle's
actions alienated the U.S. Congress and Conservative allies, and failed to appease Liberal
opponents. 58
Somoza Debayle compounded this by rigging the 1974 election, a process which
included the arrest of any opponent that urged voters to boycott the election and outlawed
nine major opposition parties. The Nicaraguan Roman Catholic Church and the small
pro-Liberal party press led by Pedro Joaquin Chamorro's La Prensa denounced Somoza
Debayle's attempts to force Nicaraguans to vote. By daring to denounce the
government's corruption, the Church and Chamorro signaled to the country and the
Sandinistas in particular, that Somoza Debayle's hold on power was tenuous. 59
Nicaragua at this juncture was what Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour
Lipset term as "pseudo-democracy" where the existence of democratic institutions (e.g.,
an executive, legislative, and judicial branches) and "multiparty electoral competition,
masks (often in part to legitimize) the reality of authoritarian domination." 60 While the
57 The definition of kleptocracy being used here is based on that of the French newspaper Le Monde which
gave the Somoza family's economic development model the name of kleptocracy. This model of
development is based on what Cockcroft calls "thievery not only from the working people but also from
elites and foreign investors." Cockcroft in this sense indicates that the Somozas took "their cut" from any
private investment and or aid package in Nicaragua. See, Cockcroft, James D. Latin America: History,
Politics, and U.S. Policy. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1997, 2 "d edition, pg. 209.
58 The Somoza Debayle government acted the way it did because it was confident that it could ultimately
extract continued U.S. political-military and economic support by playing the role of loyal vassal. This less
than nationalistic position, coupled to widespread domestic recognition that Nicaragua was a personal
kleptocracy of the Somoza family, radicalized the opposition. See, Bandow, Doug, "Economic and Military
Aid," in Schraeder, Peter J. Intervention into the 1990s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World. Boulder,
CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992, pgs. 90-91.
59 LaFeber, pg. 228.
60 Diamond quotes Giovanni Sartori who finds that institutionalized ruling parties will make extensive use
of coercion, patronage, and media control to deny the opposition parties a fair and open playing field for
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Somoza-era constitution and civil code may have included some of the democratic
notions highlighted by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter in Transitions
from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, such as
"citizen equality, majority rule, direct participation, parliamentary sovereignty, voluntary
associability, accountable representation, unrestricted political choice honest
apportionment, public disclosure, alternance between incumbents and challengers," their
practice remained restricted, making it impossible to accomplish the peaceful, democratic
removal of the Somozas via the ballot box.6 1
The Overthrow of Somoza Debayle: The Snubbing of an old Friend (EI rechazo de
un viejo amigo)
Despite Somoza Debayle's lack of meaningful political accountability and
repressiveness, his staying power was dependent on cultivating strong ties to the United
States. Somoza Debayle, like his father and brother, remained an unwavering supporter
of the United States and its Latin American foreign policies (Propositions 5, 10, and 12).
Such unquestioning loyalty to the United States and its policies ensured Somoza Debayle
enduring support for years among influential members of the U.S. Congress. 62
competing for power. See, Diamond, Larry. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore,
MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1999, pg. 15.
61 See, O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Philiippe C. Schmitter. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1986, pg. 42.
62 During the height of the Cold War the Somozas offered the United States not only the possibility of using
Nicaraguan territory as a base for launching an offensive against Cuba in 1966, but also volunteered the
country's armed forces to fight in Viet Nam (1967) and assist in ousting Panama's president Arnulfo Arias
(1968). See, Stanford Center for Latin American Studies and the School of Education's Learning, Design,
and Technology Program (LDT), in "Expressions of Nicaragua - Timeline," accessed April 6, 2008,
http://www.stanford.eduigroup/arts'nicaragua/discovery eng'timeline/.
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Notwithstanding Somoza Debayle's political clout in Washington, congressional
unease by the 1970s increased as a result of the negative publicity associated with
accusations over the gross misappropriation of the 1972 earthquake international relief
funds (only half of $32 million donated was ever accounted for by the Nicaraguan
treasury), misgivings about heavy-handed rule, and growing proof that the American
trained-and-equipped Nicaraguan National Guard tortured regime opponents. 63 These
issues resonated with the post-Watergate American electorate weary of Washington's
less-than transparent dealings with affable yet non-democratic anti-Communist allies.
The post-Watergate era represents a significant evolution, or even a paradigm
shift, in the American electorate's perception that the government has the obligation to
check the spread of communism (Proposition 16). Throughout the Cold War and until the
Viet Nam debacle, U.S. politicians, regardless of party affiliation, feared political
backlash from disgruntled voters if they could be accused of failing to contain
communism. As a result of the American electorate's shift, Representative Ed Koch (D-
New York, 1969-77) and Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Massachusetts, 1962 to
present) spearheaded efforts in an assertive post-Watergate Congress to hold Somoza
Debayle accountable. Koch and Kennedy pressured the incoming administration of James
E. "Jimmy" Carter (D, 1977-81) to terminate all U.S. military aid unless Somoza Debayle
scaled back political repression.
63 Note $32 million in 1972 is equivalent to roughly $158.5 million in 2007 dollars using the consumer
price index. For computing the relative value of the U.S. dollar in 1972 to 2007 (last year of full annual
data for initial and target year) using the consumer price index, see
http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators'uscompare/index.php# accessed, August 9, 2008.
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Carter was trapped between fellow Democrats in Congress demanding that he
honor campaign promises to force Managua to improve its human rights record and the
pro-Somoza lobby spearheaded by Representative John Murphy (D-New York, 1963-81)
insistent on continuing U.S. support. Despite the Somoza lobby's strong opposition to
any measure that would punish Managua, in April 1977 the Carter administration opted
to send Somoza Debayle a blunt diplomatic message to either reform and curtail the sort
of repressive measures that had led to the rise of widespread popular discontent within
Nicaragua, or face the immediate cutoff of American economic and military aid.
Despite the Carter administration's threat to cut off aid, the administration's
determination floundered and by September, succumbed to the pro-Somoza lobby's
strong-arm tactics. The Somoza lobby's advocacy for lifting sanctions was strengthened
by Somoza Debayle's lifting of the 1974 state-of-siege. Somoza's "act of contrition"
allowed the pro-Somoza lobby to placate fair weather opponents of Somoza Debayle and
point out to the Carter administration that the human rights issue had been addressed by
Managua. 64
The Carter White House and the pro-Somoza lobby actions are representative of
Blasier's Propositions 5 and 12. In the case of Proposition 5, economic considerations,
continued support for a friendly capitalist government did not conflict with the U.S.
strategic considerations within the Central American region. With regard to Proposition
12, actions by the Carter White House and Congress are indicative of a high degree of
participation by both in the crafting of U.S. policy.
64 Charles Nesbitt "Charlie" Wilson (D-Texas, 1973-97) is illustrative of the ability of the pro-Somoza
lobby's ability to pressure the White House. Hethreatened as member of the House Appropriations
Committee and Somoza friend, to hold up administration's appropriation funding unless Nicaragua was
assured its military aid. LaFeber, pg. 231.
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Yet the Carter administration's back-and-forth wavering between applying and
lifting sanctions contributed to weakening the position of the United States, and was
responsible for undermining the position of the bourgeoisie-middle class Democratic
Union of Liberation (Union Democratica de Liberacion - UDEL). In The Fall and Rise of
the Market in Sandinista Nicaragua, Phil Ryan finds that Carter's inconsistent sanctions
policy toward Somoza Debayle emboldened the FSLN to launch a major military
offensive by October 1977.65 The Ortega brothers' decision to carry out the Sandinista
version of Viet Nam's Tet Offensive in late 1977 was meant to preempt the non-
Sandinista opposition from effectively organizing a united anti-Somoza political
grouping. If Daniel and Humberto Ortega had not acted, popular support for the non-
Sandinista opposition would have relegated the Sandinistas to a junior partner role. 66
The Overthrow of Somoza Debayle: Blasier's Propositions 1, 3, 4, and 11 as applied
to Carter's Choices
In light of the deteriorating situation in Nicaragua, Carter, already treading water
in the face of an assertive yet divided Congress, was forced to reassess his position and
options for dealing with the Sandinistas. Carter and his advisors were trapped between
two policy options. The first option was to declare the Sandinistas to be hostile, anti-
American revolutionaries with links to the Soviet Union (Proposition 1 and 3) and
65 Daniel and Humberto Ortega launch the FSLN's October 1977 large-scale offensive against the Managua
regime both as a consequence of Washington's inability to solidify a strategy for dealing with Nicaragua
and as a result of the fact that opposition within the Sandinista movement to the "insurrectional strategy"
had been decimated by the Somocista government's ability to capture and or kill off the opponents of the
strategy. See, Ryan, Phil. The Fall and Rise of the Market in Sandinista Nicaragua. Montreal, Canada:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995, pg., 45-46, accessed April 13, 2008,
http://books google.corn/books?id=3vWxkl mqYC&pg=PA46&lpg=PA46&dqi~fsln~october~offensive&
source=web&otsm4eFET Ozg&sig=WdIWe~cilNc 1nUM9YWAkEp4X2rUk&h1=en#PPA45 M I.
66 Ibid. pg. 45.
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proceed to work with the Somoza Debayle government or some remnant of it to suppress
the Sandinista revolution out of strategic considerations (e.g., retain hemispheric political
primacy - Proposition 11). The second option was to abandon Somoza Debayle and seek
accommodation with the FSLN if it could be persuaded to temper demands and policies
once in power (Proposition 4).
While deliberating what policy options to throw at political instability in
Nicaragua, Carter was torn between his personal moral beliefs and geopolitical
expediency. In short, Carter was confronted with the dilemma of having to choose
between sacrificing his beliefs in the value of championing human rights and the foreign
policy necessity of ensuring if not the survival of the Somoza Debayle presidency, at
least preventing an outright Sandinistas victory. 67
Interpreting the Sandinista Rebel Threat: Blasier's Propositions 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11,
and 12
Carter's perception of the Sandinistas as a growing threat to U.S. regional
strategic security interests was influenced by National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski (1977-81), who saw the Soviet Union conspiring with Cuba's Fidel Castro to
challenge the United States in Central America (Proposition 1 and 11). However, two of
Carter's other senior-level foreign policymaking advisors, Secretary of State Cyrus
67 To the chagrin of the Carter administration, the FSLN amply demonstrated its growing military prowess
with its October 1977 military offensive. The October 1977 military offensive showed for the first time that
the Sandinistas were capable of launching coordinated North-to-South attacks and seizing small towns.
What is interesting to note about the Sandinista October offensive is that opposition to Somoza Debayle
rests not just with the FSLN. Mass uprisings occur in which in a number of cases included civilians
spontaneously taking up arms and fighting alongside FSLN military units against the Somocista National
Guard. See, Morley, Morris H. Washington, Somoza, and the Sandinistas State and Regime in U.S. Policy
toward Nicaragua, 1969-1981. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pgs. 88-89.
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Vance (1977-80) and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young (1977-79),
took issue with Brzezinski's globalist assessment.
Vance and Young believed that revolutionary proclivities and turmoil in Central
America were indigenous, not the result of Soviet interventionism and or of a Soviet
allies' mischief making (Proposition 1 during the rebel phase and Proposition 3 in the
governing phase). 68 The Vance-Young regionalist interpretation of the threat posed by a
Sandinista political and military victory failed to convince Carter.69
Instead, Carter accepted Brzezinski's position of the existence of a Soviet threat
and the existence of a tangible Sandinista-Soviet link. Carter interpreted this linkage as a
threat to U.S. vital security interests since it was seen as jeopardizing Central American
political stability by potentially providing the Soviets with a beachhead on the mainland.
Such a situation would intolerable since it could threaten U.S. interests in Panama
(Proposition 1) and challenge U.S. leadership in the Americas (Proposition 11).The
Brzezinski interpretation of the threat posed by a FSLN political-military victory
dovetails with Charles F. Dorn's conclusions in The Globalist-Regionalist Debate, where
he argues that the White House's over-reliance on the globalist perspective was a key
68 LaFeber, pg. 210.
69 While the globalist perspective favors order-maintenance from the top of the international system out of
fear of conflicts escalating on the periphery to encompass the center, the regionalist approach on the other
hand, sees the suppression of foreign policy grievances from the top of the global hierarchy as the main
source of instability leading to global warfare. For regionalists the greatest threat to a table world system is
imposition of order by a superpower blind to the fact that a stable world system is one of interdependence
among states with autonomous foreign policies. See Dorn, Charles F., The Globalist-Regionalist Debate in
Schraeder, pgs. 56-57.
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determinant of Carter's conclusion that the Sandinistas posed a threat to U.S. interests in
Central America. 70
Labeling the Sandinistas a threat to U.S. interests (Proposition 1, 11, and 12),
Carter sought to prevent the collapse of the Somoza Debayle government. Carter's efforts
were neither facilitated by his policy inconsistencies, such as the termination of aid in
1977 and the subsequent reincorporation of military aid in 1978, nor by lambasting
Somoza Debayle and the National Guard in 1977 for human rights abuses only to
afterwards praise them for the progress in resolving these concerns.
The twilight hours of the Somoza Debayle government are characterized by
frantic efforts by a Carter White House obsessed on saving some pro-United States
vestige of the government. While Carter's efforts to prevent a Sandinista victory are
taken to stave off the establishment of a Soviet foothold in Central America (Proposition
1), by this juncture the only options open were acquiescing to a Sandinista victory or
armed intervention to reinforce the despised Somocista National Guard.
0 The globalist perspective eventually dominated President Ronald W. Reagan's (1981-89) interpretation
of the Sandinistas as being a radical revolutionary regime conspiring with the Soviet Union to export
revolution to their neighbors. The globalist logic required the United States to counter Latin American
revolutionary movements or otherwise face the likelihood of seeing pro-American regimes in Central and
South America, and possibly the United States, succumb to communism. See, Schraeder, Peter J., Studying
U.S. Intervention in the Third World, in Schraeder, pgs. 10-12.
7 Carter sends a letter dated June 30, 1978, to Somoza Debayle praising him and the National Guard for
the progress made in addressing human rights concerns and democratic initiatives at a time the State
Department continued to receive reliable confirmation of continued violations of the aforementioned. See,
Sklar, Holly, Washington 's War on Nicaragua. Boston, MA: South End Press, 1988, pgs. 15-16. While
indications are that Carter intended that the letter remain private, Somoza Debayle under mounting pressure
from the civilian opposition and the Sandinistas saw the letter as a sign of continued, unequivocal United
States support for his government. See, Cottam, Martha L., in "The Carter Administration's Policy toward
Nicaragua: Images, Goals, and Tactics, " in Political Science Quarterly, Volume 107, Number 1, (Spring
1992), pg. 123.
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United States military intervention was, however, ruled out. Unlike the situation
in the past, strong Latin American resistance - emanating primarily from Venezuela,
Panama, and Costa Rica - precluded the Carter administration from intervening
militarily. Latin American resistance was significant enough as to preclude an American
intervention even under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS).7 2
Despite the Carter administration's attempts to prevent the disintegration of the
Somoza Debayle government, events escalated out of control. While Carter and his
cabinet remain directly involved in setting foreign policy based on strategic
considerations (Propositions 5 and 6), the diverging perceptions of the threat posed by
the ramifications of a potential (Marxist-oriented) Sandinista victory by Congress seems
to have hampered the administration's efforts. Congress becomes divided between the
pro-Somoza lobby which interpreted a Sandinista victory as a catastrophic change of
events foreshadowing the possibility of greater Soviet involvement in the Americas
(Proposition 12), and more liberal members of Congress who called on Carter to require
that Somoza Debayle meet human rights obligations.
Conflicting policy objectives, a volatile mix of post-Watergate politics, and
congressional legislation requiring annual reporting by the U.S. State Department on
Managua's adherence to human rights, all hampered effective foreign policymaking. The
responses of the United States to the Sandinistas and the Somoza Debayle government
became bogged down not only by inter-agency conflict as represented by the Brzezinski-
Vance split on the nature of the Sandinista threat, but also were stymied by intra-agency
72 By February 1979 the FSLN was openly receiving moral and material support from key states in the
Central American region, which opposed another OAS sanctioned U.S. intervention like the 1965
Dominican Republic intervention. See, Woodward, pg. 262.
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conflict (Proposition 9) within the U.S. State Department, further impeding the crafting
of a unified strategy. These factors represent the failure of strategic considerations and
private interests to overcome bureaucratic considerations (Proposition 10).
Illustrating the extent of intra-agency conflict is the situation that confronted
Patricia Derain, as the U.S. State Department's Human Rights bureau chief. Derain had
to ascertain whether Nicaragua was complying with human rights requirements and
report back to Congress, and had to deal with dissention among desk officers. Desk
Officers, responsible for the day-to-day relationships with foreign officials, often
downplayed human rights violations believing that the continuation of aid would be more
helpful than its termination in forcing compliance from violators. 73 Leogrande argues that
desk officer's reluctance to press Nicaragua on human rights was also shared by the U.S.
State Department's Latin American Bureau, where Assistant Secretary Terence Todman
was skeptical of the effectiveness of the emphasis placed on human rights as a driver of
U.S. foreign policy in Latin America.74
What tipped the scales for the Carter administration to adopt a conciliatory policy
toward the Sandinistas is the Somoza Debayle government's January 10, 1978,
assassination of (Liberal party) Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. The assassination of the
7 Ibid. pg. 211.
7 Todman was of the opinion that not much good would come from Carter's human rights policy. On the
contrary, Todman and his staff determined that much of Somoza Debayle's difficulties and the advances
being made by the Sandinistas were the consequence of such an ill-conceived policy that ultimately would
only contribute to undermine the U.S. position. Todman's stance on the issue is mirrored by the Pentagon
which considered the suspension of military aid as punishment for human rights violations an inadequate
means for achieving policy objectives. See, Leogrande, pg. 19.
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strongest proponent of democracy and leader of the anti-Somoza opposition ultimately
influenced Carter's decision to seek accommodation.7 5
At the same time, the Sandinistas incessantly whittled down what little remained
of Somoza Debayle's legitimacy. The FSLN seizure (August 22, 1978) of the Nicaraguan
National Palace sealed the fate of the regime. 76 The Sandinistas wrestled a massive
ransom in exchange for the release of 1,500 bureaucrats and Congressmen from the
government. 77 The Sandinistas' act of defiance put Somoza Debayle's ability to provide
security into question and undermined the National Guard's morale. Somoza Debayle's
legitimacy was further eroded since his government could no longer claim sole control
over the use of force in the country. At this point, the Sandinistas transitioned from being
an armed insurrection with a limited constituency to becoming a contending pole of
political legitimacy for a significant portion of the national population.
7 Chamorro's assassination favored the political position of the Sandinistas by removing their strongest
(democratic) rival for legitimacy. Chamorro's murder at the hands of the Somoza Debayle government
insiders simultaneously highlighted the government's ruthlessness and its repressiveness. Building on the
success of the October 1977 FSLN offensive, the Sandinistas adeptly exploited Chamorro's assassination to
catalyze mass popular support for anti-Somoza Debayle demonstrations. The Sandinistas by this point
seized the initiative and took ownership of the anti-Somoza Debayle mass movement. In achieving this
outcome, the Sandinistas assured their ultimate political and military victory over Somoza Debayle by
successfully persuading a significant portion of the Nicaraguan national population to outright switch its
allegiance away from the Somoza Debayle government to the Sandinistas, or to at the least not challenge
the FSLN bid for political power in its quest to oust the Somoza Debayle government.
76 The audacity of Eden Pastora, also known as Comandante Cero, in seizing the National Palace captured
the popular imagination and allowed the Sandinistas to grab control of the anti-Somoza struggle.
Thousands of Nicaraguans lined the streets to cheer Pastora, his guerillas, and the fifty-nine freed political
prisoners as they made their way to the airport for their flight to Panama. See, Leogrande, pg. 20.
7 Somoza had no recourse but to agree to the FSLN's demands which included the release of sixty FSLN
guerrillas from prison, media dissemination of an FSLN declaration, a $500,000 ransom, and safe passage
for the hostage takers to Panama and Venezuela. The success of the FSLN raid humiliated Somoza Debayle
and tarnished the image of the National Guard. See, Merrill, Tim, ed., Nicaragua: A Country Study.
Washington, D.C.: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1993.
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The Carter administration viewed the deterioration of the situation as constituting
a political-security crisis with significant implications for U.S. interests. 7 8 Carter, in what
turned out to be a futile attempt to prevent a Sandinista victory, lobbied regional allies for
support of a U.S.-led OAS intervention. Opposition built against the Carter initiative
since it became identified as a U.S. plan for generating regional consensus and the
imprimatur of legality for preventing a Sandinista victory.
The collapse of the Somoza Debayle government, and the inability of the United
States to impose a constitutionalist resolution to the crisis or its will on the OAS, was the
result of a number of factors: 1) a Sandinista victory could not have been possible had the
U.S. Congress supported the Carter administrations' attempts to shore up the Somoza
Debayle regime; 2) a Sandinista victory could have been averted had the Carter
administration's policies toward Nicaragua been less contradictory from the onset, and;
3) adoption of the Vance-Young regionalist assessment of the origin of the Sandinista
revolution coupled with less policy uncertainty could have paved the wave for Somoza
Debayle's graceful exit from power via a managed constitutional succession favoring
U.S. interests. As such, Leogrande believes that the interplay of forces not only within the
executive branch (Proposition 9), but also between the branches, resulted in a failed
policy of bureaucratic compromise that deemphasized strategic interests (Proposition
10).79
The Somoza Debayle government undermined its own position by continuing to
foment an aura of invulnerability in the National Guard. The Somaza Debayle
78 Sklar, pg. 16.
79 Leogrande, pg. 20.
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government members' own belief about their unaccountability is captured by the on-
camera execution (June 19, 1979) of American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)
correspondent Bill Stewart. A foot soldier's non-orchestrated act of vindictiveness caught
in the midst of a civil war galvanized the U.S. government to sever its support for the
Somoza Debayle government.80 As Jacqueline E. Sharkey indicates in "When Pictures
Drive Foreign Policy, " the American public's horror at the on-camera execution of
Stewart forced Carter to disassociate the United States from Somoza Debayle, causing
the government to fall (July 19, 1979).81
Table 8 summarizes the U.S. interpretation of the Sandinistas as rebels. It details
how Carter addressed revolutionary change at a time of increased demands on the ability
of the United States to anticipate and react to crisis. Table 8 shows the variables that
Ronald W. Reagan's (R, 1981-89) administration inherited from Carter and how these
influenced its perspective for confronting Latin American revolutionary change while
contending with a Congress which viewed the Sandinista threat less ominously.
80 LaFeber cites infighting within the United States government as a factor of whether or not it would
continue to support the Somoza Debayle administration. This infighting is consequently a key factor
involved in the collapse of the Somoza Debayle government. LaFaber notes that while the Carter White
House waffled on promoting a strong human rights policy with regards to Nicaragua, it nonetheless
continud to supply the military aid that allowed the National Guard to remain a vehicle of repression for the
Somoza Debayle government. At the same time, the Carter administration failed to provide the economic
aid necessary to address the socio-economic factors fueling the Sandinista claim to revolutionary
legitimacy. Ibid., pgs. 230-232.
81 Sharkey finds that graphic footage such as the Stewart execution can spark widespread national debate
about the political and ethical implications of those pictures. Such debate highlights the media's influence
on U.S. foreign policymaking. The media's usage of dramatic images can significantly influence public and
congressional opinion by oversimplifying complex issues. See, Sharkey, Jacqueline E., in "When Pictures
Drive Foreign Policy, " in American Journalism Review (December 1993), accessed April 1, 2008,
http://www.air.org/Article.asp?id=1579. See also, United States Department of State, (Appendix 4),
Incoming Telegram - American Embassy Managua, "Somoza the First Visit," Number 2857 (June 1979),
accessed April 6, 2008, http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/nsa/publications/nicaragua/nidoc l.html.
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Table 8 - Applying Blasier's Propositions to the United States
Government's (USG) Action in Dealing with the FSLN as
Revolutionaries
Proposition Explaining USG Action
USG became hostile toward the Sandinistas once Carter interpreted the Sandinistas as
Number 1 forming part of the greater Cold War struggle between the United States and Soviet
Union. Carter's National Security advisor significantly influenced the President's
interpretation of the Sandinistas as constituting a political-security threat to the United
States given the FSLN Marxist-oriented proclivities and its links to the Soviet Union and
Cuba (globalist perspective).
Strategic considerations primarily impacted the Carter administration's outlook toward
Number 5 the Sandinistas as a rebel movement on the verge of seizing political power.
The USG foreign policy response toward the Sandinista rebels was characterized by
Number 6 significant involvement by Carter. Carter determined that the United States needed to
block potential Soviet and Cuban adventurism in Central America.
USG responses involved intra-agency conflict (i.e. internal State Department turf
Number 9 fighting over the applicability of human rights as a driver of U.S. foreign policy).
Bureaucratic considerations will condition USG response.
Ultimately strategic considerations determined by the Carter White House, and not
Number 10 bureaucratic considerations, condition the USG response. U.S. State Department
concerned over human rights violations remain a concern but take on secondary
importance when considered in light of the strategic threat a communist beachhead
would entail (globalist interpretation). State Department's concerns with human rights
violations also became subsumed in intra-agency struggles for preeminence.
Although Carter's response to the Sandinistas was not as blatant as that of Reagan, he
Number 11 does nonetheless attempt to forestall the collapse of the Somoza government since it
could be interpreted by the Soviet Union as an invitation to contest U.S. hemispheric
political primacy.
Carter and his cabinet shaped policy toward the Sandinistas, but Congress and mid-level
Number 12 diplomats also influenced policies.
Source: Blasier, 1985, pgs. 236-237.
CASE STUDY NUMBER 3: THE SANDINISTAS AS THE RULING PARTY
Interpreting the Sandinista Government Threat: Blasier's Proposition 3, 4, 5, 6, 10,
and 12 as applied to Carter's Evaluation of the Sandinistas in Power
Strategic considerations, namely the inability to garner support from the Latin
American countries for an OAS-sanctioned U.S. intervention to reinforce the Nicaraguan
National Guard, convinced Carter to seek accommodation with the Sandinistas.
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Carter and his advisors concluded that a constitutional succession, or "Somocismo
without Somoza, " acceptable to the majority of Nicaraguans could not be imposed by the
United States. Carter had to adopt a conciliatory position towards the FSLN (Proposition
3) by acceptance of the evolved dynamics of the U.S.-Nicaragua relationship and the
conviction that U.S. capabilities could not guide an outcome that could sideline the
Sandinistas.82 Despite lingering concerns over the Sandinistas' leftward proclivities, the
Carter White House recognized the new (revolutionary) government (Government of
National Reconstruction - Gobierno de Reconstruccidn Nacional - GRN) hoping to
forestall a further leftward drift.
LaFeber indicates that the Carter administration, through the mediation efforts of
U.S. envoys William Bowdler and Lawrence Pezzullo, did seek to extract three key
concessions from the Sandinistas: 1) that the FSLN forgo retaliatory mass killings of
National Guardsmen and other Somocistas in retribution for their excesses and that the
U.S. Embassy and Americans be spared the ire of revolutionary mobs; 2) that the GRN
enlarge its five-person governing junta (Sergio Ramirez, Alfonso Robelo, Violeta Barrios
de Chamorro, Mois6s Hassin, and Daniel Ortega) to encompass at least seven members
by incorporating two more moderate members, and: 3) that elements of a purged
Nicaraguan National Guard be incorporated into the new government. 83
82 Ambassador Pezzullo had crafted a face-saving transition between the remnants of the Somoza Debayle
government and the Sandinista-led Provisional Government. However (Nicaraguan) Congressman
Francisco Urcuyo, Somoza Debayle's successor, instead of turning power over immediately to the
Provisional Government declared his intentions to stay in office. According to Leogrande, this last act of
the Somoza Debayle era came to an abrupt end when the latter called Urcuyo from Miami and told him in
no uncertain terms to resign. Somoza Debayle feared being deported back to Nicaragua if Urcuyo refused
to comply. See, Leogrande, pgs. 26-27.
83 See, LaFeber, pgs. 235-237.
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While the Sandinistas did acquiesce to not execute guardsmen, and never
organized the sort of anti-American protests that led to the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in
Tehran following the Shah of Iran's downfall (February 11, 1979) and resulted in the
hostage crisis of November 4, 1979 to January 20, 1981, they only partially met the U.S.
mediators' second demand and refused to consider the third demand outright.84
Although Carter and the Sandinista-led government sought to avoid a repetition of
the events that pushed Castro into the Soviet camp in the early 1960s, the timing of the
success of the Sandinista revolution within a period of heightened U.S.-Soviet distrust
and international instability precluded reconciliation. 85 Had the Sandinista government
adopted policy objectives geared to reassuring Washington by placating concerns raised
by the old pro-Somoza lobby in Congress and other staunch anti-communists both in and
outside of government - namely assurances that the new Managua regime would be free
of outside (i.e., Soviet and Cuban) influence - then possibly a different sort of
relationship could have resulted (Proposition 4). Sandinistas' intransigence on expanding
the junta's membership to include additional moderate elements and their embrace of the
84 While the demand that the five-person junta be expanded to at least seven people was rejected based on
the Sandinistas' assertion that the same already represented a broad-based group, they did form an
eighteen-member "Cabinet" which only contained one Sandinista representative with the other members
coming from business and professional groups. On the third demand there was no compromise possible that
would have allowed elements of the National Guard to be integrated into the new government. Ibid., pg.
236.
85 To put things in perspective while the FSLN insurgency in Nicaragua was posed to wrestle political
control of the country away from the longtime U.S. ally government of Somoza Debayle, the United States
was denouncing the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan and for a number of other evils such as
supporting a proxy war in Ethiopia, using Cuban troops in Somalia, and supporting the Vietnamese
invasion of Cambodia. The Cold War characteristics of the Carter presidency are best typified by
diminished trade relations with the Soviet Union, human rights proclamations against Moscow, improved
trade ties with Beijing, the Carter proclamation, and the boycott of the 1980 Olympics. See, Leonard,
Thomas M.., "Central America: A Microcosm of U.S. Cold War Policy, " in Air University Review (July-
August 1986), accessed April 20, 2008,
http-//www airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1986/iul-aug/leonard.html.
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Soviets and Cubans as kindred revolutionaries provided Carter's Nicaragua policy critics
(Democrats and Republicans alike) with justifications to keep Nicaragua in the spotlight.
What is often forgotten, or subsumed within the criticism of Carter's idealistic
human rights policy, is that Carter did adopt realistic and constructive policies for dealing
with the Sandinista government. Carter's policies for dealing with Managua avoided
overestimating actual U.S. capabilities at a time of heightened international instability
and prevented a further radicalization of the Nicaraguan revolution that could have
rapidly morphed into a second Cuba (Propositions 4, 5, and 6).86
The Carter administration sent $20 million in aid to Nicaragua immediately after
the Sandinista triumph, evidence that the United States sought to adopt a conciliatory,
realistic posture toward the Sandinista-led government despite congressional opposition.
Similarly, the Carter White House requested an additional $80 million aid package for
Central America, of which $75 million were earmarked for Nicaragua from Congress
(September 1979).87 However, congressional opposition to Carter's aid initiative
remained strong at the same time Carter sought to demonstrate to the Sandinistas and
other like-minded governments that the United States could now "respond positively to
revolutionary change in Latin America."88 The House of Representatives hampered
86 For a detailed description of congressional opposition to Carter's attempts to seek rapprochement with
the Sandinista-led Provisional Government, especially as it relates to approving foreign packages, see
Leogrande, pgs. 31-32.
87 Note $20 million in 1979 is about $57.1 million in 2007 dollars using the consumer price index, while
$80 million is equivalent to more than $228.5 million. Also note that the $75 million in aid for Nicaragua
proposed by the Carter administration accounts for approximately $214.2 million in 2007 dollars. For
computing the relative value of the U.S. dollar in 1979 to 2007 (last year of full annual data for initial and
target year) using the consumer price index, accessed, August 9, 2008, see
http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php#.
88 LaFeber, pgs. 240-241.
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Carter's radical change of course by imposing onerous conditions on the White House
and the Sandinistas in exchange for the funding request.89
Carter's pragmatic efforts at establishing a constructive relationship with
Managua (Proposition 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, and 12) were further undermined by Nicaragua's
accession to the Non-Aligned Movement, thus fueling conservatives' criticism of
Carter's policy. The Sandinistas' declared intent to forgo dependence on a particular
economic development model (e.g., capitalism or communism in favor of a mixed
economy), while at the same time seeking to pursue a foreign policy independent of both
the United States and the Soviet Union, became an irritant to U.S. foreign policymakers.
A further focal point of concern was the Sandinista government's relationship with
Soviet-backed Cuba - the Sandinista leadership's triumphant welcome in Havana
following the ousting of Somoza Debayle did not make the new regime in Managua any
easier to accept.
Managua's critical position on Washington's assistance to El Salvador, which was
itself combating a leftist insurgency, further antagonized U.S. conservative critics of the
Sandinistas. Additionally, the Sandinistas' unwillingness to support the U.S.-sponsored
89 The House of Representatives imposed no less than sixteen conditions on the aid request including the
stipulation that at least 60 percent of the aid be earmarked for the private business sector. Furthermore, the
House insisted that no funds be utilized for projects using Cuban personnel - this stipulation cut-off aid to
health and education facilities. And ultimately, the House conditioned aid on obliging the Sandinistas to
following not only high human rights standards, but also to holding elections in a reasonable period of time.
As LaFeber indicates, the Sandinistas may have bridled at these conditions but they had no other choice but
agree to them. Sandinista-led government realized that should the United States Congress withhold the aid
package because of Managua's refusal to adhere to its terms, international bankers would be highly
reluctant to provide the new government with the type of loans needed to rebuild a war-ravaged Nicaragua.
The House and Senate ultimately passed the aid legislation in June 1980 in order to retain leverage over the
Sandinistas out of fear that Managua was starting to turn increasingly to the Soviet Union for assistance
much as Cuba had done in the 1960-61 period. Ibid.
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United Nations resolution condemning the Soviet Union's 1979 invasion of Afghanistan
stoked concerns about another Cuba taking root near the Panama Canal.
Nicaragua's unwillingness to adopt confidence-building measures to mitigate
American unease over the course that the revolutionary government was charting
handicapped Carter's 1980 reelection bid. Carter, waylaid by the Sandinista triumph, the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the hostage crisis in Iran among other events, failed
to survive Reagan's presidential bid. Once in office Reagan, unlike Carter, abandoned the
previous administration's reactive posture and adopted a proactive, confrontational
position to roll back Latin American (leftist) revolutionary gains.
Although the Sandinista revolutionary and the Chavez reformist governments
share certain ideological similarities and a common history in seeking to break their
respective countries' ties of political-economic dependence on the United States, they
nonetheless portray differences. The Sandinista government and Chavez part ways in
terms of retaining key financial link to the United States. The Sandinistas opted to follow
Castrorite Cuba's (pragmatic) advice to maintain a large private business sector and
retain as many ties as possible to United States funding - the Cuban policy
recommendation explains why Managua was willing to adhere to the terms of the June
1980 U.S. aid package. Chavez, controlling the largest known petroleum reserves outside
of the Middle East today, is not similarly handicapped and thus can chart a vastly
different course of action than a war torn, and economically vulnerable Nicaragua.
LaFeber graphically illustrates Managua's inability to sever ties to the United
States by its willingness to abide by onerous U.S. congressional aid requirements and by
highlighting the Sandinistas' adoption of a business-friendly posture which limited
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nationalizations largely to the expropriation of the Somoza family's holdings. 90
Furthermore, the junta's willingness to block radical (Nicaraguan) union members'
disruptive strikes helped to convey to American multi-nationals with operations in
Nicaragua (i.e., the Coca Cola Company, United Brands, and Standard Fruit) assurances
that their interests would be respected. Such action by any government, and especially a
revolutionary one, reassures the international financial community that the government
could borrow vital reconstruction and development funds.9 1
The foregoing serve as key examples of the factors that characterize Blasier's
Propositions 4 and 5, whereby the Sandinista-led government signaled to the United
States its willingness to abide by international norms that are neither politically disruptive
within the region or threatening to U.S. interests. The Nicaraguan situation contrasts with
Chavez's politically popular, but financially reckless, acts of withdrawing the Venezuelan
national oil company's American Depository Receipts (ADR), under investing in critical
petroleum and electricity generating infrastructure, and politically motivated
nationalizations.
With such sharp contrasts in mind, what explains the turn of events that drove
elements within the Congress to stymie Carter's policies of positive engagement? And as
a transition to the next section, what convinced the succeeding Reagan administration
that the Sandinistas not only had links to the Soviets, but that these links constituted a
political-military threat to the United States despite Managua's reassuring messages and
overall weakness?
90 LaFeber, pgs. 238-239.
9' Ibid.
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The preceding points are significant in light of U.S. Ambassador Pezzullo's
testimony before Congress. Pezzullo, subscribing to a regionalist-centric perspective, and
denigrated by the incoming Reagan administration, testified to Congress in the aftermath
of his mediation efforts with the Sandinistas that the FSLN was a Nicaraguan
phenomenon. Pezzullo argued that Sandinismo and the Sandinistas were not ideologically
linked to Cuba's Fidel Castro, stating:
"It is very much a Nicaraguan phenomenon. There is no question about that.
Sandinismo, whatever its opportunities ought to be, is a Nicaraguan homegrown
movement. Sandino predates Castro. He was a man; he lived. So there is no
reason to believe they are going out and borrow from elsewhere when they really
have something at home. The nature of this thing is such that you have to see it
take its own form, rather than make prejudgments [sic] about."9 2
While Pezzullo's testimony could have serve as a road map for the incoming
administration, its regionalist perspective was ignored by the Reagan White House which
favored viewing events through the globalist prism of the East-West struggle.
Interpreting the Sandinista Government Threat: Blasier's Propositions 3, 11, and 12
as applied to Reagan's Evaluation of the Sandinistas in Power
Reagan entered the White House intent on rolling back the threat posed by the
Soviet Union's brand of expansionist and interventionist communism. As Beth A. Fisher
indicates in "Toeing the Hardline? The Reagan Administration and Ending the Cold
War, " Reagan viewed the Soviet Union's expansionism and interventionism as being the
main threat to world peace and by extension a threat to the security of the United States.93
92 Ibid. pg.,239.
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Expansionism is defined in terms of Soviet "imperialistic" behavior, while
interventionism is viewed in terms of the Soviet Union's "unconstructive involvement,
direct and indirect, in unstable areas of the Third World." 94
Reagan's interpretation of the Sandinista threat potential (Proposition 3, 11, and
12) is the result of the globalist perspective combined with what he and other
conservatives saw as the disaster-prone political and military ramifications of Carter's
human rights policy that forced reform on moderate, pro-United States (anti-communist)
autocrats during a time of superpower confrontation. Reagan and other conservatives
concluded that Carter's policies undermined U.S. hemispheric primacy and jeopardized
national security. For example, Reagan and his advisors lamented what they considered
to have been the Carter administration's "giveaway" of the Panama Canal and were
troubled by Carter's casting off anti-communist allies in Latin America precisely when
the Soviet Union was challenging the United States for global leadership. 95
93 Fisher cites Reagan's Secretary of State Alexander Haig's (1981-82) early pronouncements on the nature
of the Soviet threat in terms of Moscow's desire and withal to "promote violent change throughout the
globe, especially in areas of vital interest to the West." Haig argued that "Moscow is the greatest source of
international security" and that the "Soviet promotion of violence as the instrument of change constitutes
the greatest danger to world peace." See Fisher, Beth A., "Toeing the Hardline? The Reagan
Administration and the Ending of the Cold War, " in Political Science Quarterly, Volume 112, Number 3
(Autumn 1997), pg. 478, accessed May 20, 2008,
http://www.transatlantic.u.edu.pl/upload/59 f9a5 Fischer.Reagan.end.CW.pdf.
94 In 1983 Secretary of State George Schultz (1982-89) testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that the Soviet Union's "unrelenting efforts to impose an alien Soviet model on foreign
countries threatened American security." Ibid. pg. 478.
95 In our system of divided government, and in an era that lacks consensus on foreign policy direction and
issues, the President must still nonetheless seek the approval of the Senate whose constitutional
responsibility is to give its advice and consent by approving or rejecting treaties. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the case of the Panama Canal treaties where the Senate leadership played a prominent role.
Despite the Reagan White House criticism of the Carter administration's handling of the Panama Canal's
return to Panamanian control, (Republican) Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker (R- Tennessee, 1967-
85) working with (Democratic) Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D - West Virginia, 1959 to present)
played prominent roles among the treaties' proponents by helping head off situations that could have
prevented the passage of the treaties. See, Furlong, William L., and Margaret E. Scranton. The Dynamics
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Reagan entered the White House distrustful of the Soviet Union and its proxies in
Latin America. Prior to his election, Reagan promised that he would roll back Soviet
expansionism and interventionism worldwide. He was influenced by the "Report of the
Committee of Santa Fe, " which reaffirmed his convictions that U.S.-Soviet ddtente was
dead and that the containment of the Soviet Union was no longer sufficient to guarantee
the survival of the United States. 96 Reagan's Latin American policies, while influenced
by the Santa Fe Report and its alarmist findings indicating that the Caribbean Basin was
becoming a "Marxist-Leninist lake" exposing the southern flank of the United States,
chose to selectively apply its recommendations. 97
While the Carter administration aimed to accommodate the Sandinistas
(Proposition 3 and 4, conciliatory), the Reagan administration immediately sought to
suppress (Proposition 3 and 4, suppressive) the Sandinista government because of what a
globalist-focused White House perceived to be Managua's growing links to the Soviet
Union through Moscow's Cuban proxy (Proposition 11). In the same light Reagan also
opted to continue the containment of Cuba because of the island's well-established links
to the Soviet Union (Proposition 3, 11, and 12). However, at the same time, the Reagan
administration did nonetheless seek to improve relations with neighboring Mexico, one of
Havana's traditional allies, as a means of safeguarding what the White House saw as a
vulnerable southern flank (Proposition 10).
of Foreign Policymaking: The President, Congress, and the Panama Canal Treaties. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1984, pgs. 151-152.
96 Leogrande, pg. 55.
9' Smith, Joseph. The United States and Latin America: A History of American Diplomacy, 1776 - 2000.
New York, NY: Routledge, 2005, pg., 149-150, http://books.google.com/books?id=HE-
7RmI~ozl8C&pg'PA 1 50&lpg=PA I 50&dcrkirkpatrick~santa+fe+report&source=web&ots=i slgOeC9M
&sig=SkAWnSl2 RZp0vju0cB65mNdaOU&hl=en#PRA1-PA152,M1.
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The Reagan administration concluded that the Sandinistas, as a revolutionary
movement, was representative of all Latin American revolutionary movements. 98 The
Reagan White House believed that the Sandinistas, and by extension all Latin American
revolutionary movements, were not just ideologically aligned with the Soviet Union but
more alarmingly were influential instruments of Soviet interventionism. This sort of
"profiling" negated the possibility that Latin American revolutions could be the result of
purely local factors and or even be nationalistic expressions of their political outlook and
objectives.
Today the prevailing consensus in Washington is that Chivez's brand of populism
can only be replicated by states that possess significant natural resources or other forms
of wealth. Chavez-style populism is dependent on popular backing that can be bought
through the adoption of redistributed economic policies and increased social spending.
The export of Chavez's brand of populism is also hampered by the nonexistence of an
extra-hemispheric rival of the United States that can protect such revolutionary states.
Reagan Rolling Back Soviet Interventionism: Pursuit of Victory in Central America
As Leogrande adroitly characterizes the mood in the Republican camp, "a victory
in Central America would be Reagan's first foreign policy success and its ramifications
would be global." 99 Reagan's resolve to defeat what conservatives saw as Soviet
98 While the Reagan administration obsessed over the potential for Soviet interventionism in Central
America and within the Caribbean Basin facilitated by the Sandinista and Castro regimes, at the same time
it opted to leave South America often to its own devices. The Reagan White House's disinterest in South
America is itself in many aspects a throwback to a similar policy position taken in the 1950s by
Eisenhower's administration. The Reagan White House instead makes Nicaragua in Central America the
focal point for the administration's overall Latin American foreign policy strategy.
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interventionism in Central America was meant to send Moscow the message that the
United States would no longer tolerate Soviet expansionism in Asia, much less
interventionism in Latin America as had been the case during the Carter presidency. The
intent to demonstrate to Western European allies that Washington was again firmly
committed to exercising global leadership was equally important to Reagan.'00 The White
House aimed to score political victories across the board, at home over the Democrats
that had backed Carter's failed human rights policies and abroad against the Soviets, their
Cuban proxy, and their Sandinista friends.'0 1
For the Reagan White House, the Sandinistas were linked to Soviets via Havana.
The Managua-Havana-Moscow linkage implied that that Soviet Union was pursuing a
non-constructive interventionist policy in the Central American region. Soviet
interventionism had to be confronted and Managua's links to Moscow severed. Reagan
and his advisors determined that suppressing the Managua government was the most
effective means for rolling back overall Soviet influence in the western hemisphere
(Proposition 6, 11, and 12). Robert McFarlane, Reagan's National Security Advisor
(1983-85), lectured Congress that the United States could ill afford not to intervene in
Central America since if it failed to do so, Washington's credibility to dictate terms
99 Leogrande, pg. 81.
100 Ibid.
101 Reagan's reasoning on Nicaragua was deeply influenced by Jeane Kirkpatrick's writings on the Carter
administration's foreign policy failings in the lead up to the 1980 election. Kirkpatrick's conservative
writings helped confirm candidate Reagan's beliefs that the Sandinistas were a radical Latin American
revolutionary movement aided-and-abetted by Soviet-backed Cuba conspiring with the Kremlin to
undermine the United States and its traditional hemispheric leadership. As the newly elected President,
Reagan made no qualms about confronting the Sandinistas given his strong belief that the Nicaraguan
government was already an agent of Moscow's intent on helping to establish a Soviet foothold on the
Central American mainland (Proposition 3).
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elsewhere in the Third World would have been compromised.1 02 Speaking for the
Reagan White House, McFarlane reasoned that:
"If we could not muster an effective counter to the Cuban-Sandinista strategy in
our own backyard, it was far less likely that we could do so in the years ahead in
more distant locations. We had to win this one."
Suppressing the Sandinista Government: Totalitarians never Democratize
Despite conservatives' lambasting of Carter's human rights policies, the Reagan
administration made a point to unrelentingly press Managua on human rights concerns.
Reagan and his foreign policy advisors reasoned that human rights were an expedient
means for prodding the Sandinistas to acquiesce to U.S. policy objectives, while assisting
to deflect potential (liberal) congressional criticism of U.S. interventionism.
The Reagan White House sought to build congressional support for the
suppression of the Managua regime by highlighting the Sandinistas violations of human
rights and their lack of commitment to democratic practices. 104 At the same time, the
Reagan administration ignored the enforcement of human rights concerns in the case of
friendly military regimes (i.e., El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala). Thus, in the case
102 See, Kornbluh, Peter, "Nicaragua" in Intervening into the 1990s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third
World. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Peter J. Schraeder, editor, 1992, pg. 291.
103 Ibid. pg. 291.
4 J. Michael Waller indicates that Sandinista prisoners were occasionally mutilated (often skinned alive)
prior to execution. Killing Sandinista opponents in the countryside at times included drawing-and-
quartering individuals and then leaving them to bleed to death. Although inefficient, this technique was
used by the Sandinista security forces, namely the Directorate General for State Security (DGSE). Also
while Somoza Debayle had only one prison (Carcel Modelo), upon seizing power the Sandinistas expanded
its size fourfold, built another twenty-two prisons, and reportedly operated twenty clandestine jails. See J.
Michael Waller, "Tropical Chekists: The Sandinista secret police legacy in Nicaragua" in
Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization. (July 21, 2004) accessed May 30, 2008,
http://www.iwp.edu/news/newsID.126/news detail.asp.
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of pro-United States regimes, the Reagan administration weighed the need of ridding the
region of Soviet influence as being of greater strategic utility than coercing friendly
autocratic regimes to respect moral issues such as human rights (Proposition 3 and 10).
Ultimately what shaped Reagan's opinions of the Sandinistas was Kirkpatrick's
article "Dictatorship and Double Standards. " Reagan concurred with Kirkpatrick's
assessment that not only had Carter's human rights policies been ineffective, something
which U.S. Ambassador Todman himself agreed with and used to challenge advocates of
human rights at the U.S. Department of State, but more alarmingly these jeopardized the
strategic interests of the United States.' 05 Leogrande stresses that Kirkpatrick criticized
Carter's policies not just because they accepted the inevitability of (revolutionary, anti-
American) change in the Third World, but rather because Carter "simply lacked the will
to resist malevolent changes fostered by our enemies." 106 As a result, Reagan's
acceptance of Kirkpatrick's conclusions became a major driver of U.S. policies toward
the Sandinistas.
While Carter may have sought to establish a constructive working relationship
with the Sandinistas (Proposition 3 and 4, conciliatory) by extending U.S. aid and
engaging the new government in exchange for its commitment to refrain from aiding
neighboring revolutionary movements, the Reagan administration perceived the
Sandinistas at best as driving Nicaragua headlong toward becoming a one-party Leninist
'05 Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. "Dictatorships and Double Standards," in Commentary (November 1979), accessed
May 1, 2008, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/dictatorships--double-standards-6189.
106 See, Leogrande, pg. 54.
191
dictatorship.10 7 Reagan viewed the Sandinistas as willing accomplices of the Soviets and
their Cuban proxy's attempts to subvert Nicaragua's non-communist neighbors.
Reagan's belief of a link between the Sandinista and Soviet-backed Cuba intent
on subverting neighboring pro-United States regimes convinced him to pursue a policy of
suppression (Proposition 3 and 4, suppressive). Reagan terminated the previous
administration's commitments to Managua to punish the Sandinistas.' 08
Reagan viewed the Sandinista government as the byproduct of an armed leftist
revolutionary seizure of power. Reagan and other conservatives were convinced of the
need to suppress the totalitarian-prone Sandinista regime because its cadres were
incapable of evolving into democrats, nor for that matter could the Sandinista
government be relied on to cooperate in installing a representative liberal democracy and
abide by its workings if left to its own devices.1 09 The Sandinista government's
experiment with participatory democracy only served to further convince the Reagan
administration that Managua and the political ideology of Sandinismo had to be
107 Namely that in exchange for continued U.S. aid the Sandinistas would not provide material support for
the leftist insurgency in neighboring El Salvador.
108 Reagan's conclusion that the Sandinistas-led government constituted a threat to the vital interests of the
United States was premised not just by the Managua government's growing political-economic links to the
Soviet Union (Proposition 3), but was also based on the belief that the Sandinistas were evolving towards
one-party totalitarianism. Influenced by Kirkpatrick's assertion that traditional dictators are more moderate
than radical leftwing revolutionaries, Reagan and his foreign policy advisors concluded that moderately
authoritarian Latin American governments such as the one governing neighboring El Salvador could under
the right conditions eventually evolve into western-style (pro-United States) democracies.
109 Steve Hobden in his review of Katherine Hoyt's "The Many Faces of Sandinista Democracy," points out
that the Sandinistas represent an interesting variation of the military/authoritarian transition to democracy
model prevalent throughout Latin America. Citing Phillip Williams, Hobden indicates that in the case of
Nicaragua, Sandinista rule represents a dual transition where a revolutionary vanguard that had overthrown
an authoritarian regime experimented with a form of popular democracy only to peacefully succeed as a
result of its own defeat in open and democratic elections. See, Hobden, Steve, in a review of Katherine
Hoyt's "The Many Faces of Sandinista Democracy," in H-LatAm (May 1998), accessed May 18, 2008,
http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.cgi?path=29133896371283.
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combated. Sandinismo was seen as posing a threat to both U.S. security and business
interests (Proposition 2, 3, and 5) in Nicaragua and in Central America.
The Reagan White House was certain that Cuba had manipulated Nicaraguan
political-economic frustrations in the lead-up to Somoza Debayle's overthrow on behalf
of the Soviet Union. The Sandinista overthrow of the Somoza dynasty, the leftist
totalitarian proclivities of the succeeding Sandinista government, and links to the Soviet
Union served as catalysts for the U.S. policy of suppression. In a repetition of similar past
events with Zelaya, no Sandinista action short of capitulation to its domestic political
opponents could have altered the Reagan administration's assessment (Proposition 4). 110
Reagan's initial policy proposal for confronting Nicaragua's Sandinista-led
government was to ramp up U.S. support for the Sandinistas' non-communist political-
economic opponents. In early 1981, the Reagan administration requested $35 million
(equivalent to $79.8 million in 2007) for economic aid to Nicaragua for FY1982, all of
which was earmarked for the country's private sector. The Reagan administration sought
to confront the Sandinista threat by strengthening Nicaragua's private business sector.
The Reagan administration believed that by building-up Nicaragua's business sector, it
could establish a non-violent line of defense against expanding Sandinista totalitarian
proclivities in the short-term.1 1
10 This sort of reasoning comes across quite clear in the writings of Jorge Salaverry where he indicates that
the "Sandinistas' promises are designed to present an image of flexibility and reasonableness while making
few substantive moves toward democracy. The state of emergency, for example, which suspended a
number of political and civil rights, can be re-imposed at any moment. Political activity, in any case, can be
controlled easily by the Sandinistas through their broadly worded public security law." See, Salaverry,
Jorge, "A U.S. Response to the Sandinistas' New Promises," in Executive Memorandum 186 (January 21,
1988), accessed May 30, 2008, http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/EM186.cfm.
" Note $35 million in 1981 is about $79.8 million in 2007 dollars using the consumer price index. For
computing the relative value of the U.S. dollar in 1981 to 2007 (last year of full annual data for initial and
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The Reagan White House moved beyond this initial policy by quickly abandoning
any pretense at attempting to peacefully sway the Sandinista government away from pro-
communist policies. Within three months of having assumed office Reagan ceased
certifying (April 1, 1981) to the U.S. Congress that the Managua government was abiding
by its agreement not to aid the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)
insurgency in neighboring El Salvador (Proposition 4). Managua's de-certification was
indicative of the Reagan administration's intent to cut adrift any further pretense of
peacefully weaning the Sandinistas off their Soviet-Cuban economic and diplomatic life-
line.2
As justification for the White House's action, Reagan administration officials cite
the certitude that the Sandinista government had funneled 200 tons of military equipment
to the FMLN. In doing so, the Reagan White House linked the Sandinista revolutionary
government to the FMLN insurrection and to Soviet-Cuban interventionism in Central
America. The Reagan administration asserted that a significant link between Managua,
the FMLN insurrection, and Soviet-backed Cuba existed despite the fact that in 1980 the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) previously testified to Congress that El Salvador's
(civil) war was "largely home grown," and that Cuba's role in the Salvadorian insurgency
was much less prominent than it had been in Nicaragua's.11 3
target year) using the consumer price index, accessed, August 9, 2008, see
http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php#.
1 Reagan's action forced the halt of the final disbursement of $15 million ($33.2 million) of the original
$75 million authorized by the Carter administration. See, Schoultz, pgs. 52-53. Also note that the $75
million in aid for Nicaragua proposed by the Carter administration accounts for approximately $208 million
in 2006 dollars. For computing the relative value of the U.S. dollar in 1979 to 2006 (last year of full annual
data for initial and target year) using the consumer price index, accessed, April 12, 2008, see
http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php#.
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The Reagan White House argued that the Sandinistas, themselves increasingly
dependent on Soviet and Cuban assistance, were assisting the FMLN in its attempt to
overthrow the pro-United States regime in San Salvador. As a result, Reagan approved
National Security Decision Directive 17 in November 1981, which became the
centerpiece of the administration's covert war against the Sandinistas (Proposition 3).114
The Sandinista Government Threat: National Security Directive 17 and Blasier's
Propositions 3, 6, and 12
In the lead up to National Security Directive 17, the Reagan White House had
sought to cultivate congressional support for Nicaragua policy. Reagan and his foreign
policy advisors argued to Congress that while a democratic transition had been possible
following the downfall of the Somoza Debayle government in 1979, the Carter
administration had failed to stop "a small Cuban-advised elite of Marxist-Leninists" from
seizing control of the Nicaraguan state. Furthermore, thanks to Cuban assistance, the
Sandinistas consolidated their hold on the state apparatus through the monopoly of
force.115 U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz's (1982-89) escalated the rhetoric
advocating the suppression of the Sandinista regime's through reference to Nicaragua's
leaders as "a handful of ideologues, fortified by their Cuban and Soviet-bloc military
advisors" (Proposition 6 and 12) followed by, even more importantly, Reagan's own
13 By the beginning of the 1980s DIA had concluded that the Cubans, acting as the Soviets' surrogates,
"are the driving organizational force behind the entire insurgency movement in area" of Central America.
Schoultz, pgs. 51 and 55.
114 Ibid. pgs. 53-54. Also see, The White House, "National Security Directive 17" (Appendix 5).
Washington, DC, January 4, 1982, accessed May 26, 2008,
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/nsa/publications/presidentusa/pddoc.html.
115 Statements to Congress made by Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders. See, Ibid., pg. 54.
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acerbic tongue lashing of the Sandinista regime as representing "a communist reign of
terror. "116
The accuracy of the claims by Reagan and his administration's senior officials
that political instability in Central America was due to the Soviet Union working through
its Cuban proxy to undermine hemispheric stability was questioned by Congress. To
counter congressional opposition early in the administration during the summer of 1981,
U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig (1981-82) voiced that the Soviet Union had to
show restraint and reciprocity in international relations if it wanted to engage the United
States. Fisher indicates that Haig's interpretation of the Soviet Union showing restraint
implied the curtailment of Soviet interventionism.' 17 As Haig indicated:
"The Soviet Union [to] cease and desist from instigating, supporting, and carrying
out efforts to effect historic change by force, whether it be done through proxy or
the direct involvement of Soviet forces."" 8
Despite Haig's quixotic attempt to build consensus in Washington for the need to
adopt a harder approach with the Soviets by calling on Moscow to show restraint
(Proposition 12), congressional doubts about the actual threat posed by the Sandinistas
had already arisen as a result of the February 1981 release of the U.S. Department of
State white paper "Communist Interference in El Salvador. "
The paper, conceived as a policy piece to build support for the Reagan
administration's calls for increased military aid to El Salvador, actually undermined the
116 Ibid. pg. 54.
11 Fisher, pg. 480.
118 Ibid. pg. 480.
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administration's claims of link between Managua, the FSLM, and Soviet-backed Cuba.119
The paper, in an attempt to draw similar conclusions to the development of events in Viet
Nam, argued that the insurgency in El Salvador could not exist without the benefit of
outside (Soviet-Cuban) support. The State Department paper portrayed events in El
Salvador as a textbook case of outside aggression involving the Sandinistas and the
Soviets and their Cuban proxy. Ultimately the paper's conclusions are refuted because of
a number of deficiencies that Robert Kaiser of the Washington Post and Jonathan Kwitny
of the Wall Street Journal found and made public.
The Reagan administration had made a number of the paper's supporting
(captured) documents, which it argued constituted primafacie evidence for its claims,
available to the press. The documents, in Spanish and many of unverified authenticity,
were determined by the press to have been translated by the U.S. Department of State to
distort the original context of them. The press found that U.S. Department of State's
mistranslation emphasized greater Soviet and Cuban involvement than was the actual
case. The press as well as scholars such as James Petra's own "White Paper on the
White Paper, " showed that the State Department paper's data and reasoning was flawed
and showed a bias by its authors to attribute responsibility for actions to outside forces
when these actions were likely the result of indigenous forces.
119 See, U.S. Department of State, "Communist Interference in El Salvador," Special Report Number 80,
(February 23, 1981).
120 Schoultz quotes Wayne S. Smith's article "Dateline Havana: Myopic Diplomacy," in Foreign Policy,
Number 48 (Fall 1982). Schoultz and Smith make the case that not only were the supporting documents
mistranslated, but also the white paper suffered from a large number of unsupported inferences and
especially the probability of forgery of some of the documents. For Schoultz and Smith, not only was the
white paper an embarrassment of the administration attributable to poor research, but more importantly it
revealed a dangerous determination to advocate a policy position not supported by actual facts. See,
Schoultz, pgs. 60-61.
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As a consequence, U.S. congressional distrust of the accuracy of the information
being conveyed to it by the Reagan administration multiplied. For example, skeptical
members of Congress requested copies of the actual documents used in the Reagan
administration's briefings to Congress. In one particular case a member of the House
Intelligence Committee went as far as to request actual copies of the documents used by
the Reagan administration in a March 1982 CIA briefing.
The fact that the Reagan administration denied the congressional request, citing
that "the intelligence sources and methodology used to collect this evidence are highly
confidential in nature" and that "it would be impossible to release the information
without jeopardizing those resources" did not help its case with Congress. 2 1 For
Schoultz, the Reagan administration's reluctance to offer concrete evidence of direct and
substantial Soviet-Cuban activity in Central America is proof that it did not exist. 122
Interpreting the Sandinista Government Threat: Conclusions and Consequences
The present section summarizes how the Reagan administration's conclusions
about the threat posed by the Sandinistas differed from that of Congress.123 The section
highlights that Congress viewed the Reagan administration's position on the Sandinista
threat as falling largely within the parameters of what Blasier would characterize as being
a dysfunctional (Proposition 14) policy response. Where the Reagan White House saw
the Sandinistas as a threat to U.S. security and hemispheric political leadership
121 Ibid., pg. 62
122 Ibid., pg. 62.
1 Interestingly enough the United States and Nicaragua's Sandinista-led government maintained
diplomatic relations throughout the 1979-90 period.
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(Proposition 3, 6, and 11), Congress saw the Managua regime merely as a nuisance.
Although there may have been potential for a threat to develop along the lines of greater
Sandinista-Soviet-Cuban cooperation over time, the actual threat scenario was
misconstrued or even overblown by the Reagan administration either in fulfillment of a
campaign promise and or with the intent of applying its (successful) outcome to other
areas of the third world.
Note that arguing against a significant Sandinista-Soviet-Castorite link was the
low number of Soviet and Cuban military (300) and non-military (700) advisors.
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega indicated that the number of advisors stationed in
Nicaragua did not exceed 1,000 and that the Sandinistas were willing to dispense with
these advisors if the Reagan administration agreed to end hostilities. Although political
(diplomatic), economic, and military ties between the Sandinistas, the Soviet Union, and
Cuba did exist, Congress nevertheless concluded that there was insufficient evidence
indicating a tangible threat to U.S. vital interests to the extent purported by the Reagan
White House (Proposition 13). Actually, the Sandinistas declared their initial hope of
breaking free of dependence on either superpower.
A Sandinista non-aligned position should have led, if not to full reconciliation
with the United States, to at the least a modicum of acceptance (Proposition 3,
conciliatory). Yet Reagan was convinced that there was a need to confront Soviet
interventionist communism in Central America to retain hemispheric political hegemony
(Proposition 11). The administration believed that failure to challenge the Managua-
124 The State Department asserted that the actual number was in excess of 2,500 military advisors. See,
Lewis, Neil A., "Ortega May Weigh End of Soviet Aid, " in The New York Times, (October 8, 1987),
accessed May 30, 2008,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DEFDF133BF93BA35753C1A961948260.
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Havana-Moscow threat would jeopardize U.S. security and risked public political
backlash for having failed to stop the threat posed by the spread of communism in
Nicaragua (Proposition 16). Congress by now saw itself immune from such public
backlash, because it realized that support for the Contra War and the commensurate
possibility of renewed U.S. intervention overseas was unpalatable to an American
electorate still agonizing over Viet Nam and the consequences of executive branch
adventurism.
The combination of two main factors was driving congressional thinking about
the inconclusiveness of the Sandinista threat and links to the Soviet Union: 1) concerns
over the exorbitant cost of funding a covert war and; 2) mounting public disapproval of
the Reagan administration's Central American policies aimed at retaining hemispheric
political primacy (Proposition 11,) which were increasingly seen as leading the United
States down the path to eventual military intervention (Proposition 3).
In August 1983, Reagan appointed the National Bipartisan Commission on
Central America to counter growing public objections to his administration's Nicaraguan
policies. The Commission, chaired by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,
reported its findings in January 1984, and concluded that longstanding political-economic
conditions in the region were responsible for fomenting revolutionary tendencies.
However, the Commission also found that the Soviet Union, working through Cuba and
Nicaragua, was ultimately responsible for regional instability. To counter Soviet
interventionism, the Commission recommended increased military aid (arms and military
advisors) to strengthen the position of the pro-United States regimes in El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala as well as continued ample support for the Contras.
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Congress, confronting a $200 billion budget shortfall in 1984 (or more than
$399.1 billion in 2007 dollars) was leery of the costs to its membership if it approved any
financially and politically costly foreign aid measure (Proposition 12).125 Congress
remained hesitant to authorize any foreign (military) aid measure that would reinforce
deeply ingrained Latin American conclusions that the United States sought to reassert
traditional leadership in the region by paternalistic means. 126 Despite congressional ill-
feeling on the matter of funding the suppression of Nicaragua's Sandinista government
(Proposition 3), which, although opposed by the U.S. government still retained full
diplomatic relations with Washington, the Reagan White House continued its attempts to
build consensus on Capitol Hill for support for its policy objective.
Why did Reagan's conclusions about the threat the Sandinista regime posed to
U.S. vital interests diverge from those of Congress? Why did the Reagan White House
become so obsessed with continuing to engage in counterrevolutionary activities against
the Sandinistas that even after Congress terminated all direct and indirect aid to the
Contras in October 1984, it risked a presidential scandal over illicit dealings with Iran to
finance a covert war in Central America?12 7
12 Note $200 billion in 1984 is about $399.1 billion in 2007 dollars using the consumer price index. For
computing the relative value of the U.S. dollar in 1984 to 2007 (last year of full annual data for initial and
target year) using the consumer price index, accessed, May 30, 2008, see
http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php#.
126 LaFeber cites Senator Daniel Moynihan (D-New York, 1977-2001), who even as a staunch anti-
communist, found it difficult to make the connection that the Soviets where responsible for Central
American political-economic turmoil. Moynihan argued that the Commission failed to "produce any facts
that show that the Soviet-Cuban bloc threatened U.S. interests in the region." Nowhere is congressional
opposition made more evident than when Congress voted 84 to 12 against the Reagan administration's
request for funding as proposed by the Commission. Even the "Republican-controlled Senate had no
qualms about condemning the CIA's mining of Nicaragua's ports." See, LaFeber, pgs. 308-309.
127 The Reagan administration sought to undermine the Sandinistas by means of the "Covert Action
Proposal for Central America," (February 27, 1981). National security advisor Robert McFarlane made the
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The foregoing questions are at the heart of the U.S. executive-legislative debate
over which branch has the privilege of primary responsibility for foreign policymaking.
Table 9 helps to summarize how the Reagan administration sought to deal with the
Sandinistas as the ruling party in Nicaragua.
Table 9 - Applying Blasier's Propositions to the United States
Government's (USG) Action in Dealing with the FSLN as a
(Revolutionary) Government
Proposition Explaining USG Action
Number 2 While the Carter administration sought to engage the Sandinista government, and these
actually reciprocated by communicating to Washington their willingness to cooperate in
safeguarding American business interests, the Reagan administration saw the
expropriation of American holdings in Nicaragua as having an adverse impact on U.S.
private interests.
Number 3 While the Carter administration saw some links between Managua and the Soviet Union
and Cuba, its (pragmatic) strategic considerations convinced Carter to extend an olive
branch to the Sandinistas. Reagan on the other hand saw the Sandinistas in the worst
possible terms colluding with the Soviet Union and thereby negatively impacting
American national security interests. Strategic considerations determined that the USG
responses would be suppressive.
Number 4 The Reagan White House determined early on that the Sandinista government would not
honor its agreements as evidenced by its involvement in supplying El Salvador's FMLN.
The USG consequently sought to subdue any agreement with Managua since the White
House determined that this was the best means of countering Soviet interventionism in
Central America.
Source: Blasier, 1985, pg. 236.
case for "a multi-front approach short of direct military intervention." McFarlane argued that "the key point
to be made now is that while we must move promptly, we must assure that our political, economic,
diplomatic, propaganda, military, and covert actions are well coordinated." Kombluh citing Pentagon
manuals finds that this approach represented the "synergistic application of comprehensive political, social,
economic and psychological efforts" short of overt military deployment by the United States. This policy
allowed the White House to wage "total war at the grass-root level" without the sort of "domestic and
international backlash that conventional war would provoke." See, Kombluh, pg. 291. Increasingly blocked
by Congress's hesitation to fund the covert war in Central America, the Reagan White House appealed to
the public by lambasting Congress's lack of nerve and its willingness "to wash its hands of Central
America much like Pontius Pilate." The Reagan White House sought to convince, if not threaten Congress
to come over to its side by stoking fear in the publicof the spread of communism (Proposition 16). The
Reagan White House even went to the extreme of comparing Soviet interventionism in Central America to
Nazi Germany's conquest of Europe during the Second World War (1939-45). See, LaFeber, 309.
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Table 10 groups the bureaucratic and economic aspects of the Reagan
administration's dealings with the Sandinistas as a revolutionary government.
Table 10 - Applying Blasier's Propositions to the United States
Government's Action in Dealing with the FSLN as a (Revolutionary)
Government
(Grouped by Economic and Bureaucratic Explanations and Responses)
Proposition Action Grouped by Relevance to Economic and Bureaucratic Explanations
Number 5 Strategic considerations primarily impact the Reagan administration's outlook towards
the Sandinistas government.
Number 6 The USG foreign policy response toward the Sandinista government is characterized by
significant involvement by Reagan. Reagan largely determines that the United States
needs to block potential Soviet and Cuban adventurism in Central America.
Number 11 Reagan's suppressive policies toward Nicaragua are meant to communicate to the Soviet
Union that the United States retains hemispheric political primacy in the Americas.
Number 12 Reagan and his cabinet shape policy towards the Sandinista, but Congress also has input.
Proposition Action Grouped by Responses Evaluated and Impact
Number 13 USG perceptions of German influence in Zelaya's Nicaragua are correct, however
Soviet influence in Sandinista Nicaragua is exaggerated or incorrect. USG concerns over
Cuban influence are somewhat correct.
Number 14 USG strategic responses in Nicaragua are dysfunctional.
Number 16 The U.S. public's perception that the USG has the obligation to check the spread of
communism inculcates in U.S. leaders a fear of political repercussions if they fail to
contain communism.
Number 18 The Reagan administration's suppressive policies polarized Nicaraguan society and
radicalize opposition groups leading to the creation of a contra revolutionary situation.
Number 19 USG policies will generally not facilitate revolutionary governments' attempts to reduce
their dependence on the United States.
Source: Blasier, 1985, pgs. 236-238.
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During the Reagan administration the U.S.-Nicaragua relationship remained
subject to congressional disagreement with the White House's belief of the existence of a
Soviet-Sandinista link. Congress did not believe that Nicaragua was another Cuba. The
Democratic-controlled House, as well as moderate Republicans in the Senate, held that
Reagan's attempt to pressure the Sandinista regime was a greater threat to regional
stability than the Sandinistas' ties to Moscow and Havana.
Congress concluded that Reagan's policies forced Managua closer to the Soviets
and Cubans and is responsible for radicalizing the Sandinistas (Proposition 18). At the
same time, Sandinista's attempts to obtain needed economic assistance and
reconstruction aid from the West were blocked at the behest of the United States, leaving
Managua with no alternative but to turn to the Soviet bloc for assistance (Proposition 19).
CHAPTER SUMMARY AND PRELUDE TO CHAPTER 5
Chapter 4 has explored the executive-legislative debate regarding which branch of
the U.S. government has the primary responsibility in the foreign policymaking process.
Blasier's theoretical propositions have been applied to three specific cases where
Congress influenced U.S.-Latin America policy before and during the Cold War. This
discussion serves as the basis of analysis for the final two chapters of this study.
Chapter 5 will elaborate on the preceding arguments by shifting its focus to
Bolivarian Venezuela as the first post-Cold War case study of U.S. reaction to Latin
American revolutionary change. This chapter applies Cole Blasier's theoretical
propositions to the review of U.S. foreign policymakers' interpretation and reaction to
Chavez's brand of leftist-inspired revolutionary change.
204
In the process, the next chapter delves into the origins of Chavez's anti-
Americanism and explores Venezuela's economic dependence and thus its vulnerability
in the U.S.-Venezuela bilateral relationship. Chapter 5 also defines Chavez's
revolutionary reforms and highlights the key areas where his government has stumbled
and will likely stumble again in the future. The chapter analyzes Chavez's revolutionary
agenda for Latin America and key areas of concern for Congress, such as U.S. energy
security and the state of Venezuelan democracy. Chapter 5 concludes with an assessment
of the threat that the Chavez government poses to the United States and the factors that
limit its capability to contest U.S. regional leadership.
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CHAPTER 5 - CONFRONTING REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IN
POST COLD-WAR LATIN AMERICA: THE CASE OF
BOLIVARIAN VENEZUELA
"The hegemonic pretensions of the American empire are placing at risk the very survival
of the human species. We continue to warn you about this danger and we appeal to the
people of the United States and the world to halt this threat, which is like a sword
hanging over our heads ... And the devil [George W. Bush] came here yesterday.
Yesterday the devil came here. Right here. And it smells of sulfur still today. Wherever
he looks, he sees extremists."
President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela's address to
the United Nations, September 20, 20061
POST-COLD WAR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICYMAKING: DEALING WITH HUGO
CHAVEZ
Setting the Stage
Chapter 4 sets the stage for the present chapter by elaborating on how the United
States (U.S.) Congress influenced foreign policymaking toward the Latin American state
of Nicaragua before and during the Cold War, and analyzed the evolution of U.S.-
Nicaraguan interactions during three revolutionary periods spanning the greater part of
the twentieth century. Chapter 5 builds on the preceding discussion by elaborating on
Bolivarian Venezuela (1998 to present) as a case study of U.S. reaction to Latin
American revolutionary changes in the post-Cold War era. Chapter 5 applies Cole
1See, Chavez, Hugo, "Chdvez address to the United Nations, " New York, (September 20, 2006), accessed
June 7, 2008, http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0920-22.htm (Appendix 6). In light of Chavez's
comments about George W. Bush at the United Nations, David Stout of the New York Times interestingly
wondered whether "Chavez was exhorting Americans to rise up in revolution, or if his gibe was an indirect
reference to previous American-aided upheavals in Central and South America." Stout, David, "Chavez
Calls Bush 'the Devil' in U.N. Speech," in The New York Times, (September 20, 2006), accessed June 8,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/20/world/americas/20cnd-
chavez.html? r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin.
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Blasier's theoretical propositions to the analysis of foreign policymakers' interpretations
of revolutionary changes. Blasier's propositions remain a viable means for interpreting
the impact of Congress on U.S. foreign policies dealing with Hugo Chavez and his brand
of leftist-inspired revolutionary change.
Nicaragua under the first Sandinista-led government (1979-90) and Venezuela
under Chivez's rule (1998 to present) share a number of similarities, as well as key
differences, in light of how the United States has crafted its policies for dealing with
revolutionary changes. For example, a major stumbling point in Washington's relations
with both of these regimes has been the Sandinistas and Chivez's implementation of
political policies structured in a manner that discount representative democracy in favor
of a greater role for participatory democracy.
From a foreign direct investment perspective (FDI), Venezuela, like many of the
other Latin American countries, has also long been the target of U.S. private business
interests focused on developing the local consumer market as a destination for U.S. food
stuffs, manufactured exports, and services.2 On the flipside of the trade equation
countries such as Venezuela in the Central America/ Caribbean Basin sub-region have
traditionally served as key sources of extractive resources (e.g., tropical horticultural
products, a wide array of minerals, and in Venezuela's case, petroleum). In addition,
countries such as Nicaragua and Venezuela, exhibit a number of factors that at times lend
both countries an otherwise disproportionate degree of geopolitical importance in U.S.
2 Venezuela in calendar year 2007 alone imported from the United States more than $5 billion in
machinery, organic chemicals, and iron and steel products in addition to more than $600 million in food
stuffs (namely cereals, edible food preparations, and fats and oils). See, Global Trade Atlas, "Venezuela
Import Trade Statistics," accessed June 20, 2008, http://www.gtis.com/gta.
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security calculations at times. 3 These factors include close proximity to the Panama
Canal, and a track record of fiscal mismanagement leading them to become financially
indebted not only to the United States but also to extra-hemispheric powers.
As a result, U.S. foreign policymakers in both the White House and Congress
have historically sought to maintain Nicaragua and Venezuela within the U.S. political-
military and economic orbit, or reign them in should they stray. Beyond such similarities
there are two key differences today that set the two case study countries of Nicaragua and
Venezuela apart. These two differences are responsible for shaping U.S. foreign
policymakers' reactions to revolutionary change.
The first critical difference is that Venezuela, unlike Nicaragua, controls some of
world's largest proven reserves of petroleum outside of the Middle East. With approximately
80 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, Venezuela has the world's seventh largest reserves
of petroleum and is the United States fourth largest supplier (approximately 11 percent) of
crude oil. Oil wealth makes Venezuela critically important in U.S. foreign policymaking
calculations. Yet the question that arises in this context is does oil wealth strengthen
Venezuela's hand vis-a-vis its dealings with the United States or does it constitute a
vulnerability? The question of vulnerability will be addressed shortly. For now Table 11
compares major petroleum producers with political-economic stability.
3 The United States feared that Venezuela and Nicaragua would be unable to service their foreign debt
obligations and thereby invite foreign intervention by non-American powers. The United States intervened
in Nicaragua in 1909 in no small measure out of the fear that the Jose Santos Zelaya government would be
unable to service Nicaragua's foreign debt and thereby result in a repetition of Germany's aggressive
intervention which occurred during the Venezuela incident of 1902-03. In the case of the latter, Berlin
communicated to the British that it was wiling to "temporarily occupy Venezuelan harbors much as it had
done in China. Note that in 1898 Germany had "temporarily" acquired Kiaochow (China) on a ninety-nine
year lease on the basis of a similar dispute. See, Morris, Edmund, "A matter of extreme urgency: Theodore
Roosevelt, Wilhelm II, and the Venezuela Crisis of 1902 - United States-Germany conflict over alleged
German expansionistic efforts in Latin America," in Naval War College Review (Spring 2002), pg. 2,
accessed May 30, 2008, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi mOJIW/is 2 55/ai 88174230/pg 2.
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Table 11- Petroleum Reserves and Reserves Life at Current Levels of
Extraction (ranked by reserves largest to smallest)
Country Proven Production Est. Reserve Country Risk (3)
Reserves (1) (2) Life (scale of 1 toS,
(billions of (millions of (number of with 1=low and 5=extreme)
barrels) barrels per years at
day) current
levels
Saudi Arabia (ME) 260 10.2 69.8 2.34 Moderate
Canada (WH) 179 3.2 153.3 1.32 Negligible
Iran (ME) 136 4.0 93.2 3.70 High
Iraq (ME) 115 2.0 157.5 4.06 Very High
Kuwait (ME) 99 2.6 104.3 2.11 Moderate
United Arab 97 2.9 91.6 1.68 Negligible
Emirates (ME)
Venezuela (WH) 80 2.6 84.3 3.80 High
Russia (EURASIA) 60 9.8 16.8 2.91 Medium
Libya (AF) 41.5 1.8 63.2 2.85 Medium
Nigeria AF 36.2 2.3 43.1 3.86 High
United States of 21 7.4 7.8 1.51 Negligible
America (WH)
Mexico (WH) 12 3.4 9.7 2.60 Medium
Obs: Reserve life calculated by dividing reserves by annual production (daily production times 365 days).
ME = Middle East, WH = Western Hemisphere, EURASIA = Europe and Asia combined, and AF = Africa.
Sources: (1) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) - Energy Information Agency (EIA), accessed June 15,
2008, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/reserves.html. (2) Ibid. accessed June 15, 2008,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/RecentCrudeNGPLOtherProduction.xls. (3) Global Insight,
Country Risk Calculations as of June 16, 2008, http://www.globalinsight.com. (Appendix 7).
Nicaragua, on the other hand, having lost its bid at the beginning of the twentieth
century to become the site for a trans-isthmus canal, and with its significant geopolitical
importance and economic pull, remains underdeveloped and impoverished. In the
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Americas, only Haiti, with 80 percent of it population living below the poverty line, 54
percent living in conditions of abject poverty, and wracked by political instability, is in a
direr situation.4
The second difference between Nicaragua and Venezuela is that the latter only
poses a threat to U.S. economic security. During the Cold War, Sandinista-led Nicaragua
was identified by the Ronald W. Reagan (R, 1981-89) and the George H.W. Bush (R,
1989-93) administrations, as well as by elements in Congress, as being within the Soviet-
Cuban camp. While both the White House and Congress disagreed on the extent of the
capabilities that Nicaragua had at its disposal to threaten the United States and its
interests, both saw the Sandinistas as part of the greater Cold War era struggle where the
Soviet Union working through its proxies attempted to undermine U.S. regional
leadership. In the post-Cold War this is not the case. Neither the executive nor legislative
branches of the U.S. government seriously view Chavez as posing a political or
diplomatic threat to U.S. regional leadership (political hegemony).
a As the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) attests in "2008 World Fact Book, " Nicaragua "has widespread
underemployment (46.5 percent), one of the highest degrees of income inequality in the world (48 percent
of the population lives below the poverty line), and the third lowest gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita income in the Western Hemisphere ($2,600 in purchasing power parity - PPP). While the country
has progressed toward macroeconomic stability in the past few years, annual GDP growth of 3.8 percent
has been far too low to meet the country's needs, forcing the country to rely on international economic
assistance to meet fiscal and debt financing obligations (e.g. it received $471 million in economic aid in
2006). In early 2004, Nicaragua secured some $4.5 billion in foreign debt reduction under the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, and in October 2007, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
approved a new poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF) program that should create fiscal space for
social spending and investment. The continuity of a relationship with the IMF reinforces donor confidence,
despite private sector concerns surrounding Sandinista Daniel Ortega's re-election as president (2006, in
office since January 2007), which has dampened investment. The U.S.-Central America Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA) has been in effect since April 2006 and has expanded export opportunities for many
agricultural and manufactured goods. Energy shortages fueled by high oil prices, however, are a serious
bottleneck to growth. See, Central Intelligence Agency, "2008 World Fact Book." Washington, DC: CIA-
Office of Public Affairs, (2008 edition), accessed June 27, 2008,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications'the-world-factbook/geos/nu.html.
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As a consequence the White House and Congress are hesitant to declare Chavez a
threat to the vital interests of the United States. Although Chavez may desire to place
Venezuela in today's Latin American revolutionary vanguard and sees himself as Fidel
Castro's revolutionary heir, the current geopolitical situation lacks the main crucial
element that made Cuba and Nicaragua somewhat threatening during the Cold War.
Today there is no hostile, extra-hemispheric power threatening the United States. Unlike
the Soviet Union of the Cold War era, none of today's potentially hostile Great Powers
have at present the capability to implement an interventionist, non-constructive foreign
policy in Latin America aimed at challenging and or substituting U.S. leadership.
Chavez's aspiration to become a post-Cold War Latin American revolutionary
leader is handicapped by the political-military inability and diplomatic-economic
unwillingness of either the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China to
provide more than token support for his revolutionary agenda.5 While the Russian
Federation affirms its intent to strengthen relations with Venezuela, Moscow's sustained
capability to back words with long-term military cooperation and economic muscle is
5 Note that the Russian Federation, under Vladimir Putin's presidency (2000-08), undertook controversial
arms sales (i.e., 100,000 AK-103 assault rifles in 2005-06) to Caracas, provoking Washington's ire. The
Bush administration formally lodged its protests with Moscow over the weapons sale with the U.S.
Department of State indicating that, "Venezuela's plans to purchase various types and large quantities of
weapons are extremely troubling. And we believe that Venezuela should consult with its neighbors on such
armament acquisitions. The purchase has raised questions as to their ultimate purposes. Our concerns about
these weapons purchases are heightened by Venezuela's tolerance for groups such as FARC [Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia] and ELN [National Liberation Army] and others." See, The Washington
Times, "Russian arms sale to Chavez irks U.S." (February 10, 2005), accessed June 21, 2008,
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2005/feb/10/20050210-123420-3113r/?page=1. Venezuela has also
purchased Russian Mi-24 HIND attack and Mi-26 transport helicopters, and has begun receiving 24
Russian Sukhoi Su-30 fighters. These advanced weapons purchases coupled with a 2005-06 agreement to
construct a rifle and ammunition complex and the 2007-08 agreement to purchase Mi-28 Havok attack
helicopters, IL-76 heavy lift aircraft, an integrated air defense missile system from Belarus, four KILO
class submarines, and Chinese K-8 jet trainers is viewed as exceeding Venezuela's defense needs and may
led to a regional arms race. See U.S. Department of State - Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affair,
"Background Note: Venezuela," accessed June 25, 2008, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm.
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hamstrung by its own vulnerability to the swings in global demand for its oil and gas
exports. The global recession of 2008-09, brought about by the financial crisis in the
United States, has resulted in a deep economic recession that has dampened U.S. demand
for imported oil and as a consequence driven down the per barrel price of petroleum.
Both of these non-Western Great Powers, outside of some weapons sales in order
to secure their own commercial access to Venezuela's and the region's resources and
markets, continue to concede the Americas to the United States. 6 As a result, Chavez,
lacking the backing of a powerful anti-American patron, cannot export his homegrown
revolutionary model. Also the Bolivarian revolutionary model cannot be easily replicated
by Latin American countries that lack vast natural endowments similar to those found in
Venezuela. Chavez, despite the inflammatory rhetoric and recourse to oil diplomacy,
cannot kick start Bolivarian-style revolutions in Latin America.7 His own domestic
6 China is interested in exploiting Latin American diplomatic and commercial ties in order to gain access to
natural resources critical to its own economic development and industrialization drive. Chinese investment
in Latin America has focused on the extraction and production of local resources. Some analysts have
raised red flags over Chavez's visit to Beijing in December 2004 and China's Vice-president Zeng
Qinghong's visit to Caracas in January 2005 and their signing of a series of energy-related agreements.
Others contend that Chinese interest remains relatively benign and confined to prospecting for new trade
and investment opportunities that could help fuel its development and assist in further reducing Taiwan's
international space (roughly half of the countries that accord Taipei diplomatic recognition are located in
Latin America). See Dumbaugh and Mark P. Sullivan, "China's Growing Interest in Latin America."
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, (April 20, 2005), pgs. 1, 3, and 5, accessed June 1,
2008, http://itlay.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RS22119.pdf.
While in the 1960s Castro sought to export his brand of revolutionary communism to the Latin American
region, including Venezuela, on the basis of men and arms, Chavez has sought to win over the people of
Latin America and their leaders to Venezuelan Bolivarianism with cheap oil. Thanks to record high oil
prices in recent years, Chavez has had the means to engage in a sort of diplomacy that escaped Castro
during the long years of rule in Cuba. Chavez launched PetroCaribe in October 2005 as an arrangement to
supply friendly states in the region with cheap Venezuelan crude as a means of undermining their
traditional dependency and therefore support for the United States. Besides offering cheap crude oil to
these countries and discussing his desire to co-construct non U.S.-controlled petroleum refineries, Chavez
has also "bought up some of their bonds and offered cash aid for development programs in a bid to unify
the region around his ideology." See The Miami Herald, "ChAvez's Oil Diplomacy Attracting new
Friends," (November 17, 2005), accessed June 21, 2008, http://www.flacso.org/hemisferio/al-
eeuu/boletines/01/02/chavez.oil.pdf.
212
revolutionary reforms also become increasingly difficult to fund, thereby increasing
Venezuelan political instability, when the price of petroleum falls below the $120 mark.8
Venezuela's Relevance
Venezuela, led by the mercurial and increasingly autocratic but still
democratically elected Chavez, is an important case study illustrating how the United
States Congress is reacting to Latin American revolutionary changes in the post-Cold
War in a less belligerent, non zero-sum manner than it did in the past.9 The U.S. reaction
to post-Cold War Latin American revolutionary change is conditioned not just by the
desire of the United States to retain regional leadership (political hegemony), but also by
strong congressional willingness to assert its own foreign policymaking influence even if
it might defer to the White House on certain policy issues.
Unlike the Reagan-Bush years, a period when the executive and legislative
branches of the U.S. government were at loggerheads over their assessments of the
Sandinista threat, today both branches concur that Chavez is more a nuisance than a
threat to U.S. interests. Furthermore, and in sharp contrast to the 1909 Rayner resolution
8 According to Saul Hudson, Venezuela's state oil company and the financial engine of Chdvez's social
programs has become so debt laden that industry experts have questioned how long Chivez will be able to
fund food hand outs and free doctor visits. Alberto Barrera, author of a Chdvez biography states, "Chdvez
has promised Venezuelans paradise but that paradise, which he calls socialism, depends on oil above
$120." See, Hudson, Saul. "Venezuela's Chavez celebrates 10 years in power," (February 2, 2009),
accessed February 6, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE51151920090203.
9 Hugo Chdvez, born on July 28, 1954, in the state of Barinas, Venezuela, is the son of school teachers.
Chivez graduated from Venezuela's Military Academy in 1975 and attained the rank of lieutant colonel by
1990. During his imprisonment (1992-94) for his coup attempt against the elected government of Carlos
Andres Perez in February 1992, Chdvez further refined his thoughts and the constructs of his nationalistic
and left-leaning Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement which he had founded while in the military.
Pardoned in 1994, Chivez went on to dispute and win the Venezuelan presidency in 1998. See, Sullivan,
Mark P., and Nelson Olhero, in "Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy." Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, (revised January 11, 2008), pg. 4,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL324 8 8 .pdf.
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in the Nicaragua-Zelaya case study, the common ground experienced among
governmental branches on Chavez's revolutionary agenda does not imply that Congress
is ceding its foreign policymaking privileges to the executive branch. Rather, today's
concurrence of opinion on the threat posed by Chavez is based on the conclusion that he
has not established Cold War era-style ties to an extra-hemispheric rival of the United
States. Nor does Chavez have links to Islamic movements (today's non-state threat)
significant enough to warrant his removal from power (i.e., regime change/ suppression).
Furthermore, Chavez is unable to break relations with Washington because
Venezuela remains dependent on U.S. food stuffs and petroleum sector machinery
imports.10 Chavez's dependence is shown by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
estimates of Venezuela's export-import trade. Top export partners in 2007 compared to
2006 are the United States (42.7 percent down from 46.2 percent), the Netherlands
Antilles (8 percent down from 13.5 percent), and China (3.1 virtually unchanged from 3.2
percent). The main export commodities are petroleum, bauxite and aluminum, steel,
chemicals, agricultural products, and basic manufactured products.
10 "Venezuela is a significant importer of agricultural products, totaling $4.2 billion in 2007 according to
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (BRV) data. U.S. agricultural and food exports to Venezuela over the
last five calendar years (2003-2007) have averaged $442 million, with 2007 jumping to $619 million. The
main products currently imported from the United States, by value, are wheat, corn, consumer-oriented,
animal fats, and vegetable oils. Demand for consumer-oriented products from the United States has been
growing rapidly; these exports to Venezuela in 2007 were $97 million compared to $35 million in 2003."
See United States Department of Agriculture - Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). "GAIN Report -
Exporter Guide (Venezuela)." Washington, DC: FAS. Number VE8076, October 3, 2008, accessed
February 5, 2009, http://www.fas.usda.gov, scriptsw attacherep attache lout asp.
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Table 12 - Venezuelan Import Statistics, All Commodities and
Chapters for Calendar Years 1999 to 2007
(in $ billions*)
Trade 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 CAGR
Partner (calc.
(Ranking) on 2008
dollars)
World 12.4 14.4 16.3 11.0 7.9 15.1 21.9 30.6 41.9 13.3
16.0 18.0 19.8 13.1 9.2 17.2 24.1 32.6 43.5 percent
1) United 5.1 5.4 5.5 3.6 2.6 4.8 6.6 9.0 10.8 9.8
States 6.5 6.7 6.6 4.3 3.0 5.4 7.2 9.6 11.2 percent
2) Colombia .734 1.0 1.4 .950 .708 1.6 2.3 3.0 5.6 36.2
.948 1.2 1.7 1.1 .847 1.8 2.5 3.2 11.2 percent
3) China .068 .184 .334 .199 .158 .447 1.0 2.2 4.0 61.9
.087 .230 .406 .274 .184 .509 1.1 2.3 4.1 percent
4) Brazil .455 .724 .971 .698 .536 1.2 1.9 2.9 3.9 27.1
.588 .905 1.1 .835 .627 1.3 2.0 3.0 4.0 percent
5) Mexico .494 .625 .771 .505 .363 .723 1.5 1.9 2.1 16.1
.638 .781 .937 .604 .424 .824 1.6 2.0 2.1 percent
Cuba (50) .003 .004 .013 .004 .095 .105 .053 .030 .031 29.7
.004 .006 .016 .056 .112 .119 .058 .032 .032 percent
Obs: Venezuela's full year export-import statistics are only available for calendar year 1999 through 2007.
Data for 2008 is incomplete with Venezuela selectively reporting data for January to October 2008.
(*) Values are in dollars billions, figures given in each annual cell per country are in nominal values over values
adjusted in 2008 dollars using the consumer price index (last year of full annual data for initial and target year)
using the consumer price index, see http://www.measurincworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php#.
Compound annual growth rate or CAGR = (((current year/ initial year) ^ (1/ number of years [8])-1)*100),
calculated based on adjusted CPI values.
Source: Global Trade Atlas, "Venezuela Import Statistics: All Commodities and Chapters," accessed June
20, 2008 and February 6, 2009, http://www.gtis.com/ta/.
Despite the economic rationale for nurturing links, Chavez seeks to distance
Venezuela's reliance on the United States. Venezuelan trade remains dominated by the
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United States. Venezulea's major imports from the United States are raw materials,
machinery and equipment, transport equipment and construction material (Table 13).
Table 13 - Venezuelan Import Statistics, All Commodities and
Chapters for Year-to-Date January-October Values for Years 2006 to
2008
(in $ billions*)
Trade Partner's Share of
Trade Partner 2006 2007 2008 Venezuelan Import Trade
(Ranking) 2006 2007 2008
World 24.5 34.0 36.2 100 100 100
26.1 35.3 36.2 percent percent percent
7.4 9.1 9.4 30.1 26.7 26.01) United States
7.9 9.4 9.4 percent percent percent
. 2.4 4.2 5.4 9.9 12.4 14.92) Colombia
2.5 4.3 5.4 percent percent percent
2.5 3.3 3.4 10.0 9.6 9.43) Brazil
2.6 3.4 3.4 percent percent percent
. 1.7 3.3 3.3 6.8 9.7 9.24) China
1.8 3.4 3.3 percent percent percent
. 1.6 1.7 1.7 6.7 5.0 4.8
1 .7 1.7 1.7 percent percent percent
0.025 0.026 0.026 0.10 0.08 0.07Cuba (53)
0.026 0.026 0.026 percent percent percent
Obs: Venezuela's full year export-import statistics are only available for calendar year 1999 through 2007.
Data for 2008 is incomplete with Venezuela selectively reporting data for January to October 2008.
(*) Values are in dollars billions, figures given in each annual cell per country are in nominal values over values
adjusted in 2008 dollars using the consumer price index (last year of full annual data for initial and target year)
using the consumer price index, see http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.ph_#.
Source: Global Trade Atlas, "Venezuela Import Statistics: All Commodities and Chapters," accessed June
20, 2008 and February 6, 2009, http://www.gtis.com/eta/.
" See, CIA (2008), accessed June 27, 2008, and February 5, 2009,
https://www.cia. gov/library/publications the-world-factbook/ eos/nu.html and
https://www.cia. gov/library/publicationslthe-world-factbook/geos/ve.html.
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Central Intelligence Agency estimates indicate that Venezuela's export earnings
are highly dependent on oil revenues which account for 90 percent of all export earnings
and represent 50 percent of the federal budget while translating into 30 percent of GDP.12
Trade with the United States accounts for 25 percent of Venezuela's imports ($10.8
billion in 2007).13 Despite attempts to increase trade with China ($4.4 billion in 2007)
and Cuba ($31.8 million in 2007), trade remains dominated by the United States and by
pro-U.S. Colombia.1
Chavez aims to diversify Venezuela's trade relations by increasing the depth of
trade ties with MERCOSUR (Mercado Comun del Sur) member Brazil. Trade with Brazil
has grown by 31 percent during Chavez's administration (although starting from a low
base of $455 million), but still accounts for only a third of the U.S. total trade in 2007.15
Venezuela's trade dependence on the United States severely constrains Chavez's
economic and diplomatic maneuverability. Table 14 shows that out of the $14.2 billion
goods that Venezuela exported to the world in 2007, over $7.2 billion, or half of the
country's exports were shipped to the United States. 16 Of the $7.2 billion exported to the
United States in 2007, $6.1 billion or 85 percent of the total were petroleum products.' 7
1 CIA, accessed February 6, 2009, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ve.html.
13 Global Trade Atlas, "Venezuela Export and Import Statistics, All Commodities and Chapters for
Calendar Years 1999 to 2007," accessed June 20, 2008, http://www.gtis.com/gta/.
14 Ibid.
"5 See, Global Trade Atlas. MERCOSUR, known in Portuguese as Mercado Comum do Sul
(MERCOSUL), is a regional trade agreement to which Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay are full
members. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru have associate status. Venezuela, under Chivez
signed a membership agreement on June 17, 2006.
16 Ibid.
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Table 14 - Venezuelan Export Statistics, All Commodities and
Chapters for Calendar Years 1999 to 2007
(in $ billions*)
Trade Partner 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 CAGR
(Ranking) (calc.on
dollars)
World 4.1 4.7 5.0 5.4 5.2 6.8 12.2 15.7 16.2 15.8
5.2 5.8 6.0 6.4 6.0 7.7 13.4 16.7 16.8 percent
1) United 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.1 2.7 6.0 8.4 8.8 24.8
States 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.7 2.4 3.0 6.6 8.9 9.1 percent
2) Colombia .675 .740 .715 .703 .623 .983 1.0 1.1 1.1 2.9
.872 .925 .869 .841 .728 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 percent
3) Netherlands .0000 .006 .002 .008 .012 .044 .318 .396 .594 123.2
Antilles 8
.001 .007 .002 .009 .014 .050 .350 .422 .616 percent
4) Netherlands .092 .142 .139 .260 .215 .256 .550 .804 .493 17.8
.118 .177 .168 .311 .251 .291 .606 .843 .439 percent
5) Mexico .181 .271 .256 .260 .338 .406 .467 .680 .423 7.9
.233 .338 .311 .311 .395 .462 .514 .726 .428 percent
Cuba (8) .016 .012 .016 .011 .009 .084 .089 .165 .356 44.0
.020 .015 .019 .013 .010 .095 .098 .176 .369 percent
Obs: Venezuela's full year export-import statistics are only available for calendar year 1999 through 2007.
Data for 2008 is incomplete with Venezuela selectively reporting data for January to October 2008 and
suppressing 2008 export data for HS commodity code 27-09, Petroleum Oils and Oils Obtained from
Bituminous Minerals, Crude. (*) Values are in dollars billions, figures are given in each annual cell per
country are in nominal values over values adjusted in 2008 dollars using the consumer price index (last year of
full annual data for initial and target year) using the consumer price index, see
http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php#. Compound annual growth rate or CAGR =
(((current year/initial year) ^ (1/number of years [8])-1)*100), calculated based on adjusted CPI values.
Source: Global Trade Atlas, "Venezuela Export Statistics: All Commodities and Chapters," accessed June
20, 2008 and February 6, 2009, http://www.gtis.com/gta/.
" Ibid.
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The basis of Chavez's ability to fund his government and Bolivarian initiatives at
home that translate into domestic political support is the profitability of the oil trade. Oil
trade profitability is sustained by high prices and continued strong U.S. demand. Political
survival is dependent on access to the U.S. energy market. Despite Chavez's caustic
rhetoric, he is cognizant of this dependence and will not jeopardize the relationship
without having first secured an alternative buyer (Graph 4) of Venezuelan crude.
Graph 4 - Evolution of Total Venezuelan Exports to the United States
Percentage of total
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Obs: Venezuela's full year export-import statistics are only available for calendar year 1999 through 2007.
Data for 2008 is incomplete with Venezuela selectively reporting data for January to October 2008 and
suppressing 2008 export data for HS commodity code 27-09, Petroleum Oils and Oils Obtained from
Bituminous Minerals, Crude. Yearly nominal values in dollars adjusted to 2007 dollars using the consumer
price index (last year of full annual data for initial and target year) using the consumer price index, see
http://www.measurincworth.com/calculators uscompare/index.php#.
Source: Global Trade Atlas, "Venezuela Export Statistics: Commodity: Total, all (HS) tariff chapters,"
accessed June 20, 2008 and February 6, 2009, http: /www.gtis.com/'ta/.
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Graphs 4 and 5 show a slump in exports to the United States during the calendar
year (CY) 2007. The slow down parallels the overall drop in value in terms of exports.
Exports to the United States have remained strong despite threats to cut off oil shipments.
Graph 5 - Evolution of Venezuelan Exports Crude Oil (H.S. 27-09) to
the United States Compared to Venezuelan Exports to the World
(1999 to 2007)
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Obs: Venezuela's full year export-import statistics are only available for calendar year 1999 through 2007.
Data for 2008 is incomplete with Venezuela selectively reporting data for January to October 2008 and
suppressing 2008 export data for HS commodity code 27-09, Petroleum Oils and Oils Obtained from
Bituminous Minerals, Crude. Crude oil exports to the United States during the 1999-2007 have a compound
annual growth rate (CAGR) equal to 49 percent, whereas exports to the world during this period have grown by
over 54 percent (includes exports to the United States). CAGR = (((current year/initial year) ^ (1/number of
years [8])-1)* 100). If exports to the United States are eliminated, exports to the world during the 2000-2007
(no exports in 1999 outside of those to the United States) have a CAGR of over 65.5 percent. CAGR =
(((current year/initial year) ^ (1/number of years [7])-1)*100). Yearly nominal values in dollars adjusted in 2007
dollars using the consumer price index (last year of full annual data for initial and target year) using the
consumer price index, see http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php.
Source: Global Trade Atlas, "Venezuela Export Statistics: Commodity: 27-09, Petroleum Oils and Oils
Obtained from Bituminous Minerals, Crude," accessed June 22, 2008 and February 6, 2009,
http://www.gtis.com/gta/.
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Graph 5 also shows the impact of Chavez's attempts to divert Venezuela's
reliance away from the U.S. market. Export destinations are highlighted in Table 15.18
Table 15 - Venezuelan Export Statistics, Crude Oil (H.S. 27-09) to the
United States Compared to Exports to the World 1999 to 2007
(in $ billions*)
Trade Partner 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 CAGR
(Ranking) (calcon
dollars)
World .196 .406 .473 .593 .619 .761 5.4 8.6 10.4 59.7
.253 .507 .575 .709 .724 .867 5.9 9.1 10.7 percent
1) United States .196 .362 .398 .557 .559 .710 4.1 6.6 7.6 53.5
.253 .452 .483 .666 .654 .809 4.5 7.0 7.8 percent
2) Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 .024 .274 .317 .458 160.1
Antilles 0 0 0 0 0 .027 .302 .338 .475 percent
3) United 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .314 Insufficient
Kingdom 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .326 Trade Data
4) Cuba 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .291 Insufficient
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .302 TradeData
5) Netherlands 0 0 0 0 .017 0 .237 .357 .250 92.1
0 0 0 0 .019 0 .261 .381 .259 percent
Obs: Full year export-import statistics are only available for calendar year 1999 through 2007. Data for 2008 is
incomplete with Venezuela selectively reporting data for January to October 2008 and suppressing 2008 export
data for HS commodity code 27-09, Petroleum Oils and Oils Obtained from Bituminous Minerals, Crude.
(*) Values are in dollars billions, figures are given in each annual cell per country are in nominal values over
values adjusted in 2008 dollars using the consumer price index (last year of full annual data for initial and target
year) using the consumer price index, see http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php#.
Compound annual growth rate or CAGR = (((current year/initial year) ^ (1/number of years [8])-1)*100).
Source: Global Trade Atlas, "Venezuela Export Statistics: All Commodities and Chapters," accessed June
20, 2008 and February 6, 2009, http://www.gtis.coi/eta/.
18 Not reflected in Table 15 is that Venezuela commenced crude oil shipments to Ecuador in 2006 at a
value of $1.2 million ($1.3 million in 2008 dollars using the consumer price index) and that in 2007 it had
shipped a total value of $199 million ($207 million in 2008 dollars), making the former Venezuela's 6 h
largest petroleum export destination.
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Venezuela and PetroCaribe
PetroCaribe is a Caribbean-based energy alliance, created by Chavez and
organized to assist friendly countries' purchases of Venezuelan petroleum on the basis of
preferential payments. Chivez aims to undermine U.S. regional leadership by utilizing
PetroCaribe "as an integral process intended to promote the eradication of social
inequalities and to foster improved living standards and more effective participation by
nations in their efforts to shape their own destiny." 1 9 The percentage of total Venezuelan
crude oil exports destined for the U.S. energy market declined since 2005 with the launch
of the PetroCaribe agreement (June 2005).2 Venezuelan crude exports to the United
States declined by 3.8 percent in 2007 compared to 2005. However, exports to the United
States still account for more than 72 percent of Venezuela's total crude oil exports.
Chivez engages in oil diplomacy to undermine U.S. leadership in Latin America.
However oil diplomacy has a cost. Chavez, by subsidizing exports to the PetroCaribe
countries, is sacrificing the (immediate) full market price he could otherwise obtain for
U.S. bound shipments. Sales to the PetroCaribe members are negotiated as mixed barter
agreements and traditional sales with partial and deferred payment components. Table 16
shows that Venezuelan crude oil shipments to PetroCaribe members by quantity and
value increased by 190 and 81 percent in the 2005-07 period. These values can be
19 Oxford Analytica. "Oil price may hit PetroCaribe prospects." (October 27, 2008), accessed, February 6,
2009, http://www.globeinvestor.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20081027.woxfoanalytical027/GIStory/.
20 In addition to Venezuela, states party to the agreement are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize,
Costa Rica, Cuba (is not a signatory to the agreement but is listed as a member), the Dominican Republic,
Dominica, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti (April 2006), Honduras (December 2007), Jamaica,
Montserrat, Nicaragua, Suriname, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago were invited to join PetroCaribe at its inception but have chosen not to
subscribe to the agreement. See also, Sanchez, Gualveris Rosales, "PETROCARIBE expresses the unity,
solidarity, and cooperation among people," (December 22, 2007), accessed June 27, 2008,
http://wwwcadenagramonte.cu/english/economy/petrocaribe cuba.asp.
222
deceptive since they start from very low levels when compared to U.S. shipments (e.g.,
$76 million versus $4.5 billion in 2008 adjusted dollar values) but are still important.
Table 16 - Venezuelan Export Statistics, Crude Oil (H.S. 27-09) to the
United States Compared to Exports to the World and PetroCaribe
(in Metric Tons millions and in $ billions*)
Exports
Trade Partner 2005 2005 2006 2006 2007 2007 CAGR CAGR Share
(Ranking) T $ T $ T $ 2005/07 (calc. % A
(Metric on 2008 2005/ 07
Tons) dollars) (Metric
Tons)
World 16.2 5.4 23.0 8.6 37.0 10.4 51.1 34.7 100
5.9 9.1 10.7 percent percent percent
76.0%
1) United States 12.3 4.1 17.8 6.6 24.4 7.6 40.6 31.7 down to
4.5 7.0 7.8 percent percent 72.7%
4) Netherlands 274 .317 .4584 nthes .891 .2 864 337 2,0 .45 53.3 24.5 5.5% upAntilles .302 .338 ' .47h percent percent to 5.6%
5) United 0 0 .314 Ins. Ins. Ins.
Kingdom 0 0 0 0 1.5 .326 Trade Trade Trade
Data Data Data
6) Cuba 0 0 0 0 10 .291 Ins. Ins. Ins.
0 0 .302 Trade Trade Trade
Data Data Data
4.8%
7) Netherlands .774 .237 .963 .357 .674 .250 -6.7 -0.4 down to
.261 .381 .259 percent percent 1.8%
.069 .195 .24009.9.20 190.6 81 1.5% up
PetroCaribe 1.5 .076 2.7 .208 5.6 .249 perent percent 5 3%
Ohs: Full year export-import statistics are only available for calendar year 1999 through 2007. Data for 2008 is
incomplete with Venezuela selectively reporting data for January to October 2008 and suppressing 2008 export
data for HS commodity code 27-09, Petroleum Oils and Oils Obtained from Bituminous Minerals, Crude.
Exports to Cuba in 2007are included in PetroCaribe values. "Ins" stands for "insufficient."
(*) Values are in dollars billions, figures are given in each annual cell per country are in nominal values over
values adjusted in 2008 dollars using the consumer price index (last year of full annual data for initial and target
year) using the consumer price index, see http://www.measurineworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php#.
Compound annual growth rate or CAGR = (((current year/initial year) ^ (1/number of years [2])-1)* 100).
Source: Global Trade Atlas, "Venezuela Export Statistics: All Commodities and Chapters," accessed June
20, 2008 and February 6, 2009, http://www.ctis.com/ta/
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Oil diplomacy is not new to Venezuela. Past administrations have also sought to
win neighbors' favor by providing oil largesse. Venezuela has also traditionally defended
Latin American interests within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). With Chavez however, Venezuela's state oil company Petrdleos de Venezuela,
S.A., (PdVSA) is finding it difficult to comply with the requirements of production and
distribution while remaining faithful to Chavez's diplomatic objectives.
Indicative of the difficulties facing PdVSA is the fact that since Chavez won
control of the Venezuelan presidency, PdVSA's production output has dropped from 3.2
million barrels per day in 1998 to approximately 2.4 million barrels per day as a result of
a combination of official government corruption and managerial ineptitude.
Compounding the consequences of a drop in production and declining global prices is the
fact that while half of the daily production is shipped to the United States, Venezuela's
largest "cash on the barrel" paying customer, a small but growing amount of the daily
production is being shipped to PetroCaribe states and friendly allies such as Ecuador.
PetroCaribe member states are allowed to purchase Venezuelan crude at market
value and pay for a small percentage of the total up front.2 The remaining balance is
financed at 1 percent over 25 years as long the barrel price remains at $100 or above. The
Caribbean states, party to the PetroCaribe agreement, are authorized to purchase up to
185,000 barrels of Venezuelan petroleum per day under these terms.
21 Thirty percent is due in 90 days with the rest over 25 years (fixed 1 percent). McDermott, Jeremy,
"Venezuela's oil output slimps under Hugo Chavez," in The Telegraph, (October 13, 2008), February 6,
2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/venezuela/3183417/Venezuelas-oil-
output-slumps-under-Hugo-Chavez.htm.
22 Ibid.
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As a further sign of Venezuelan benevolence, member states can pay for part of
their petroleum import costs in the form of agricultural commodities such as bananas,
rice, and sugar. Such favorable terms, which curtail the possibility of obtaining
immediate full payment for oil deliveries, will increasingly weigh down the Chavez
administration's ability to finance its domestic social welfare spending programs as the
barrel price of petroleum stays depressed because of lower U.S. demand.
Despite economic realities, Chivez continues to challenge the United States via
PetroCaribe's discounted financing of Venezuelan crude. For example, in 2007,
PetroCaribe's discounted financing equaled $1.2 billion, an amount equivalent to the
entire Inter-American Development Bank's (IADB) soft loans for that year. Now
Chavez's PetroCaribe largesse also encompasses food security. Chavez has pledged to
provide $450 million for food assistance, a figure that matches the U.S. Agency for
International Development's (USAID) $500 million assistance levels for the region.23
Yet Petro-Caribe's take off comes at a time that has seen rapid expansion in
international crude oil prices followed by an equally precipitous fall in prices during the
second half of 2008 because of global recession. Venezuela's obligations to provide
PetroCaribe states with cheap oil may eventually become untenable (especially if
Venezuela de-values its currency) and cause political instability at home. Instability can
arise if domestic oil consumption continues to expand while prices are low prices and
there is insufficient PdVSA oil infrastructure investment to meet expanded demand.
Industry experts estimate that it will take Venezuela up to five years and more
than $32 billion to bring on three additional petroleum upgrading units (in addition to the
23 Ibid.
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current three now handling 600 thousand barrels per day) needed to upgrade the
country's poor quality crude (high sulfur content and low viscosity) prior to shipment.
Low export prices and lack of investment in infrastructure will make it difficult for
Chavez to juggle funding of social welfare and poverty eradication programs with oil
diplomacy abroad.
Venezuela, despite attempts to decrease its reliance on a single export destination
market, remains dangerously dependent on the U.S. energy market. Map 2 graphically
illustrates CY 2005 destinations for Venezuelan crude oil exports on a daily basis. 25
Senator Larry E. Craig (R-Idaho, 1991-2009) in a Hearing of the United States Senate -
Committee on Foreign Relations on Energy Security in Latin America held on June 22,
2006, indicated that the People's Republic of China is exploiting the rise of leftist-leaning
governments such as Chavez's to secure increased access to the Latin American region's
natural resources.26 For Craig only through aggressive congressional oversight and the
"pushing" of bills such as U.S. Senate 2435, can the United States move away from failed
policies of benign neglect and non-engagement.2 Craig argues that focusing too narrowly
on the Middle East and neglecting Latin American petropolitics, will deliver a profound
and negative impact on the United States.28
24 McDermott.
25 See, BBC, "Venezuela Key Facts - Flow of Crude and Refined Oil in 2005," (2008), accessed June 21, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/456900/456996/html/nn3page 1.stm. Also see Appendix 7.
26 See, Craig, Larry E., in "United States Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, "Energy Security in Latin
America." Washington, D.C. (June 22, 2006), accessed May 25, 2009, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109 senate hearings&docid=f:34697.pdf.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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Map 2 - Destination of Venezuelan Petroleum Exports (Crude and
Refined in Calendar Year 2005 (in thousands of barrels per day)
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Obs: Author modified map of "Central America and the Caribbean" based on "Flow of Crude and
Refined Oil in 2005" with the Panama Canal represented by a solid blue line and the general routing of
Venezuelan petroleum exports represented by solid red lines. The Panama Canal's location is
approximated. Barrels per day = BBP
Source: University of Texas - Perry Castaneda Library Collection, accessed February 16, 2008, see
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/central america ref02.ive and BBC, "Venezuela Key Facts -
Flow of Crude and Refined Oil in 2005," (2008), accessed June 21, 2008.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/ uides/456900/456996/html/nn3patzel.stm.
The same cannot be said of the United States, which has had to reduce its reliance
on Venezuelan crude oil through market forces and not government measures (Table 17).
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Table 17 - United States Import Statistics, Crude Oil (H.S. 27-09)
for Year-to-Date January-November Values
(in Barrels of Petroleum - BBP, millions)
Trade Partner's Share of U.S.
Trade Partner 2006 2007 2008 mport Trade
(Ranking) 2006 2007 2008
World 2,719.6 2,706.6 2,649.1 100 100 100
percent percent percent
1) Canada 570.4 602.4 619.4 20.9 22.2 23.3percent percent percent
2) Mexico 501.3 467.9 385.4 18.4 17.2 14.5
percent percent percent
3)-13.1 14.0 11.83) Nigeria 357.5 379.7 314.1 p3.n p4.n pe.8
percent percent percent
4) Venezuela 317.0 326.1 297.8 11.6 12.0 11.2
percent percent percent
5) Saudi Arabia 216.4 208.4 240.9 7.9 7.7 9.1
percent percent percent
6) Angola 162.2 169.4 162.8 5.9 6.2 6.1
percent percent percent
7) Iraq 74.8 68.3 91.0 2.7 2.5 3.4
percent percent percent
8) Ecuador 85.1 67.0 71.2 3.1 2.4 2.6percent percent percent
9) Brazil 40.0 42.8 66.0 1.4 1.5 2.4percent percent percent
10) Algeria 64.3 77.4 63.9 2.3 2.8 2.4percent percent percent
Obs: Source: Global Trade Atlas, "United States Import Statistics: Crude Oil (H.S. 27-09), Petroleum Oils
and Oils Obtained from Bituminous Minerals, Crude." Accessed February 6, 2009,
http://www.gtis.comngta/.
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An additional indicator of Chavez's vulnerability is the fact that the Venezuelan
state oil company PdVSA has currently more than $12 billion worth of global assets
locked up in the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the Netherlands
Antilles. PdVSA assests are facing possible seizure to compensate investors for the
Chavez government's nationalization of foreign owned oil field development and
equipment in the Orinoco River Basin oil belt in 2007.29 At present some $300 million of
PdVSA assets are temporarily awaiting a court ruling in New York.
CITGO Petroleum Corporation (CITGO) is a United States corporation, PdVSA-
owned refiner and marketer of gasoline, lubricants, petrochemicals, and other petroleum
based products. CITGO has three major refineries in Texas (Corpus Christi), Louisiana
(Lake Charles), and Illinois (Lemont) with a daily in-house refining capacity of 749,000
barrels of petroleum and more than 1.1 million barrels total (or roughly 1/ 14 th of U.S.-
national daily refining capability) through its participation in joint ventures.30
Venezuela's strategic economic vulnerability, coupled with declining reliance on
Venezuelan crude and the absence of an interventionist extra-hemispheric rival, allows
U.S. foreign policymakers to contain Chavez. A similar approach would most likely not
have been possible during the Cold War. The Soviet Union's absence has tempered U.S.
response to the post-Cold War's Latin American revolutionaries. Even Chavez has come
29 The different Orinoco oil field projects and companies affected are Sincor (PdVSA, Total, and Statoil)
and Petrozuata (PdVSA, Conoco Phillips), Ameriven (PdVSA, Conoco Phillips, Chevron Texaco), and
Cerro Negro (PdVSA, Exxon Mobil, BP). See BBC, "U.S. firms reject Venezuelan deal," (June 26, 2007),
accessed June 21, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6239702.stm.
30 See CITGO, "Corporate Website - refining Capabilities," accessed June 21, 2008,
http://www.citgo.com/AboutCITGO/Operations/Refining.isp. The United States on an annual basis refines
an average of 14.7 million barrels of petroleum on a daily basis. See Department of Energy - Energy
Information Administration, "Refinery Net Production," (May 23, 2008), accessed June 21, 2008,
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet pnp refp2 dc nus mbblpd a.htm.
229
to terms with the reality that the Cold War revolutionary path of armed leftist
insurgencies has run its course and that a new means of defying the United States has to
be found outside of the past era's paradigm.3 1 For Chavez oil is a diplomatic and
economic weapon to be used against the United States in an asymmetric political-
diplomatic struggle for regional leadership.
A Note on the Venezuelan Case Study and the Means of Analysis
The next two sections of Chapter 5 put Chavez's Bolivarian ideology into context,
and discuss what Chavez calls "Socialism for the 21St Century," as well as how Congress
is responding to Chavez's revolutionary agenda.
The Bolivarian section reviews Chavez's revolutionary credentials along with the
origins of his Bolivarian ideology and "Socialism for the 21t Century." This section
addresses how Chavez morphed from being the leader of what was initially seen as
another run-of-the-mill Latin American military putsch into a democratically elected,
anti-American president with a revolutionary leftist agenda. Chavez's Latin American
(Bolivarian) agenda is also discussed in this section.
The second section builds on the preceding section by discussing the three main
concerns of the United States Congress with regards to Chavez's Venezuela - the state of
31 Astounding foe and friend alike, Chavez has called on Colombia's largest guerrilla group to end its 40
year-long insurgency against the Colombian state. Chavez, in his June 8, 2008, television program A16
Presidente bluntly told the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia - FARC) that "the guerrilla war is over" and that "at this moment in Latin America, an armed
guerrilla movement is out of place. The FARC is classified by both Washington and the European Union as
a terrorist organization and evidence is mounting that the Chavez government has provided arms and
financing to the FARC in the past. See Romero, Sim6n, "Chavez Urges Colombian Rebels to End Their
Struggle," in The New York Times (June 9, 2008), accessed June 9, 2008,
http://www nytimes.com/2008/06/09/world/americas/0 9 venez.html?ref=americas.
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democracy, energy, and human rights. This section highlights the measures that Congress
has taken in response to Chavez's revolutionary agenda.
These final sections of Chapter 5 serve as the foundation for the next chapter.
These serve as a prelude to Chapter 6, which combines the results of expert commentary
with Blasier's theoretical propositions to draw conclusions that explain congressional
action when dealing with Chavez's Bolivarianism. Both Chapters 5 and 6 conclude that
although Chivez is increasingly perceived as an autocrat by both sides of the aisle in
Congress, a sentiment similarly shared by the previous George W. Bush (R, 2001-09)
administration, his policies have remained insufficiently radical to incite the United
States even under Bush to enact measures similar to those levied at Sandinista Nicaragua
during the Cold War. Consequently, the underlying premise of the analysis carried out
argues that, barring the unexpected rise of an ideologically and politically and militarily
powerful extra-hemispheric rival of the United States allying with Bolivarian Venezuela
to undermine U.S. leadership in Latin America, Chavez will remain, to his own chagrin,
merely a nuisance to the United States.
HUGO CHAVEZ'S BOLIVARIAN IDEOLOGY AND "SOCIALISM FOR THE 21sT CENTURY"
Defining Hugo Chavez Anti-Americanism and U.S. Foreign Policy for Venezuela:
Applying Blasier's Propositions 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 12
Peter J. Katzenstein's and Robert O. Keohane's recent work on anti-Americanism
places Chavez's anti-Americanism in context. Katzenstein and Keohane in "Anti-
Americanism in World Politics, " argue that there are distinct differences between the
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four types of anti-Americanism and that these differences arise as a result of opinion and
bias.3 2
Based on Katzenstein's and Keohane's distinctions made between opinion and
bias, and its foreign policy implications, Chavez's anti-Americanism is of the sort that
will transcend any one (U.S.) presidential administration regardless of party affiliation or
control of the Houses of Congress. If this conclusion holds true, it bodes ill for the Barack
Obama administration (D, 2009 to present). During the U.S. presidential campaign
Obama said that he believes that although Chavez threatens the national security of the
United States, because of his support for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC), this threat is nonetheless
manageable.3 3
Obama believes that the threat to U.S. interests posed by Chavez can be managed
by means of more direct high-level diplomatic dealings with his government (Proposition
6). This sort of engagement was largely put on hold during the Bush administration.
Should this approach fail, Obama has alternatively proposed to contain Chavez by means
of forceful Organization of American States (OAS) and or United Nations (UN) sanctions
in order to obtain guarantees that his revolutionary government will refrain from
unsettling the Latin American region (Proposition 4).
32 See, Katzenstein, Peter J., and Robert O. Keohane, "Anti-Americanisms" in Policy Review, a publication
of the Hoover Institution, Number 139 (October and November 2006), accessed June 8, 2008,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policreview/4823856.html.
33 Ramos, Jorge, "Entrevista con el candidato dem6crata a la Presidencia de Estados Unidos: Obama
asegura que Hugo Chavez es una amenaza, pero una amenaza manejable," in Diario El Mercurio, (June 11,
2008), accessed June 13, 2008,
http://diario.emercurio.com/2008/06/11/internacional/ portada/noticias/7469E6C0-3F6E-49F5-AC2B-
08DDFFE50D4D.htm?id=I7469E6C0-3F6E-49F5-AC2B-08DDFFE50DAD .
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Obama proposes moving away from the preceding Bush administration's position
of dealing with Chivez mainly at the lower level bureaucratic level (Proposition 7) to
more direct senior-level negotiations (Propositions 6 and 12) to assure that he will
continue to supply oil to the United States. Under this scenario which coincides with
Senator Craig's comments from the Hearing of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations - Energy Security in Latin America (June 22, 2006), dealings with Chavez will
be defined by economic considerations and private business interests tied to the
exploitation of Venezuela's oil reserves (Proposition 5). Such considerations will remain
fundamental to the formulation of U.S. government policies towards the Chavez
government and is compatible with overall foreign policies decided on strategic grounds.
Chavez's anti-Americanism is long-lasting and will endure a change of
presidential administrations. Even with a change of parties controlling the White House
following January 20, 2009, Chavez will nonetheless continue to fault the United States
government, and accuse its leadership of having hegemonic pretensions over the Latin
American region and Venezuela.
The Chivez government, much like Castrorite Cuba, needs an ideological foe
such as the United States in order to retain popular support domestically and abroad. But
unlike past situations, Chavez's domestic support today is not being undermined by the
United States financing and outfitting a counter-revolutionary force like it did in Cold
War Nicaragua. Today Chavez is being undermined more insidiously by an annual
inflation rate of more than 30 percent (2008).3 What has changed since the end of the
1 Ibid.
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Cold War, and has modified the way both the executive and legislative branches of the
U.S. government deal with Latin American revolutionaries is the emergence of
globalization.
The globalization of the world economy has fundamentally changed U.S. foreign
policy. Latin American countries such as Venezuela stood to gain from this new reality
and looked forward to increased attention by U.S. foreign policymakers in the White
House and Congress. The end of the Cold War ushered in the possibility for commercial
and economic issues to take on greater stature in foreign policymaking calculations.
Narcotics trafficking, immigration, and the environment became key issues of importance
at the beginning of the post-Cold War period since they combined both domestic and
international aspects of importance to U.S. voters. The events of September 11, 2001,
however necessitated a change of course and led the Bush administration to focus its
resources outside of the Latin American region. Chavez exploited the Bush
administration's distraction to build an anti-United States Bolivarian movement that
seeks to challenge continued U.S. leadership by providing a socialist Latin American
model of development and governance.
However, Chavez, despite record high international petroleum prices in 2008,
faces growing internal dissatisfaction over the state of the Venezuelan economy which is
3 Fidel Castro, Chdvez's ideological mentor, in this same manner made a post-revolutionary career out of
accusing both Democratic and Republican administrations alike of holding such pretensions for nearly fifty
years. Also Venezuela is in the midst of an economic slowdown with an annual inflation rate of 30 percent
as well as an increasing crime rate. See The Economist, "Latin America's self-styled Bolivarian hero may be
losing his populist touch," accessed June 28, 2008,
http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story id=11541336.
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traversing a period of high inflationary pressure (more than 18.7 percent in 2007 alone).36
Interestingly enough it was economic instability that thrust Chavez onto Venezuela's
political stage in 1992 and again in 1998 when he legitimately won control of the
country's presidency via the ballot box, but also nearly resulted in his overthrow in 2002
when the unemployment rate hovered at nearly 19 percent. 37
As argued in earlier chapters, since the early 1800s U.S. foreign policy has
remained consistent in denying extra-hemispheric powers the possibility of establishing a
foothold in the Americas that could be utilized to threaten the United States. Such an
exclusionary policy objective will not change during the Barack H. Obama administration
or with changes of party control of the Houses of Congress (Propositions 3, 4, 6. and 12).
Based on Katzenstein's and Keohane's argument, Chavez's anti-Americanism
presents a consistently strong bias against the United States. Chavez distrusts the United
States government, its policies as well as its motives, as much as he distrusts its
leadership. Further compounding matters is Chavez's visceral distrust of American
corporations which he sees as an unofficial extension of Washington's power
(Proposition 5). For Chavez, American corporations have exploited Latin American
countries and their resources at the behest of U.S. foreign policymakers. To Chavez,
economic and commercial exploitation have traditionally been linked to political
36 CIA, (2008), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ve.html.
3 Global Insight, "Global Insight Report: Venezuela (Country Intelligence)," (June 17, 2008), accessed
June 17, 2008, http://myinsight.globalinsight.com/servlet/cet.
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subjugation, which is being articulated by Washington's recommendation that the
countries of the region adhere to neo-liberal political-economic policies.38
What is important to take away from Katzenstein's and Keohane's distinctions
about anti-Americanism, and makes it relevant in the context of the present discussion, is
how Chavez's anti-Americanism differs from that of other international rivals of the
United States like China. While the Beijing government has sought to secure natural
resources (i.e., petroleum, iron ore, copper) in Latin America to fuel its burgeoning
economic growth, its opinions of United States foreign policy and consequently its own
anti-Americanism differ significantly from that of Chavez.
Chavez seeks to establish a new set of boundaries in the Latin American region by
drawing in China and thereby creating a triangular relationship that he can use to keep the
United States off balance while building momentum for the Bolivarian cause. Chavez
hopes that Beijing's increasing economic involvement in the region will eventually
become a political and diplomatic counterbalance to Washington's traditional
hemispheric political and economic dominance. 39
38 Neo-liberalism is characterized by the emphasis that is placed on the freedom of trade in goods and
services, as well as the free circulation of capital and the ability to invest. As a theory it advocates the
notion that sustained economic growth is ultimately the driver of human progress. Markets, free from
undue government interference brought about by the inefficiency of the public sector as the primary engine
of national economic life, are the most efficient drivers in the allocation of scarce resources. Neo-
liberalism, wary of the state crowding out private investment, calls for the privatization of the public sector
and restricting government's role to that of providing the necessary infrastructure to advance the rule of law
and respect for property rights and contracts. See, Shah, Anup, "A Primer on Neo-liberalism," (July 2,
2007), accessed June 17, 2008, http://www.globalissues.org/TradeRelatedl/FreeTrade/Neoliberalism.asp.
39 Although Venezuelan energy officials continue to say that Venezuela will not divert significant amounts
of petroleum away from the United States to China, Chavez has been quoted as saying in reference to U.S.
involvement in Venezuela's oil sector, "... hundreds of years of domination by the United States . .. now
we are free, and place this oil at the disposal of the Chinese fatherland." See, Dumbaugh and Sullivan
(2005), pg. 4.
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However, Chavez fails to make the distinction between his own brand of anti-
Americanism, premised on the need to create an alternative ideological pole of political,
diplomatic, and economic attraction for the Latin American states, and that of China.
Chinese anti-Americanism is based primarily on China's aspiration to regain (global)
Great Power status, which it sees being blocked by Washington.
Chivez, as a would-be autocratic and sovereign nationalist, sees the United States
as seeking to exert political, military, and economic hegemony in the Latin American
region. Beijing's senior foreign policymaking leadership on the other hand takes a more
subtle approach than Chivez. It (collectively) views Washington's foreign policy as
fraught with hypocrisy and double standards. Yet China does not view today's U.S.
foreign policy as being driven by classical American-style imperialism ( 19 th and early
20th centuries variety), as alluded to by Chavez, nor are Washington's actions seen as
being constrained by the sort of ideological blinders that characterized American foreign
policy toward Nicaragua during the Cold War.
While Chavez may aspire to become a radical anti-American revolutionary leader
for the region much like Castro was during the Cold War, times have changed. Chavez
nevertheless is intent on promoting Bolivarianism with the same intensity of
revolutionary fervor that characterized Havana's Marxist-Leninist zeal when at its height
it was associated with "violent revolution against U.S.-sponsored regimes."0 However,
today radical (violent) anti-Americanism directed towards the United States and its Latin
40 Shah, (2007).
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American allies is no longer feasible given the absence of an interventionist extra-
hemispheric power that would serve as a buffer to the threat of U.S. retaliation.
Chavez, despite himself, is coming to terms with this reality, forcing himself to
conclude that armed insurrection is no longer a viable means for toppling pro-U.S.
governments such as that of neighboring Colombia. As an alternative to armed
insurrection Chavez is proposing Bolivarianism, with its anti-systemic and nationalist
calls to move away from economic and political dependence on the United States, as
being the only viable non pro-United States option for redefining Latin American
regional leadership and economic relations (e.g., through PetroCaribe's role).
China on the other hand, as another sovereign nationalist, is also an anti-American
state. Yet China's anti-Americanism differs from that of Bolivarian Venezuela's in the
sense that despite its unfavorable judgments of the United States and its policies, which it
sees as orchestrated to prevent China's resurgence as a Great Power, it is receptive to new
information that may sway its opinions and conclusions about the United States and its
policies.4 Chavez, short of a radical change that alters the basic forms of societal
governance in the United States and its policies toward Venezuela, remains shackled by
the predisposition to believe all negative reports about the United States. Bound to such
thought processes, Chavez is incapable of accepting the possibility of positive reports
about the United States.
41 Neil Gross argues that it is Chinese distrust rather than bias that characterizes Chinese anti-Americanism.
Gross cites Alastair Johnston and Daniela Stockmann, who contributed the China chapter in Katzenstein's
and Keohane's "Anti-Americanism in World Politics, " and argue that "Chinese 'anmity' toward the United
States is in decline as China asserts itself as a budding superpower. However, Chinese dislike for U.S.
economic and cultural power is still quite distant from the level of hatred and bias' the Chinese direct at
Japan and the Japanese." See, Gross, Neil, in "The Many Stripes of Anti-Americanism," in The
International Herald Tribune, (January 15, 2007), accessed June 8, 2008, pg. 2,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/15/america/web.0115americanism.php?page= 1.
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Although Chavez's sovereign nationalism may sway endemically impoverished
and politically unstable countries such as Bolivia, or even obtain support from traditional
rivals of the United States for hemispheric leadership such as Argentina, it lacks the
ideological rigor of the Marxist-Leninism advocated by the Castro regime during the
height of the Cold War. Chavez's anti-American Bolivarianism is constrained by the fact
that it cannot be easily replicated by other Latin American countries, thus lacks
ideological appeal that can cross state and societal boundaries. Chavez's anti-
Americanism, even in Venezuela, is only feasible as long as international oil prices
remain high since the sale of Venezuelan crude to the U.S. energy market finances
Bolivarian initiatives that buy the government continued political support.42
Despite the shallow roots of Bolivarianism as an ideology and Chavez's
dependence on continued access to the U.S. energy market, Chivez's anti-Americanism
has often found a receptive audience in the region because of U.S. foreign policy
blunders. In the post-Cold War there has been a disjuncture in U.S. foreign policy
objectives not just for Venezuela, but for the entire Latin American region.
Most Latin Americans envisioned that with the end of the Cold War the United
States would finally turn its attention to the region and assist in its development.
42 To help quantify this assertion it is worthwhile to recall how dependent, and thus fiscally exposed, the
Chavez government is to the fluctuations of international oil market prices. The Economist Intelligence
Unit (EIU) indicates that if Venezuela's oil prices average $85 per barrel in 2007, PdVSA's net financial
surplus should hover at the $10 billion range. This is ChAvez's "war chest" for financing acquisitions (i.e.
compensation for nationalized industries). However once investment spending and transfers to the national
development fund (Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo - FONDEN) are made the cash surplus drops to roughly
$2.3 billion. Even with the price of oil surpassing the $100 per barrel, the average year-to-year oil price
remains at roughly $92 per barrel (end of April 2008). ChAvez, looking at between $8 to 10 billion in
compensation payments to companies affected by the nationalization of the oil sector, remains constrained
with what he can and cannot pay for. See Economist Intelligence Unit - Country Briefing, "Venezuela
Politics: Nationalization Drive Continues," (May 19, 2008), accessed June 1, 2008,
http://www.viewswire.com/index.asp?layout=VWArticleVW3&article id=1763369561&country id=1540
000154&page title=Latest+analysis.
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However, in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, and the wars in Afghanistan
and in Iraq, the Latin American region has again been allocated a lower priority among
U.S. foreign policymakers. The Latin American states which were hoping that the United
States would finally pay "greater attention to the region's acute social agenda, reduce
agricultural subsidies, and implement liberal immigration laws," have been frustrated43
The extent of the disjuncture in U.S. foreign policy for Latin America as a whole,
and in Venezuela's case in particular, was raised in Michael Shifter's testimony before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in June 2007. Shifter, as vice president of policy
for the Inter-American Dialogue, testified before Congress that the United States has lost
much of its credibility with Chavez and Latin America as a result of the April 2002 coup
d'6tat attempt against the Chavez government. In Shifter's own words:
"Even more costly have been the serious missteps in dealing with Hugo Chavez,
the main adversary of the United States in South America. The United States lost
considerable credibility on the democracy question in April 2002, when it
expressed its approval of the short-lived coup against Chavez. It has been hard to
square that initial position (which was later corrected) with the U.S. claim that it
is defending interruptions in democratic, constitutional governments. In general,
the U.S. policy towards Venezuela under Chivez has been inconsistent and
contradictory. Sometimes the United States has been confrontational - at other
times too passive. The approach has showed little strategic thought, and has been
ineffective. The occasional tit-for-tat rhetorical exchanges with Chavez have been
counterproductive and have only bolstered his popularity. Our friends in the
region have also resented the U.S. pressure on them to stand up and condemn
Chivez. Looking for a South American leader to play the role of the anti-Chavez
has proved futile and self-defeating." 44
43 Shifter, Michael, "South America and the US: How to Fix a Broken Relationship," statement before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs (June 19, 2007), accessed October 10, 2007,
http://www.thedialoue.org/PublicationsFiles/testimony.pdf.
44 Ibid., pg., 2
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Defining Hugo Chavez as a Revolutionary Putschist: Revolutionary Credentials:
Applying Blasier's Propositions 1, 3, and 4
In contrast to the Sandinista revolution that came to power by militarily defeating
the Somoza Debayle dictatorship, Hugo Chavez's revolutionary credentials lack a similar
successful revolutionary luster. Recall from Chapter 4 that in the late 1970s as the
Somoza Debayle government was entering its twilight hours, the administration of
President Carter, confronted by the deteriorating political-military and economic situation
in Nicaragua, was trapped between two opposing policy options: 1) declaring the
Sandinista revolutionary movement to be a hostile, anti-American insurrection with links
to the Soviet Union (Proposition 1 and 3), thereby turning a blind eye to the Somoza
Debayle government and all its faults in order to suppress the Sandinista revolution out of
strategic considerations (i.e., retain hemispheric political primacy - Proposition 11) or; 2)
abandon Somoza Debayle outright and seek accommodation with the FSLN if they same
could be persuaded to temper its demands and potential policies once in power
(Proposition 4).
Unlike the Sandinistas, Chavez failed in his attempt to overthrow the government
of Carlos Andres P6rez (1989-93) during the February 4, 1992 coup and alter the
country's societal organization by the force of arms. The Sandinistas had partial success
in reorganizing Nicaraguan society from 1979-90, while Fidel Castro's Cuban revolution
and revolutionary government (1959 to present) has fully succeeded as evidenced by the
smooth transfer of power to his brother Raul Castro (acting President from July 31, 2006
to February 24, 2008, and President from 2008 to present). Chavez's (homegrown) bid
for power caught the world unaware. The lack of a link to a hostile, extra-hemispheric
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power (Proposition 1 and 3) negates the possibility of a comparison with the Sandinista
revolution.
Chavez took up arms not just against the P6rez administration, but rather rebelled
against the continuation of Venezuela's unwritten system of governance and its power
sharing rules known as the Pacto de Punto Fijo.45 This governance pact, born out of the
fear of a return to the sort of military rule characteristic of the pre-1945 period, sought to
moderate socio-political demands by requiring consultations among the country's main
political parties - Accion Democratica (AD), Comite de Organizacin Politica Electoral
Independiente (COPEI), and Unidn Republicana Democratica (URD).46 Although the
Punto Fijo pact attempted to delineate socio-political responsibilities, its primary
objective was to assure the sustainability of a narrow form of democracy by guaranteeing
the equitable participation of all the major parties in the cabinet of the winning party.
However as Richard Lapper indicates in "Living with Hugo: U.S. Policy towards
Hugo Chavez's Venezuela, " by the 1980s Venezuelan democracy had become flawed
4 The electoral law decreed in May 1958 by the provisional junta convoked elections for December 1958.
Nonetheless the parties making up the Patriotic Front were unable to reach consensus on a single candidate.
This inability to reach a consensus leads the Accidn Democratica (AD), Comite de Organizacion Politica
Electoral Independiente (COPEI), and Unidn Republicana Democrdtica (URD) parties in October to draw
up the Pact of Punto Fijo whereby the parties' leadership agreed to resume cooperation after the December
elections. The parties agreed not only to a common policy but more importantly from a stability
perspective, to divide cabinet posts and other governmental positions among themselves regardless of
which candidate won the December elections.
46 Caudillismo (strong-man politics) and military rule have characterized most of Venezuela's political
history. Strong-men and the military ruled Venezuela from its independence period until the country's brief
experiment with democratic rule during the three year period ranging from 1945 to 1948 (known in
Venezuela as trienio or triennial). In 1948 the military rebelled against the AD government as a reaction to
the former's radical reforms that had alienated Venezuela's traditional economic elite. Eventually the
military regime's oppressive measures motivated former political enemies in AD and the conservative
COPEI to unite and sign the political pact known as Pacto de Punto Fijo which ensured political
cooperation between the main political parties. This pact became effective in 1958 with the removal of the
ruling military regime and ushered in Venezuela's Fourth Republic. See Economist Intelligence Unit,
"Venezuela: Country Profile 2008." London, United Kingdom: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008, pg., 4,
accessed June 16, 2008, http://www.eiu.com/report dl.asp?issue id=18529881704&mode=pdf.
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and seriously "corrupt, undermining popular support for the establishment."4 7 Popular
(mass) dissatisfaction with the Punto Fijo system grew as a result of the fact that both AD
and COPEI used their control over state welfare resources to openly reward their
membership. The population was also dissatisfied with the governing system's inability
to effectively deal with plummeting international oil prices.4 8 As a result, the Perez
administration found itself unable to maintain the traditional patronage networks and
social programs guaranteeing socio-political stability.49
To stem further financial and economic hemorrhaging brought about by the
collapse in oil prices, Perez implemented a number of far reaching, painful structural
adjustments measures recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).5 0
Among these adjustment measures was the termination of state subsidies for gasoline and
diesel fuel. In light of falling oil prices, it will be interesting to see how Chavez deals
with this situation when it becomes increasingly difficult to finance the purchase of ballot
box support through social welfare programs dependent on high oil prices.
47 Lapper, Richard, "Living with Hugo: U.S. Policy towards Hugo Chavez's Venezuela." New York, NY:
Council of Foreign Relations, CSR Number 20 (November 2006), pg. 6.
48 Both Lapper and the International Crisis Group concur that the Punto FUo system suffered from being
unable to respond to economic recession and falling international oil prices, as well as the fact that the AD
and COPEI political parties' stranglehold on Venezuela's economic and political life made the parties
beholden to party bosses and not to individual constituents. As a result, social policy was geared toward
providing "cheap, universal coverage of public services but failed to pursue comprehensive development so
as to improve the quality of life, reduce social inequity, and improve productivity." See, Lapper, pg. 6 and
the International Crisis Group, "Venezuela: Hugo Chavez's Revolution," in Latin America Report Number
19 (February 22, 2007), pg. 3.
49 Lapper, pg. 6.
50 For an overview of the evolution of oil prices see Appendix 9 - Annual Average of West Texas
Intermediate (Texas Light Sweet) Crude Oil Prices, 1946 to present (2007). Note that Venezuela's heavier
"sour" (higher sulfur content crude) as represented by the "Standard Maya" variety normally trades at a 20
percent discount compared to West Texas Intermediate.
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The end of fuel subsidies brought about an immediate spike in public
transportation costs affecting Caracas' urban poor and lower middle class, sectors which
were already largely excluded from the Punto Fijo system of patronage. The ensuing
increase in public transportation costs led to massive popular protests in February 1989,
whose intensity verged on the precipice of becoming a full-blown popular uprising. The
riots, largely concentrated in Caracas, became known as the "Caracazo " and resulted in
hundreds of deaths. For Chavez, the riots brought the weakness of Venezuela's governing
system to the forefront. For decades it ignored the demands of the poor and concentrated
the benefits arising from the country's oil wealth in the supporters of the Punto Fijo
system. Today, Chavez is facing growing domestic oil consumption and the need to
import gasoline to meet demand and avoid raising fuel prices. To counteract such growth
the Chavez government is decreeing that at least 30 percent of new cars must run on
natural gas in 2009, rising to 40 percent in subsequent years. Yet such measures have
already been delayed and watered down by plummeting international oil prices.5 '
P6rez, who during his first administration (1974-79) had overseen prolific
government spending when oil prices were high, during his second term as President
moved to embrace the "Washington Consensus" and its macro economic
recommendations. These recommendations, along with the IMF austerity measures,
called for deep government spending cuts, trade liberalization, free exchange and interest
rates, reduced price controls, and the implementation of a sales tax.52
51 Oxford Analytica.
52 International Crisis Group, pg., 3-4.
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Chdvez's own discontent with Venezuela's governing system, linked to the
uninterrupted flow of oil to the U.S. energy market, however, predates the Caracazo.
According to Cristina Marcano and Alberto Barrera Tyszka in Hugo Chdvez: The
Definitive Biography of Venezuela's Controversial President while still a junior officer in
the Venezuelan army, Chavez became disillusioned with the country's political
corruption and social inequity leading him to conspire with other likeminded individuals
to create the Bolivarian movement within the military.5 3 Chavez was able to organize a
Bolivarian movement within the military through his official position as an instructor at
the Venezuelan military academy (1981-84).
At the military academy, Chavez adroitly exploited his position to influence and
ultimately recruit cadets to his cause by appealing to a misguided sense of nationalism.
Chavez sought to inspire the cadet corps, as well as fellow officers to rise against what he
perceived to be the enemies of the Venezuelan poor and under-represented masses.
Chavez assigns responsibility for what he calls Venezuela's "hunger, corruption,
indigence, unemployment, and misuse of our nation's immense riches" to the United
States, and its allies within Venezuela's political and economic establishment as
represented by the Punto Fijo.5 4
Chavez and his fellow conspirators determined that the most opportune time to
launch their coup against the Perez government and put an end to the Punto Fijo system
of governance would be somewhere along the midway point of the administration when
5 Marcano, Cristina and Alberto Barrera Tyszka in "Hugo Chivez: The Definitive Biography of
Venezuela's Controversial President." New York, NY: Random House, 2007, pg., 46-47.
5 Comments attributed to Pedro Carreno, one of Chdvez's students from the 1985 graduating class and in
later years a Chdvez party Congressman. See, Marcano and Barrera Tyszka, pg. 49.
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the government's popular approval would in all likelihood be at a low point.55 By timing
their coup to the 1991-92 rotations, the conspirators also reasoned that they could take
advantage of the next cycle of military promotions, granting them greater authority over
the military command structure and resources.56
Chavez and the Bolivarian movement within the military benefited from the
events associated with the Caracazo. The riots radicalized the lower echelons of the
Venezuelan military after its junior officers were ordered to turn their weapons on the
urban masses. In Chavez's own words, the Caracazo "sensitized many people in the
military, especially the youngest ones, who had experienced the horror up close," serving
to "accelerate things considerably."5 7 As unlikely as it may seem, the military's senior
leadership discounted mounting evidence that Chavez was plotting a revolution. Prior to
the coup attempt the Ministry of Defense promoted Chavez to the rank of lieutenant
colonel in August 1991. Further compounding matters, the Minister of Defense and other
senior officers not only approved his promotion despite the evidence against him, but also
signed off on giving Chivez command of a battalion of combat paratroopers. 58
By February 1992, the Perez government had already faced 120 protests and 46
strikes, with the President's approval rating suffering a precipitous decline because of the
economic austerity measures.5 9 At this low point of popular backing for the P6rez
5 Approval ratings according to the "hammock thesis " purport that support for the government is highest at
the beginning and at the end of an administration and lowest in the middle as represented by the curve of a
hammock. Ibid., pg. 54.
56 Ibid., pg. 54.
5 Ibid., pg. 55.
58 Ibid., pg. 59.
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government, Chavez launched his coup in the early morning hours of February 4, 1992.
However, by the end of the day the coup failed and Chavez, along with another 2,367
uniformed men, roughly 10 percent of the total battalion strength of the Venezuelan
armed forces, surrendered to the P6rez government.
In an unexpected turn of events, the Perez government permitted Chavez to turn
defeat around to avoid the sort of political and military disgrace that befell Panama's
dictator, (1983-90) General Manuel Noriega. 60 Unlike Noriega who was paraded in front
of the cameras in his undershirt, Chavez remained composed and fully uniformed when
he ordered his followers to surrender via a live televised feed. 61 Chavez's own words,
unedited and broadcast at 10:30 a.m. the day of the coup best illustrate his defiance and
forewarning that Bolivarianism remained a viable (political-military) force:
"First of all, I want to say good morning to the people of Venezuela. This
Bolivarian message is for the brave soldiers who are presently at the Paratroopers'
Regiment in Aragua and the Armored Brigade in Valencia. Compaieros
(comrades): unfortunately, for now, the objectives we established in the capital
were not achieved. That means that we, here in Caracas, did not succeed in taking
control [of the government]. You did an excellent job out there, but it is now time
to avoid more bloodshed, it is now time to reflect. New situations will present
themselves. The country must find the definitive path toward a better destiny.
Listen to what I say. Listen to Commander Chavez, who sends out this message
so that you will please reflect and lay down your weapons, because now, truly, it
is impossible for us to meet the objectives we established on the national level.
Compaleros (comrades): listen to this message of solidarity. I thank you for your
loyalty, your bravery, your generosity, and as I stand before the nation and all of
59 Marcano and Barrera Tyszka indicate that by February 1992, 81 percent of the Venezuelan population
had lost faith in Perez and 57 percent also indicated that they wanted a new government. Ibid., pg. 65.
60 Noriega surrendered to U.S. forces on January 3, 1990.
61 See Appendix 10 - The Symbolism of Defeat: Pictorial Difference between the Fate of Panama's
General Manuel Noriega and Venezuela's Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chdvez following their Surrender.
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you, I assume the responsibility for this Bolivarian military movement. Thank you
very much." 62
Summed up, Chavez's Bolivarian military coup attempt failed to usher in a
revolutionary government in 1992. The United States was consequently spared the need
to decide, like it had been forced to do with the Sandinistas in 1979, to choose between
the suppression of a revolutionary government or seeking accommodation with it
(Proposition 4) and its ties to anti-American extra-hemispheric powers.
Defining Hugo Chivez's Bolivarianism and the Status of Socialism for the 2 1st Century
In the wake of the failed 1992 coup and following Chavez's "for now" (por
ahora) surrender speech many people in and outside of Venezuela questioned what the
Bolivarian movement was. Since the events of February 4, 1992, Bolivarinism as a
revolutionary form of governance has been interpreted as an anti-systemic and
democratic socialist interpretation of the ideas of Sim6n Bolivar (the Venezuelan leader
of South America's nineteenth century wars of independence) which uses the country's
oil wealth to contest U.S. regional leadership. While Chavez's 1992 coup attempt failed
and resulted in his imprisonment, his Bolivarian military insurrection against the
constitutional authority brought to the forefront deep disillusionment with Perez and the
Punto Fijo political arrangement. Chavez's attempt to address the country's corruption
and political ineffectiveness by non-constitutionalist means bought him folk-hero status.63
62 Chavez's surrender speech. Marcano and Barrera Tyszka., pgs. 74-75.
63 See, Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008, pg. 5.
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Pardoned by the government of Rafael Caldera (1993-98), Chavez was freed from
prison in 1994 and immediately proceeded to exploit lingering popular dissatisfaction
with Venezuela's political and economic arrangements. Chavez went on to win the
presidential election in 1998, trumping his rivals with more than 56 percent of the vote
(the largest majority in Venezuelan democratic political history until then). Chavez won
the elections largely on the campaign pledge to replace the discredited Punto Fijo
political arrangement with a new Bolivarian Republic (Fifth Republic - Quinta
Republica) ushering in a new era of popular and participatory governance in Venezuela.
In the wider context of foreign affairs, the U.S. Department of State interprets
Chavez's "Bolivarian Revolution" as being a (revolutionary) movement that calls on
other countries to help establish a "multipolar world devoid of U.S. influence and for
greater integration among developing countries (e.g., regional integration via the
PetroCaribe petroleum assistance initiative)." 64 The Bolivarian revolution within
Venezuela's borders represents a nationalist, anti-capitalist assertion of sovereign (state)
rights on natural resources coupled to a redistribution of the country's wealth to the
previously under-represented masses by means of social development.
Graphs 6 and 7 highlight the connection between Chivez's political fortunes and
oscillations in the barrel price of petroleum. Upon assuming the presidency in February in
1999, Chavez moved rapidly, as promised during the campaign, to organize support for
rewriting Venezuela's national constitution.6 5 Voters, mobilized by the need to fix a
6 See, United States Department of State - Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affair, "Background Note:
Venezuela," accessed June 25, 2008, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm.
65 Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008, pg. 5.
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broken political system which had been tied for decades to the health of the country's oil
sector, overwhelmingly supported Chavez's request to convene a constituent assembly.
Graph 6 - Timeline of Venezuelan Political Turmoil linked to Chavez
and low Petroleum Prices (Nominal Values)* - Years 1991 to 2007
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OBS: BBP = barrel price in U.S. dollars. Price cited is for West Texas Intermediate (WTI), inflation
adjusted. Note WTI is also known as Texas Light Sweet crude and used as benchmark in oil pricing and the
underlying commodity of the New York Mercantile's Exchange's oil futures contracts. It is a higher grade
of crude (e.g. lower sulfur content, easier flowing), thereby commanding a higher price than the typical
Venezuelan heavy crude (higher sulfur content). (*) See Appendix 8 for the inflation adjusted average of
annual BBP price compared to inflation adjusted figures based on calendar year 2007 rates. The positions
of call outs on the timeline serve as approximations for the actual dates of events.
Source: Oil and Gas Confidential, "Historical Crude Prices: The Annual Averages of WTI Crude Oil
Prices," (March 2008), accessed June 18, 2008,
http://www.oilandgasconfidential.com/Historical Crude Prices.html.
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In three months the constituent assembly drafted a constitution and put it to a vote
in the July 2000 elections which were held to re-legitimize elected posts. With oil prices
high, Chavez is re-elected with 60 percent of the vote. However, abstentions total 43.5
percent of the ballots cast. 66
Graph 7 - Timeline of Venezuelan Political Turmoil linked to
Chavez and low Petroleum Prices (Nominal Values)*
- Years 2007 to 2009
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Source: United States Department of Energy - Energy Information Agency (EIA). "Petroleum Marketing
Monthly." Washington, DC: EIA, (February 2008), accessed, February 6, 2008,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil gas/petroleum/data publications/'petroleum marketing monthly'current
pdf/pmmtab l .pdf.
66 Ibid. pg., 5.
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Although Chavez failed to gain power in the 1992 coup, ballot box victories
allowed him to refine his anti-systemic Bolivarian ideology into "2 1st Century
Socialism." Chavez advocated a larger role for the state in the economy via re-
nationalization of privatized sectors. 6 7 Constrained by the democratic process, the price
of petroleum has been a two-edged sword that has facilitated revolutionary reforms when
oil prices are high but breathed new life into the political opposition when prices are low.
While Chavez's revolutionary socialist designs had been slowed by defeat in the
December 2007 polls, causing the government and its backers to take a step back to
reflect on the course of events, this period of reflection is now over. There was
widespread agreement among analysts that Chavez would use the November 2008
elections to gather support and momentum for further entrenching and expanding
Bolivarianism with the intent of revisiting the proposed reforms struck down during the
December 2007 election. In that poll, the electorate had been asked to approve the
"authorized" unlimited re-election vote of Venezuelan presidents and the convening of a
constituent assembly to transform the country's political framework into a socialist
67 Venezuela's opening of its petroleum sector during the Rafael Caldera government (1993-98) in 1996
lead to extensive trade and investment opportunities for U.S. corporations. The Venezuelan state's intent to
assert for itself a greater role in the national economy, in particular the petroleum, telecommunications,
electricity, cement and steel sectors, as well as select companies in the meat and milk distribution sectors is
seen as constituting a threat to private property rights. The result of the uncertainty regarding property
rights coupled to high inflation (forecasted to exceed 30 percent in 2008) and foreign exchange controls is
reducing the space for the private sector and consequently deterring private investment. See, U.S.
Department of State - Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affair, "Background Note: Venezuela," accessed
June 25, 2008, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35766.htm. Juridical uncertainty combined with structural
flaws (i.e., poor regulatory enforcement, corruption, and a high degree of politicization are undermining
growth in the medium term and contributing to the possibility of a severe economic crisis in the future.
Global Insight, "Global Insight Report: Venezuela (Country Intelligence)," (June 17, 2008), accessed June
17, 2008, http://myinsight.globalinsight.com/servlet/cet.
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republic. Gains by the opposition in capturing five of the twenty provincial governorships
did not stymie Chavez's desires for a new referendum in February 2009.
It is worthwhile to recall that besides a major constitutional reform, which
envisions a greater role for the state in the national economy, Chavez's " 2 1" Century
Socialism" is premised on four key foundations: 1) approval of the law that will allow
Chavez to fast-track the passing of legislation via presidential decrees; 2) boosting public
education; 3) the overhaul of Venezuela's administrative landscape, and; 4) the further
strengthening of communal council powers with the aim of eventually replacing the
current local-level state authorities. 6 8
The December 2007 polls neither approved unlimited presidential re-election, nor
allowed Chavez to move forward with his intent to reform the national constitution. 69
The Venezuelan electorate then also voted down Chivez's attempt to reconfigure
Venezuela's administrative map. With Chavez's right to rule-by-decree coming to an end
in 2008, he banked on a strong showing in the November 2008 gubernatorial and
68 According to Mark P. Sullivan and Nelson Olhero, on August 15, 2007, Chavez announced a series of
proposed constitutional changes, including the elimination of presidential term limits in order to
concentrate political power in the presidency. His other proposed changes included the extension of the
presidential term from six to seven years, the removal of Central Bank autonomy, and changes in the
administrative division of the Venezuelan state and the structure of local government. Chavez also
proposed the nationalization of the energy sector, as well as the reduction of the workday to six hours. He
also proposed the creation of a popular militia as the fifth component of the armed forces. See, Sullivan,
Mark P., and Nelson Olhero, "Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy, a CRS Report for
Congress." Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, (September 4, 2007), accessed June 22,
2008, 1, http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA471983&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.
69 A key reason why the December 2, 2007, constitutional reform poll failed to pass is attributed to the high
number abstentions. Previously more than 76 percent of eligible voters participated in the December 2006
poll compared to about 56 percent in the December 2007 poll. Furthermore roughly 3 million fewer voters
supported the 2007 reform proposals than supported Chavez in 2006. See, Sullivan and Olhero (2008), pg.
19.
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municipal elections in order to revitalize his socialist agenda and plans for constitution
reform which would allow him to run for re-election in 2012.70
The U.S. government has publicly stated in numerous U.S. Department of State
press briefings over the years that Chavez is a democratically elected head of state. As
such Chavez may put forward ideas that the United States disagrees with, yet ultimately it
is up to the Venezuelan people to decide which form of governance best suits their needs.
For example, this was clearly articulated during the U.S. Department of State daily press
briefing of January 19, 2007, in which Tom Casey, the department's deputy spokesman
responded when queried about Chavez's increasingly authoritarian policies:
"President Chavez is the elected President of Venezuela. He has put forward plans
and ideas internally in Venezuela that, you know, have caused us some concern,
including a current proposal that's working its way through the legislature to give
him power to rule by decree. Again, that's the sovereign right of Venezuela but
certainly is a bit odd in terms of a democratic system.
In terms of his role in the hemisphere, well, I think as far as we're concerned there
is a positive agenda for the hemisphere that we've laid forward. It's an agenda
that's shared by the vast majority of countries in the hemisphere and frankly that's
what we prefer to concentrate on. The economic issues and the efforts to move
towards -- what I believe he calls a 21St Century Socialism -- are things that again
are -- we talked about this at the gaggle this morning with respect to Bolivia.
Countries can choose whatever economic policies they wish to, though, that needs
to be done in the context of their international agreements. I have seen
commentaries written by a number of people in the region that say that 2 1st
Century Socialism looks a lot like 20th century communism. But whether this
serves the interests of the Venezuelan people or not is something that the
Venezuelans themselves are going to have to decide." 71
70 Barbel, Marion, "Venezuela: New Exports Ban and Un-limited Re-election Back on the Venezuela
Agenda" in Global Insight (January 11, 2008), accessed January 11, 2008,
http://myinsight global insight.co1I5Crvlet/cats?documentID=~21 4 2337&servicelD=4078&pageContent=a-t
&context=email&src=pc&source=email alert&source id=4&p1=296247&date=2008'01,11.
" Casey further clarified that "Chavez is free to speak his mind and he certainly has shown no hesitancy to
do so. But again, our focus is not worrying about him or his comments." The United States' focus is
254
However, the U.S. government remains concerned by the Chavez government's
intent to further dilute Venezuela's constitutional checks and balances on executive
power. Concerns have been raised among the Venezuelan opposition and in Washington
about Chavez's attempts to concentrate power in the presidency. By staffing key
positions in the attorney general's office, the Supreme Justice Tribunal, and the electoral
council with active duty and retired military officers loyal to him, Chavez is
progressively bringing under his control entities that would otherwise offer a
constitutional buffer against unbridled presidential ambitions.
Defining Hugo Chavez Bolivarian Agenda for Latin America: Applying Blasier's
Proposition 3
The lack of an anti-American, extra-hemispheric patron (Proposition 3) has not
impeded Hugo Chavez's desire to become involved in the internal affairs of other Latin
American and Caribbean states. Chavez's actions has raised concerns in conservative
foreign policy circles (e.g., the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage
Foundation) in Washington that seek to influence both the White House and Congress by
arguing that Chavez's involvement in the affairs of his neighbors needs to been seen as
constituting a challenge, even though a limited one at the moment, to the United States. 72
working with "its partners in the hemisphere to do the kinds of things that is generally agreed by all
members of the OAS that we want to see happen."See comments attributed to Casey, Tom, "U.S.
Department of State Daily Press Briefing," (January 19, 2007), accessed October 11, 2007,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/ 2 0 0 7 /7 9 05 6 .htm.
72 In 2002, U.S. congressmen Barney Frank (D-Pennsylvania, 1981 to present), John Conyers (D-Michigan,
1965 to present), Chaka Fattah (D-Pennsylvania, 1995 to present), Jan Schakowsky (D-Illinois, 1999 to
present), Jose Serrano (D-New York, 1990 to present), and eleven others complained in a letter to President
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However Chivez has opted to limit his assistance to financial assistance as highlighted by
the fact that since first taking office in 1998 he has provided the Latin American and
Caribbean region with almost $9 billion in foreign aid commitments. 73
Reminiscent (if to a limited degree) of Soviet-style Cold War era interventionist
policies, deemed during that time period to be non-constructive by the United States,
Chavez has sought to broker the release of Colombia's FARC prisoners (including three
American civilian contractors) in order to gain increased diplomatic stature and leverage
among the Latin American states. At the same time, Chavez's procurement of weaponry,
much of it offensive in nature, from the Russian Federation was seen by the Bush
administration and Congress as constituting an undisguised ploy to intimidate if not
threaten Venezuela's neighbors. 74
In the Hearing of the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services' "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 and Oversight of
Previously Authorized Programs," held on March 16, 2006, Congressman Duncan Hunter
George W. Bush that the United States was not adequately protecting Chivez against a groundswell of
internal opposition to his increasingly authoritarian rule--an upsurge that might lead to his ouster. See,
Halvorssen, Thor, "Comandante Chavez's Friends: Hugo Chavez supports Saddam Hussein and terrorism.
Several congressional Democrats support Chavez. What's wrong with this picture?" The Weekly Standard,
(March 11, 2003), accessed Marchl, 2008,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/346jori.asp?pg=1.
Also see, Falcoff, Mark, "The Mystery of Hugo Chavez," (January 16, 2007), accessed May 21, 2008,
http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.25450/pub detail.asp, for background on why Chavez's
attempts to convince Colombia and the larger, politically more stable and unified states of Argentina or
Brazil to submit to Venezuelan leadership will fail. According to Falcoff ChAvez is limited to "shopping
among the friendless, vulnerable micro-states of the Caribbean or (lately) in small and troubled republics
like Nicaragua and Ecuador" for support. More importantly as an indicator of ChAvez's lack of geopolitical
relevance to the United States and its continued ability to be seen as the Latin American region's partner of
preference is his failed bid to sway Mexico to his leadership.
73 Murphy, Dan, "As ChAvez gains Latin American stature, analysts wonder about implications for US," in
The Christian Science Monitor (August 31, 2007), accessed September 6, 2007,
http//www.csmonitor.com/ 2 0 0 7 '0830/p99s01-duts.html.
7 Ibid.
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(R-California, 1981 to 2009) stated that developments in Latin (South) America are
crucial for the outcome of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan.7 5 Hunter argues that while the
U.S. Southern Command and Colombia have been combating narco-terrorists for years,
neighboring Venezuela under the sway of "Castro admirer" Chavez is "aggressively
importing weaponry out of proportion to his needs and recklessly provokes the United
States."
While Chavez has publicly sought to maintain cordial relations with the Alvaro
Uribe government in neighboring Colombia, his involvement in the internal affairs of
Colombia has raised suspicions of ulterior motives. United States-Colombian suspicions
about Chivez's involvement with the FARC have subsequently been proven true,
although denied by Chavez, with the capture of incriminating evidence linking his
government to Colombia's insurgent revolutionary forces.
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND HUGO CHAVEZ
U.S. Congressional Concerns in Dealing with Hugo Chavez versus the Concerns of
the United States Government as a Whole
The United States government's concerns as a whole with Chivez's policies can
be summed up as: 1) the scope of his military purchases; 2) relations with Cuba and Iran;
3) the export of Bolivarian populism to the Latin American region; 4) the state of
Venezuelan democracy; 5) Caracas' failure to cooperate with the United States in
7 See, Hunter, Duncan in "United States House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,
"National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 and Overight of Previously Authorized
Programs." Washington, D.C. IMarch 16, 2007), accessed May 25, 2009,
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.¬ov/cgi-bin/pgetdoc.cgidbfame=109 house hearings&docid=f:33790.pdf.
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combating drug trafficking, and; 6) Venezuela's unwillingness to cooperate with the
United States in fighting the war on terrorism.
The U.S. Congress for its part has focused extensively on two critical issues in the
U.S.-Venezuela bilateral relationship which have domestic political ramifications in the
United States: 1) energy issues, which impacts U.S. economic interests in terms of
domestic fuel prices and; 2) the state of Venezuelan democracy and its degradation's
impact on human rights in that country. 76
U.S. foreign policy towards Chavez's Venezuela is formulated along traditional
lines. Much like the case through the past half century, Congress has remained concerned
with Latin American countries' economic development as a driver of domestic social
peace, stability, and harmony. Blasier finds that a key indicator of how the bilateral
relationship between the United States and a revolutionary government will evolve
depends on how Washington reacts to the nationalization of American property. 77
For example, Richard Saull points out that in the Cuban case studied by Blasier,
the United States sought to initially guide the Cuban Revolution through offers of
involvement towards specific goals that rested on what were perceived as mutual
economic interests even though Havana was in the process of expropriating American
76 The U.S. Congress can make foreign policy through resolutions and policy statements, legislative
directives, legislative pressure, legislative restrictions/funding denials, informal advice, and congressional
oversight. According to Richard Grimmett, "under these circumstances, the executive branch can either
support or seek to change congressional policies as it interprets and carries out legislative directives and
restrictions, and decides when and whether to adopt proposals and advice." See Grimmett, Richard F.,
"Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress," (June 1, 1999), accessed June 17, 2008,
http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/ 6 1 72.htm.
77 See, Saull, Richard. "Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War: The State, Military Poer, and
Social Revolution." London, Great Britai: Routledge, 2001, pg. 182.
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holdings.78 Chavez, who has only fairly recently commenced to nationalize foreign
properties in Venezuela, has unlike Castro usually made good faith efforts to provide
compensation (i.e., the CANTV re-nationalization). Chavez's actions permit U.S.
policymakers to continue to remain vigilant but nonetheless still craft conciliatory
policies in the hope that Caracas will continue to ensure the preservation of mutual
economic interests, namely the continued uninterrupted flow of oil to the United States
(Proposition 4).
U.S. Congressional Energy Issue Concerns in Dealing with Hugo Chivez: Blasier's
Propositions 4, 5, 10, and 12
As highlighted in the previous sections, continued U.S. access to Venezuelan
petroleum was a major concern of the Bush administration and the 11 0 th Congress (2007-
08) (Proposition 5). The U.S. Congress as a whole is cognizant of the fact that high oil
prices fund Chavez's revolutionary agenda and that this agenda is not dependent on
financial backing by an extra-hemispheric, anti-American power as was the case in Cold
War Nicaragua (Proposition 3).
Given the weak demand outlook for the petroleum exporting countries, with
prices remaining low through 2009 and into 2010 compared to 2008's record high prices,
Chavez will be hard pressed to radically and expeditiously move ahead with his
economic goal of increasing the state's control over national production in key sectors of
the Venezuelan economy. Chavez will continue, if somewhat limitedly, to use oil profits
to fund additional nationalizations and land reform as well as boost social spending in
7 8 
Ibid., pg. 182.
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poverty alleviating programs. Chavez's reforms will affect U.S. economic interests
(Propositions 5 and 10), but not necessarily U.S. vital interests (thus no need for
suppression based on Propositions 3, 4, and 11).
In 2007 the U.S. Congress responded to Chavez's policy measures impacting the
U.S. energy market by passing House Resolutions (H.R.), expressing its concern about
Venezuela's actions in the oil sector (i.e., H.R. 560), as well as by passing Senate Bills
(S.B.) calling for greater hemispheric cooperation on energy issues (i.e., SB 193 - The
Energy Diplomacy and Security Act of 2007 and S.B. 1007 - The United States-Brazil
Energy Cooperation Pact of 2007). The 1 10 th Congress's action has been brought about
by the Chivez government's June 26, 2007, announcement of its intent to pressure
foreign (United States-based) oil majors such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips to sign
new Orinoco River Basin oil belt partnership agreements in which the state would
acquire majority ownership. 79 This is a case that falls within Blasier's Proposition 12
whereby the United States government's response is shaped as much as by the President
and his cabinet as it is by Congress working with U.S. corporations seeking to pressure
Venezuela out of a combination of security, economic, and bureaucratic considerations to
adhere to the rule of law.
Note that Chavez, while setting May 1, 2007 (May Day holiday) as the deadline
for the government to assume control over the extra-heavy oil Orinoco River Basin
projects, his government did nonetheless permit the affected foreign oil majors to
negotiate the terms of their conversion to minority partners until June 26, 2007. British
79 Four other oil majors - British Petroleum, Total, Statoil, and U.S.-owned Chevron - have subsequently
agreed to assume minority partnership in the renegotiated contract agreements. See, Sullivan and Olhero
(2008), pg. 2.
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Petroleum (Great Britain), Total (France), Statoil (Norway), and Chevron (United States)
signed new partnership agreements with PdVSA whereby they would assume a minority
role in the exploitation of these fields on June 26.
However Chavez and two other oil majors, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips,
failed to reach agreement on a negotiated level of adequate compensation reflecting the
fair market value of the expropriated assets. ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips were, when
negotiations ceased, demanding roughly $5 billion in (combined) compensation for their
Orinoco assets and investments. The Chavez government refused to meet these demands
for compensation. Subsequently on August 29, 2007, Venezuela's Minister of Energy,
Rafael Ramirez, submitted to the Venezuelan National Assembly a new law transferring
ownership of ExxonMobil's and ConocoPhillips's assets to state control without
contemplating the possibility of any compensation being paid for these assets.8 0
Representative Ileana Ros-Lethinen, the ranking Republican in the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, exerting oversight, called on the Bush administration to investigate
PdVSA's dealings with Iran's Petropars. While Ros-Lethinen's inquiry of the PdVSA-
Petropars relationship is not a direct factor in the Venezuela - ExxonMobil/
ConocoPhillips dispute, it indictes congressional interest in exerting oversight (e.g., via
the Iran Sanctions Act) and shows the links between petroleum sourcing and concerns
with foreign, extra-hemispheric powers cooperating with Chivez.81 Despite the
80 Ibid., pg. 39.
81 See, U.S. House of Representatives - House Foreign Affairs Committee, "Press Release: Ros-Lehtinen
Calls for Investigation into Possible Violations of U.S. Law by Venezuelan State Oil Company Linked to
Iran," (February 6, 2008), accessed February 6, 2008,
http-//foreignaffairs.republicans.house.gov/apps/list/press/foreignaffairs rep,'O80206venezuela.shtml.
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ExxonMobil /ConocoPhillips compensation dispute and Chavez's Iran dealings, Chavez
remains a reliable if unfriendly supplier of oil to the U.S. energy market (Graph 8).82
Graph 8 - Venezuelan Crude (H.S. Code 27- 09) Oil Global
Exports (metric tons) Compared to Percentage of Same Exported
to the United States - Years 1999 to 2007
(in millions of tons)
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Source: Global Trade Atlas, "Venezuela Export Statistics: Commodity: 27-09, Petroleum Oils and Oils
Obtained from Bituminous Minerals, Crude," accessed June 22, 2008, http://www.ctis.com/eta/.
82 Note that the drop off in the percentage of crude oil being shipped to the United States can be attributed
to a combination of other factors besides Chdvez's inflammatory rhetoric. These include Venezuela's
commitment to supply PetroCaribe member states with more affordable oil, diversification of trading
partners, as well as the drop in Venezuelan production caused by lack of investment and other non-
productive turmoil in the country's oil sector. OPEC reports that since 2006 there has been a drop in
Venezuelan in total (daily) oil production from an average of 2,539 million barrels in 2006 to 2,392 million
barrels in 2007 to roughly 2,345 million barrels in May 2008. Production levels in Venezuela are actually
down by 11.9 percent in May 2008 compared to April 2008. See, Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, "Monthly Oil Market Report," (June 2008), Hasan M. Qabazard (editor-in-chief), pg. 32,
accessed June 25, 2008,
http://www.opec.ore/home/Monthly%2001%20Market%20Reports/2008/pdf'MR062008.pdf.
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Table 18 - Applying Blasier's Propositions to United States
Congressional Action in dealing with the Chavez Government and
Energy Issue Concerns
Proposition Explaining Congressional Action
Number 4 USG leaders have signaled a conciliatory response to the Chavez government since it
has determined that this revolutionary government will (eventually) negotiate an
acceptable settlement of issues in conflict. This is due to the fact that the country itself
vitally dependent on access to the U.S. energy market for its own political survival and
that such an agreement precludes the interference of a hostile Great Power (there is none
willing or seriously able to contest U.S. hegemony in the Latin American region).
Number 5 Economic considerations (e.g., continued access to Venezuela's petroleum reserves) and
private business interests (reaching an agreement on fair and prompt compensation for
nationalized U.S. business investments (e.g. compensation for ConocoPhillips and
Exxon Mobil) are important in the formulation of USG policies and are compatible with
policies decided on strategic grounds (e.g. assuring that Venezuela remains a reliable
supplier of crude in times of war). Concerns with growing Chinese and Iranian interest
in the Latin American region.
Number 10 Strategic considerations (e.g., assuring the continued flow of oil to the U.S. energy
market) and or private interests prevail (e.g., compensation for the U.S.-based oil
majors) over bureaucratic considerations and are incorporated into the internal
bargaining process (e.g., both branches of the U.S. government see Chivez as a nuisance
U.S. economic interests and not as a threat to vital U.S. security interests.
Number 12 USG responses are shaped by: 1) the President acting with or through cabinet-level
officers; 2) leaders of large corporations working with the U.S. Congress and the
executive and 3) middle level diplomats and civil servants. Responses with regards to
the continued flow of Venezuelan oil are the result of security, economic, and
bureaucratic considerations.
Source: Blasier, 1985, pgs. 236-237.
In a Joint Hearing of the United States House of Representatives, Committee on
Government Reform - Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations - "Energy as a Weapon: Implications for U.S. Policy," held on
May 16, 2006, Congressman Darrell Issa (R-California, 2001 to present) indicated that
Chivez threatened the United States in April 2004 and in February 2006 with suspending
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oil sales if it continued to "intervene in Venezuela's domestic affairs."8 3 Chavez aims to
exploit U.S. dependence on imported oil to threaten U.S. economic security and the
effectiveness of foreign policy (e.g., promotion of democracy and human rights).
Table 18 highlights that despite the threats Chivez continued to keep his pre-Iraqi
War promise to remain a reliable wartime supplier of petroleum. 84 Congressional action
in dealing with Chavez's revolutionary challenges remains influenced by energy security
and Venezuela's guarantee to keep oil flowing to the U.S. energy market.
In the greater scheme of things even with the 2006 scaling back to approximately
68 percent of Venezuela's oil exports being earmarked for the U.S. energy market, this
sort of commitment by Chivez falls within Blasier's Proposition 4. As a consequence the
United States will opt for conciliatory responses since it has determined that Chavez's
revolutionary government will negotiate an acceptable settlement of issues in conflict and
that such an agreement precludes the interference of a hostile extra-hemispheric power.85
83 See, Issa, Darrell, in United States House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform -
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations - "Energy as a
Weapon: Implications for U.S. Policy." Washington, D.C. (May 16, 2006), accessed May 25, 2009,
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109 house hearings&docid=f:31181.pdf.
84 Sullivan and Olhero, (2005), pgs. 39-40.
85 However on November 5, 2007, the 1 10th Congress approved House Resolution 435 by voice vote which
"expresses concern over the emerging national security implications of the Iranian regime's efforts to
expand its influence in Latin America." Sullivan and Olhero indicate that this resolution noted Venezuela's
support for Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency and planned for a $2 million Iranian-
Venezuelan fund for investment in third countries, as well as the establishment of direct civilian flights
between both countries. See Sullivan and Olhero (2008), pgs. 50-51.
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U.S. Congressional Concerns in Dealing with Hugo Chivez, the National
Endowment for Democracy, and the State of Venezuelan Democracy: Blasier's
Propositions 3, 5, 8, 9, and 12
An indicator of congressional interest in Chavez is the number of resolutions,
bills, and hearings that reference the state of democracy and how its deterioration under
Chivez's increasingly autocratic rule is impacting human rights. 86 The 1 0 8 th Congress
(2003-04) expressed its concerns by means of the Hearing of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere held on June 24, 2004 to
assess the possible impact of the August 2004 recall referendum on Venezuela's
democracy (Proposition 12).87
What is significant about the June 2004 hearing is that it discussed the continued
funding of U.S. democracy-promoting projects in Venezuela. In this sense the conference
report to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Division B of
Public Law - P.L. 108-792) required a comprehensive report on the National Endowment
for Democracy's (NED) activities in Venezuela dating back to FY 2001, as well as
required that the Endowment ensure that all of its activities adhere to core NED
principles (Proposition 9).88 The NED inquiry resulted from the need to review the events
86 Note that Congress does not act in a vacuum. Its resolutions, bill, and hearings are the product of
constituent concerns. Howver, consituents are both individual voters and U.S. businesses. The latter of
which, thanks to vastly greater financial reources can hire the best lobbyists on K Streert (Washington,
D.C.) and exert a disproportionate level of influence on congressional actions.
87 See, United States Senate, Foreign Relations Committee - Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, The
"State of Democracy in Venezuela." Washington, D.C. (June 24, 2004), accessed May 25, 2009,
http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2004/hrg040624p.html, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senatehearings&docid=f:96730.wais, and Miguel Diaz, "Testimony: The
Threat to Democracy in Venezuela and its Implications to the Region and to the United States,"
Washington, D.C. (June 24, 2004), accessed May 25, 2009, pg. 2,
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2004/DiazTestimony040624.pdf.
88 See, Sullivan and Olhero, pgs. 52-53.
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leading up to the April 12-14, 2002, political-military coup that temporarily removed
Chivez from office. Chavez, once restored to power by pro-Chavez government forces,
accused the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, and NED
representatives in Venezuela of having orchestrated a bid to oust him by using the
country's opposition as a proxy for U.S. action (e.g., a situation, if true which falls within
Proposition 6).89
Senator Norm Coleman (R-Minnesota, 2003-09), Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs in the June
2004 hearing's opening commentary indicated that the political situation in Venezuela
represents the most important test of democracy in the Western Hemisphere. 90
Coleman's concerns demonstrate the continuity of traditional U.S. congressional concern
with Latin American economic and political development. Here Coleman states:
"The United States has a tremendous interest in what happens in Venezuela.
Venezuela is in our neighborhood. The Western Hemisphere is, by and large, a
89 Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-Connecticut, 1981 to present) as Chairman of the United States Senate
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs of the Senate Foreign Affairs
Committee requested that Inspector General of the United States Department of State and the Broadcasting
Board of Governors Office of Inspector General (OIG) conduct a review of U.S. policy and actions during
the weekend of April 12-14, 2002, and the six month period prior to that date. Senator Dodd sought to
ascertain whether the United States was involved directly or indirectly in the events that precipitated
Chavez's ouster. More specially, Dodd sought an answer to the question of whether the actions and policies
of the United States government were consistent with the U.S. policy in support of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter, as well as whether the NED's programs and activities were carried out in Venezuela in
a manner consistent with U.S. law and policy. OIG concluded in its report that there was nothing to indicate
that U.S. assistance programs in Venezuela, including those of the NED, were inconsistent with U.S. law or
policy. See, United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of
Inspector General, "A Review of U.S. Policy toward Venezuela: November 2001 - April 2002," Report
Number 02-OIG-003 (July 2002), pgs. 2-3 and 37, accessed January 15, 2008,
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/13682.pdf.
9 See, Coleman, Norm, in "United States Senate, Foreign Relations Committee - Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere, "The State of Democracy in Venezuela." Washington, D.C. (June 24, 2004),
accessed May 25, 2009, http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2004/hrg040624p.html,
http"//frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108 senate hearings&docid=f:96730.wais.
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community of democracies. We do not want to see any steps backward in what
has been a very encouraging stride toward democracy in recent decades,
particularly in a country like Venezuela with such a strong democratic tradition.
We cannot afford to see a large exodus of Venezuelans fleeing their nation. We
are interested in preventing terrorism and drug trafficking in the region. And it
goes without saying that Venezuela is a major energy supplier to the United
States. Another major disruption in Venezuela will hurt average Americans at the
gas pump.
We in the United States may have an interest in what happens in Venezuela, but it
is the Venezuelan people who must have the opportunity to determine the future
of their nation for themselves. What we in the United States can do is support,
even insist upon, a fair process as guaranteed under the Venezuelan Constitution
and as agreed upon by the Chavez government and the opposition. We in the
United States can press for respect for universal human rights, such as the right of
free assembly and the right to express one's political views without fear of
retribution.
I also believe America can and should take exception when President Chavez
makes disparaging remarks about our President and our troops in Iraq. These are
times when words matter.
Relations between the United States and Venezuela are in a difficult state, and I
acknowledge that the mutual distrust is not entirely unrelated to the handling of
the 2002 coup attempt. In spite of these bad feelings, I believe we must continue
to work with the Venezuelans where at all possible to pursue shared goals." 91
What is worthwhile to note about Coleman's comments above is that they
summarize traditional policy concern not just for Venezuela but for the entire Latin
American region. There are references to (representative) democracy, political
persecution, immigration, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism. All of these issues have
gained importance in congressional deliberations in the post Cold War.
As a result of this type of concern, the 109th Congress (2005-06) increased the
number of hearings and legislative action relating to the state of Venezuelan democracy.
Of particular importance to how the 109th Congress reacted to Chivez brand of
91 Ibid.
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revolutionary change was its appropriation of $2 million in democracy funds for NED to
use for promoting democracy in FY 2006.92 On December 6, 2006 in Senate Resolution
607, Congress also condemned, Chavez's recourse to anti-American rhetoric at the
United Nations (September 20, 2006) as well as his undemocratic actions.
As Sullivan and Olhero indicate, the House of Representatives also passed House
Resolution 2601 (House Report - 109-168) with its provisions for funding "activities in
support of political parties, the rule of law, civil society, an independent media, and
otherwise promote democratic, accountable governance in Venezuela." 93 At the same
time, other legislative action undertaken during the 1 0 9 th Congress included House
Concurrent Resolution 224 which called on the Chavez government to uphold human
rights and civil liberties, as well as House Concurrent Resolution 328 which condemned
Chavez's anti-democratic actions (Proposition 12). Another measure, although not
completed during the 10 9 th Congress, was Senate Resolution 587 which sought to
condemn 'the anti-democratic actions and statements of the leaders of Iran, Cuba, and
Venezuela and expressed concern about the national security implications of the
relationship between these leaders (Proposition 3, barely).94
92 These funds, along with $2.25 million in funding for the Andean Counter-drug Initiative, were contained
within the Foreign Operations appropriation measure (P.L. 109-102, H.R. 3057, House Report 109-265).
93 Sullivan and Olhero, (2008), pg. 52.
94 Sullivan and Olhero also indicate that during the 109f Congress oversight hearings were held on
Venezuela policy issues. The House International Relations Committee - Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere held a hearing on November 17, 2005 on the status of Venezuelan democracy as a follow-up to
its earlier hearings of March 9 and September 28 on the status of democracy in Latin America which also
addressed Venezuela's democracy. See Ibid., pg. 52.
268
Table 19 - Applying Blasier's Propositions to United States
Congressional Action in dealing with the Chavez Government and the
State of Venezuelan Democracy Concerns
Proposition Explaining Congressional Action
Number 3 USG will respond to revolutionary governments in accordance to the latter's perceived
links to the United States' strongest Great Power rival. Strategic considerations will
shape whether USG responses are conciliatory or suppressive. Senate Resolution 587,
which sought to condemn 'the anti-democratic actions and statements of the leaders of
Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela and expressed concern about the national security
implications of the relationship between these leaders.'
Number 5 Economic considerations and private business interests are important in the formulation
of USG policies and are compatible with policies decided on strategic grounds.
However, strategic factors take precedence over economic considerations. For example,
the 110" Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2008 (P.L. 110-
161, Division J), which although it does not specify the funding of the U.S. State
Department's international broadcasting operations targeting Venezuela, the joint
explanatory statement for the bill does however express support for restoring shortwave
and medium wave transmissions to Venezuela.
Number 8 USG responses determined by departmental officials are in line with those of U.S.
private interests or at least do not blatantly oppose these interests. For example, the
110h Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2008 (P.L. 110-161,
Division J).
Number 9 USG responses involve intra-agency conflict. Bureaucratic considerations will
condition USG response. A key example of this is the conference report to the Fiscal
Year (FY) 2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Division B of Public Law - P.L. 108-
792) which required a comprehensive report on the National Endowment for
Democracy's (NED) activities in Venezuela dating back to FY 2001, as well as
requiring that the Endowment ensure that all of its activities adhere to core NED
principles.
Number 12 USG responses are shaped by: 1) the President acting with or through cabinet-level
officers; 2) leaders of large corporations working with the U.S. Congress and the
executive and 3) middle level diplomats and civil servants. Responses are the result of
security, economic, and bureaucratic considerations. For example, the 10 8th Congress
expressed its concerns by means of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee -
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere hearing held during June 2004 to assess the
possible impact of the August 2004 recall referendum on Venezuela's democracy.
Source: Blasier, 1985, pg. 236.
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Evidence of mounting congressional concern (Table 19) with Venezuelan
democracy and human rights is seen in the 110th Congress's (2007-08) approval of Senate
Resolution 211 expressing concern about freedom of expression and the Venezuelan
government's decision not to renew the license of Radio Caracas Televisi6n (RCTV). As
a result of Chavez's badgering of the media, the 110th Congress enacted the Consolidated
Appropriations Act for FY 2008 (P.L. 110-161, Division J). While Congress did not
actually fund the U.S. State Department's international broadcasting operations targeting
Venezuela, the joint explanatory statement for the bill does express support for restoring
shortwave and medium wave transmissions to Venezuela (Propositions 5, 8, and 12).95
Congressional concern with the state of Venezuelan democracy, human rights,
and press freedoms over time is captured by Graph 9 on the following page. Graph 9
highlights how congressional post Cold War concerns have spiked during periods of
Venezuelan political instability. The graph charts the evolution of congressional concern
with Chavez and his impact on issues of importance to Congress and U.S. voters.
95 Note that Sullivan and Olhero report that the Bush administration's FY 2008 foreign aid budget does
request $3 million in Development Assistance for support of Venezuelan civil society. See Ibid. pg. 50.
270
Graph 9 - Key Congressional Concerns over time as Highlighted
by the Congressional Record Index (CRI)
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Source: Compiled from U.S. Government Printing Office - U.S. Congressional Record Index, 1983-2009
accessed May 25, 2009, http://www.gpoaccess. gov/cri/index.html.
Congressional concern is captured in the Congressional Record Index (CRI). The
CRI reports that in 1983 only seven documents out of 451, or 1.5 percent of possible
documents referenced Venezuela and human rights concerns. By 1992, the year of
Chavez's failed military coup attempt, the number of references jumps to 19 documents
out of 437 but drops down to 16 out of 415 in 1998 with Chavez's election. Indicative of
mounting congressional concern is that by 2007, references to Venezuela and human
rights spikes to 94 out of 530 documents, or nearly 18 percent.
A noteworthy resolution that made its rounds in the 11 0 th Congress is House
Resolution 50 which calls on the Chivez government to uphold the human rights and the
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civil liberties of the Venezuelan people. A critical resolution linked to the foregoing is
House Resolution 77 which calls on the Chavez government to respect a free and
independent media and to avoid all acts of censorship against the media and freedom of
expression.96
Both Houses of Congress are similarly concerned with the state of Venezuelan
democracy, human rights, and the freedom of the press. The CRI in this sense highlights
that in 1983 only nine documents mention Venezuela and democracy out of 285
documents. These numbers again jump in 1992 to reference 23 out of 556 documents.
Interestingly enough Congress appears to have initially thought that after Chavez's failed
coup attempt in 1992, the situation had returned to a semblance of normality and that
democracy in Venezuela although bruised was safe and therefore no longer necessitated
heightened congressional attention. As a result the 1993 CRI record consequently only
highlights two documents that mention Venezuela and democracy out of 485 documents.
Congressional concern with Venezuelan democracy as a result is relegated to the foreign
policy backburner for much of the 1993-97 period.
Congress's concern with Venezuelan democracy remains low, despite Chavez's
1998 election until the April 2002 coup attempt. The failed coup attempt generates a brief
increase in the number of CRI records referencing Venezuela and democracy. CRI
records go from nine out of 338 documents in 2001 to 14 out of 261 documents in 2002.
The following year (2003) however, sees a drop to five out of 423 documents. What is
particularly telling about the analysis of the CRI records is that these evidence double
digit records starting in 2004 and continuing to the present. The largest increase occurs in
96 Ibid., pg. 51.
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2007 when the CRI record jumps to 54 out of 356 documents referencing both Venezuela
and democracy - the previous year there had been 26 out of 352 documents, or 15
percent of all documents making references to democracy. The CRI also highlights that
congressional concern with press freedoms has had a similar trajectory during the 1983-
2009 period but not as pronounced as the concern over human rights and democracy.
Since the April 2002 failed coup attempt against the Chavez government,
congressional concern with the state of Venezuelan democracy, the deteriorating human
rights situation, and the undermining of press freedoms has not waned. Congress's
ongoing involvement contending with Chavez's revolutionary agenda for Venezuela is
captured in part by the FY 2006 NED $2 million appropriation for promoting democracy,
as well as by how NED has sought to allocate funds among its discretionary grant
programs.
Table 20 on the following page lists both NED's grant programs and budget
allocations and thereby illustrates the areas that are of greatest concern in its activities in
Venezuela. Funds spent on these activities by NED must be accounted for to Congress,
which itself has an interest in promoting these programs on behalf of its consituents.
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Table 20 - National Endowment for Democracy Grant Programs for
Calendar Years 2004 to 2007
(in $ thousands)
Grant Program 2004 2005 2006 2007
Farmers in Action $65,000 $58,240 S60,106 NFC
Action for Development S12,420 CDJ $74,590 CDJ S49,904 NFC
Justice Consortium S67,000 S79,632
Justice Consortium- West S16,000 $20,000 $27,460 NFC
Alternative Justice $13,980 $17,650 $26,750 NFC
Civil Association Kape-kape --- $14,950 S39,900 NFC
Civil Association for Citizen Freedom --- --- --- $37,200*
*
Leadership and Vision S56,000 $22,721 S64,823 NFC
Civil Association Uniandes --- $15,058 S21,630 NFC
Asodisamar --- --- $16,200 NFC
Center for Human Rights Studies --- --- $45,652 NFC
Education Center for Community --- --- $70,800 NFC
Training and Ethics
Center for International Private Enterprise $92,488 --- $98,173 NFC
$33,006*
Center for Justice and International Law $90,000 --- --- NFC
Center for the Resolution of Conflict of --- $12,850 --- NFC
the Lawyer Association of the State of
Lara
Center for Service to Popular Action $60,000 $68,133 $74,675 NFC
Concentroccidente --- $14,202 --- NFC
Justice of Peace of Monagas State $11,490 $17,200 $28,850 NFC
Foundation
Press and Society Institute - Venezuela $72,000 $74,950 582,700 S102,856
International Republican Institute (IRI) $285,000 $200,000 $200,000 $100,000
S mate --- $107,200 --- NFC
Venezuelans of the World --- $12,490 --- NFC
Total Dollars 841,378 655,644 937,351 202,856*
**
OBS: (*) Indicates reprogrammed 2001 funds. (**) Department of State funding beyond NED's annual
appropriations. CDJ stands for "Consortium for Development and Justice." NFC stands for "new funding
category" starting in 2007, grant recipient not specified. (***) Indicates, see table 21 for full year values.
Sources: National Endowment for Democracy - Latin America and Caribbean Grant Programs,
http://www.ned.org/grants/O4pro rams/grants-acO4.html#Venezuela,
http://www.ned.org/grants/05pro rams/grants-lac05.html#Venezuela,
http://www.ned.org/grants/06prorams/grants-lac06.html#Venezuela, and
http://www.ned.org/grants/07programs/grants-lac07.html#Venezuela.
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As of 2007, the last full year of data for NED grant programs, NED while still
retaining budget line item clarification of its grant program money for the Civil
Association for Citizen Freedom, the Press and Society Institute - Venezuela, and the
International Republican Institute, is no longer tagging a particular grant program to an
activity. Rather NED now reports generic categories such as accountability, civic
education, human rights, and NGO strengthening among others. It does however continue
to provide both a monetary break down per category and a description of how funds will
be utilized.
Table 21 - National Endowment for Democracy Grant Programs for
Calendar Years 2007 - 2009
(in $ thousands)
Grant Program 2007 2008 2009
Accountability $35,000 N/A N/A
Civil Association for Citizen Freedom $37,200*
Civic Education $21,300 N/A N/A
$26,750
$32,800
$33,030
$34,660
$44,154
$43,820
$65,000
Freedom of Information $45,888 N/A N/A
Human Rights $45,000 N/A N/A
$50,000
NGO Strengthening $50,500 N/A N/A
$83,835
$86,400
Press and Society Institute - Venezuela $102,856 N/A N/A
International Republican Institute (IRI) $100,000 N/A N/A
Total Dollars $900,993 N/A N/A
OBS: (*) Indicates Department of State funding beyond NED's annual appropriations.
Sources: National Endowment for Democracy - Latin America and Caribbean Grant Programs,
http://www.ned.org/Vrants/07prorams/rants-lacO 7 .html#Venezuela.
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Table 21 reflects NED's current means for reporting grant program fund
allocations. Allocations for 2007 are slightly off from 2006 values due primarily to a drop
in funding for the International Republican Institute. Funding for activities related to
strengthening freedom of the press has increased in comparison to past years (see, Tables
20 and 21). Targeted funding increases illustrates that NED has been influenced by
Congress's concern with freedom of the press and the role that NGOs play in preserving
the rule of law and democracy in Venezuela.
Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana, 1977 to present) in the Hearing of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on the Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the
Development of Democracy (June 8, 2006) raised his concerns over the state of
democracy in Venezuela. 97 In his opening remarks, Lugar stated to the committee that the
United States is pleased with expansion of democratic governance in places such as the
Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia, but is alarmed by the counteroffensive launched by
authoritarian regimes to undermine civil society and pro-democracy organizations. Lugar
indicated that support for democratic grassroots organizations is the centerpiece of
America's international outreach.98
According to Lugar, individuals and entities that support democracy in places
such as Venezuela are under increasing government scrutiny and harassment. For
example, Lugar cites the case of Maria Corina Machado, founder and executive director
of the independent democratic civil society group S mate, who has been charged by the
97 See, Lugar, Richard, in "United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "The Role of Non-
Governmental Organizations in the Development of Democracy," Washington, D.C. (June 8, 2006),
accessed May 25, 2009, http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2006/LugarStatementO6O6O8.pdf and
http://frwebgate access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109 senate hearings&docid=f:34274.pdf.
98 Ibid.
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Chivez government with treason for having received NED grant funding. S'mate
monitors the performance of Venezuela's electoral institutions. 99 Machado's persecution,
and mounting congressional concern in recent years with safeguarding the promotion of
democratic governance in Venezuela, is responsible for changing how NED now
publically reports its grant program allocations (Table 21).100
Lugar and Senator Christopher Dodd (D-Connecticut, 1981 to present) co-
sponsored during the 110 th Congress's (2007-08) approval of Senate Resolution 211
expressing concern about freedom of expression and the Venezuelan government's
decision not to renew the license of Radio Caracas Televisi6n (RCTV).101 In Senate
Resolution 211, Lugar expressed the Senate's profound concern with the Chavez
government's "transgression against the freedom of thought and expression. 10 2 The Lugar
- Dodd resolution specifically intervenes in U.S. foreign policymaking by directly
accusing Chavez of refusing to renew RCTV's license merely because the station adhered
to an editorial stance that "is different from his way of thinking."103
99 Ibid.
100 Senator Lugar is referring to the National Endowment for Democracy report, "The Backlash Against
Democratic Assistance," that he commissioned. This report details that "representatives of democracy
assistance NGOs have been harassed, offices closed, and staff expelled. Even more vulnerable are local
grantees and project partners who have been threatened, assaulted, prosecuted, imprisoned, and even
killed." Lugar met with Maria Corina Machado in October of 2005, where the latter raised mounting
concerns over the Chivez government's tighetening of legal constraints against democracy assistance.
101 Senate Resolution 211 expresses "the profound concern of the Senate regarding the transgression against
freedom of thought and expression that is being carried out in Venezuela, and for other purposes." See,
Lugar, Richard, and Christopher Dodd, in "United States Senate Resolution 211," 1100 Congress, 1t
Session, Washington, D.C. (May 21, 2007), accessed May 25, 2009, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?c 110:1:./temp/-c 110hAZkOo.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
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The resolution cites that there is neither proof of the station's complicity in the
events that led to the failed April 2002 coup attempt against Chavez, nor have charges or
legal sanctions been filed against the station. Lugar, speaking for the U.S. government,
accuses Chavez of violating freedom of thought and expression, an act that is prohibited
by Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Lugar - Dodd
resolution goes to great lengths to make the point that RCTV and other means of
communication "have the right to carry out their role in an independent manner."10 4 The
resolution strenuously argues that any "direct or indirect pressures exerted upon
journalists or other social communicators to stifle the dissemination of information are
incompatible with freedom of expression." 10 5
By recurring to Blasier's theoretical propositions, the Lugar - Dodd resolution
(Senate Resolution 211) falls primarily within the foreign policymaking parameters of
Propositions 2, 5, and 12. Although RCTV is not controlled by U.S. interests, Lugar and
Dodd were influenced by Chavez's re-nationalization of Compaifa Andnima Nacional de
Telefonos de Venezuela (CANTV) Venezuela's largest telecommunications provider -
which was then partially owned by Verizon Communications (an American broadband
and telecommunications company). Although in February 2007 the Venezuelan
government ultimately negotiated an agreement with Verizon for the purchase of its stake
in CANTV that the latter deemed fair, concern has lingered over the aggressive take over
of this company and the precedent that it sets.
14 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
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The Lugar - Dodd resolution is also associated with Blasier's Proposition 5 since
it deals with freedom of expression and the rule of law. Both of these issues are of critical
interest to U.S. foreign policymakers in the post- Cold War era since they combine both
economic concerns and strategic considerations that are important to the U.S. electorate
and therefore by extension to Congress. Blasier's Proposition 12 is of paramount
importance with regards to this resolution. Here the former is the result of Congress
taking a key interest, even a lead role, in arguing that the Chavez government's action
against RCTV constitutes a security threat against U.S. interests defined in terms of
safeguarding of freedom of expression and the rule of law, as well as casts a shadow over
the safety of current and future U.S. business investments in Venezuela. Nonetheless in
acknowledgement of the scant overall threat that the Chavez government poses to the
United States, these security considerations do not exceed the threshold of comfort that
would otherwise justify recourse to the sponsoring of armed action against the Chavez
government (Proposition 15, not applicable).
Yet despite the significant amount of U.S. private sector investment in the
Venezuelan petro-chemical sector over the decades, congressional concern with U.S.
business interests in Venezuela has not eclipsed concern with Venezuelan human rights
issues and democracy. Only in 2008 does Congress focus more on Venezuelan petroleum
related concerns (46) than it does on human rights (42), democracy (27), or press
freedoms (33). However it seems to be too soon to tell if this is a one time event or
indicates the possibility of a long-term shift in congressional concern. For now the
evidence shows that in the post Cold War period Congress remains concerned primarily
with ensuring the preservation of democratic governance, safeguarding human rights,
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freedom of expression, and ensuring the rule of law, all of which reinforces each other as
well as promotes Venezuelan economic development and social peace. U.S. business
interests in Venezuela are linked to the foregoing and suffer as a result of the Chavez
government's repression of these other issues.
Congressional interest inferred from CRI statistics indicate that Congress plays an
active role in influencing U.S. foreign policymaking towards Venezuela. For over a
decade now, Congress has sought to entice Chavez to respect human rights via the
promotion of (representative) democracy. Congress, at the same time, is cognizant of the
economic importance that Venezuela plays in U.S. energy security calculations as
evidenced by hearings on the subject matter. However, the absence of an extra
hemispheric and anti-American rival of the United States engaging in non-constructive
and interventionist policies on behalf of Venezuela mitigates the possibility of Congress
calling for armed intervention against Chavez. Venezuela, and the Chavez government, is
actually more vulnerable to any disruption in crude oil supplies to the United States than
the United States is itself.
Interpreting the Hugo Chavez Government Threat: Expert Opinions
U.S. Senator Bob Graham (D-Florida, 1987-2005), the former chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Committee, stresses that Chavez is more of a nuisance at present than
an actual threat to the security interests of the United States.106 Graham clarifies that
Chavez's political power is based almost exclusively on oil. In this regard, U.S. demand
106 Graham, Bob. "Telephone interview with Senator Bob Graham," Miami, Florida, April 21, 2008.
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for Venezuelan petroleum actually subsidizes the Chavez government and thereby
finances Chavez's means for retaining political control in Venezuela.
Chavez's willingness to engage in compensation negotiations for nationalized
foreign investments indicates a willingness to work with the affected parties and the
United States. The United States has responded to this situation by adopting a
conciliatory position (Proposition 2). An example of this is the case of the Chavez
government's willingness to negotiate an agreement on compensating Verizon for the
nationalization of its interests in CANTV
To ensure the survival of the Bolivarian Revolution, Chavez often ultimately
implements a quiet but nonetheless conciliatory policy towards the United States with
regard to dispute settlement. Chavez's greatest constraint is, as Graham points out, the
fact that the United States imports a significant amount of its daily crude oil needs from
Venezuela, which also represents the bulk of that country's export earnings. As a result
ChAvez's hold on power is vulnerable because of this trade relationship.107
Unlike the case of Middle Eastern petroleum (normally lighter and with a lower
concentration of sulfur), Venezuela exports largely heavy and sour crude oil. Venezuelan
107 On an average daily basis, the United States imports approximately 1.13 million barrels of petroleum
and petroleum products from Venezuela. This number is down by 11.7 percent in the first four months of
2008 and represents a 5-year low. The decline in U.S. imports of Venezuelan crude oil is a result of the
combination of falling U.S. demand for oil, falling daily output by PdVSA (2.4 million barrels a day
estimated by the Paris-based International Energy Administration versus PdVSA's claims of 3.4 million
barrels per day), and Venezuela's own attempt to diversify away from export dependence on the United
States. Chavez has sought to diversify reliance on the U.S. energy market by shipping an average of
250,000 barrels of Venezuelan crude per day to China and aims to double this figure by 2010. See, Jones,
Rachael (Associated Press), "U.S. Imports Less Oil from Venezuela," in The New York City Daily News,
(July 1, 2008), accessed July 4, 2008,
http://breakingnews.nydailynews.com/dynamic/stories/V/VENEZUELA US OIL?SITE=NYNYD&SECT
ION=US&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2008-07-01-00-13-46. For a monthly breakdown in
thousands of barrels of U.S. imports of petroleum by country of origin with an analysis of the evolution of
Venezuelan exports to the United States, see, U.S. Department of Energy - Energy Information Agency,
"U.S. Imports by Country of Origin," (June 26, 2008), accessed July 6, 2008,
http-//tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet move impcus a2 nus ep00 im0 mbbl m.htm.
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crude oil requires additional refining, which adds costs. Specialized refineries, tooled to
handle Venezuelan crude oil are concentrated in the southern United States. 108 Such key
factors limit, if not outright hamper, Chavez's capability of threatening the economic
security interests of the United States.
Congress, aware of this reality, coupled with the absence of an extra-hemispheric
rival of the United States acting as a protector of Chavez, finds it politically expedient to
adopt less suppressive policies. Its call on Chavez to respect the democratic process,
human rights practices, and ensure freedom of the press, while politically embarrassing
for Chavez are far less threatening than Congress appropriating funds for the armed
overthrow of his government. If Chavez had gained power during the Cold War,
Congress could have formulated policies toward Venezuela mirroring those of 1959/61
Cuba or 1980s Sandinista Nicaragua. If this had been the case, Congress's actions toward
Chivez would have been formulated along the lines of Blasier's Proposition 3.
Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana, 1977-present), a strong and influential
proponent of reducing the United States' dependence on foreign oil, has made similar
comments with regards to oil and gas. Lugar, referring to United States intelligence
agencies, indicates that 90 percent of the world's oil and natural gas prices are not set by
108 An arbitrary shutdown of PdVSA-CITGO refineries in the United States by Venezuela is an empty
threat given that it would bog down Venezuela in thousands of contract breech lawsuits with its 14,000
independently owned retail outlets, posing an unmanageable and costly legal situation. Also seeking to
export Venezuelan sour and heavy feedstock, which constitute the largest portion of Venezuelan oil to
China is both financially unsound as well as practically not feasible. Although Chivez may threaten the
United States government with a suspension of oil shipments by shifting these to China, this is not likely
given the primitive nature of China's refining network. China is unable to receive and process the volume
of sour and heavy crude oil that the United States receives from Venezuela. It is estimated that it will take
several years of bilateral coordinated planning and extensive investment to turn such an initiative into a
reality. See, Giusti, Luis E., "Comments," Statements delivered before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations in Washington, DC, on June 22, 2006, pg. 9, accessed June 20, 2008,
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/ 2 0 0 6 /GiustiTestimony060622.pdf.
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the supply and demand mechanisms associated with the workings of the free market.109
Rather, Lugar finds that these prices are set by foreign governments." 0 These
governments or their oil policies are not necessarily crafted to favor the interests of the
United States.1 ' Lugar's, like Graham's comments, fall within Blasier's Propositions 5
and 12 whereby Congress will formulate balanced policies based on the links between
strategic considerations and economic objectives.
In the executive-legislative struggle for the privilege of primary responsibility in
the U.S. foreign policymaking process, a major mechanism at Congress's disposal for
influencing policy is control over the funding process. Nonetheless, Graham supports the
notion that the executive branch leads U.S. foreign policymaking (Proposition 6).
Graham goes on to clarify that "in our system of divided government, the President has
the constitutional privilege of primary responsibility for foreign policymaking." Yet
similarly mirroring the division of powers in the U.S. Constitution, Graham also strongly
believes that the U.S. Congress has a significant role and responsibility in crafting U.S.
foreign policymaking as highlighted by the role played by the Appropriations Committee
(Proposition 12).
By comparing Chavez to other Latin American revolutionaries of the past, namely
the Cold War era Sandinista government, Graham is of the opinion that today's situation
in the Americas is markedly different from that prevalent in the late Cold War. While
Graham supports the notion that the Soviet Union sought to exploit opportune
109 Lugar, Richard. Comments delivered at the American Enterprise Institute during the Food Security
Conference on July 2, 2008.
"1 Ibid.
" Ibid.
283
developments in Sandinista Nicaragua, he does not see a similar threat today confronting
the United States in Latin America and as a result Blasier's Proposition 3 does not apply
to Chivez. Similarly Senator Jim Webb (D-Virginia, 2007 to present) indicates that the
Chavez government mainly presents challenges to the United States in the areas of
human rights, energy, and terrorism.' 1 2
Graham is of the opinion that the United States today is not facing the same sort
of potential threat to its security interests when it comes to Chavez as it did with the
Sandinistas' attempt to act in concert with the Soviet Union during the Cold War
(Proposition 3). Graham concurs with the notion that the United States at present is not
facing an extra-hemispheric power seeking to dispute its political and economic
hegemony in the Latin American region. Graham, however, does agree that should
Chavez at some point in the future seek to cooperate or collude with a radical, anti-
American entity such as Al Qaeda, then such actions by Chavez could and should be
construed by U.S. foreign policymakers as a threat to the security interests of the United
States (Propositions 3 and 4).
With regards to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Graham makes
the point that unfortunately the NED in Latin America has been less effective than in
other places as a consequence of insufficient funding. 113 Graham, as a former U.S.
112 Webb, Jim. "Senator Jim Webb's response to interview questionnaire," E-mail GUID#IA5bac73dc-
38e6-4bal-9c8c-85b78596766 (August 28, 2008).
13 Bob Graham served on the National Endowment for Democracy's Board of Directors, where he played
an influential role in setting priorities for Latin America. Furthermore, as a member of the Senate, Graham
played a key role in articulating the role of the Endowment to fellow Senators. Graham, as a staunch
supporter of NED's long-term democracy promotion has argued that "Democracy is not just about
elections," he said, "democracy requires work, effort and sacrifice to be achieved." See, National
Endowment for Democracy, "NED Honors Graham and McHugh with Democracy Service Medal," in
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Senator and member of the NED's Board of Directors, clarified that a limiting factor of
the endowment's effectiveness in Latin America has been U.S. policymakers' inability to
provide it with reasonable objectives. Graham believes that to be effective, NED
activities, much like U.S. foreign policies in general, need to be more focused and "less
scatter shoot." He also argues that the Endowment can play a significant role in Latin
America, a region that needs more attention. According to Graham, the United States
needs to craft strategic policies for Latin America that are much more proactive instead of
being merely reactive.
Chavez and his Bolivarian revolutionary government's reforms have proven to be
an economic nightmare for mid- to long-term foreign direct investment planning.
Chavez's revolutionary reforms far from threatening the vital interests of the United
States, serve as positive proof of the ineffectiveness of centralized state economic
planning. In this case, national resources are being misallocated as the Chavez
government simultaneously over staffs certain sectors of the state apparatus for political
support while under investing in upgrading PdVSA's operational capability.
The Chavez government, having narrowly focused its policies on confronting the
United States and failing to re-invest oil profits in PdVSA, has possibly undermined its
own long-term political survival. Any shortfall in Venezuelan crude output as a result of
decaying infrastructure and failure to implement new recovery technologies and or
extended low global oil prices as a result of a protracted global economic slowdown that
NED Publications, (2004), Issue, 1, accessed July 6, 2008,
http://www.ned.org/publications/newsletters/spring04.html#Top.
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reduces demand for petroleum, puts the Chavez government at risk domestically.1 4 Low
oil prices, not the political opposition that is otherwise too fragmented, weak, and
demoralized, constitutes a threat to Chivez.
Similarly within the executive branch of the U.S. government among desk
officers and division directors in frontline foreign policymaking agencies, there is
consensus that Chivez is more of threat to his neighbors' stability than to the United
States.1 1 5 For example, the government of Peru's Alan Garcia Perez has taken issue with
Chavez's support for Casa ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana de las Americas).116 Casa
ALBA being a non-governmental organization is supposedly chartered to promote
cooperation between Venezuela and other Latin American states. However the Garcia
Perez government has seen Casa ALBA involving itself in Peruvian domestic politics.
Such action has led the Garcia Perez government to restrict and shut down this NGO's
activities in Peru.
It bears mentioning that as is often the case, Chavez will speak his mind on an
issue and then pull back and force Venezuela's diplomats to finesse and or explain to the
114 Thanks to high international oil prices in recent years, Chivez has managed to lower Venezuela's
dependency on foreign borrowing and augmented the country's central bank's stock of dollar reserves,
according to Lapper. At the same time Chavez has also been able to lower poverty levels in Venezuela
since 2003. However, despite the country's impressive levels of growth the Chavez government is
dangerously dependent on continued high oil prices in order to finance its current level of spending, its
social missions to the urban poor, and foreign assistance commitments. Lapper finds that even a modest fall
back toward the $30-$40 per barrel range will impose severe strains on Venezuela's budget. Lapper,
writing in 2006, finds that even if oil prices remain at the then current level of $60 per barrel, the Chavez
government will struggle to maintain revenue levels because of its lack of investment in the oil sector
coupled with private firms deferring investment because of political risk. Since 2006, Venezuelan
investment in the oil sector has not improved. See Lapper, pgs. 27-28.
15 Venezuela is dependent on imports for more than 60 percent of daily food supply. Zanin, Bruce.
"Interview with Bruce Zanin, U.S. Department of Agriculture - Foreign Agricultural Service, Director
Western Hemisphere, Office of Country and Regional Affairs," Washington, DC, February 9, 2009.
116 Orbezo Salas, Gian Carlo, "La ALBA en el Peru," in Peru Politico, accessed July 30, 2008,
http://www.perupolitico.com/?p= 4 76.
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world what Chavez really meant to say. This sort of action is undertaken as a means of
damage control, but nonetheless still highlights the fact that almost all governing power is
concentrated in Chavez." 7
Arguing against identifying Chavez as a threat to U.S. vital interests in the
Americas, when compared to Cold War era Sandinista Nicaragua is the fact that Chavez
unlike the Sandinistas, is trying to export a revolutionary model that is only viable in
countries with vast endowments of natural resources (i.e., Bolivia) in demand by the
global economy. Venezuela's Bolivarian revolution is only viable as long as high oil
prices remain in place. Countries without a similar source of wealth will be hard pressed
to implement Bolivarian-style revolutionary reforms.1 1 8
FACTORS ARGUING AGAINST LABELING CHAVEZ AS A SIGNIFICANT THREAT
Congressional Record Index Findings
A review of the Congressional Record Index (CRI) shows that U.S. concern with
Latin American reformists' and revolutionaries' tangible collusion with a militarily
powerful extra-hemispheric, anti-American power will result in U.S. suppressive policies
regardless of the time period being analyzed. For example, congressional concern with
discerning whether there is a threat is quantified by tallying the number of times that the
Soviet Union, Nicaragua, and the Sandinistas appear in the CRI during the Cold War."1 9
117 Ultimately such a disproportionate concentration of power in one person will lead to succession
problems. The Venezuelan National Assembly is devoid of leaders, as well as has surrendered to Chavez
control over its legislative agenda. This in turn has resulted not only a weak party structure built around
Chivez, but also has resulted in the enfeeblement of Venezuelan institutions.
118 Zanin (2009).
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Concern is captured by Graph 11 which tracks congressional interest with the Soviet
Union and Nicaragua's Sandinistas during the late Cold War.
Similarly this sort of analysis is also applied in the post-Cold War era by
comparing the number of times that Venezuela is mentioned in the CRI to the number of
times the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Russian
Federation are mentioned (Graph 12). With the Soviet Union's demise and the end of the
Cold War, Latin America's importance declines. Chavez's threat to U.S. security, mainly
economic security, is framed in these terms. This situation is highlighted by Graphs 10
and 11 on the following pages that detail the low priority assigned to Latin America and
Venezuela by Congress in the post-Cold War era.
119 This same method is also utilized in the present study to quantify U.S. congressional concern with a
country or its leadership in the post-Cold War.
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Graph 10 - U.S. Congressional Concerns with Nicaragua and the
Sandinistas vis-a-vis the Soviet Union/ Russia and Cuba
(1983-2008)
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Obs: The end of the Cold War (1991) downgraded the relevance of the Soviet Union/ Russia. Russia, as a
successor state to the Soviet Union, has not generated a similar level of attention. Post-Cold War Russia
accounts for 1.5 percent of entries versus 5.1 percent for the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Source: Compiled from U.S. Government Printing Office - U.S. Congressional Record Index, 1983-2008
accessed July 25, 2008 and February 14, 2009, http://www.epoaccess.gov cri index.html.
Graph 10 also shows that absent the Soviet threat, Latin America drifts unnoticed
except for collateral concerns resulting from the Asian financial crisis (1997-99).2o
120 As a consequence of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq,
concern with Latin America declines. Even with the region's leftward tack and concerns with energy
prices, Congressional attention with the region since 2001 more or less remains where it was during the late
Cold War. The outlyer is Cuba, but this is attributable to Fidel Castro's failing health and succession.
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Without the presence of an anti-American power, Chavez hardly seems to constitute a
major military security threat for Congress when compared to China and Russia.
Graph 11 - U.S. Congressional Concerns with Venezuela and Latin
America vis-i-vis Russia and China
(1983-2008)
Congressional Record, Individual Documents
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Source: Compiled from U.S. Government Printing Office - U.S. Congressional Record Index, 1983-
2008, accessed July 25, 2008 and February 14, 2009, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/cri/index.html.
Graph 11 highlights the current international situation which points to the fact that
the post-Cold War period lacks an outside agitator on which the Chavez government can
call on for support should its policies drive Washington to opt to suppress its
revolutionary programs. By tallying entries in the CRI the study finds that this reality
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negates the situation that would otherwise be associated with Blasier's Proposition 3.
Post-Cold War congressional interest with China and Russia is often linked to concerns
over high commodity prices (e.g., oil, gas, and food stuffs) more than with ideological
concerns.
Graph 12 - U.S. Congressional Concerns with Russia and China vis-t-
vis Middle East Issues
(2000-2008)
Congressional Record, Individual Documents
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Obs: For the annual average value of oil see Appendix 8.
Source: Compiled from U.S. Government Printing Office - U.S. Congressional Record Index, 1983-
2008, accessed July 25, 2008 and February 14, 2009, http://www.epoaccess.gov cri'index.html.
Graph 12 stresses that though interest in China and Russia endure because of their
international political and military stature, interest is no longer just defined in terms of
their ability to exert global political and military influence. Rather congressional interest
now appears to have expanded to encompass also these countries' ability to compete with
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the United States for access to strategic natural resources and markets - an example of
this is CNOOC's attempted acquisition of U.S. oil and gas major Unocal.12 1 By tallying
entries in the CRI, Graph 15 also highlights that the steep spikes in congressional interest
with regards to China and Russia since 2000 are often issue-specific driven.
The CRI shows that there is a significant departure from the situation prevailing
during the Cold War when Congress and other foreign policymakers in the U.S.
government focused more narrowly on the ideological and military threat posed by these
two countries to the United States.122 China today aspires to be seen as a renascent great
power, while Russia seeks to arrest its eroding great power status. Yet neither one of
these states have adopted the sort of competitive and interventionist policy postures that
approximate the level of distrust and rivalry associated with the Cold War U.S.-Soviet
121 On June 23, 2005, China's third largest state oil company China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC) announced its intent to purchase California-based Unocal for $18.5 billion. China's offer of
approximately $2 billion more than U.S. oil major Chevron's own bid drew congressional calls for greater
scrutiny of the deal based on national security concerns. In a letter to President George W. Bush, U.S.
Representatives Duncan Hunter (R-California, 1981-present) and Richard W. Pombo (R-California, 1993-
2007) stated: "As the world energy landscape shifts, we believe that it is critical to understand the
implications for American interests and most especially, the threat posed by China's governmental pursuit
of world energy resources. The United States increasingly needs to view meeting its energy requirements
within the context of our foreign policy, national security and economic security agenda."' See, Lee, David
and the University of Illinois College of Law. "A Warning to Foreign Companies Entering Sensitive U.S.
Markets," (September 18, 2006) in the Illinois Business Law Journal, accessed February 14, 2009,
http://iblsioumal.typepad.com/illinois business law soc/2006!09/a warning to fo.html.
122 This marks a departure from ideological rigidity towards issue driven policy concerns. Today many
congressional arguments, such as those of Senator John Cornyn (R-Texas, 2008-present) string together a
number of issues such as linking high energy prices to unfriendly suppliers (i.e. Venezuela) along with
terrorism. Cornyn, in arguing for expanded domestic energy production, has quoted Senator Barak Obama
(D-Illinois, 2005-present), who himself has indicated that "...our dependence on foreign oil strains family
budgets and it zaps our economy. Oil money pays for the bombs that go off from Baghdad to Beirut, and
the bombast of dictators from Caracas to Tehran. Our Nation will not be secure unless we take that leverage
away, and our planet will not be safe unless we move decisively toward a clean energy future." See, U.S.
Government Printing Office - Congressional Record (Senate), "Gas Prices and National Security," Volume
154 (2008), June 17, 2008, pg. S5672, accessed July 30, 2008, http: frwebgatel.access.gpo.gov cgi-
bin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdocID=705 4 72 4 4 1669+1+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve.
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struggle for international leadership/ supremacy.' As a result Latin America remains
largely a politically and economically stable region, resulting in less U.S. congressional
scrutiny than other regional hot spots.
Interestingly enough with regard to the issue of access to strategic natural
resources and commodities, 2008's high commodity prices, while representing a boom
for agricultural exporters like the United States, did nonetheless also highlight the United
States' own vulnerability to then record high international oil and natural gas prices. The
high prices of strategic natural resources in 2008 adversely impacted American industrial
and agricultural profitability since it contributed to driving up production input costs and
thereby tightened producer profitability margins. With the 2009 financial crisis and
global recession, slackening consumer demand is now adversely impacting producer
profitability as consumers forgo purchases and thereby put downward pressure on
producers to further lower prices.
Congressional concern with U.S. economic dependence on imported petroleum in
2008 highlighted U.S. vulnerability to strategic resource competition from China. While
the 2009-10 period will see little if any economic growth, and as a consequence will
lessen demand for strategic resources and in the process help ease tensions resulting from
competition for commodities and resources, this will likely be a short-lived respite. As
123 Legislative branch attention, much like that of the executive branch remains fixated on developments in
the Middle East and China to the detriment of other regions like Latin America. While this represents a
departure from the levels of congressional interest directed toward Latin America during the Cold War, it
provides support for the notion that Congress will focus its resources on those issues that it and the sitting
administration believe to be most pressing and of greatest public interest.
1 As a result producers sought to pass their added costs to consumers in the form of higher prices.
Ammonia-based fertilizer costs escalated as the price of natural gas and oil increased given that inorganic
fertilizers are dependent on energy derived from petroleum for its manufacture. High input costs impacted
farming and ranching with higher transportation and feed costs.
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the United States and other industrialized economies recover from the financial crisis and
global recession of the 2009-10 period consumer demand will rebound. As a result both
the United States and China will again compete for access to diminishing petroleum and
natural gas supplies from abroad (including Latin America) unless significant advances
occur in the short-term either in the implementation of new technologies that lessen
reliance on foreign oil suppliers or immediate access is obtained to new and or easily
accessible oil and gas fields. Up through 2008 this sort of competition triggered increased
congressional concern with China.
Blasier's framework, although written at a time of heightened Cold War tensions
between the two superpowers, can still be used for studying post-Cold War revolutionary
situations in Latin America. For example, by applying Blasier's Proposition 3 to Chavez
and Bolivarianism such an approach can anticipate how the U.S. Congress interprets this
post-Cold War version of Latin American revolutionary change, as well as how it may
react to Chavez's socialist-inspired reforms.
It is the degree of involvement of an extra-hemispheric and interventionist foreign
power in support of a revolutionary movement or the reformist and or revolutionary
governments which will be the key determinant of the type of response that will emanate
from U.S. foreign policymakers. Washington's response will fall into one of two
categories: either Washington will seek conciliation, or it will seek to suppress the
revolutionary movement or the reformist and or revolutionary governments. Today's
absence of an extra-hemispheric and interventionist foreign power acting in support of
reformist and or revolutionary movements or governments allows the United States to
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exert a softer type of hegemony which the United States refers to as being the Latin
American region's "partner of choice."
Why Chavez is not a Significant Threat
By recurring to Blasier's framework, the study finds that the reason Chavez
should not be considered a threat to the military security interests of the United States
resides in the fact that in the post-Cold War period there is an absence of an extra-
hemispheric, anti-American power willing and capable of undertaking an interventionist
foreign policy similar to that of the Soviet Union's during the Cold War (Proposition 3).
Some members of Congress, such as Representative Ron Klein (D-Florida, 2007-
present), cite Iran's ties to Chavez as a source of concern for U.S. security. However in
Klein's case this concern is not structured along the conservative ideological lines of the
past that defined the struggle for superpower survival. Instead it is based on important yet
non-vital constituent-driven interests. 25
Absent the potential of great power confrontation over Venezuela, what other
factors could lead Congress to seek the suppression of the Chavez government? Blasier's
framework during the Cold War defined the reason for U.S. intervention in Nicaragua
and other Caribbean Basin countries in terms of retaining its preeminent position as well
as preventing Soviet incursions. Alternatively, the U.S. sought to suppress reformist and
revolutionary governments whenever they threatened U.S. business interests. Yet in the
125 Congressman Klein indicates that it is his constituents' concerns over the bombing of the Jewish
Community Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1994 by Iranian agents that motivated his call for action
against Iranian activities in Latin America. See, U.S. Government Printing Office - Congressional Record
(House), "Iran and Latin America," Volume 153, (2007), September 27, 2007, pg. H10942, accessed July
30, 2008, http://frwebgatel.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdocID=70 7 801444059+46+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve.
295
post-Cold War era, a time when Chavez has already threatened U.S. business interests,
Congress has been unwilling to call for suppressive measures against Caracas.
What has changed since the Cold War period, for example when the United States
decided in 1959 to remove Castro is that Chavez is not a strategic threat nor is he
seriously jeopardizing U.S. interests throughout the region. Also during the previous era,
conservative ideology that hinged on the notion that the United States had a right to its
sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere would have sought the suppression of the
Chavez government.126 But today liberal internationalists would be hard pressed to act in
concert with yesteryear's conservatives since there is no extra-hemispheric aggressive
power seeking to work with Chavez that needs to be contained.
As a result Congress has been forced to take a more subtle approach to Venezuela
and Chavez's Bolivarian Revolution. Suppression of the Chavez government can no
longer be justified in terms of safeguarding the business interests of the U.S. oil majors.
Rather Congress now views safeguarding U.S. business interests in broader terms that
encompass not just ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, but more broadly the entire U.S.
business sector dependent on regular arrival of crude from overseas suppliers, such as
Chavez.
As Benjamin puts it, citing Blasier's work in The Hovering Giant, one of the
critical factors that drove to a rupture of relations between Cuba and the United States
during the Cold War were the economics of U.S. investments being nationalized on the
126 Benjamin provides an overview of the reasoning that motivated the United States to seek the ouster of
Castro in 1959. These reasons do not compare with today's Chivez government, but do serve as a point of
reference for the crticial motivations during the Cold War to suppress a Latin American revolutionary
government. See, Benjamin, Jules R. "The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An
Empire of Liberty in an Age of National Liberation." Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992, pg.
196.
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island and Cuban sugar exports being directed away from the United States to the Soviet
Union and China.1 27 In the past this action led the United States to accuse Cuba of being
an "undependable supplier," and resulted in what Benjamin calls an "economic slug
match" where the Castro government nationalized large chunks of U.S. property on the
island (August 1960) and the United States responded by cutting off all trade (October
1960). Castro responded by nationalizing all remaining U.S. properties. 128
While the cycle of nationalization and retaliation came to a halt with the severing
of U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations (January 3, 1961), and remains frozen to this day, a
similar situation has not occurred with Chavez. Nationalizations, or often rather re-
nationalizations as in the case of CANTV, have been followed by negotiated
compensation and or submission of the dispute to arbitration. The United States has
refrained from seizing Venezuela's U.S.-based assets (i.e., CITGO refineries), while
Chavez has not ceased exporting Venezuelan crude to the United States and thus remains
a reliable wartime supplier of crude.
Blasier's framework consequently can be utilized to place the concurrent situation
in context. The framework can highlight the fact that the Chavez government is unable to
court an extra-hemispheric power as patron. If it could this would force Congress to
respond by framing its decisions along Blasier's Proposition 3. Furthermore Blasier's
Proposition 4 is applicable due to its emphasis on congressional policymakers'
willingness to adopt conciliatory and or non-suppressive policies toward Chavez because
of his attempts to negotiate a settlement of issues in conflict.
127 Ibid. pg. 195.
128 Ibid.
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Blasier's Proposition 5, with its economic focus also explains why Congress does
not view Chavez as a serious enough threat to warrant his government's suppression. The
United States has a strategic interest in assuring that Venezuelan crude oil continues to
flow to U.S. refineries during wartime. Chivez during the Second Gulf War, throughout
the occupation of Iraq, and the War in Afghanistan, has reliably continued to ship crude
to the United States with the exception of the December 2002 to February 2003 period
when the PdVSA strike disrupted shipments. Throughout Chavez's term in office, the
United States has had no need to suppress his government since U.S. hemispheric
political primacy although challenged by Caracas, is not seriously jeopardized. As a
result Congress does not need to adopt the sort of measures associated with Blasier's
Proposition 11.
Ultimately as Joan Dudik-Gayoso claims, what defines the United States' overall
national interest still remains unchanged from the Cold War.129 The U.S. Department of
State as the executive branch's foreign policymaking lead agency, as well as Congress,
both define the national interest in terms of foreign governments' policies and actions
that jeopardize the security and prosperity of the United States. National (military)
security is defined in terms of safeguarding the United States' borders and the continued
survival of its population. 3 0 For Dudik-Gayoso prosperity is defined in terms of securing
a stable financial system and preserving American jobs.' As a result, and by applying
129 Dudik-Gayoso, Joan, "Preparing for Multilateral Meetings." Briefing given at the Foreign Service
Institute - U.S. Department of State on August 4, 2008.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid. Dudik-Gayoso is the former director of the U.S. Department of State's International Organization
Bureau.
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Blasier's Proposition 12, it seems that Congress and the White House engage Chavez at
the appropriate levels formulating policy in response to Chavez's revolutionary agenda
on the basis of U.S. security concerns and economic considerations.
Chavez's outreach to Latin America, while troublesome, is not a major threat to
vital U.S. interests, but rather represents setbacks in U.S. attempts to promote and
consolidate representative democracy and neo-liberal economic reform policies in Latin
America. 32 These are issues that affect U.S. prosperity but at present do not directly
impact national (military) security. Ray Walser and James M. Roberts in "Hugo
Chivez's Andean Offensive, " further clarify that Chavez and his allies in Bolivia and
Ecuador have "under the banner of social justice" sought to: 1) to dethrone old economic
elites and traditional political parties; 2) eliminate checks and balances; 3) curb individual
rights; 4) rein in "rapacious" foreign companies; and 4) resurrect failed socialist and
redistributive policies.133
While both the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute's (AEI)
Roger F. Noriega concur that U.S. foreign policymakers have largely maintained silence
on Chavez's antics, this study finds that the possible threatening nature of the latter's
actions have so far been curtailed by the inexistence of an interventionist extra-
hemispheric power and the resilience of the Venezuelan political opposition which itself
handed Chavez a major electoral defeat, and loss of aura of invincibility, in the
132 Noriega indicates that the U.S. policy to Latin America since the Reagan administration has been shaped
by tacit bi-partisan consensus in favor of democracy and free markets as the regional development model.
See, Noriega, Roger F. " United States Foreign Policy and Strategic Dimensions," paper submitted to the
Alexandre de Gusmao Foundation and the International Relations Research Institute (September 29, 2008),
pg. 4, accessed November 24, 2008, http://www.aei.org/docLib/2008107 Brazilconference.pdf.
133 Walser, Ray, and James M. Roberts, "Hugo Chavez's Andean Offensive," in WebMemo: The Heritage
Foundation, Number 2027 (August 18, 2008), pg. 1.
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November 2008 state and municipal elections.13 4 Barring the outright imposition of
dictatorial rule these factors coupled to declining oil prices that undermine social welfare
spending will serve as an effective anchor on the further radicalization of Chavez's
domestic reforms and Latin American policies.
U.S. concern remains closely linked to oscillations in the international price of oil
and gas. For example, in 2008 Chavez could still afford to boost his aspiration to form a
strategic alliance with Moscow and welcome the stationing of Russian troops on
Venezuelan soil. Chavez, buoyed by high oil prices in July 2008 could also declare his
commitment to engage in regionally destabilizing weapons purchases in order to
influence neighboring Colombia's own position and policies vis-i-vis Venezuela and the
United States.135 Yet, with the per barrel price of oil now plummeting, Chavez's
capability of engaging in such action is severely constrained.
Although Chavez has reached out beyond Latin America as Dennis C. Blair,
Director of National Intelligence (2009 to present) cited in his testimony before the
Senate Select Intelligence Committee on February 12, 2009, by engaging China, Iran, and
Russia, this sort of action is also significantly hampered by "bureaucratic and linguistic
134 Noriega, Roger F. Untitled presentation given as part of the American Enterprise Institute's "The Future
of Chivez's Petro-Diplomacy," (February 11, 2009), accessed February 14, 2009,
http://app2.capitalreach.com/esp1204/servlet/tc?cn=aei&c=10162&s=20271&e=10708&&espmt=2. See
also Walser and Roberts, pgs. 1-2.
135 Walser and Roberts, pg. 2 and Bernard, Anne, "Russia: Venezuela Offer to Host Bases," in The New
York Times, (July 24, 2008), accessed February 14, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/0724/world/europe/24briefs-
VENEZUELAOFF BRF.html?scp=l&sq=chavez%20russian%20bases&st=cse.
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obstacles to implementing accords."136 Chavez's outreach to Russia comes too late. As
Walser elaborates in "Chavez, Venezuela, and Russia: A New Cuban Missile Crisis,"
current U.S-Venezuela tensions are not reminiscent of the Kennedy-Khrushchev era and
the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962) or for that matter similar to the Central
American situation of the 1979-90 period. 137 As Walser states, "there is no nuclear threat,
no Cold War, and no clear-cut, ideological conflict such as existed in 1962."138
By applying Blasier's framework this study concurs with Walser's findings that
the situation in the post-Cold War is radically different from the preceding era. Chavez's
invitation to Moscow to station troops on Venezuelan territory would in the past have as
Walser indicates "triggered a major international crisis." 139 Today the executive and
legislative branches' reaction to such statements is more in tune with prudence and
articulating cautious statements than outright calls for regime suppression.
Blasier's framework can also be applied with regards to Chavez's outreach to
China, yet his actions are also not necessarily as threatening to U.S. vital interests as he
had hoped. Despite China's voracious appetite for strategic natural resources it needs to
fuel its continued economic expansion and development, the pursuit of which has led it to
take an active (economic) interest in Venezuela and thereby compete with the United
States for access to these commodities, there is a marked difference between such actions
136 Blair, Dennis C. "Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence." Washington, DC: DNI. (February 2009), Statement of Record (Unclassified),
pg. 32, accessed February 13, 2009, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212 testimony.pdf.
131 Walser, Ray, "Chivez, Venezuela, and Russia: A New Cuban Missile Crisis," in WebMemo: The
Heritage Foundation, Number 2064 (September 15, 2008), pg. 1.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
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and those characteristic of the Cold War superpower rivalry. High economic growth in
China, coupled with burgeoning nationalism, has yet to translate into Beijing adopting a
Soviet-style interventionist political-military policy for Latin America.
It bears mentioning that China's activities in Latin America, and especially in
Venezuela, are relegated primarily to securing access to affordable strategic natural
resources (i.e., petroleum, natural gas, minerals). 1 40 Yet China's economic ties to the
region and Venezuela have not required its trade partners to downgrade their own
political and economic ties with the United States, adopt a political ideology mirroring
that of Beijing's, nor for that matter have any of the Latin American states been forced
into a Cold War style patron-client relationship. 141
An example of China's strategic economic interest in Latin America, and in
Venezuela in particular, is highlighted by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC)
agreement with the Chavez government to invest over $10 billion in oil exploration in the
Orinoco River Basin oil belt and the constructing of three oil refineries (with a combined
refining capacity of 1 million barrels per day) in the near future. Chinese investment has
4 According to Richard Lapper, Venezuela is seeking to expand its current petroleum oil shipments of
approximatelty 100,000 barrels of crude per day to China by roughly 500,000 barrels by 2011. To further
facilitate this sort of oil trade, Beijing has promised to supply the Chdvez government with supertankers for
trans-oceanic shipments, as well as provide financial assisatance for the construction of twelve offshore oil
drilling sites. See, Lapper, Richard, "Living with Hugo: U.S.Policy towards Hugo Chavez's Venezuela,"
Council on Foreign Relations, CSRNumber 20 (November 2006), pg. 14, accessed June 20, 2008,
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&id=lLoCV50T4nwC&dq-richard+lapper&printsec=frontcover&sou
rce=web&ots=l Kp9nlPvwt&sig=9ZPF 1 oKiVTFVAQLxAg38tzO68-
k&sa=X&oi=book result&resnum=6&ct-result#PPP 1,M 1.
141 Note that both the People's Republic of China (mainland) and Taiwan in recent years have engaged in
checkbook diplomacy in the Latin American and Caribbean regions. This competition has however not
impacted the United States' own relations with Latin America and the Caribbean countries.
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sparked interest in Washington foreign policymaking circles as could be expected, but
not in terms of it politically destabilizing the region.
Such economic agreements and level of cooperation although a source of concern
to some in Congress, since they have the potential to impact the U.S. domestic energy
market, are not great enough to necessitate the enactment of suppressive policies.
Although Chavez's revolutionary reforms have indeed impacted U.S. private interests
(Proposition 5) in Venezuela, these have failed to meet the test of seriously threatening
U.S. vital (military security) interests. Thus the recent Sino-Venezuelan agreements all
fall far short of heralding the basing of Chinese military forces on the Latin American
mainland (Proposition 3).143
Based on Blasier's Proposition 5, another factor responsible for tempering U.S.
congressional backlash against Venezuela with regards to the impact of Chavez's
revolutionary reforms on U.S. private business interests is the fact that the Chavez
government has endeavored, and largely succeeded, in negotiating fair and rapid
compensation for most properties impacted by the government's nationalization
measures. For example, in the telecommunications sector the re-nationalization of
Compania An6nima Nacional de Telefonos de Venezuela (CANTV) on May 22, 2007,
occurred only after U.S.-based Verizon and the AES Corporation, as the majority
142 China Business News, "Venezuela and China ink $10 billion oil deal," (September 13, 2007) in
International Crisis Group, "Venezuela: Political Reform or Regime Demise," in Latin America Report
Number 27 (July 23, 2008), pg. 9, accessed July 24, 2008,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin america/27 venezuela political reform or regime de
mise.pdf.
143 The stationing and or the possibility of basing foreign, anti-American forces in the Americas drove U.S.
foreign policymakers during the Cold War to justify suppressive measures against revolutionary
movements and governments which paved the way for overt and covert U.S. military action.
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shareholders of CANTV, reached a negotiated agreement with the Venezuelan
government on compensation.144
When other such attempts have failed (e.g. the ongoing dispute between the
Chavez government and ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips), the Venezuelan government
has exercised the legal option of pursuing nationalization and re-nationalization disputes
with private domestic and foreign firms in the courts (Proposition 4).The Chavez
government in this way has been forced to pursue expropriations of privately held
property within an established legal framework since Venezuela's Bolivarian
constitutional reforms have not done away with the constitutional right to own property.
Thus in order for the Chavez government to legally expropriate private property, a factor
that itself provides some measure of safety to foreign direct investment, Venezuela's
courts must ratify the government's proposed expropriation procedures and assure that
just compensation is paid out to the affected parties in a timely manner.145
Nevertheless there is an alternative method that the Chavez government uses in
order to expropriate privately held property which bears mentioning, since it is much less
transparent than the method outlined above. The Venezuelan government is known to
pursue direct negotiations with targeted companies prior to making its intent to
nationalize publicly known. Motivating the government to act in this manner is its
political need to obtain an expeditious resolution to, and control over a disputed property.
144 The Venezuelan government acquired 79.6 percent of the outstanding shares of CANTV, which in
addition to the 6.6 percent of shares that it already owned brought the government's control of shares to
86.2 percent. This re-nationalization was structured as an acquisition of shares and not an outright
government take-over.
145 Briefing at Export-Import Bank of the United States, "Venezuela Country Briefing: Legal Aspects of
Nationalizations," (July 2008).
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Out of political necessity the Chivez government may seek to bypass the more
cumbersome and time consuming judicial ruling expropriation mechanism.146 This sort of
action by the government undermines the rule of law since it places undue pressure on
the company's directors to surrender a firm's control over to the state.
Obtaining a final judicial ruling in Venezuela is often too slow for meeting the
political objectives of the Chavez government. The Chavez government is increasingly
handicapped by its failure to empower civil society, as well as address society's concerns
with insecurity, food shortages, growing inflation, and corruption despite the record
windfall from high petroleum prices. The need to placate constituent wealth redistribution
demands motivates the Chivez government to scout out quick political-economic
deliverables that can serve to deflect popular discontent.147
The Chavez government favors closed door negotiations as a way of pressuring
company owners and or their boards of directors to sell their controlling interests to the
government.148 However, the compulsory nature of the sale is brought to the forefront by
the Chavez government's practice of publishing in the press the name of a firm that has
been targeted for nationalization. A company's owners and directors confronted by this
public threat "voluntarily" turn over control of their interests to the government. The non-
voluntary nature of the sale is made all the more evident by the fact that should the
146 Ibid.
147 Chavez feels politically threatened by any sort of discontent that has the potential to translate into
support for the opposition. International Crisis Group, "Venezuela: Political Reform or Regime Demise," in
Latin America Report Number 27 (July 23, 2008), pg. 3, accessed July 24, 2008,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin america/27 venezuela political reform or regime de
mise.pdf.
148 Briefing at Export-Import Bank of the United States, "Venezuela Country Briefing: Legal Aspects of
Nationalizations," (July 2008).
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company resist its expropriation, the Chavez government will retaliate by investigating
the company and its directors for tax irregularities and environmental damages and or
non-compliance with regulations as an inducement to reach an understanding. 14 9
The non-transparent nature of these transactions is also highlighted by the fact
that the Chavez government seldom fails to uncover some contingency that lowers the
book value of the targeted asset. It is a very smart, subtle way of nationalizing a private
entity. To further elicit a non-contested or minimally contested sale, the Chavez
government will offer compensation in the form of future rights to bid on new projects.
The Chavez government's offer has been taken up by four of the six oil majors affected
by the Chivez's re-nationalization of the Orinoco River Basin petroleum projects. 50
While U.S. economic and private business interests remain important in the
formulation of U.S. foreign policy towards Venezuela (Proposition 5), the absence of an
imminent, tangible extra-hemispheric threat to vital U.S. interests has caused the
relegation of U.S. foreign policymaking to the bureaucratic level (Proposition 7, 8, and
9) with limited participation by the President or the Secretary of State (Proposition 6). At
present there is limited U.S. senior (presidential or cabinet) level participation despite the
fact that the Chivez government has made it quite clear that in the near future it intends
to target the country's banking, gas distribution, and mining sectors, sectors that count on
American private interest involvement.
U.S. Congressional concern with the state of Venezuelan democracy and the
reorganization of the country's economy, led U.S. Representative Connie Mack (R-
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
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Florida, 2005 to present) in February 2007 to question not only the sweeping powers that
Venezuelan lawmakers have given Chavez via an Enabling Law (ley habilitante), but
also why the Bush administration remained indifferent to such measures.151 Mack,
disagreeing with the Bush administration's "hand-off- Chavez" approach was in this
specific case referring to the comments made by the U.S. Department of State's Tom
Shannon, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere, who in an Associated
Press interview stated:
"...the enabling law isn't anything new in Venezuela. It's something valid under
the constitution. As with any tool of democracy, it depends how it is used. At the
end of the day, it's not a question for the United States or for other countries, but
for Venezuela." 1 52
As indicated in the preceding sections, post-Cold War's absence of a militarily
powerful and ideologically hostile extra-hemispheric power (equivalent to the Soviet
Union) undertaking an interventionist foreign policy minimizes the military security
threat potential posed by Chavez's revolutionary changes. The Bush administration and
most members of Congress, distracted by concerns in the Middle East and China's
economic and political growing pains, recognized this reality. Both branches during the
previous administration largely concurred with the assessment that Chavez's economic
threat is of minor concern and does not merit the pursuit of policies that would needlessly
151 See, U.S. Government Printing Office - U.S. Congressional Record (Extension Remarks), "Concerning
Venezuela's Passage of the Enabling Law," Volume 153, (2007), February 8, 2007, pg. E300, accessed
July 30, 2008, http://frwebgate2.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdocID=6285064467+4+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve.
152 Ibid. pg. E300.
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overstretch already hard pressed U.S. diplomatic and militarily resources because of
disagreements over ideology.
The Obama administration is now confronted with either continuing the preceding
administration's policy of non-reaction toward Chavez's acerbic baiting or elevating the
level of engagement to the senior executive level in order to find a level of mutually
acceptable recognition and understanding of common interests. Arguing against Chavez
lowering the volume of the rhetoric is the fact that he, in times of high oil prices, needs to
lambast the United States for domestic political support and international recognition.
Arguing for Chavez putting aside the acerbic baiting of the United States is the fact that
Venezuela remains dependent on the U.S. energy market and that prices for its main
export commodity (oil) has fallen by two-thirds to the $40-$45 range (February 2009).153
Although Chivez and Cuba may seek to continue to exploit Washington's
distraction with other parts of the world in order to fill the political vacuum in Latin
America with like-minded socialist/populist leaders, their success has been largely
limited by other (moderate, more U.S.-friendly) Latin American states such as Brazil and
Mexico whose own political and economic development success stories are more
attractive than those proposed by Bolivarian Venezuela and Castro's Cuba. Especially
damning for Chavez is the case of Chile, which unlike Venezuela has had the economic
foresight to establish a sovereign wealth fund which reinvested returns from copper
exports. Chile's sovereign wealth fund will help mitigate the impact of economic
153 Value given refers to West Texas Intermediate and Brent oil which are lower in sulfur content and thus
command roughly a 20 percent premium, or $6 to $8, over Venezuelan heavy crude oil.
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recession on the national economy.' 5 4 Not only has Chavez failed to implement a similar
safety measure, his government routinely forces the Central Bank of Venezuela to
undertake unrequited reserve currency transfers to the administration which results in
both the de-capitalization of the bank and increases in inflationary tendencies.155
J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence (2007-09), in February
2008 testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Chivez and Cuba
sought to inspire and support leaders in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador to pursue
agendas that undercut these countries' checks-and-balances on presidential power and
also advocated the adoption of anti-American policies.156 McConnell sought to bring to
the attention of the Senate the executive branch's concerns with Chavez's and Cuba's
anti-American rhetoric which seeks to inspire like-minded states in the Americas to align
with Iran. Such action, while not interpreted necessarily as a threat to the military security
interests of the United States, does however recognize that there is a movement to adopt
measures that clash with U.S. political interests and initiatives.'57
In February 2009, Dennis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence (2009 to
present) voiced similar concerns but emphasized that Chavez is now facing increased
154 Ramos, Alberto. "Venezuela: Challenging Outlook - Unconventional Policies; Large Macro
Imbalances," presentation given as part of the American Enterprise Institute's "The Future of Chivez's
Petro-Diplomacy," (February 11, 2009),
http://app2.capitalreach.com/esp 1204/servlet/tc?cn=aei&c=10162&s=20271&e=10708&&espmt=2 and
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20090211 Ramos.pdf.
155 Ibid.
156 See, McConnell, J. Michael, "Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence," Statement for the Record delivered in Washington, DC, on
February 5, 2008, accessed June 25, 2008, pg. 34,
http://fl 1 .findlaw.com/news.findlwa.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/nie20805din.pdf.
157 Ibid. pgs. 34-35.
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constraints in expanding his influence both at home and in Latin America. Ss With the
barrel price of oil (West Texas Intermediate) being forecast to stay below $50 for 2009,
Chavez will find it difficult to maintain current spending levels.' 59 Blair indicates that
Chavez will be forced to make significant cuts in domestic and foreign spending, as well
as devalue the Bolivar and draw down on hard currency reserves.' 60
Alberto Ramos, Senior Economist at Goldman Sachs, and Gustavo Coronel,
Associate Editor of Petroleum World, agree with Blair's assessment and say that Chavez
will face increased constraints in financing reforms at home and abroad as the price of oil
falls below the point where revenues can keep up with government spending.' 61 Both
foresee Chavez being forced to scale back support for his welfare spending programs
(misiones) and carry out a devaluation of the overvalued Venezuelan currency in 2009.162
The need to scale back on spending will limit Chavez's ability to form a strategic
alliance with Russia. In any case, such an alliance needs to be seen in terms of Russian
commercial and diplomatic opportunism. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's
willingness to engage Chavez and sell offensive weapons to Venezuela is a matter of
concern, but ultimately does not pose a threat to U.S. military security interests.
158 Blair, pgs. 32-33.
159 Ibid.
160 Blair also highlighted in his testimony the concern with Chavez's dealings with Iran which have led the
U.S. Treasury Department to designate two Venezuelan-based individuals (of which one was a Venezuelan
diplomat) as supporters of terrorism for providing Iran-backed Hizballah members with logistical and
financial support. Ibid., pgs. 31-32.
161 Ramos (2009). Also see Coronel, Gustavo. "The Future of Hugo Chavez's Petro-Diplomacy,"
presentation given as part of the American Enterprise Institute's "The Future of Chavez's Petro-
Diplomacy," (February 11, 2009),
http://app2.capitalreach.com/espl204/servlet/tc?cn=aei&c=10162&s=20271&e=10708&&espmt=2 and
http://www.aei.org/docLib/200 9 02 11 Coronel.pdf.
162 Ibid.
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Medvedev, much like his predecessor Vladimir Putin, is currently pursuing weapons
sales to the Chavez government to irritate the United States, but this is not significantly
alarming enough to challenge the U.S. position in the Latin American region.1 63 U.S.
weapon sales to Taiwan and military cooperation with Georgia similarly irritate both
China and Russia, but do not necessarily pose a political-military security threat to the
continued survival of these countries. 164
If Chavez's Bolivarian revolution had gained political power prior to the end of
the Cold War, under such a scenario oil-rich Venezuela's drift toward socialism could
have potentially been seen as a greater threat to U.S. political-military security interests
than Nicaragua's Sandinista government. Under such circumstance there would have
been greater involvement by the President and the Cabinet in strategic decision making
(Proposition 6) and the need for the adoption of suppressive policies. Such action by
Washington would have been required in order for the United States to retain
hemispheric political primacy (Proposition 11), since Bolivarianism is held up by Chavez
163 Despite its own petroleum and natural gas windfall Russia is incapable of undertaking an interventionist
role in Latin America like the Soviet Union did in the past. In spite of the rhetoric associated with Russia's
desire to be considered a superpower, it is economically far too intertwined with the West and the United
States to seriously risk a confrontation over Chavez. Russia is far too weak militarily and technologically
compared to the United States and is actually fearful of American encroachment via the expansion of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into its traditional sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and
the Caucuses. At best Russo-Venezuelan cooperation will be relegated to economic cooperation in the
energy sector as highlighted by the bilateral cooperation on energy agreement between Moscow and
Caracas that authorizes three Russian energy companies to operate in Venezuela. See, British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC), "Chivez calls for Russia Alliance," in BBC News, (July 22, 2008), accessed July 22,
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7520624.stm.
164 Chavez has purchased more than $5.3 billion in new weapons since 2005 from Russia, China, and
Spain. However Chivez's military purchases "are plagued by logistic, military and transportation
shortfalls. Notable purchases from Russia include 24 Su-30MK2 fighters, helicopters, and assault rifles.
See, Blair, pg. 32. Chavez s also has a $1 to $2 billion line of credit to purchase Russian submarines. See,
Coronel.
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as a Latin American alternative for U.S. region leadership. Bolivarian Venezuelan has so
far failed to achieve its objective with the exception of Bolivia. 65
Since such a scenario has not played out, nor is there likelihood that it will, U.S.
congressional concern will remain focused on otherwise more mundane, less critical
(non-vital) soft interests. Congress will remain focused on the state of Venezuelan
democracy, the Chavez government's lack of competence for properly administrating the
economy, and Venezuela's unassailable bureaucratic corruption.1 66
Not surprisingly these issues, as well as the nationalization process itself, have
been adversely impacted by the Venezuelan judicial system's diminished autonomy vis-
a-vis that country's executive branch.167 The emasculation of the Venezuelan judicial
system's autonomy is evidenced by the ease with which Chavez has been able to appoint
165 Should the Russian Federation however confirm its intent to land Tu-160 (nuclear capable) supersonic
bombers in Cuba (or Venezuela) in response to the planned U.S. missile defense shield in Europe which
Moscow opposes, then the United States would need to send a strong response that a threshold has been
crossed. See, U.S. Air Force General Norton Schwartz comments to the U.S. Senate Armed Services
Committee in response to an unconfirmed Russian Izvestia newspaper report reminiscent of the 1962
Cuban missile crisis in Franks, Jeff and Eric Beech, "Cuba Silent on Russian Bomber Report: Fidel
Castro," (July 24, 2008), accessed July 24, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/wtMostRead/idUSN2346531520080724?pageNumber-1 &virtualBrandCha
nnel=0.
166 This does not mean that members of Congress are not attempting to link Chivez's recent weapons
purchases and support for neighboring Colombia's FARC to greater U.S. strategic concerns. However
many of these concerns fall under the rubric of energy security concern and not political-military threats to
the vital interests of the United States. For an example of this sort of situation see, U.S. Government
Printing Office - U.S. Congressional Record (House), "National Energy Security Intelligence Act of 2008,"
Volume 154 (2008), July 22, 2008, pgs. H6796 to 6798, accessed July 30, 2008,
http://frwebgate3.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdocID=6343469505+8+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve.
167 Lapper indicates that the Chavez government has dramatically increased the influence of Venezuela's
executive branch over the judiciary. In this sense the Chivez government reformed the basic law of the
Venezuelan Supreme Court and managed to increase the number of sitting judges from twenty to thirty-
two. All new judges are Chavez loyalists. As a consequence, far from representing a check on executive
power, Lapper finds that the judicial branch has centralized political control in the presidency. To illustrate
this state of affairs, Lapper utilizes the case of Isaias Rodriguez, Venezuela's public prosecutor who as a
Chavez supporter has utilized his position to promote the Chavez government's interests. See, Lapper, pg.
10.
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80 percent of all sitting judges since taking power.' 6 Executive control of the judiciary
has not resulted in improved transparency, nor has it diminished official corruption.169
What is alarming about this state of affairs is that Chavez, as an expert on "Chavismo," a
decade ago forewarned Venezuela and the world of his intentions by stating that:
"In Venezuela, the Republic is over.... There is no social contract, no State, no
serious executive branch, no real government, no real legislative branch that
legislates according to the needs of the country, and no judicial branch.... I will
not rule with political parties."17 0
Chavez Bolivarian revolutionary program is out of sync with the current time.
Had Chavez come to power in the 1980s his revolutionary agenda, coupled with
Venezuela's oil reserves and greater U.S. dependence on these, could have plausibly then
represented a threat to U.S. vital interests. However, today's geopolitical realities make
168 These judges, as temporary political appointees, can be dismissed by the Chivez government easily
should they rule unfavorably for the government.
169 While Latin America is well known for its high levels of corruption, Venezuela is considered to be one
of the most corrupt countries in the region. It is only marginally less corrupt than the likes of Ecuador,
Haiti, and Paraguay. Corruption in this sense is often defined as the use of a position of trust for dishonest
gain for that person or third parties, and against the general interest of the institution or community.
Gustavo Coronel in "Curbing Corruption in Venezuela," states that Venezuela's corruption is due to three
factors: "motive, opportunity and impunity. Motive: thousands of public employees who feel underpaid and
distrusted by the community, feel that they might as well get what they can while they can. Opportunity:
presented by the combination of ineptness with lack of controls and administrative procedures, chaotic
management and indifferent bureaucrats. Impunity: No one is punished, no one is indicted. Coronel states
that around $10 billion have been stolen during Chavez's administration and no one has been made
accountable. See, Beech, Alexandra and Maritza Ramirez de Agena, "Venezuela and Corruption,"
accessed July 30, 2008, http://centralasia.usaid.gov/datafiles/ act/venezuelaandcorruption.pdf. Also see
Lapper, who argues that while the Venezuelan government has been frequently charged with corruption, as
evidenced by the fact that 95 percent of all government contracts were awarded without competitive bids in
2004, a fact that implies widespread bribery. Furthermore, former Supreme Court Justice Luis Velazquez, a
staunch Chivez supporter was accused in 2006 of receiving more than $4 million in kinckbacks, but has
not yet been charged with any crime. See, Lapper, pg. 11.
170 Noriega, Roger F. "Venezuela under Chivez: The Path toward Dictatorship," in Latin American
Outlook - AEI Online, (June 6, 2006), Number 3, 2006, accessed February 14, 2009,
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID. 2 4 4 9 1 /pub detail.asp.
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Chavez and his Bolivarian revolution irrelevant to the continued survival of the United
States.
Much like the Cold War era Sandinista revolutionary government (1979-90),
Chavez today is merely an irritant and distraction for U.S. policymakers as evidenced by
the fact most issues dealing with Venezuela are handled by the executive branch's
permanent bureaucracy (Blasier's Proposition 7, 8, and 9) and congressional concem is
focused on more parochial constituent concerns that directly impact a member of
Congress's ability to get reelected - hardly a matter of national survival when compared
to Cold War issues such as the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 15-28, 1962).'71
With the Cold War political-military struggle over, the United States as the
planet's sole remaining superpower is not confronted at present by a rival of equal
magnitude as the Soviet Union in its heyday. Rather the United States government and
U.S. Congress funding the government's overseas activities, is today confronting what
Peter J. Katzenstein in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World
Politics, characterizes as "a pandemonium of ethnic wars and wars of rage caused by the
171 A Cold War, anti-U.S. and pro-Moscow regime in Caracas economically and militarily subsidized by
the Soviets could have potentially provided the Soviets with a foothold in South America, influence over
significant petroleum reserves on which the United States was then more heavily dependent upon. Such a
scenario could have also have threatened the Panama Canal (then controlled by the United States) and U.S.
interest in Central America and the Caribbean (Propositions 3 and 4). Today even Chivez's attempts to
procure four anti-shipping, shallow water Russian-built diesel-electric Kilo Class Type 636 submarines
(valued at $1 billion, with $800 million being financed by Russia), does not critically threaten U.S.
shipping in the approaches to the Panama Canal or other vital U.S. interests. Unlike nuclear powered
submarines, the Type 636's diesel engines although quiet cannot operate for extend periods of time
submerged (400 nautical miles at 3 knots per hour submerged), a factor that make them prone to detection.
Furthermore, the United States economy in the post-Cold War is not as reliant as it was in the past on
shipping going through the Panama Canal. U.S. Navy super (aircraft)-carriers, oil supertankers, and
increasing numbers of container ships are of post-PanaMax design and are thus unable to utilize the
Panama Canal.
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excessive weakness, not strength of states."172 Hence the concern evidenced in the
Congressional Record Index with regard to Iran (Graph 13), which indicates that starting
in 2004 congressional concern with Iran has begun to outpace congressional concern
even with China. 7 3
At the same time Chavez's Bolivarian revolution, and the state apparatus that is
implementing the socialist-inspired reform (revolutionary) agenda in Venezuela, remains
dependent on access to the U.S. energy markets. The Chavez government is dependent on
ensuring the preservation of a viable global economy in order to fund its revolutionary
reform programs at home and abroad. This fact is evidenced by Chavez's desire to
deepen, not curtail economic integration with his neighbors by offering to provide them
with Venezuelan crude oil on favorable terms.
", Katzenstein, Peter J., editor, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics.
New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996, pg. 499.
13 Lapper indicates that Chavez is seeking to exploit strong global hostility to the United States and its
actions in Iraq and support for Israel. While Venezuela's relationship and cooperation does not represent a
new variable in the U.S-Venezuela bi-lateral relationship, Iran's decision to construct factories and vehicles
in Venezuela, as well as PetroPars (Iran's state oil company), expressed interest in assisting Venezuela in
expanding its oil sector's output has nonetheless caused a measure of concern in Washington. See, Lapper,
pg. 18.
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Graph 13 - U.S. Congressional Concerns with Venezuela and Latin
America vis-a-vis Russia, China and Iran
(1992-2008)
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Note congressional concern with Cuba has remain high in the post-Cold War period despite the collapse of
the Soviet Union and Russia's severing of its economic lifeline to Havana largely as a consequence of the
Castro regime's ability to muddle along economically while continuing to defy the United States and the
politically powerful Cuban exile community.
Source: Compiled from U.S. Government Printing Office - U.S. Congressional Record Index, 1983-2008,
accessed July 25, 2008 and February 14, 2009, http:/'www.gpoaccess.cov cri index.html.
Today's Bolivarian program, although compatible with yesteryear's Soviet
interventionism, is incompatible with radical Islamic fundamentalism which is the
preeminent threat facing the United States. Graph 13 highlights growing congressional
concern with Iran, which since 2004 has now overtaken concern with China.
However Chivez's Venezuela and Iran, outside of a deep hatred of the United
States have little else in common - they do not share the same language, religion, or
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worldview. As a result the U.S. Congress, despite Chavez's anti-American rhetoric,
political theatrics, and overtures to Iran and other anti-American powers, continues to see
Bolivarianism, much like it saw Sandinismo, largely as a nuisance to U.S. interests in
Latin America. Neither Sandinismo during the Cold War, nor Chavez Bolivarianism in
the post-Cold War period, represent a threat to U.S. military security interests.
Oil Exports, Chivez's Achilles Heal
As indicated throughout Chapter 5 and in the preceding section of the present
chapter, Chavez and his Bolivarian revolution are susceptible to any disruption in
Venezuela's access to the United States energy markets. The United States can turn to
alternative suppliers fairly quickly for its daily petroleum import requirements (including
the international spot market), since there is always a producer willing to take advantage
of another supplier's loss. The Caracas government is much more exposed to any
disruption in its trade relationship with the United States. Economic vulnerability, not
congressional accusations levied at Caracas for a watering down representative
democracy in favor of participatory democracy is what actually serves to constrain
Chavez. 174
The Chavez administration, should it follow through on its oft repeated threat to
cut off the United States in retaliation for U.S. foreign policies that it disagrees with, will
be hard pressed to locate in the short- to medium-term a replacement buyer for its crude
oil exports. Although China has shown interest in Venezuelan petroleum, the economics
174 Hakim, Peter, "Is Washington Losing Latin America," in Foreign Affairs, (January/ February 2006),
Volume 85, Number 1, pgs. 42-44.
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of trade and logistics do not favor Venezuelan aspirations to replace the United States
energy market with a Chinese one. 175 The financial crisis and global recession of 2009-10
will lower demand for petroleum, driving down prices for consumers and cutting
revenues for producers. As a result Blair indicates that declining revenues may put the
squeeze on the adventurism of producers like Iran and Venezuela. 176
Factors arguing against Chavez's shift towards Beijing, which ultimately favors
the position of the United States in the bilateral relationship are: 1) PdVSA (Petrdelos de
Venezuela Sociedad Andnima), Venezuela's state oil company, has major refining asset
capacity for Venezuelan heavy, sour crude oil in the United States that could be seized in
the eventuality of a need to freeze assets; 2) there has been scant investor interest in
acquiring the PdVSA refineries in the United States since these are specifically equipped/
tooled to only process Venezuelan heavy, sour crude, which could be cut off by Chavez if
the same was no longer burdened by the requirement to use U.S.-based refineries to
generate income to fund his Bolivarian revolutionary programs; 3) proximity to market -
it takes four days for an oil tanker to travel from Venezuela to the United States, while it
takes roughly forty-eight days to make a round trip voyage to China from Venezuela via
the Panama Canal; 4) bigger tankers (e.g. SuezMax, VLCC, or ULCC) sailing to China
are not a viable option because draft limitations (shallow water depth) in Lake Maracaibo
(location of Venezuela's principal crude oil loading facilities); 5) travel through the
Panama Canal, with its accompanying tolls, on smaller PanaMax (79,000 DWT) tankers
15 As Lapper indicates, China has greater priorities with the United States be it in terms of trade, Taiwan,
its currency, or North Korea that exceed the potential strategic profit associated with supporting Chavez in
order to antagonize Washington. China has been willing to purchase Venezuelan crude only at deeply
discounted prices. See, Lapper pg. 25.
176 Blair, pg. 3.
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increases shipping costs at least five-fold compared to the larger AfraMax vessels
(79,000 to 120,000 DWT) used in the Venezuela/ U.S. Gulf trade; and 6) ultimately the
volatility in the oil market and in tanker prices is subject to swing producer and U.S. ally
Saudi Arabia's, continued policy of pricing East-of-Suez oil exports at a premium
compared to shipments destined to the West. 177
In an age characterized by asymmetries of power, Chavez is correct in his
assertion that "oil is a geopolitical weapon." 78 Chavez is slowly realizing that although
he has at his disposal significant petroleum reserves and an established market presence
with the largest consumer of oil and oil products in the world, oil like any other weapon if
misused can backfire. An example of this situation is the conclusion that Chavez's
largesse to the PetroCaribe members, which includes approximately 93,000 barrels per
day to Cuba, comes at a huge financial cost of lost revenue in exchange for international
support. 79 According to Coronel, buying Cuban support for the Venezuelan regime has
177 Note that heavy crude oil requires more refining, whereas as sour crude oil has a higher content of
sulfur. There are two types of oil tankers - tankers that carry crude oil and tankers that carry refined
products such as gasoline, aviation fuel, paraffin, and kerosene. There seven size classifications for tankers
based on dead weight tonnage (DWT): 1) Handy-size (20,000 to 30,000 DWT); 2) HandyMax
(approximately 45,000 DWT); 3) PanaMax (79,000 DWT); 4) AfraMax (79,000 to 120,000 DWT); 5)
SuezMax (120,000 to 180,000 DWT); 6) VLCC or Very Large Crude Carrier (200,000 to 300,000 DWT);
and 7) ULCC or Ultra Large Crude Carrier (over 300,000 DWT). For the economics of shipping
Venezuelan crude oil to China in comparison to shipping costs to the United States, see, Nersesian, Roy,
"The Economics of Shipping Venezuelan Crude to China," in The Oil and Gas Review (2005), Issue
Number 2, pgs. 78-80, accessed July 5, 2008, http://www.touchbriefings.com/pdf/1736/nersesian lr.pdf.
See transit times also see, Miller, Christian T., "Venezuela Strike Pushes Nation to Crisis," in the Los
Angeles Times (December 6, 2002), accessed July 5, 2008,
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/dec/06/world/fg-strike6.
178 As Nikolas Kozloff indicates, Chavez realized even before his 1998 election that Venezuela possesses a
natural resource (e.g. petroleum) in such abundance that its possession allows the country to exert a role in
the world that it would not have were it not for the economic leverage provided by petroleum. In one fell
swoop Chavez links his disdain for Venezuela's (flawed) representative democratic procedures and
institutions with his rejection of the United States in his statement that "these imbeciles who govern us
don't realize the power they have, as an oil-producing country." See, Kozloff, Nikolas, Hugo Chdvez: Oil,
Politics, and the Challenge to the United States. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006, pg. 7.
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cost Chavez somewhere in the neighborhood of $15 to S16 billion over the past five
years. Cuba, like other PetroCaribe participants, often pays in kind with health care,
sports trainers, bodyguards, and foodstuffs such as beans and bananas and not cash on the
barrel like the United States.1 80
Chavez is facing a conundrum in that his government and its reformist
(revolutionary) agenda are dependent on oil profits from crude oil sales to the United
States.181 Chavez's hopes to entice China to build refineries specifically tooled to process
Venezuelan heavy sour crude will takes years to become operational. Over dependence
on oil exports has been further compounded by the Chavez government's myopic
decision to under invest in PdVSA's CITGO operations in the United States. Under
investment has led to a drop in current refining capacity as needed upgrades and repairs
have been repeatedly put off. 182
179 Coronel.
180 Ibid.
181
181 Interestingly enough in Bolivarian Venezuela under Chivez, checks and balances on the executive
branch have degraded to the point that policymaking is now largely an executive driven process with the
National Legislative Assembly becoming increasingly subservient to Chavez by allowing the same to
bypass congress and rubber stamp executive decreed reforms. Gulliermo O'Donnell characterizes the
deficit of horizontal and vertical accountability, characteristic of reformist governments and their proclivity
to isolate their technocrats from criticism, as being a state of delegative democracy. See, Williamns, Mark
Eric, "Escaping Zero-sum Scenario: Democracy versus Technocracy in Latin America," in Political
Science Quarterly, (Spring 2006), Volume 121, Number 1, pg. 122.
182 The capital expenditures for the construction of a modern, large capacity refinery (e.g. with processing
capacity of 10.5 million tons of crude annually, or 200,000 barrels per day) is estimated at between $3 to $4
billion and will take at least three to five years to construct depending on choice of location and access to
parts and supplies. Annual operating expenditures for such a refinery are estimated at roughly $400 million.
See, Socor, Vladimir, "Oil Refinery Construction Project Examined at the Kyiv Energy Summit," in
Eurasia Daily Monitor - Published by the Jamestown Foundation, (May 30, 2008), accessed July 6, 2008,
http://www.iamestown.org/edm/article.php?article id=2373102. Economic factors as well as
environmental impact of refineries have prevented any new refinery construction in the United States in the
past three decades and required refiners, such as PdVSA-owned CITGO to commit to costly modernization
and pollution abetment upgrades. CITGO has delayed its own refinery upgrades required by the U.S.
government to produce cleaner fuels as a result of the requirement to maximize its payments repatriation
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Rafael Amiel of Global Insight's Country Intelligence Group indicates that
Chavez's re-nationalization of Venezuela's Orinoco River Basin oil belt is nothing more
than a well-worn rehashing of an old story whereby populist leaders claim that the
country and its resources are being exploited by foreign corporations and governments. 183
Despite Chivez's populist rhetoric, Venezuela has already gone through a
previous round of nationalizations in the petroleum sector. During the 1975-76 period
Venezuela passed the Oil Nationalization Law. The Oil Nationalization Law placed all
oil production and distribution activities under state control. 184 However the Venezuelan
government then did foresee the need for a role for the private sector as evidenced by
reserving the right to contract out to foreign multi-nationals technical services and
marketing activities.'85 What has changed compared to the past is that until early 2009,
Venezuela's approach to nationalization focused on contract re-negotiation where the
of profits to PdVSA. As a result of curtailing investments in the United States, CITGO has scrapped
worthwhile investments that would have otherwise increased its refining capacity. See, Campoy, Ann and
David Luhnow, "CITGO Scales Back in U.S. to Fund Chavez: Venezuelan Owners Put Own Team and
Take Refiner's Profit Home," in The Wall Street Journal, (November 16, 2007), Volume CCL, Number
117, pgs. Al and A18.
183 Amiel, Rafael, "Energy Security and Resource Nationalism: Latin America," presentation given at the
Global Insight World Economic outlook Conference, (October 25-26, 2006), Washington, DC. See also
Lapper who in this sense concurs and states that "in Latin America, Chavez draws upon a common heritage
of economic struggle, pan-American sentiment, and the widespread perception that dependency on the
United States and Europe is a cause of economic backwardness in order to rally support. See Lapper, pg.
16.
184 Interestingly enough in relation to today's re-nationalization of Venezuela's oil industry the same was
nationalized in 1976. As a consequence this buyback is not without precedent. Chavez's oil policy and
Venezuela's approach to nationalization appear to be significantly less stringent than that of many other oil
producers. See, Political Affairs Magazine, "Oil and Nationalization in Venezuela," (June 23, 2007),
accessed July 30, 2008, http://www.politicalaffairs.net'article/articleview/5465'.
185 Amiel, 2006.
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threat of re-nationalization was utilized as a negotiating tactic by the Chivez
government.186 However, this approach has now shifted to outright expropriation.
A lingering question is how long will oil prices stay low, thereby limiting
Chavez's ambition, who along with fellow Organization of Oil Producing Countries
(OPEC) member Iran, is seeking to exploit oil revenues for geopolitical purposes.
Nariman Behravesh of Global Insight foresaw the global growth slow down as a result of
high oil and gasoline prices, as well as realized that the longer these prices remain high
the greater likelihood for a sharp adjustment in both supply and demand increases. 187
While Behravesh expected an adjustment in supply and demand could eventually
bring prices back down in five to ten years, the financial crisis and global recession of
2009 has accelerated that timeline.188 Indications are now that demand will eventually
rebound, but at what level? Uncertainty impacts both producers and consumers alike, but
leaves Chivez vulnerable because of his unwillingness to invest in critical oil exploration
and processing infrastructure which should have been undertaken when oil prices were
relatively high. Such investment could have allowed Chavez's government to divert trade
away from dependence on the United States.
186 Ibid. Amiel's findings mesh with the position held by the Law Firm of Lapadula - Esteban - Cadenas
as highlighted in its Venezuela Country briefing of July 2008.
187 Behravesh, Nariman, "The World Economic Outlook: A Mild Slowdown or Something More
Problematic," presentation given at the Global Insight World Economic outlook Conference, (October 25-
26, 2006), Washington, DC.
188 Ibid.
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Interpreting the Hugo Chavez Government Threat: Conclusions and Consequences
Is the U.S. Congress responding differently to the challenge posed by a post-Cold
War Latin American revolutionary such as Venezuela's Hugo Chavez than it would have
in the preceding period? Today both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S.
government have tended to adopt more measured foreign policy responses to challenges
posed by Chavez than would have been expected during the Cold War. Both the White
House and Congress are less swayed by ideology today than in the past.
The U.S.-Nicaragua bilateral relationship during the Cold War was driven by
polarized ideology and fear of Soviet inroads being made on the Central American
mainland. Despite the fact that such concerns in hindsight were largely overblown, the
United States government repressed the Sandinista regime. Today both the White House
and Congress concur that the threat posed by the Chavez government does not represent a
significant threat to the vital interests of the United States.
Therefore for Congress Chavez poses a limited but nonetheless manageable
threat to U.S. interests. Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Nebraska, 1997-2009) indicated as much
during the October 21, 2003, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee -
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion when he
stated that America needs a comprehensive energy policy that recognizes the realities of
our interconnected world, and the links between political stability and energy security. 89
Hagel, speaking in the wake of the 2003 Venezuelan oil sector strike that disrupted crude
189 See, Hagel, Chuck, in "United States Senate, Foreign Relations Committee - Subcommittee on
International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, "U.S. Energy Security: West Africa and Latin
America." Washington, D.C. (October 21, 2003), accessed May 25, 2009,
http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=2 4 06 7851 6 2 6 8+1+1 0&WAISaction=retrieve.
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shipments to the United States, indicates that political instability and corruption in Latin
American countries such as Venezuela if unaddressed will only stymie long-term
development (both economic and political).
Referring to post-Cold War congressional foreign policy concerns, Hagel
elaborates that rule of law and reform must accompany energy development efforts in
order to attract investment, as well as ensure prosperity and promote peace. In contrast to
what could reasonably be expected by ideologically driven Congress during the height of
the Cold War, Hagel's comments do not call for the (armed) suppression of the Chavez
government in order to force it to become a responsible regional actor. Rather Hagel
argues that U.S. energy interests are better assured by diversifying U.S. energy suppliers.
Hagel's comments, and those of Senator Norm Coleman, much like Blasier's
own comments regarding Soviet involvement in Guatemala and Bolivia during the Cold
War, recognize that there is no extra-hemispheric power providing meaningful assistance
to Chivez's revolutionary government (Proposition 13). Suppression of the Chavez
government under today's prevailing circumstances would be dysfunctional in Blasier's
terms.
The inexistence of an extra-hemispheric, anti-American rival of the United
States acting as a patron for Chavez negates the need to seek to suppress the Chavez
government (Proposition 15, not applicable). Furthermore, Chivez's vulnerability to
petroleum production disruptions such as the 2003 oil sector strike or the collapse of
crude prices in late 2008, highlight the fact that his government is much vulnerable than
the United States.
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Chivez's vulnerability, exacerbated by almost complete reliance on the United
States as an export destination for Venezuela's largest export commodity, weakens the
appeal of his revolutionary model and undermines the possibility of wrestling
hemispheric political primacy away from the United States. Under these circumstances
according to Blasier's theoretical precepts, the United States has no need to seek the
suppression of the Chavez government (Proposition 11, not applicable).
Theatrics aside, by engaging in a reckless attempt to assume a geopolitical role
that despite Venezuela's natural endowments exceeds his country's human and material
capabilities, Hugo Chavez is ultimately only a threat to his own government and the
Venezuelan people. Chavez's political survival is dependent on continued access to the
U.S. energy market. The United States, though dependent on Venezuelan crude oil
shipments for roughly 11 percent of its daily petroleum needs, is not as exposed as
Venezuela which depends on the U.S. energy market to absorb nearly 70 percent of its
daily exports of crude oil.
Furthermore, the absence of a hostile extra-hemispheric state willing to
underwrite Chavez's socio-political and economic revolutionary agenda and ambitions
for the Latin American region is in sharp contrast from the prevailing situation during the
Cold War. Although Congress ultimately saw Nicaragua's Sandinistas as merely being a
nuisance to U.S. security interests, the Sandinistas did nonetheless count on the tacit
support if not backing of the Soviet Union and its interventionist foreign policy measures
for the region.
Today neither the Russian Federation nor the People's Republic of China are able
or willing to dispute the United States' continued leadership and overwhelming political-
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military and economic preponderance in the Americas. Though red flags may be raised
about Iran it lacks the global reach capable of threatening the United States. Iran also
does not possess the means to provide Chavez with the support needed to move or cajole
the Latin American states away from the U.S. orbit.
Congress, in light of current circumstances, is hard pressed to qualify the Chivez
government as a threat to the vital interests of the United States. Any such attempt would
fall within Blasier's parameters of a dysfunctional (Proposition 14) policy response. In
this sense both the preceding Bush administration, and today's 111 th Congress see
Chavez largely as a threat to non-vital economic security interests. For example, House
Resolution 560 (introduced July 19, 2007 and co-sponsored by 41 members of the House)
expresses outrage over the Chavez government's actions towards energy companies
operating in Venezuela, but leaves it at that and refrains from calling for intervention. 190
While Chavez may appeal to some Latin American states, his revolutionary model's
appeal is not great enough for the vast majority of the Latin states to shift their support
away from the United States for regional political leadership.
With the absence of a threat to continued U.S. hemispheric leadership, there is no
need to dedicate scarce military and or other resources as was the case during the
Nicaraguan Contra War to overthrow the Chavez government (Proposition 15, not
applicable). Also while there is American public interest in the state of Venezuelan
democracy and the Chavez government's impact on human rights, as evidenced by
congressional concerns, it is not sufficient enough to warrant the same sort of knee jerk
190 See, Barton, Joe, in "United States House of Representatives - House Resolution 560 Regarding the
Recent Actions of Hugo Chavez and the Government of Venezuela." Washington, D.C. (July 19, 2007),
accessed May 25, 2009, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/D?d 110:4: ./temp/-bd73Xh:(a (a)(a D&summ2=m&.
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rejection that characterized the Cold War period's fear of the spread of communism.
Democracy, albeit under siege, is still alive in Venezuela and its resilience was
demonstrated by the Venezuelan electorate's willingness to freely vote down Chavez's
December 2007 attempt to transform the country into a socialist republic (Proposition 16,
not applicable) and again in November 2008.
By adopting a more conciliatory foreign policy towards Venezuela, one that
avoids falling prey to Chivez's inflammatory rhetoric, the United States government has
contributed to de-radicalize and check the momentum of revolutionary change in
Venezuela and by extension the rest of Latin America. Evidenced for this resides in the
enduring political resilience of the country's opposition movement despite its internal
divisions. Also the Chavez government has failed to establish single party rule, which
occurred with Castrorite Cuba, despite having subjugated the military to his sole control
(Proposition 20).
Both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government continue to
follow a pragmatic foreign policy of wait-and-see when dealing with the Chavez
government. U.S. foreign policymakers are not overestimating Chavez's capabilities to
threaten United States' vital interests in the Latin American region, nor are they
mortgaging the farm by pursuing ultimatums with Caracas - either reform or be
overthrown. The foreign policy of the Preseident and the policy recommendations of
Congress, if not necessarily completely conciliatory, are far from being suppressive.
Congress's flexibility in policy formulation is the result of the recognition that the
Chavez government does not pose a grave strategic threat to the United States, nor is it
allied with an extra-hemispheric, anti-American power posing a vital security threat to
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U.S. interests. The presence of either, or both, of these factors would otherwise incite
calls from the American electorate for suppression of the Chdvez government much as
was the case during the Cold War when Soviet attempts at incursion in the Americas
(e.g., Cuba) was widely seen as constituting a threat to the vital security interests of the
United States.
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CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS
"To lead, a great nation must command the respect of others. America has been respected
in the past as a powerful nation, a purposeful nation, and generous and warm-hearted
nation...The world still looks to the United States for leadership. American leadership is
wanting, but is still wanted. Our friends around the world do not want the United States
to retreat. They want once again to be allied with the nation whose values, leadership,
and strength have inspired the world for the last century. To reclaim our proper place in
the world, the United States must be stronger, and our policies must be smarter."
U.S. Senator Hillary Rodman Clinton'
ASSESSING THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS'S REACTION TO VENEZUELA'S HUGO
CHAVEZ
The Study's Central Research Question
My study explores how the United States (U.S.) Congress takes an active role in
U.S. foreign policymaking when dealing with revolutionary change in post-Cold War
Latin America. As a qualitative study of United States foreign policymaking, the central
research question ponders whether the U.S. Congress is reacting differently to
revolutionary change in post-Cold War Latin America than it did during the Cold War. If
so, how is it reacting differently, and if not, why not?
To answer this central question, this study reviews how Congress engages in
foreign policymaking throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century.
My study of foreign policymaking examines congressional reaction to revolutionary
change in Latin America. The framework selected to tackle this central question was
developed by Cole Blasier's ground-breaking study which compared U.S. responses to
Hillary Clinton (D-New York, 2001-09) became U.S. Secretary of States in 2009. See, Rodman Clinton,
Hillary, "Security and Opportunity for the 21" Century," (October 16, 2007), in Real Clear Politics,
accessed February 25, 2008),
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/' 2 0 0 7/110/security and opportuinity for t.html.
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revolutionary change in the pre- and Cold War periods.2 My dissertation attempts to test
Blasier's framework through an evaluation of how the U.S. Congress - and the United
States more generally- has responded to the self-described revolutionary reforms of
Hugo Chavez in post-Cold War Venezuela.
Blasier's framework of analysis for assessing how the U.S. government has
reacted to Latin American revolutionaries in the past and its subsequent dealings with
these movements once in power remains a valid means for understanding how Congress
deals with Hugo Chivez. Blasier's framework has withstood the test of time despite the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the end of the Cold War. Blasier's framework
remains relevant because of the enduring, immutable nature of U.S. foreign policy
objectives, national security and economic interests, and how these play off each other.
Blasier's framework retains a certain degree of elegance that allows the foreign policy
analyst to construct causal observations of that explain why the U.S. government, and
Congress, reacts to Latin American revolutionary challenges in the way that it does
What has indeed changed as it pertains to the applicability of Blasier's framework
in the post-Cold War is the condition under which certain propositions of the framework
are likely to be applied within the current Latin American context. Propositions ] and 3
are highly unlikely at present since there is no Great Power rival of the United States
backing Latin American revolutionary movements or governments. Proposition 2,
however, with its emphasis on a hostile U.S. policy toward reformist/revolutionary
governments that adversely impacts U.S. private interests cannot be ruled out given the
2 See, Blasier, Cole. The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910-
1985. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 1985.
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economic and political strength of the U.S. business sector and its paid lobbyists. In
effect, Proposition 2 and Proposition 4, which condition the likelihood of the United
States adopting policies of conciliation or suppression based on a reformist/ revolutionary
government's willingness to settle issues in dispute while foregoing linkages to hostile,
anti-American Great Powers, are still largely applicable to current circumstances in Latin
America.
Similarly, Blasier's bureaucratic and economic propositions remain a valid means
for gauging how the executive and legislative branches will react to Latin American
revolutionary challenges. For example, Proposition 5 with its emphasis on the
importance of economic considerations and private businesses remains a key determinant
of U.S. policy. Also the bureaucratic propositions of Blasier's framework, Propositions
6-12, are not likely to be abandoned (excluding Proposition 11). The President and the
Secretary of State will continue to oversee strategic decision-making at the highest levels
(Proposition 6), while departmental officials (especially career civil servants) will remain
the principal decision-makers in most responses perceived as strategically insignificant.
U.S. private business interests and lobbyists will continue to influence members of
Congress who will pressure executive branch offices to adopt policies that are in
accordance or at least do not oppose these interests (Proposition 8). Likewise,
Propositions 9 and 10 will not change since the U.S. government is bureaucratic and as a
result fosters intra- and inter-agency conflict that necessitates internal negotiations and
compromises in order to formulate effective policies.
What has changed, and is reflected in the U.S. government's dealings with
Chavez since 1998, is the likely obsolescence of Blasier's Proposition 11. The United
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States does not need to engage in suppressive policies to retain hemispheric political
primacy. Much as Blasier recommends in Security and the United States Latin American
Relations in the 1980s, the United States has increasingly acknowledged that it is difficult
to shape the outcome of leadership struggles in the region.3 Attempts to do so are
hampered at the senior political level by a combination of lack of knowledge, experience,
and the necessary expertise to determine what is best for each of the Latin American
countries. 4 Extrapolating from Blasier's work, this study finds that meddling in the
internal affairs of the Latin American countries is counter-productive and endangers
long-term U.S. interests, as well as incites harsh criticism from the region's states that
define their sovereignty in terms of non-interference in their internal affairs.
This situation makes Blasier's Proposition 12 highly relevant. United States
policy responses are the result of security, economic, and bureaucratic considerations
where the executive and legislative branches have major input. United States policies
now aim to entice cooperation instead of suppressing non-cooperative regimes. As a
consequence American hegemony has evolved from political-military dominance to
political-economic partnership that still nonetheless ensures U.S. security.
Blasier's relevance to this day is based on the fact that his framework continues to
provide the U.S. foreign policy analysts with a explanatory mechanism that is capable of
answering "why" and "how" U.S. foreign policymaking questions. Blasier's framework
3 Blasier, Cole, "Security and the United States Latin American Relations in the 1980s: The Extra-
Continental Dimension," in Latin American Program Working Papers - The Wilson Center, (1984),
Number 149, pgs. 27-28.
4 Ibid.
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provides a means of analysis that explains causal relationships that explain U.S. foreign
policymaking behavior.
The Study's Level of Analysis
My study looks at the international environment as the primary level of analysis
to explain the applicability of Blasier's framework of how the U.S. Congress is reacting
to revolutionary change in post-Cold War Latin America. Much like Blasier's framework
of analysis, my study aspires to be a cumulative work that builds upon previous research.
Like many others, as a result I concur with the finding that no definitive answer exists
that can state with authority which level of analysis is the most appropriate means for
analyzing interstate relations.5 As Srini Sitaraman clarifies, it is difficult to pinpoint the
exact origins of international cooperation, or for that matter non-cooperation. 6 Does
cooperation "reside in the fundamental nature of human beings," or is international
cooperation the result of the domestic socio-political structure that determines states'
foreign policies? 7 Or do situations of cooperation and conflict arise as Robert Jervis
indicates, as a result of the international environment determining a state's behavior?
In response to the foregoing questions the present study applies Blasier's
framework to the international (systemic) level to explain U.S. reactions to revolutionary
challenges. At this level of analysis there is the understanding that states compete for
5 See, Sitaraman, Srini, "Evolution of the Ozone Regime: Local, National and International Influences," in
The Environment, International Relations, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington, DC. Georgetown
University Press, Paul G Harris, editor, 2001, pg. 112.
6 Ibid.
' Ibid.
8 Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976, pg. 18.
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power and resources in a realm devoid of a supra-national entity that can enforce order.
Much like Arnold Wolfers indicates in "Discord and Collaboration, " my study finds that
key characteristics of state behavior even post-Cold War remain the pursuit of power and
security.9 These are vital concerns that transcend the President and the sitting Congress of
the moment.
Yet my study also finds that due to the significant level of economic
interdependence between the United States and Venezuela at a time when the United
States is the sole superpower, a commingling of the domestic and international levels of
analysis is possible. As a consequence, Congress's reactions to post-Cold War
revolutionary challenges can be explained by Blasier's framework which recognizes in a
number of its propositions the role that domestic factors play in formulating U.S. policy
responses. Sitaraman cites Robert Putman in this regard, affirming that domestic politics
and international relations are entangled.10 It is this overlap of the domestic with the
international environments that generates a situation that ensures that international
transactions (deals) and interactions must receive support at the domestic level, especially
from constituent interest-driven legislative bodies such as Congress."
Branislav L. Slantchev similarly concludes in his review of Kenneth Waltz's
Man, the State, and War, that the three levels of analysis (human behavior, the internal
structure of states, and international anarchy) are interlinked.12 While international
9 See, Wolfers, Arnold. "Discord and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics." Baltimore, MD: John
Hopkins University Press, 1962.
10 Sitaraman, pg. 113.
" Ibid.
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anarchy describes the framework of world politics, without inclusion of the first two
levels of analysis there cannot be effective comprehension of the forces that shape
policymaking.' 3 Ultimately Blasier's framework, with its emphasis on domestic and
international factors, bridges the divide between the levels of analysis. My study thus
focuses on the international level of analysis and incorporates aspects of human behavior
and domestic structures to analyze how Congress reacts to revolutionary challenges.
The Study's Findings: Placing the Hugo Chavez Threat in Context
My study finds that in the post-Cold War, Congress is not linking Chavez's
reformist/revolutionary agenda with tacit backing from an extra-hemispheric rival of the
United States. Unlike the case of the Cuban revolution (1959), which galvanized U.S.
policymakers' perceptions of a link between Latin American revolutionaries and Soviet
interventionism, there is no such link today between Venezuela and a foreign patron. As
Jervis indicates in "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma," the Cold War conflict was
largely a product of a clash of social systems and ideology - the post-Cold War world in
this sense is devoid of a existential struggle for ideological survival.14
The research conducted for this study has found that prior to the Cuban revolution
U.S. foreign policymakers often favored a wait-and-see approach. This approach served
Washington as a means of ascertaining how the revolutionary change would play itself
12 Slantchev, Branislav L. "Review: Kenneth Waltz's Man, the State, and War." 2001, accessed July 15,
2009, http://www.gotterdammerung.org/books/reviews/m/man-the-state-and-war.html.
13 Ibid.
14 Jervis, Robert. "Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma" in the Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 3,
Number 1 (Winter 2001),pgs., 36-60.
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out, permitting U.S. foreign policymakers to focus resources on determining the
implications of the revolutionary agenda on American interests. My study subsequently
finds that once again Congress is increasingly likely to adopt a wait-and-see approach for
dealing with Latin American revolutionary challenges. This is evidenced by strong
congressional interest in human rights, promotion of democracy, and freedom of the press
in its foreign policy formulations in the post-Cold War.
Blasier's framework effectively analyzed how the United States has formulated
foreign policy in light of revolutionary challenges throughout the Cold War. During this
timeframe Latin American revolutionaries viewed the United States as an enemy
(especially after 1961) from the onset of their campaigns to topple their countries'
(traditional-conservative) pro-U.S. governing political elite.
With the triumph of Fidel Castro's revolution in 1959 and the subsequent
deterioration of relations between Washington and Havana by 1961, the previous period's
wait-and-see approach for dealing with revolutionary challenges fell by the wayside. As a
result the study finds that Latin American revolutionaries since then have no longer
sought to assure either the U.S. Department of State or the American public that their
revolutionary objectives were not anti-American. Rather, Latin American revolutionaries
have now for fifty years consistently and openly identified the U.S. government and
American interests it represents as an enemy of their revolutionary agendas.
What my study finds, and where it adds value to the original Blasier framework,
is that although the United States continues to be viewed with distrust by Latin American
revolutionaries, the United States itself is no longer as obsessive as it was at the height of
the Cold War in seeking to stomp out every leftist insurgency. Congress, as well as U.S.
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foreign policymakers, with the collapse of the Soviet Union is taking a more subtle
approach to dealing with Latin American revolutionaries. Blasier's framework not only
serves as a roadmap for how Congress decides whether a revolutionary movement
represents a threat, but more importantly serves as a factual means of judging what can
and cannot be realistically done to contend with revolutionary challenges. This ultimately
is the hallmark of a prudent, pragmatic, and objective policy and knowledge.
Congress is no longer dealing with Latin American revolutionary movements by
supporting Cold War administrations' policies calling for the suppression of Latin
American (reformist/revolutionary) governments if they were interpreted as moving
towards becoming communist, were quasi-communist, or had already become communist
states. What is even more telling about Congress's post-Cold War change of course is
that it has put aside Cold War notions that any anti-American government is an
ideological and imminent threat to the vital interests of the United States.
One of the key premises of this study is that a visible and serious external threat
to U.S. hegemony in the region is absent in the post-Cold War period. As a consequence
since Hugo Chavez came to power in 1998 unlike the situation for U.S. governments
during the Cold War- Congress has not had to contend with the threat from an extra-
hemispheric power as a serious factor. The demise of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s
not only eliminated an external threat to U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere, it also
made the United States the only real global power.
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Table N0 22 - Summary of Blasier's Propositions for United States
Government's (USG) Action Grouped by Case Studies
(Foreign Government Actions/ USG Responses)
- Nicaragua - Nicaragua - Venezuela
- Zelaya - Nicaragua - FSLN - Chavez
Govt. - FSLN Govt. Gov.
Proposition 1 Reform/ Rebels Reform/ Reform/
Rev. (Cold War) Rev. (Cold Rev. (Post
Pre-WW I War Cold War
USG will respond flexibly to rebel FSLN seeks
movements (stage 1) whenever the N/A support form N/A N/AUnited States does not associate the Soviets
these rebel movements with a Great and Cuba
Power rival. USG will be hostile USG
toward rebel movements when these N/A Uso
are perceived to be associated with Hostile
rival Great Powers.
Proposition 2
USG will be hostile toward most Reforms are Reforms are Reforms
reformist governments (stage 2) linked to linked to impact U.S.
primarily because of the adverse adverse N/A adverse private
impacts these have on U.S. private impacts on impacts on interests, but
interests. U.S. private U.S. private compensation
interests interests is negotiated
USG USG USG
response: N/A response: response:
Hostile Hostile Conciliatory
Obs: N/A stands for "not applicable." WW stands for "World War."
Source: Blasier, 1985, pg. 236.
The disappearance of the Soviet threat is clearly an important factor tempering
congressional reaction to Latin American revolutionary changes in the post-Cold War
period compared to previous eras (Table 22). Both Tables 22 and 23 (following page)
highlight the fact that absent the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union, or for that
matter of any extra-hemispheric rival power of the United States, the response of the
United States in general and Congress in particular will tend to be more conciliatory than
suppressive.
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Table N0 23 - Summary of Blasier's Propositions for United States
Government's (USG) Action Grouped by Case Studies
(Foreign Government Actions/ USG Responses)
- Nicaragua - Nicaragua - Venezuela
- Zelaya - Nicaragua - FSLN - Chavez
Govt. - FSLN Govt. Gov.
Proposition 3 Reform/ Rebels Reform/ Reform/
Rev. (Cold War) Rev. (Cold Rev. (Post
Pre-WW I War Cold War
USG responds to revolutionary Zelaya's Reagan Links to
governments (stage 3) in accordance to outreach to determines Cuba,
their links to the U.S.'s strongest Great Germany is a that FSLN Russia, and
Power rival (Germany until 1945 and strategic N/A links to the Iran are
the Soviet Union 1947-91) and its threat Soviets and minor, non-
impact on U.S. national security Cuba are a vital threats
interests. Strategic considerations shape threat
whether response is conciliatory or USG USG USG
suppressive. response: response: response:
Suppressive N/A Suppressive Conciliatory
Proposition 4
USG leaders opt for a conciliatory No action Reagan Dependent
response if they determine that the short of determines for the mid-
revolutionary government will capitulation that the term on the
negotiate a settlement of issues in will appease N/A FSLN is not U.S. market,
conflict and that an agreement USG trustworthy oil shipments
precludes further interference of a continue
hostile Great Power. USG leaders opt
for suppression when they determine USG USG USG
that the revolutionary government will response: response: response:
not negotiate an agreement and avoids Conciliation Conciliation Conciliatory
an agreement when it is deemed the not possible N/A not possible.
best means of preventing or countering FSLN is
the interference of a hostile Great undermined
Power. to counter
Soviets
Obs: N/A stands for "not applicable." WW stands for "World War."
Source: Blasier, 1985, pg. 236.
The Enduring Validity of Blasier's Framework
One of the principal theoretical and methodological concerns of this study was to
test whether Blasier's Cold War era framework is useful in evaluating U.S. responses to
contemporary changes in Latin America. Congressional foreign policymaking, much like
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that of the executive branch, is based on a process that combines common sense as well
as the input from lobbying groups that favor or reject certain aspects of U.S. policies. As
a result, Leslie H. Gelb indicates that most foreign policy professionals formulate a
policy in order to attempt to "find out what is occurring in other countries; figure out the
problems and opportunities, the likely interplay of power, and what can and cannot be
accomplished."1 5
Members of Congress and their staff are attempting to decipher Chavez's
objectives and capabilities by holding hearings in order to formulate policy. These
hearings are often led by members of Congress who sponsor resolutions and enact
legislation aimed at enticing or punishing foreign states such as Venezuela. For Gelb, the
problem that exists with U.S. foreign policymaking is that it can quickly be hijacked by
"extravagant principles, nasty politics, and the arrogance of power."16 My study finds that
these pitfalls are a result of the fact that in the U.S. political system Congress is a
powerful, independent legislative body driven by constituent demands arising from both
individual citizens and interest groups. Ultimately the willingness and capability of
addressing constituents' demands will impact a congressional representative's likelihood
of being reelected.
Congress is driven by the need to score political points. To do so, Congress holds
hearings, enacts resolutions, and passes legislation. Congressional action however does
not occur in a vacuum, it is often the result of intense lobbying efforts by groups that
1" Gelb, Leslie H., "Necessity, Choice, and Common Sense: A Policy for a Bewildering World," in Foreign
Affairs, (May/ June 2009), Volume 88, Number 3, pgs. 56-57.
16 Ibid.
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favor or reject specific aspects of U.S. foreign policies." For example, the intricate nature
of the U.S. political process is highlighted by the situation that can arise when the House
of Representatives takes action (e.g., passes a bill) that is objectionable to the foreign
policy course set by the sitting administration. The White House will rebuke the language
and support counteracting language in a follow-up Senate bill. Although the Senate bill
will likely be the product of intense negotiations between the Senate's key committee
members and the White House, "it can become very hard for the executive [branch]" to
successfully pushback on an issue once "a faction in Congress takes a position under
pressure from lobbyists."' 8 Such a situation is further aggravated when one party controls
the White House and the other controls one or both of the two Houses of Congress.
Blasier finds that Congress's interpretation of the concept of security impacts U.S.
foreign policymaking. However, the concept of security, according to Blasier, "has many
meanings, misuses, and controversial associations."19 Blasier makes the point that
security is often utilized as a "catch-all" for a variety of foreign policy problems.20
Blasier's position on this matter voices a concern with the possibility of the
American public (including lobbyists representing U.S. business interests) and Congress
1 For example, on foreign trade matters lobbyists (including law firms and trade associations) and private
industry (individual corporations) will approach the U.S. Trade Representative's Office and threaten to go
to Capitol Hill to raise complaints about a country to members of Congress who sit on key committees that
oversee a foreign country's impact on U.S. interests (public and private sector). This tactic prods the
executive branch to work with the private sector and deescalate tensions by addressing its concerns and
aligning U.S. foreign policy objectives to its concerns. Trade is a variable in overall foreign policy
calculations since it forms part of a nation's economic security.
18 Newhouse argues that lobbyists are increasingly influential as a consequence of the expanding
complexity of the U.S. government. For Newhouse, "only insiders such as former members of Congress or
congressional staff members turned lobbyists can navigate its confusing structure." See, Newhouse, John,
"Diplomacy, Inc.," in Foreign Affairs, (May/ June 2009), Volume 88, Number 3, pg. 74.
19 Blasier, pg. 1.
20 Ibid.
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linking security with military security. Military security, for Blasier, refers specifically to
the protection of the national territory and the nation's population from external threats
by the armed forces of another nation.2 Blasier clarifies that ensuring security also
includes protecting the nation from external threats through non-military means such as
treaties of friendship, trade agreements, and multi-lateral treaties.22 As a result of linking
security with military security during the Cold War, congressional appropriations were
often justified and defended on "catch-all" security grounds to protect the United States
from the Soviet Union and the spread of international communism.2 3
Blasier, by breaking down the concept of security into its component parts (e.g.,
political, economic, and military), effectively explains U.S. behavior toward Latin
America during the Cold War. Blasier's framework, his interpretation of U.S. actions in
Latin America throughout much of the twentieth century in response to revolutionary
change, and his recommendations remain a relevant guide for assessing how Congress
may react to post-Cold War Latin American revolutionary challenges.
Based on Blasier's framework, this study finds that Chavez's nationalization of
U.S. business interests in Venezuela and the threat to cut off oil shipments to the United
States is merely a short- to medium-term threat to U.S. economic interests. For Blasier,
official U.S. perceptions during the Cold War were clouded by U.S. domestic politics that
long feared the expansion of international communism. My study finds that with the
21 Ibid, pgs. 1-2.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid. pg. 2.
342
absence of the Soviet Union, there is at present neither an explicit nor a potential military
security threat to the United States emanating from Venezuela or any other Latin
American state (including Cuba). Although the present situation is characterized by the
absence of a threat posed by an interventionist and hostile extra-hemispheric power,
Blasier's framework remains valid for interpreting how Congress is reacting to Chavez's
challenge to continued U.S. economic and political hegemony in Latin America.
Free of this external threat during the post-Cold War, both Congress and the
White House have over the long-term (10 years plus) shown an official public
unwillingness to support continued American hegemony by suppressing Chavez's
revolutionary reforms in a Cold War era manner (i.e., support for counter-revolutionary
forces). Rather the present study finds that both branches of the U.S. government
evidence a strong proclivity to follow Blasier's two pragmatic foreign policy
recommendations: 1) adopt a country specific approach and; 2) look at U.S. interests in
Latin America from a wider, long-term perspective.25 This proclivity is proven by the
number and type of congressional hearings and State Department statements on
Venezuela.
Despite the fact that there are at times differences of opinion within Congress and
between Congress and the White House based on political partisanship, there is no
conclusive proof that today the United States is following Cold War-style suppressive
policies aimed at Venezuela. Congressional and White House support of the democracy
enhancing activities of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in Venezuela,
25 Ibid, pg. 26.
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despite what Chivez asserts, does not constitute an attempt to suppress his government
on par with the actions undertaken by the United States towards Cuba's Castro regime
(1959-present) and Nicaragua's Sandinista government (1979-90) during the Cold War.
Rather, this dissertation finds that the United States has repeatedly stated over the years
that Chavez is a democratically elected head of state. As such Chavez may put forward
ideas that the United States disagrees with, yet ultimately it remains up to the Venezuelan
people to decide which form of governance best suits their needs.26
U.S. foreign policy during the post-Cold War, especially as it relates to Chavez, is
semi-realist. It is characterized by a strong measure of pragmatic idealism where
promoting democracy is actively pursued, especially when it is consistent with the hard
interests of the United States. 27 The William Jefferson "Bill" Clinton administration (D,
1993-2001) made promoting democracy a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy despite the
declining capability of the United States to influence developments in Latin America at a
time of rising tensions in other regions (e.g., the Balkans and the Caucuses). 28 Clinton not
26 Casey further clarified that "Chivez is free to speak his mind and he certainly has shown no hesitancy to
do so. But again, our focus is not worrying about him or his comments." The United States' focus is
working with "its partners in the hemisphere to do the kinds of things that are generally agreed by all
members of the OAS that we want to see happen." See comments attributed to Casey, Tom, "U.S.
Department of State Daily Press Briefing," (January 19, 2007), accessed October 11, 2007,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/79056.htm.
2 See, Carothers, Thomas, "Examining the Clinton Record on Democracy Promotion." Symposium held in
Washington, DC (September 12, 2000), accessed July 3, 2009,
http://www.camegieendowment.org/events/index.c fm?fa=eventDetail&id=197&&proi=zdrl.
28 John Sweeney of the Heritage Foundation points to the Second Summit of the Americas in Santiago,
Chile, on April 18-19, 1998, as showcasing the degree to which the United States had lost influence in
Latin America during the Clinton administration. A key contributing factor then was the inability of the
Clinton administration to obtain fast track authority from Congress to formally negotiate the creation of the
Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005. Latin American leaders came to see the administration's failure
to obtain this authority as indicative of the decreased importance of the region in the post-Cold War.
Sweeney finds that with trade expansion off the Clinton administration foreign policy agenda, other U.S.-
Latin America non-trade points of contention (e.g., U.S. policy toward Cuba, immigration, the war on
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only institutionalized promoting democracy in U.S. foreign policymaking bureaucracy by
expanding the number of staff positions dealing with the issue, but also spoke about it at
length in international forums such as the Community of Democracies meetings. 29
Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace sustains
that the Clinton administration continued the basic foreign policy framework of the
previous George H.W. Bush administration (R, 1989-93). However the effectiveness of
these Clinton era policies where ultimately hamstrung by a Republican controlled
Congress that reduced the international affairs budget.30 For Carothers, the 1994
Republican takeover of Congress contributed to the diffusion of the democratic norm by
failing in part to pay United Nations dues, as well as by dragging its feet on ratifying
international treaties and agreements.31
Nonetheless both the Clinton and George W. Bush (R, 2001-09) administrations
benefitted from the fact that the world has become more democratic in the post-Cold War
era. Internal U.S. foreign policymaking conflicts on whether to prioritize hard (e.g.,
strategic economic and political) interests over democracy promotion have become less
frequent given the absence of competition from the Soviet Union. The Clinton
administration as a consequence adopted a strategic and consistent vision on fostering
democracy based on the September 21, 1993, Anthony Lake speech that proposed: 1) to
drugs, and the annual drug certification process) came into sharper focus. See, Sweeney, John, "Clinton's
Latin America Policy: A Legacy of Missed Opportunities." Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation.
Backgrounder Number 1201 (July 6, 1998), accessed, July 3, 2009,
http://wwwheritage.org/research/latinamerica/bgl201.cfm.
29 Carothers.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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advance the community of developed democracies; 2) support democratic transitions; 3)
isolate and try to liberalize authoritarian states; and 4) approach conflict and post-conflict
scenarios with an eye to fostering democracy.32
Over the years both the Clinton and Bush administrations have sought to extract a
strong ideological commitment to representative democracy and neo-liberalism from its
Latin American partners. United States development assistance, cooperation, and support
for Latin American partners' international foreign policy objectives have been used by
Washington to entice and reward adherence to the Washington consensus. Non-
compliance has resulted in conditional assistance and sanctions.
David Young indicates that U.S. foreign policy is best characterized as being a
fusion of realism and morality, wherein other interests may at time trump democracy
promotion. Young elaborates that in the difficult world of foreign policy, a semi-realist or
pragmatic idealist approach is sometimes the best option. Young's comments are
compatible with Blasier's framework which echoes many of the key issues raised by
Hans J. Morgenthau in Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.33
Blasier, much like Morgenthau, recognizes the need to collect and interpret the political
acts carried out by a foreign state and its leadership. Blasier's framework in this sense
provides a rational means for assessing the consequences of Latin American
revolutionary challenges.
32 Young, David, "Examining the Clinton Record on Democracy Promotion." Symposium held in
Washington, DC (September 12, 2000), accessed July 3, 2009,
http://www.caregieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?faeventDetail&id=197&&proizdrl. Also see,
Lake, Anthony. "From Containment to Enlargement." Speech given at John Hopkins University - School
of Advanced International Studies (September 21, 1993), accessed July 3, 2009,
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html.
33 See, Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace - Six Principles of
Political Realism. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf Publisher, 1978, pgs. 4-5.
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Specifically in the Venezuelan case, Chavez's actions are clearly defined in terms
of perceived and actual power (capabilities) by both himself and the United States.
Chivez recognizes that he is critically dependent in economic and political terms on
continued access to the U.S. energy market. Despite recognition of this reality, Chavez
does desire to contest U.S. regional leadership but recognizes that he can only go so far
before jeopardizing access to the U.S. energy market. Notwithstanding his threats to use
oil exports as a weapon (e.g., threatening to cut off oil shipments to the United States),
the absence of the Soviet Union and the United States' increasingly diversified sources
for petroleum limit the threat potential posed by Chivez. As a result Chivez remains,
despite the rhetoric, a reliable wartime provider of petroleum to the United States.
Both Congress and the White House can be said to be reacting to Chavez's anti-
American policies (e.g., nationalizations and outreach to extra-hemispheric powers) in a
manner consistent with Blasier's Propositions 3 (partially), 4, 7, 8, 10, and 12. The
absence of the Soviet Union has allowed the United States, if not to seek to repress the
Chavez government (Proposition 3), to at least deal with it to keep oil flowing. Even the
nationalizations of U.S. business interests, although troubling, has not been serious
enough to warrant suppression of the Chavez government since it has offered to engage
and make timely and fair compensation for the value of expropriated properties
(Proposition 4). Today economic factors largely prevail over strategic political and
military security concerns when dealing with Chivez. As a result, principal decision
makers are departmental officials in most cases (Propositions 7 and 8). Due to the
importance of private business interests and industry's access to Congress through
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lobbyists, these interests often prevail over bureaucratic considerations and are
incorporated into the internal bargaining process (Proposition 10 and 12).
Summary of the Study's Conclusions
The principal conclusion of my dissertation is that Chavez and his so-called
Bolivarian Revolution are not a threat to the vital (military security) interests of the
United States. Vital interests in this sense are defined as those interests that constitute
such a grave threat to the United States' continued survival as a nation-state that it is
willing to go to war to defend them. My conclusion is the result of a thorough
methodology that: 1) analyzed data and reviewed the literature; 2) observed U.S.-
Venezuelan interactions; 3) analyzed trade flows and congressional interactions with the
executive branch, and; 4) collected and analyzed expert opinions. From a methodological
point of view, my study has shown that Blasier's framework continues to offer a valid
approach for analyzing how Congress and the White House react to revolutionary
changes in Latin America.
Conclusion Number 1
This study finds that in the post-Cold War environment, with the absence of a real
external threat equal to that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Venezuela's
Bolivarian Revolution is mainly a nuisance that does not threaten U.S. vital interests. The
study notes that the post-Cold War is characterized by the absence of an interventionist,
extra-hemispheric power with the political-military and economic capabilities which once
typified the Soviet Union's ability to threaten the security of the United States. Chavez's
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populist rhetoric and attempts to form alliances with extra-hemispheric powers (e.g., the
Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran), though alarming do not at present
constitute a grave enough military security threat to justify intervention at a time when
the United States is already fighting two wars simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The present economic security threat (e.g., the threat to cut off oil shipments as
well as diversify Venezuela's export partners) posed by Chivez to the United States falls
far short of the military security threat that the Cuban regime's collaboration with the
Soviet Union represented during the 1962 Missile Crisis. According to Blasier, in 1962
the Soviet-Cuban military security threat to the United States was explicit since nuclear
tipped missiles where stationed in Cuba targeting the United States.34 Even the U.S.
interventions in Guatemala (1954) and the Dominican Republic (1965) cannot be utilized
for justifying a present-day intervention in Bolivarian Venezuela since in both of these
cases U.S. concerns of a Soviet military security threat were unfounded.3 5 In both
Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, the revolutionary elite were largely middle class
reformers that sought to implement a nationalistic, anti-imperialistic foreign policy
instead of blindly acquiescing to U.S. foreign policy demands.36
My study also highlights that the February 27, 2008, Hearing of the United States
Senate Committee on Armed Services, "Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the
National Security of the United States," where John M. McConnell, Director of National
34 Blasier, pgs. 2 and 4.
3 Ibid.
36 Blasier indicates that neither Guatemala nor Dominican revolutionary movements had any significant
contacts with the Soviet government. Local communists did not play a significant role in either
revolutionary movement. See, Blasier, pgs. 8 and 10.
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Intelligence (2007-09) stated to the Committee that although Chavez has deepened
relations with Iran, Venezuela's and Iran's most significant progress has been limited to
economic and energy fronts, indicates the non-military security threat posed by Chavez.
While Venezuela and Iran have held discussions on nuclear energy, McConnell
commented to Congress that the United States is unaware of any significant
developments as a result of these discussions despite growing military cooperation. 37
Conclusion Number 2
My study finds that the present poor state of U.S.-Venezuelan relations does not
merit a repetition of the Ronald W. Reagan administration's (R, 1981-89) covert attempt
to overthrow Nicaragua's Sandinista government during the Nicaraguan Contra War
(1981-88). In this sense Blasier is critical of the Reagan administration's "hostile and
threatening stand toward Nicaragua," whereby its sponsorship of economic sanctions and
covert paramilitary activity provided no incentive for the Sandinistas to cooperate with
the United States. 38 Rather, the Reagan administration's policies motivated the
Sandinistas to seek Soviet economic, military, and diplomatic assistance. 39
Based on Blasier's framework, this study concludes that the Sandinistas' ties to
the Soviet Union never evolved to the point that they could constitute a military security
threat to the United States. At best these ties were a political security threat to the United
37 See, McConnell, John M., testimony in Hearing of the United States Senate, Committee in Armed
Services, "Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States."
Washington. D.C., (February 27, 2008), accessed May 25, 2009, pg. 28,
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110 senate hearings&docid=f:45665.pdf.
38 Blasier, pg. 24.
39 Ibid.
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States since they conceivably could contribute to undermining U.S. influence and
preeminence in Latin America.40 The Soviet Union, although opportunistic, could
financially ill afford to bankroll a second Cuba and even went so far as to avoid direct
involvement by funneling major military hardware through its Cuban proxy. 41
For Blasier, the Nicaraguan case is an example of a "sterile and dangerous" policy
that led to an impasse.42 Blasier believes that a worthwhile alternative policy the Reagan
administration could have followed would have been to utilize Mexico and France, states
friendly to both the United States and Nicaragua, to convey assurances that Washington
would not sponsor armed attacks if the Sandinistas retained close ties with the United
States.
The present study compares these findings with how Congress and the White
House, despite serious misgivings about Chavez's revolutionary reforms, continue to
follow a wait-and-see policy of accommodation in order to avoid an impasse. As a result,
there is no tangible proof that Washington has sought to: 1) mount paramilitary
operations similar to the one that overthrew the Jacobo Arbenz government (Guatemala)
in 1954 and failed to overthrow the Fidel Castro regime (Cuba) in 1961; 2) destabilize
Chavez's government through economic sanctions and covert (Central Intelligence
Agency) political operations in a manner similar to those that facilitated the overthrow of
the Salvador Allende government (Chile) in 1973; 3) impose economic sanctions and
sponsor paramilitary attempts to overthrow the Chavez government in a manner
40 Blasier, pg. 14.
41 Ibid, pg. 19.
42 Ibid, pg. 26.
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reminiscent of policies of suppression levied against Sandinista Nicaragua during the
1980s, and; 4) has not sought to intervene and occupy (militarily) Venezuela as it did in
the case of the Dominican Republic in 1965.
Conclusion Number 3
Even Chavez's involvement with Colombia's Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia (FARC) insurgency does not constitute a military security threat to the vital
interests of the United States sufficient to merit a repeat of Cold War era suppressive
policies aimed at regime destabilization and change. Rather, the study finds that
congressional action toward Venezuela-mainly the funding of democratic institution
building programs are not dissimilar to U.S. efforts elsewhere in Latin America and
the Caribbean where pro-U.S. governments are in place.
Nonetheless, the presence of congressionally funded NGOs such as the National
Endowment for Democracy continue to be interpreted by Chavez as attempts to
undermine and even overthrow the Bolivarian government. Despite Chavez's accusations
of ulterior motives behind U.S. funded NED democratic institution building programs,
the entire Latin American region, with the exception of Cuba and more recently with the
Honduran military coup that ousted the government of President Manuel Zelaya (June
28, 2009), has embraced electoral democracy. Despite Zelaya's pro-Chavez tendencies,
the United States has publically condemned the coup and affirmed that Zelaya remains
the democratically elected president of Honduras.43
4 Secretary of State Clinton on June 28, 2009, stated that "the action taken against Honduran President
Manuel Zelaya violates the Inter-American Democratic Charter, and thus should be condemned by all."
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Conclusion Number 4
My study concludes that the congressional reaction to revolutionary change in
Latin America today is different than it was during the Cold War. There no longer exists
an extra-hemispheric Great Power like the Cold War era Soviet Union seeking to
undermine U.S. hegemony in Latin America. As a consequence, Congress is less
ideological in its foreign policymaking. By extension Congress is less prone to attempt to
dictate to Latin America what the best form of governance is and more prone to follow
the sitting administration's recommendations.
That does not mean that the nature of the foreign policymaking process has
changed. The process is still nuanced, although the mechanisms are somewhat more open
given the significant advancements in technology and communications that facilitate
NGO and other organized involvement in the policymaking process. Despite the
institutionalized ways of congressional foreign policymaking, it appears that context
matters greatly in determining how Congress reacts to specific instances of revolutionary
changes in Latin America and the Caribbean. Any serious analysis of the rather tempered
congressional response to Chavez will conclude, as does this dissertation, that the current
world context and the place of the United States in it are largely responsible for the
absence of an overt military response to the Bolivarian Revolution.
See, Clinton, Hillary Rodham, "Situation in Honduras Press Release," (June 28, 2009), accessed July 3,
2009, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rmI/ 2 00 9 a 06/125452.htm.
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Conclusion Number 5
This study demonstrates that while both the executive and legislative branches of
the U.S. government have toned down their attention towards the Latin American region
as a whole, it is also clear that congressional activity regarding Latin America has not
been negligible. Three dimensions characterize congressional involvement in the Western
hemisphere since the end of the Cold War.
First, Congress's decision not to pursue what Blasier would call a policy of
suppression against the Chavez government is grounded in the notion that despite the
populist, anti-American rhetoric emanating from Caracas, Chavez has not been able to
stop the democratization process in Latin American. 44 The promotion of democracy,
human rights, and freedom of the press are key congressional foreign policy concerns in
the post-Cold War era and these have taken root throughout the region. While Chavez has
besieged these in Venezuela, his Bolivarian Revolutionary model cannot be readily
exported and its leftist objectives have often antagonized his regional counterparts. 45
Second, this study concludes that since the 1970s Congress has exerted an
increasingly active role in foreign policymaking, a role that at times puts it at odds with
the executive branch's own conclusions about the gravity of a threat. However, the
executive branch does not dispute the constitutional validity of Congress's involvement
in the foreign policymaking process. In this sense while Congress may act as a brake at
times on what it may view as executive branch (imperial) over-reach, its own
involvement in foreign policymaking is not deemed by the executive branch to be outside
as Ibid, pgs. 27-28.
as Ibid.
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the scope of the U.S. Congress's constitutional prerogatives and is often welcomed,
especially during periods of presidential administration transition.
The U.S. Department of State, as the lead foreign policymaking agency for the
executive branch, has made it a point throughout the Bush administration to state its
support for congressional involvement in foreign policymaking. This is made quite
apparent by the State Department's encouragement of congressional travel abroad. 4 6 Such
official travel serves two purposes: 1) it helps to make members of Congress invaluable
advocates of American values and instruments of public diplomacy and; 2) through
official travel overseas Congress can assess how U.S. foreign policy objectives are
implemented by U.S. foreign policymaking agencies, whose funding is dependent on the
congressional appropriations process.
In other words, this study finds that since the end of the Cold War, congressional
involvement in foreign policymaking has considerably expanded, mainly as members of
Congress travel abroad to oversee how U.S. funding promotes American values. While
their travel abroad is a direct measure of increased congressional foreign policy interest,
it is also a measure of the influence of U.S. local interests in foreign policymaking.
Members of Congress travel more today to demonstrate that they are not only being good
advocates of broad U.S. values and goals but also that they are indeed watching over
constituents' interests.
46 The U.S. Department of State strongly encourages and supports congressional travel abroad.
Congressional interaction with foreign governments, and by extension foreign policymaking, is welcomed
since such travel assists members of Congress and their staff members to exercise their responsibilities as a
separate branch of government. Members of Congress, traveling in an official capacity are seen by the
Department of State and thereby the executive branch, as invaluable proponents of American democracy
and values. U.S. Department of State, "Congressional Travel Guide," Telegram Number 012197
(unclassified) (February 7, 2008).
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In the context of current day Latin America, the debate over Plan Colombia best
illustrates this situation.47 Hardly a week passes without some congressional delegation
visiting Bogota or other parts of Colombia. Nearly ten years after its congressional
passage, Plan Colombia exemplifies the extent of congressional involvement in the
region.4 8 The Colombian case reveals how members of Congress respond in different and
often competing ways to lobbyists and others seeking to influence policy outcomes.
While members of Congress have responded to lobbyists from helicopter manufacturers,
human rights NGOs, and the American Federation of Labor - Congress of International
Organizations (AFL-CIO), the Colombian case is however the exception to the general
pattern of declining congressional involvement in Latin America as a result of increased
focus on the Middle East.
A third characteristic of U.S. congressional involvement in Latin America is the
extent to which Congress has shifted its focus to the Middle East since 2001. While it is
probably safe to assume that congressional involvement in overseeing U.S. policy toward
the Middle East has increased considerably, it is also probably correct to assert that in the
early part of this decade, given the perceived gravity of the threat of terrorism to the
United States, Congress simply went along with executive branch initiatives. In this
context, with the noticeable exception of Colombia, the U.S. Congress paid scant
47 The term Plan Colombia refers to U.S. legislation that seeks to curb narcotics trafficking and strengthen
the Colombian military. This legislation counts on strong bi-partisan backing in Congress. Plan Colombia
is not without detractors who argue that it is merely an initiative aimed not at drug eradication but at
strengthening the Colombian military in its fight against the FARC.
48 The Congressional Record Index (CRI) for the years 1998-2008 highlights that Congress has focused
more on Colombia than Venezuela. The CRI reports 1,127 individual documents referencing Colombia,
with 430 referencing Venezuela during the period. U.S. Government Printing Office - U.S. Congressional
Record Index, 1998-2008 accessed July 3, 2009, 2009, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/cri/index.html.
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attention to the Western Hemisphere.49 Paradoxically, as this study has demonstrated, this
downturn in congressional interest in the region occurred alongside the consolidation of
the Bolivarian model in Venezuela and its embrace by Bolivia and Ecuador in the Andes.
FINAL COMMENTS
The evidence and data reviewed in this study highlights the fact that Chavez can
ill afford to sever Venezuela's ties with the United States. Chivez's vulnerability permits
a number of key conclusions to be reached: 1) the absence of an extra-hemispheric, anti-
American power undertaking an interventionist foreign policy in the Latin American
region greatly limits Chavez's capability to threaten U.S. interests via the formation of
unfriendly, anti-American alliances; 2) economic dependence on the United States and its
energy market limits Chavez's ability to implement revolutionary reforms that are
antagonistic enough to convince the United States to pursue a change of regime in
Caracas; 3) with George W. Bush out of office Chavez has a unique opportunity to
declare himself the victor in his struggle against the "devil" thereby opening the door to
conciliation with the Obama administration at a time of low oil prices; and 4) Congress,
although wary of China's involvement in Venezuela's oil and gas sector, will continue to
regard Chavez mainly as a nuisance to U.S. interests in the region.
49 Nonetheless since the end of the Cold War, U.S. presidential administrations and Congress regardless of
party control have consistently promoted market oriented reforms, democratic institution building
programs, and combating narcotics production and trafficking as major policy concerns when dealing with
Latin America. With the notable exception of Plan Colombia, in which all branches of the U.S. government
have given approval, the United States has avoided recourse to any notion of direct military intervention to
pursue the foregoing policies. U.S. government reluctance to intervene in Venezuela may be conditioned by
concerns of becoming bogged down in another internal conflict as resource-demanding if not more so, than
Colombia's internal conflict.
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Such conclusions are similar to those expressed by the Director of National
Intelligence, John M. McConnell in February 2008 and coincide with those of Director
Dennis C. Blair in February 2009. Chavez, in the short- to medium-term will remain
more of a nuisance to the United States than a threat as he seeks to prioritize foreign
policies aimed at uniting Latin America under his leadership, and behind an anti-
American leftist agenda.50 Although Chavez will continue to support Bolivia's Morales
and Nicaragua's Ortega, as well as strongly back El Salvador's Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) in its bid to secure that country's presidency in the 2009
elections, the absence of an extra-hemispheric, anti-American power willing and able to
implement interventionist policies reminiscent of the Soviet Union's during the Cold War
precludes Chavez from becoming a significant threat to U.S. military security interests
especially at a time when both he and his most likely backer (Russia) are hard hit by
collapsing oil and gas revenues.
Congress will continue to view Chavez, much like it viewed the Sandinistas
during the Cold War, as a nuisance. Chavez and his revolutionary agenda will be
relegated by Congress to a lower priority level since they constitute a lower-level
economic security threat to U.S. interests. Absent the existence of a military security
threat the Obama White House will be hard pressed to wrestle the funds from Congress to
pressure/suppress the Chavez government even if it so desired. Such a reality combined
with falling oil prices will induce the United States and force Venezuela to eventually
adopt a policy of reconciliation. At worst this study finds that Chavez will continue to be
50 McConnell, pg. 35, and Blair, pgs. 31-32.
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a potential political security threat to U.S. interests in a manner similar to that of
Nicaragua's Sandinista government.
Chivez has no viable option short of reconciliation with the United States. His
government remains dependent on the U.S. energy market at a time of falling oil prices
and government spending exceeding revenue collection. United States foreign
policymakers today have the luxury of being able to wait out Chivez given the global
recession and slackening demand for petroleum. Chavez on the other hand, is dependent
on oil windfall profits. Without these, Chavez's supporters will turn their backs on the
government as government spending on social welfare dries up.
It is too soon to tell if the Obama administration will continue the Bush
administration's decision to wait out the situation with Chavez. If the Obama
administration opts to continue the preceding administration's policies toward Venezuela,
such action represents a return to the early Cold War era position when U.S. foreign
policies were geared toward ascertaining how revolutionary change could play itself out.
By doing so, U.S. foreign policymakers today in both the executive and legislative
branches will be free to better focus resources on determining the implications of Latin
American reformist and revolutionary agendas on U.S. interests in the region.
Congress is avoiding falling prey to Chivez's rhetoric. In doing so it has managed
to prevent the implementation of suppressive policies that would otherwise have
contributed to radicalize Chavez. Congress has succeeded in checking the momentum of
revolutionary change in Venezuela and by extension the rest of Latin America. This is
seen in the Chavez government's inability to establish single party rule which occurred
with Castrorite Cuba, despite having subjugated the military to his sole control.
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In conclusion, my study has found that Blasier's Cold War era theoretical
framework remains valid for analyzing how U.S. foreign policymakers in the executive
and legislative branches will react to Latin American revolutionary challenges. The study
in closing suggests that Blasier's original framework can be updated with the inclusion of
the following five propositions (Table 24) that frame how U.S. foreign policymakers,
especially those in Congress, are framing policies in reaction to post-Cold War
revolutionary challenges in Latin America.
Table 24 - Additional Propositions for United States Government's
(USG) Action Based on Blasier's Framework, Revised to Reflect Post-
Cold War Revolutionary Challenges
Proposition Definition
A USG, and in particular Congress, will respond flexibly to a post-Cold War
reformist/revolutionary government (e.g., Chavez's) due to the diminished importance
placed on socio-political and economic ideology.
B The USG and Congress in particular, will respond flexibly to reformist/revolutionary
governments, despite attempts by these to form strategic partnerships with extra-
hemispheric and anti-American powers, as long as these relationships do not pose an
existential threat to the United States. If the latter do pose a threat, and there are
verifiable links attesting to this collusion, then the reformist/revolutionary government
will be suppressed.
C USG and Congress in particular, will call on reformist/revolutionary governments to
respect human rights, safeguard democracy, and promote freedom of expression.
Noncompliance results in increased congressional funding for democracy promotion
entities such as the National Endowment for Democracy, as well as increased
congressional calls (i.e., hearings, bills, resolutions) for the offending government to
reform. Compliance will result in USG conciliatory policies.
D Economic interests of the overall U.S. economy, and not an individual U.S. corporate
entity's interests, take precedence. USG and Congress in particular, will respond flexibly
as long as the reformist/revolutionary government remains a reliable commodities and
natural resources supplier to the United States.
E Commodity and resource competition by rivals of the United States at the invitation of a
reformist/revolutionary government will result in increased congressional scrutiny and
calls for transparency.
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Blasier's theoretical framework remains a pragmatic means for assessing
reformist and revolutionary developments in Latin America, especially at a time when
U.S. foreign policymaking is in flux as the Obama administration works to develop its
own foreign policy objectives and strategies. United States foreign policymaking, in both
the executive and legislative branches of government has shifted in the post-Cold War
period between emphasizing American ideological objectives such as the promotion of
democracy and the other extreme, maintaining the status quo.
United States foreign policymaking has also gone from reliance on negotiations to
the use of force, from calls to regulate markets to liberalize them, and from consensus
building to assertive leadership. While the previous Bush administration saw the United
States assert American leadership internationally, the Obama administration will be prone
to pulling back from unilateralism and emphasize international cooperation
(multilateralism). However, in marked contrast to traditional norms, it will be the Obama
administration (Democratic) that will move away from the democracy promotion
idealism that characterized U.S. foreign policy during the Bush administration and adopt
a more realistic and pragmatic approach to international relations.
The Obama administration will move away from emphasizing human rights and
democracy promotion, as evidenced by Secretary Clinton's refusal to publicly bring up
these issues during her early 2009 visit to China, where she focused primarily on
advancing the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SED). A Democratic controlled and
assertive Congress may likely opt to champion human rights and democracy promotion
as the country comes closer to the November 2010 mid-term elections. If so, the proposed
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additions to Blasier's framework in Table 24 will help analyze how Congress will react to
revolutionary changes in the years to come.
While the Obama administration may opt to stabilize relations with rivals, for
example by prioritizing relations with Russia and embracing Chavez (e.g., President
Obama did not turn down the opportunity to shake Chavez's hand at the Summit of the
Americas in Trinidad and Tobago in April 2009) in order to protect U.S. strategic
interests, Congress will seek to strike the right balance between bilateralism and
multilateralism that often eludes U.S. presidents. As the foreign policymaking pendulum
swings in Washington, realists with their emphasis on diplomacy, decision-making by
consensus, cooperation with allies, and pragmatism are back in vogue. Liberalism, with
its emphasis on free markets, U.S. leadership (unilateralism), and democracy promotion
is on the way out.
The relevance of Blasier's theoretical framework is that it remains a pragmatic
means for resolving problems associated with reformist and revolutionary challenges
confronting U.S. policymakers in Congress. My study finds that Blasier's framework
provides the means of focusing on a goal and how to achieve it without necessarily
discarding the need for a process.
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APPENDIX 1
CONGRESSIONAL SESSION CHART
CONGRESS YEARS CONGRESS YEARS CONGRESS YEARS CONGRESS YEARS
1st 1789-91 37th 1861-63 73rd 1933-34 109th 2005-2006
2nd 1791-93 38th 1863-65 74th 1935-36 110th 2007-2008
3rd 1793-95 39th 1865-67 75th 1937-38 111th 2009-2010
4th 1795-97 40th 1867-69 76th 1939-41 112th 2011-2012
5th 1797-99 41st 1869-71 77th 1941-42 113th 2013-2014
6th 1799-1801 42nd 1871-73 78th 1943-44 --- ---
7th 1801-03 43rd 1873-75 79th 1945-46 --- ---
8th 1803-05 44th 1875-77 80th 194748 --- ---
9th 1805-07 45th 1877-79 81st 1949-51 --- ---
10th 1807-09 46th 1879-81 82nd 1951-52 --- ---
11th 1809-11 47th 1881-83 83rd 1953-54 --- ---
12th 1811-13 48th 1883-85 84th 1955-56 --- ---
13th 1813-15 49th 1885-87 85th 1957-58 --- ---
14th 1815-17 50th 1887-89 86th 1959-60 --- ---
15th 1817-19 51st 1889-91 87th 1961-62 --- ---
16th 1819-21 52nd 1891-93 88th 1963-64 --- ---
17th 1821-23 53rd 1893-95 89th 1965-66 --- ---
18th 1823-25 54th 1895-97 90th 1967-68 --- ---
19th 1825-27 55th 1897-99 91st 1969-71 ---- ---
20th 1827-29 56th 1899-1901 92nd 1971-72 ---- ---
21st 1829-31 57th 1901-03 93rd 1973-74 --- ---
22nd 1831-33 58th 1903-05 94th 1975-76 --- ---
23rd 1833-35 59th 1905-07 95th 1977-78 --- ---
24th 1835-37 60th 1907-09 96th 1979-80 --- ---
25th 1837-39 61st 1909-11 97th 1981-82 --- ---
26th 1839-41 62nd 1911-13 98th 1983-84 --- ---
27th 1841-43 63rd 1913-15 99th 1985-86 --- ---
28th 1843-45 64th 1915-17 100th 1987-88 --- ---
29th 1845-47 65th 1917-19 101st 1989-90 --- ---
30th 1947-49 66th 1919-21 102nd 1991-92 --- ---
31st 1849-51 67th 1921-23 103rd 1993-94 --- ---
32nd 1851-53 68th 1923-25 104th 1995-96 --- ---
33rd 1853-55 69th 1925-27 105th 1997-98 --- ---
34th 1855-57 70th 1927-29 106th 1999-2000 --- ---
35th 1857-59 71st 1929-31 107th 2001-2002 --- ---
36th 1859-61 72nd 1931-33 108th 2003-2004 --- ---
Source: Indiana University - Bloomington, (2008), accessed February 3, 2008,
http://www.libraries.iub.edu index.php ?pageId=3373.
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APPENDIX 2
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY FISCAL YEAR
APPROPRIATIONS BASED ON 2006 DOLLAR VALUES
FISCAL APPROPRIATION APPROPRIATION
YEAR AMOUNT AMOUNT
(ACTUAL) ADJUSTED
1995 $34.0 million S44.9 million
1996 $30.0 million S38.5 million
1997 S30.0 million $37.6 million
1998 $30.0 million S37.1 million
1999 S31.0 million S37.5 million
2000 S31.0 million S36.2 million
2001 S31.0 million $35.2 million
2002 $33.5 million $37.5 million
2003 $41.7 million $45.6 million
2004 $39.8 million $42.4 million
2005 $60.0 million $61.9 million
2006 $74.0 million $74.0 million
2007(e) $50.0 million ---
2008(r) $80.0 million ---
Note: (e) stands for estimate and (r) stands for requested.
Source: The Fiscal Year (FY) 1995-2005 data is compiled from CRS State Department and Related
Agencies FY Appropriations reports (various years), see
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/searchform.tkl. FY 2006-2008 data compiled from U.S.
Department of State, "FY 2008 Budget in Brief," (February 5, 2007), accessed January 27, 2008,
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/bib/2008/html/79742.htm. For computing the relative value of the U.S.
dollar in 1995 to 2006 (last year of full annual data for initial and target year) using the consumer price
index, see http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/uscompare/index.php# accessed, February 3, 2008.
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM - AMERICAN
EMBASSY MANAGUA 2857 (JUNE 1979)
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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 17
THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON D.C. (JANUARY 4, 1982)
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APPENDIX 5
HUGO CHAVEZ ADDRESS TO THE UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK
(SEPTEMBER 20, 2006)
Representatives of the governments of the world, good morning to all of you. First of all, I would
like to invite you, very respectfully, to those who have not read this book, to read it.
Noam Chomsky, one of the most prestigious American and world intellectuals, Noam Chomsky,
and this is one of his most recent books, 'Hegemony or Survival: The Imperialist Strategy of the
United States."' [Holds up book, waves it in front of General Assembly.] "It's an excellent book to
help us understand what has been happening in the world throughout the 20th century, and
what's happening now, and the greatest threat looming over our planet.
The hegemonic pretensions of the American empire are placing at risk the very survival of the
human species. We continue to warn you about this danger and we appeal to the people of the
United States and the world to halt this threat, which is like a sword hanging over our heads. I had
considered reading from this book, but, for the sake of time," [flips through the pages, which are
numerous] "I will just leave it as a recommendation.
It reads easily, it is a very good book, I'm sure Madame [President] you are familiar with it. It
appears in English, in Russian, in Arabic, in German. I think that the first people who should read
this book are our brothers and sisters in the United States, because their threat is right in their
own house.
The devil is right at home. The devil, the devil himself, is right in the house.
"And the devil came here yesterday. Yesterday the devil came here. Right here." [crosses
himself] "And it smells of sulfur still today.
Yesterday, ladies and gentlemen, from this rostrum, the president of the United States, the
gentleman to whom I refer as the devil, came here, talking as if he owned the world. Truly. As the
owner of the world.
I think we could call a psychiatrist to analyze yesterday's statement made by the president of the
United States. As the spokesman of imperialism, he came to share his nostrums, to try to
preserve the current pattern of domination, exploitation and pillage of the peoples of the world.
An Alfred Hitchcock movie could use it as a scenario. I would even propose a title: "The Devil's
Recipe."
As Chomsky says here, clearly and in depth, the American empire is doing all it can to
consolidate its system of domination. And we cannot allow them to do that. We cannot allow
world dictatorship to be consolidated.
The world parent's statement -- cynical, hypocritical, full of this imperial hypocrisy from the need
they have to control everything.
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They say they want to impose a democratic model. But that's their democratic model. It's the false
democracy of elites, and, I would say, a very original democracy that's imposed by weapons and
bombs and firing weapons.
What a strange democracy. Aristotle might not recognize it or others who are at the root of
democracy.
What type of democracy do you impose with marines and bombs?
The president of the United States, yesterday, said to us, right here, in this room, and I'm quoting,
"Anywhere you look, you hear extremists telling you can escape from poverty and recover your
dignity through violence, terror and martyrdom."
Wherever he looks, he sees extremists. And you, my brother -- he looks at your color, and he
says, oh, there's an extremist. Evo Morales, the worthy president of Bolivia, looks like an
extremist to him.
The imperialists see extremists everywhere. It's not that we are extremists. It's that the world is
waking up. It's waking up all over. And people are standing up.
I have the feeling, dear world dictator, that you are going to live the rest of your days as a
nightmare because the rest of us are standing up, all those who are rising up against American
imperialism, who are shouting for equality, for respect, for the sovereignty of nations.
Yes, you can call us extremists, but we are rising up against the empire, against the model of
domination.
The president then -- and this he said himself, he said: "I have come to speak directly to the
populations in the Middle East, to tell them that my country wants peace."
That's true. If we walk in the streets of the Bronx, if we walk around New York, Washington, San
Diego, in any city, San Antonio, San Francisco, and we ask individuals, the citizens of the United
States, what does this country want? Does it want peace? They'll say yes.
But the government doesn't want peace. The government of the United States doesn't want
peace. It wants to exploit its system of exploitation, of pillage, of hegemony through war.
It wants peace. But what's happening in Iraq? What happened in Lebanon? In Palestine? What's
happening? What's happened over the last 100 years in Latin America and in the world? And now
threatening Venezuela -- new threats against Venezuela, against Iran?
He spoke to the people of Lebanon. Many of you, he said, have seen how your homes and
communities were caught in the crossfire. How cynical can you get? What a capacity to lie
shamefacedly. The bombs in Beirut with millimetric precision?
This is crossfire? He's thinking of a western, when people would shoot from the hip and
somebody would be caught in the crossfire.
This is imperialist, fascist, assassin, genocidal, the empire and Israel firing on the people of
Palestine and Lebanon. That is what happened. And now we hear, "We're suffering because we
see homes destroyed.'
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The president of the United States came to talk to the peoples -- to the peoples of the world. He
came to say -- I brought some documents with me, because this morning I was reading some
statements, and I see that he talked to the people of Afghanistan, the people of Lebanon, the
people of Iran. And he addressed all these peoples directly.
And you can wonder, just as the president of the United States addresses those peoples of the
world, what would those peoples of the world tell him if they were given the floor? What would
they have to say?
And I think I have some inkling of what the peoples of the south, the oppressed people think.
They would say, "Yankee imperialist, go home." I think that is what those people would say if they
were given the microphone and if they could speak with one voice to the American imperialists.
And that is why, Madam President, my colleagues, my friends, last year we came here to this
same hall as we have been doing for the past eight years, and we said something that has now
been confirmed -- fully, fully confirmed.
I don't think anybody in this room could defend the system. Let's accept -- let's be honest. The
U.N. system, born after the Second World War, collapsed. It's worthless.
Oh, yes, it's good to bring us together once a year, see each other, make statements and prepare
all kinds of long documents, and listen to good speeches, like Abel's yesterday, or President
Mullah's . Yes, it's good for that.
And there are a lot of speeches, and we've heard lots from the president of Sri Lanka, for
instance, and the president of Chile.
But we, the assembly, have been turned into a merely deliberative organ. We have no power, no
power to make any impact on the terrible situation in the world. And that is why Venezuela once
again proposes, here, today, 20 September, that we re-establish the United Nations.
Last year, Madam, we made four modest proposals that we felt to be crucially important. We
have to assume the responsibility our heads of state, our ambassadors, our representatives, and
we have to discuss it.
The first is expansion, and Mullah talked about this yesterday right here. The Security Council,
both as it has permanent and non-permanent categories, (inaudible) developing countries and
LDCs must be given access as new permanent members. That's step one.
Second, effective methods to address and resolve world conflicts, transparent decisions.
Point three, the immediate suppression -- and that is something everyone's calling for -- of the
anti-democratic mechanism known as the veto, the veto on decisions of the Security Council.
Let me give you a recent example. The immoral veto of the United States allowed the Israelis,
with impunity, to destroy Lebanon. Right in front of all of us as we stood there watching, a
resolution in the council was prevented.
Fourthly, we have to strengthen, as we've always said, the role and the powers of the secretary
general of the United Nations.
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Yesterday, the secretary general practically gave us his speech of farewell. And he recognized
that over the last 10 years, things have just gotten more complicated; hunger, poverty, violence,
human rights violations have just worsened. That is the tremendous consequence of the collapse
of the United Nations system and American hegemonistic pretensions.
Madam, Venezuela a few years ago decided to wage this battle within the United Nations by
recognizing the United Nations, as members of it that we are, and lending it our voice, our
thinking.
Our voice is an independent voice to represent the dignity and the search for peace and the
reformulation of the international system; to denounce persecution and aggression of
hegemonistic forces on the planet.
This is how Venezuela has presented itself. Bolivar's home has sought a nonpermanent seat on
the Security Council.
Let's see. Well, there's been an open attack by the U.S. government, an immoral attack, to try
and prevent Venezuela from being freely elected to a post in the Security Council.
The imperium is afraid of truth, is afraid of independent voices. It calls us extremists, but they are
the extremists.
And I would like to thank all the countries that have kindly announced their support for Venezuela,
even though the ballot is a secret one and there's no need to announce things.
But since the imperium has attacked, openly, they strengthened the convictions of many
countries. And their support strengthens us.
Mercosur, as a bloc, has expressed its support, our brothers in Mercosur. Venezuela, with Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, is a full member of Mercosur.
And many other Latin American countries, CARICOM, Bolivia have expressed their support for
Venezuela. The Arab League, the full Arab League has voiced its support. And I am immensely
grateful to the Arab world, to our Arab brothers, our Caribbean brothers, the African Union.
Almost all of Africa has expressed its support for Venezuela and countries such as Russia or
China and many others.
I thank you all warmly on behalf of Venezuela, on behalf of our people, and on behalf of the truth,
because Venezuela, with a seat on the Security Council, will be expressing not only Venezuela's
thoughts, but it will also be the voice of all the peoples of the world, and we will defend dignity and
truth.
Over and above all of this, Madam President, I think there are reasons to be optimistic. A poet
would have said "helplessly optimistic," because over and above the wars and the bombs and the
aggressive and the preventive war and the destruction of entire peoples, one can see that a new
era is dawning.
As Silvio Rodriguez says, the era is giving birth to a heart. There are alternative ways of thinking.
There are young people who think differently. And this has already been seen within the space of
a mere decade. It was shown that the end of history was a totally false assumption, and the same
was shown about Pax Americana and the establishment of the capitalist neo-liberal world. It has
been shown, this system, to generate mere poverty. Who believes in it now?
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What we now have to do is define the future of the world. Dawn is breaking out all over. You can
see it in Africa and Europe and Latin America and Oceanea. I want to emphasize that optimistic
vision.
We have to strengthen ourselves, our will to do battle, our awareness. We have to build a new
and better world.
Venezuela joins that struggle, and that's why we are threatened. The U.S. has already planned,
financed and set in motion a coup in Venezuela, and it continues to support coup attempts in
Venezuela and elsewhere.
President Michelle Bachelet reminded us just a moment ago of the horrendous assassination of
the former foreign minister, Orlando Letelier.
And I would just add one thing: Those who perpetrated this crime are free. And that other event
where an American citizen also died were American themselves. They were CIA killers, terrorists.
And we must recall in this room that in just a few days there will be another anniversary. Thirty
years will have passed from this other horrendous terrorist attack on the Cuban plane, where 73
innocents died, a Cubana de Aviacion airliner.
And where is the biggest terrorist of this continent who took the responsibility for blowing up the
plane? He spent a few years in jail in Venezuela. Thanks to CIA and then government officials, he
was allowed to escape, and he lives here in this country, protected by the government.
And he was convicted. He has confessed to his crime. But the U.S. government has double
standards. It protects terrorism when it wants to.
And this is to say that Venezuela is fully committed to combating terrorism and violence. And we
are one of the people who are fighting for peace.
Luis Posada Carriles is the name of that terrorist who is protected here. And other tremendously
corrupt people who escaped from Venezuela are also living here under protection: a group that
bombed various embassies, that assassinated people during the coup. They kidnapped me and
they were going to kill me, but I think God reached down and our people came out into the streets
and the army was too, and so I'm here today.
But these people who led that coup are here today in this country protected by the American
government. And I accuse the American government of protecting terrorists and of having a
completely cynical discourse.
We mentioned Cuba. Yes, we were just there a few days ago. We just came from there happily.
And there you see another era born. The Summit of the 15, the Summit of the Nonaligned,
adopted a historic resolution. This is the outcome document. Don't worry, I'm not going to read it.
But you have a whole set of resolutions here that were adopted after open debate in a
transparent matter -- more than 50 heads of state. Havana was the capital of the south for a few
weeks, and we have now launched, once again, the group of the nonaligned with new
momentum.
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And if there is anything I could ask all of you here, my companions, my brothers and sisters, it is
to please lend your good will to lend momentum to the Nonaligned Movement for the birth of the
new era, to prevent hegemony and prevent further advances of imperialism.
And as you know, Fidel Castro is the president of the nonaligned for the next three years, and we
can trust him to lead the charge very efficiently.
Unfortunately they thought, "Oh, Fidel was going to die." But they're going to be disappointed
because he didn't. And he's not only alive, he's back in his green fatigues, and he's now presiding
the nonaligned.
So, my dear colleagues, Madam President, a new, strong movement has been born, a movement
of the south. We are men and women of the south.
With this document, with these ideas, with these criticisms, I'm now closing my file. I'm taking the
book with me. And, don't forget, I'm recommending it very warmly and very humbly to all of you.
We want ideas to save our planet, to save the planet from the imperialist threat. And hopefully in
this very century, in not too long a time, we will see this, we will see this new era, and for our
children and our grandchildren a world of peace based on the fundamental principles of the
United Nations, but a renewed United Nations.
And maybe we have to change location. Maybe we have to put the United Nations somewhere
else; maybe a city of the south. We've proposed Venezuela.
You know that my personal doctor had to stay in the plane. The chief of security had to be left in a
locked plane. Neither of these gentlemen was allowed to arrive and attend the U.N. meeting. This
is another abuse and another abuse of power on the part of the Devil. It smells of sulfur here, but
God is with us and I embrace you all.
May God bless us all. Good day to you.
Source: Commondreams.org. Published on September 20, 2006, accessed June 8, 2008,
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0920-22.htm.
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APPENDIX 6
AVERAGE DAILY (THOUSANDS OF BARRELS) PRODUCTION PER MONTH
PER YEAR OF VENEZUELAN CRUDE OIL, 1973 TO 2008
YEAR/ MONTH/ AVERAGE YEAR/ MONTH/ AVERAGE YEAR/ MONTH/ AVERAGE
1973 01 3272.000 1976 05 2410.000 1979 09 2358.000
1973 02 3309.000 1976 06 2371.000 1979 10 2354.000
1973 03 3330.000 1976 07 2481.000 1979 11 2389.000
1973 04 3360.000 1976 08 2447.000 1979 12 2407.000
1973 05 3426.000 1976 09 2429.000 1980 01 2281.000
1973 06 3383.000 1976 10 2364.000 1980 02 2206.000
1973 07 3391.000 1976 11 2264.000 1980 03 1989.000
1973 08 3396.000 1976 12 2388.000 1980 04 2052.000
1973 09 3406.000 1977 01 2380.000 1980 05 2047.000
1973 10 3381.000 1977 02 2332.000 1980 06 2060.000
1973 11 3395.000 1977 03 2367.000 1980 07 2171.000
1973 12 3340.000 1977 04 2180.000 1980 08 2211.000
1974 01 3284.000 1977 05 2125.000 1980 09 2191.000
1974 02 3230.000 1977 06 2230.000 1980 10 2228.000
197403 3189.000 1977 07 2209.000 1980 11 2231.000
197404 3053.000 1977 08 2284.000 1980 12 2351.000
1974 05 2939.000 1977 09 2366.000 1981 01 2214.000
197406 2953.000 1977 10 2350.000 1981 02 2189.000
1974 07 2949.000 1977 11 2074.000 1981 03 2229.000
197408 2868.000 1977 12 1965.000 1981 04 2194.000
1974 09 2778.000 1978 01 1802.000 1981 05 2169.000
1974 10 2818.000 1978 02 1640.000 1981 06 1985.000
1974 11 2826.000 1978 03 2085.000 1981 07 1755.000
1974 12 2841.000 1978 04 2251.000 1981 08 1955.000
1975 01 2747.000 1978 05 2038.000 1981 09 2092.000
1975 02 2565.000 1978 06 2372.000 1981 10 1975.000
1975 03 2535.000 1978 07 2309.000 1981 11 2224.000
1975 04 2490.000 1978 08 2206.000 1981 12 2254.000
1975 05 2394.000 1978 09 2275.000 1982 01 1989.000
1975 06 2439.000 1978 10 2328.000 1982 02 1734.000
1975 07 2336.000 1978 11 2272.000 1982 03 1834.000
1975 08 2285.000 1978 12 2367.000 1982 04 1533.000
1975 09 2316.000 1979 01 2342.000 1982 05 1503.000
1975 10 2244.000 1979 02 2342.000 1982 06 1513.000
1975 11 2045.000 1979 03 2422.000 1982 07 1844.000
1975 12 1771.000 1979 04 2380.000 1982 08 1964.000
1976 01 1675.000 1979 05 2377.000 1982 09 1994.000
1976 02 2002.000 1979 06 2246.000 1982 10 2165.000
1976 03 2289.000 1979 07 2326.000 1982 11 2305.000
1976 04 2401.000 1979 08 2324.000 1982 12 2338.000
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YEAR/ MONTH/ AVERAGE YEAR/ MONTH/ AVERAGE YEAR/ MONTH/ AVERAGE
1983 01 2098.000 1986 10 1750.000 1990 07 2040.313
1983 02 1791.000 1986 11 1780.000 1990 08 2090.320
1983 03 2093.000 1986 12 1855.000 1990 09 2290.351
1983 04 1726.000 1987 01 1671.000 1990 10 2275.349
1983 05 1695.000 1987 02 1671.000 1990 11 2320.356
1983 06 1700.000 1987 03 1807.000 1990 12 2340.359
1983 07 1705.000 1987 04 1701.000 1991 01 2395.877
1983 08 1741.000 1987 05 1726.000 1991 02 2395.877
1983 09 1736.000 1987 06 1766.000 1991 03 2395.877
1983 10 1750.000 1987 07 1887.000 1991 04 2345.717
1983 11 1781.000 1987 08 1796.000 1991 05 2345.717
1983 12 1786.000 1987 09 1746.000 1991 06 2345.717
198401 1825.000 1987 10 1751.000 1991 07 2345.717
1984 02 1800.000 1987 11 1746.000 1991 08 2345.717
1984 03 1800.000 1987 12 1746.000 1991 09 2345.717
198404 1800.000 1988 01 1853.000 1991 10 2395.907
198405 1825.000 1988 02 1853.000 1991 11 2395.907
1984 06 1790.000 1988 03 1853.000 1991 12 2446.096
198407 1845.000 1988 04 1853.000 1992 01 2390.000
198408 1805.000 1988 05 1853.000 1992 02 2340.000
198409 1835.000 1988 06 1853.000 1992 03 2190.000
1984 10 1785.000 1988 07 1853.000 1992 04 2190.000
1984 11 1710.000 1988 08 1853.000 1992 05 2290.000
1984 12 1755.000 1988 09 1928.000 1992 06 2290.000
1985 01 1673.000 1988 10 1928.000 1992 07 2290.000
1985 02 1678.000 1988 11 2078.000 1992 08 2340.000
1985 03 1683.000 1988 12 2078.000 1992 09 2390.000
1985 04 1678.000 1989 01 1862.000 1992 10 2440.000
1985 05 1688.000 1989 02 1862.000 1992 11 2440.000
1985 06 1673.000 1989 03 1862.000 1992 12 2415.000
1985 07 1673.000 1989 04 1862.000 1993 01 2484.343
1985 08 1673.000 1989 05 1862.000 1993 02 2463.726
1985 09 1673.000 1989 06 1913.000 1993 03 2412.183
1985 10 1673.000 1989 07 1875.000 1993 04 2412.183
1985 11 1678.000 1989 08 1926.000 1993 05 2412.183
1985 12 1683.000 1989 09 1926.000 1993 06 2412.183
1986 01 1730.000 1989 10 1977.000 1993 07 2463.726
1986 02 1730.000 1989 11 1977.000 1993 08 2463.726
1986 03 1730.000 1989 12 1977.000 1993 09 2453.417
1986 04 1730.000 1990 01 1990.305 1993 10 2474.034
1986 05 1730.000 1990 02 2140.328 1993 11 2474.034
1986 06 1755.000 1990 03 2040.313 1993 12 2474.034
1986 07 1770.000 1990 04 2040.313 1994 01 2563.797
1986 08 2115.000 1990 05 2040.313 1994 02 2563.797
1986 09 1760.000 1990 06 2040.313 1994 03 2563.797
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YEAR/ MONTH/ AVERAGE YEAR/ MONTH/ AVERAGE YEAR/ MONTH/ AVERAGE
1994 04 2553.500 1998 01 3440.000 2001 10 2873.755
1994 05 2574.093 1998 02 3410.000 2001 11 2863.297
1994 06 2574.093 1998 03 3410.000 2001 12 2873.755
1994 07 2594.686 1998 04 3240.000 2002 01 2630.000
1994 08 2615.279 1998 05 3240.000 2002 02 2600.000
1994 09 2615.279 1998 06 3210.000 2002 03 2620.000
1994 10 2615.279 1998 07 3070.000 2002 04 2530.000
1994 11 2615.279 1998 08 2990.000 2002 05 2730.000
1994 12 2604.982 1998 09 2940.000 2002 06 2735.000
1995 01 2600.000 1998 10 2990.000 2002 07 2735.000
1995 02 2600.000 1998 11 3040.000 2002 08 2765.000
1995 03 2600.000 1998 12 3040.000 2002 09 2955.000
1995 04 2670.000 1999 01 3019.294 2002 10 2980.000
1995 05 2790.000 1999 02 2999.366 2002 11 2972.000
1995 06 2790.000 1999 03 2959.510 2002 12 1020.000
1995 07 2790.000 1999 04 2800.084 2003 01 630.000
1995 08 2790.000 1999 05 2780.156 2003 02 1450.000
1995 09 2790.000 1999 06 2760.228 2003 03 2390.000
1995 10 2840.000 1999 07 2760.228 2003 04 2555.000
1995 11 2840.000 1999 08 2760.228 2003 05 2665.000
1995 12 2890.000 1999 09 2760.228 2003 06 2640.000
1996 01 2829.333 1999 10 2760.228 2003 07 2640.000
1996 02 2829.333 1999 11 2780.156 2003 08 2640.000
1996 03 2877.425 1999 12 2780.156 2003 09 2640.000
1996 04 2877.425 2000 01 2985.072 2003 10 2640.000
1996 05 2877.425 2000 02 3049.344 2003 11 2540.000
1996 06 2877.425 2000 03 3049.344 2003 12 2540.000
1996 07 2925.517 2000 04 3102.904 2004 01 2540.000
1996 08 2973.609 2000 05 3135.039 200402 2540.000
1996 09 2973.609 2000 06 3156.463 2004 03 2540.000
1996 10 3021.701 2000 07 3177.887 2004 04 2540.000
1996 11 3069.793 2000 08 3188.599 2004 05 2540.000
1996 12 3117.885 2000 09 3188.599 2004 06 2540.000
1997 01 3156.453 2000 10 3263.583 2004 07 2540.000
1997 02 3156.453 2000 11 3263.583 2004 08 2540.000
1997 03 3166.347 2000 12 3295.719 2004 09 2540.000
1997 04 3186.134 2001 01 3239.797 2004 10 2640.000
1997 05 3205.921 2001 02 3166.589 2004 11 2540.000
1997 06 3225.708 2001 03 3135.214 2004 12 2640.000
1997 07 3235.601 2001 04 3051.547 2005 01 2640.000
1997 08 3354.323 2001 05 3020.172 2005 02 2640.000
1997 09 3393.897 2001 06 3030.630 2005 03 2640.000
1997 10 3393.897 2001 07 3020.172 2005 04 2540.000
1997 11 3423.578 2001 08 3009.713 2005 05 2540.000
1997 12 3453.258 2001 09 2842.380 2005 06 2540.000
402
YEAR/ MONTH/ AVERAGE YEAR/ MONTH/ AVERAGE YEAR/ MONTH/ AVERAGE
2005 07 2540.000 2008 01 2440.000
2005 08 2540.000 2008 02 2440.000
2005 09 2540.000 2008 03 2430.000
2005 10 2540.000 2008 04 2420.000
2005 11 2540.000 2008 05 2410.000
2005 12 2540.000 2008 06 2400.000
2006 01 2540.000 2008 07 2390.000
2006 02 2540.000 2008 08 2380.000
2006 03 2540.000 2008 09 2370.000
2006 04 2540.000 2008 10 2360.000
2006 05 2540.000
2006 06 2540.000
2006 07 2440.000
2006 08 2490.000
2006 09 2490.000
2006 10 2490.000
2006 11 2490.000
2006 12 2490.000
2007 01 2380.000
2007 02 2383.000
2007 03 2444.690
2007 04 2444.588
2007 05 2444.337
2007 06 2444.066
2007 07 2443.808
2007 08 2443.570
2007 09 2440.000
2007 10 2440.000
2007 11 2440.000
2007 12 2440.000
Source: Economagic.com, "Economic Time Series Page: Crude Oil Production, Venezuela; Thousand
Barrels per Day," accessed June 22, 2008 and February 14, 2009, http:/"www.economagic.com em-
cgi/data.exe/doeme/paprpve.
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APPENDIX 7
OVERALL RISK RATING SCALE AND RISK DESCRIPTION FOR SELECT
COUNTRIES
YEAR/ MONTH/ AVERAGE YEAR/ MONTH/ AVERAGE YEAR/ MONTH/ AVERAGE
1.00 to 1.24 Insignificant Luxembourg (1.21)
1.25 to 1.74 Negligible United States (1.51)
1.75 to 1.99 Low Qatar (1.91)
2.00 to 2.49 Moderate Uruguay (2.29)
2.50 to 2.99 Medium Brazil (2.66)All countries averaged (2.75)
3.00 to 3.49 Significant Colombia (3.15)
3.50 to 3.99 High Nicaragua (3.55)
4.00 to 4.49 Very High Guinea (4.10)
4.50 to 5.00 Extreme Somalia (4.80)
AVERAGE OVERALL RISK REGIONAL SUMMARY
Low North America (1.81)
Europe (1.98)
Medium Latin America and Caribbean (2.58)
Asia - Pacific (2.83)
Middle East and North Africa (2.84)
Significant Commonwealth of Independent States (3.31)
Sub-Saharan Africa (3.37)
Obs: Global Insight's overall risk rating is calculated using a geometric mean of the individual risk
categories - political, economic, legal risk, tax risk, operational risk, and security risk.
Source: Global Insight, Country Risk Methodology, Accessed June 8, 2008, http: www.globalinsight.com.
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APPENDIX 8
ANNUAL AVERAGE OF WEST TEXAS INTERMEDIATE (TEXAS LIGHT
SWEET) CRUDE OIL PRICES, 1946 TO PRESENT (2007)
CALENDAR YEAR AVERAGE (NOMINAL) INFLATION ADJUSTED
1946 $1.63 $17.26
1947 $2.16 $20.29
1948 $2.77 $24.21
1949 $2.77 $24.44
1950 $2.77 $24.18
1951 $2.77 $22.42
1952 $2.77 $21.17
1953 $2.92 $22.88
1954 $2.99 $23.39
1955 $2.93 $22.94
1956 $2.94 $22.74
1957 $3.00 $23.46
1958 $3.01 $21.83
1959 $3.00 $21.62
1960 $2.91 $20.69
1961 $2.85 $20.03
1962 $2.85 $19.79
1963 $3.00 $19.97
1964 $2.88 $20.32
1965 $3.01 $20.05
1966 $3.10 $20.06
1967 $3.12 $19.65
1968 $3.18 $19.17
1969 $3.32 $19.02
1970 $3.39 $18.35
1971 $3.60 $18.68
1972 $3.60 $20.03
1973 $4.75 $22.20
1974 $9.35 $39.77
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CALENDAR YEAR AVERAGE (NOMINAL) INFLATION ADJUSTED
1975 $7.67 $47.63
1976 $13.10 $48.36
1977 $14.40 $49.88
1978 $14.95 $48.17
1979 $25.10 $71.96
1980 $37.42 $95.50
1981 $35.75 $82.70
1982 $31.83 $69.33
1983 $29.08 $61.34
1984 $28.75 $58.14
1985 $26.92 $52.56
1986 $14.44 $27.66
1987 $17.75 $32.81
1988 $14.87 $26.45
1989 $18.33 $31.05
1990 $23.19 $37.17
1991 $20.20 $31.15
1992 $19.25 $28.81
1993 $16.75 $24.36
1994 $15.66 $22.19
1995 $16.75 $23.09
1996 $20.46 $27.38
1997 $18.64 $24.40
1998 $11.91 $15.35
1999 $16.56 $20.83
2000 $27.39 $33.39
2001 $23.00 $27.29
2002 $22.81 $26.61
2003 $27.69 $31.62
2004 $37.66 $41.84
2005 $50.04 $53.77
2006 $58.30 $60.73
406
CALENDAR YEAR AVERAGE (NOMINAL) INFLATION ADJUSTED
2007 $64.20 $64.92
Source: Oil and Gas Confidential, "Historical Crude Prices: The Annual Averages of WTI Crude Oil
Prices," (March 2008), accessed June 18, 2008,
http://www.oilandgasconfidential.com/Historical Crude Prices.html.
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APPENDIX 9
THE SYMBOLISM OF DEFEAT: THE PICTORIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
THE FATE OF PANAMA'S GENERAL MANUEL NOREIGA AND
VENEZUELA'S LIEUTENANT COLONEL HUGO CHAVEZ FOLLOWING
THEIR SURRENDER
(x
Source: Public domain image (Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the United States code) of General
Manuel Noriega's mug shot taken by the United States Marshall Service, (undated), accessed June 21,
2008, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Manuel Noriega mug shot.ipg. Screenshot of Hugo Chdvez's
calls for the final surrender of the forces involved in the 1992 Coup d'etat attempt against the constitutional
government of President Carlos Andres Perez on Venezuelan national television (February 4, 1992), aired
and produced by Venezuela's Globovision in "Cuil Revoluci6n?" (2004), accessed June 21, 2008,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Hugo ChC3%Alvez %281992 Coup Surrender%29.ipg
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